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Windows Analysis Report
SecurityHealthSystray.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	SecurityHealthSystray.exe
Analysis ID:	1567841
MD5:	edd7bd6b0936af19c0858aaf2e12d543
SHA1:	2fd507b0eb1d124ba36f2897e9830be9926330c5
SHA256:	3af5c9759d95fd6091e665c03406f275fac26afe70db067a785cdc003389efbd
Tags:	aptexeKimsukyuser-smica83
Infos:

Detection

KimaLogger

Score:	64
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Yara detected KimaLogger

Abnormal high CPU Usage

Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)

Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (OutputDebugString,GetLastError)

Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls

Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)

Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)

Detected potential crypto function

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking a module file name)

Found potential string decryption / allocating functions

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

SecurityHealthSystray.exe (PID: 6904 cmdline: "C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe" MD5: EDD7BD6B0936AF19C0858AAF2E12D543)

cleanup

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
SecurityHealthSystray.exe	JoeSecurity_KimaLogger	Yara detected KimaLogger	Joe Security

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
Process Memory Space: SecurityHealthSystray.exe PID: 6904	JoeSecurity_KimaLogger	Yara detected KimaLogger	Joe Security

Unpacked PEs

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
0.2.SecurityHealthSystray.exe.7ff7237c0000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_KimaLogger	Yara detected KimaLogger	Joe Security
0.0.SecurityHealthSystray.exe.7ff7237c0000.0.unpack	JoeSecurity_KimaLogger	Yara detected KimaLogger	Joe Security

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Source: SecurityHealthSystray.exe

Avira: detected

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: SecurityHealthSystray.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 47%

Source: SecurityHealthSystray.exe

Static PE information: HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing

Yara detected KimaLogger

Source: Yara match	File source: SecurityHealthSystray.exe, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.2.SecurityHealthSystray.exe.7ff7237c0000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: 0.0.SecurityHealthSystray.exe.7ff7237c0000.0.unpack, type: UNPACKEDPE
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: SecurityHealthSystray.exe PID: 6904, type: MEMORYSTR

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe

Process Stats: CPU usage > 49%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FF7237C1700
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FF7237C1A00
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FF7237C880C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FF7237C2C20
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FF7237C943C
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FF7237CBA48
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FF7237C11B0
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FF7237C51C4
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe	Code function: 0_2_00007FF7237C7548

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe

Code function: String function: 00007FF7237C1000 appears 35 times

Source: SecurityHealthSystray.exe

Binary or memory string: OriginalFilename vs SecurityHealthSystray.exe

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal64.spyw.winEXE@1/1@0/0

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History\desktop.ini.bak

Jump to behavior

Source: SecurityHealthSystray.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Source: SecurityHealthSystray.exe

ReversingLabs: Detection: 47%

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe	Section loaded: apphelp.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe	Section loaded: wininet.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe	Section loaded: windows.storage.dll
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe	Section loaded: wldp.dll

Source: SecurityHealthSystray.exe

Static PE information: Image base 0x140000000 > 0x60000000

Source: SecurityHealthSystray.exe

Static PE information: HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source: SecurityHealthSystray.exe	Static PE information: Data directory: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT is in: .rdata
Source: SecurityHealthSystray.exe	Static PE information: Data directory: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE is in: .rsrc
Source: SecurityHealthSystray.exe	Static PE information: Data directory: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC is in: .reloc
Source: SecurityHealthSystray.exe	Static PE information: Data directory: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG is in: .rdata
Source: SecurityHealthSystray.exe	Static PE information: Data directory: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT is in: .rdata

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe

Code function: 0_2_00007FF7237CA630 EncodePointer,__crtIsPackagedApp,LoadLibraryExW,GetLastError,LoadLibraryW,GetProcAddress,EncodePointer,GetProcAddress,EncodePointer,GetProcAddress,EncodePointer,GetProcAddress,EncodePointer,GetProcAddress,EncodePointer,IsDebuggerPresent,OutputDebugStringW,DecodePointer,DecodePointer,DecodePointer,DecodePointer,DecodePointer,DecodePointer,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 9999
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe	Window / User API: foregroundWindowGot 884

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe

Evasive API call chain: GetModuleFileName,DecisionNodes,ExitProcess

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe TID: 6968

Thread sleep count: 9999 > 30

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe	API call chain: ExitProcess graph end node
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe	API call chain: ExitProcess graph end node

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe

Code function: 0_2_00007FF7237C5434 GetProcessHeap,

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe

Code function: 0_2_00007FF7237C5F68 SetUnhandledExceptionFilter,UnhandledExceptionFilter,

Source: SecurityHealthSystray.exe, 00000000.00000002.4110059902.00000021A7AF2000.00000004.00000010.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Program Manager
Source: SecurityHealthSystray.exe, 00000000.00000002.4110059902.00000021A7AF2000.00000004.00000010.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: desktop.ini.bakProgram Manager

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe

Code function: 0_2_00007FF7237C819C cpuid

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe

Code function: 0_2_00007FF7237C1A00 GetTickCount,SHGetSpecialFolderPathA,swprintf,GetLocalTime,swprintf,EnterCriticalSection,LeaveCriticalSection,GetWindowTextA,lstrcpyA,GetWindowTextA,lstrlenA,swprintf,EnterCriticalSection,LeaveCriticalSection,lstrcpyA,GetWindowLongW,GlobalLock,lstrcatA,lstrcatA,lstrcatA,lstrcatA,lstrcatA,lstrcatA,lstrcatA,lstrcatA,lstrcatA,lstrcatA,lstrcatA,lstrcatA,lstrcatA,lstrcatA,lstrcatA,lstrcatA,lstrcatA,lstrcatA,EnterCriticalSection,LeaveCriticalSection,lstrlenA,memcpy_s,swprintf,EnterCriticalSection,swprintf,LeaveCriticalSection,lstrcpyA,swprintf,EnterCriticalSection,LeaveCriticalSection,SleepEx,CreateFileA,GetFileSize,CloseHandle,swprintf,DeleteFileA,

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	2 Native API	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Process Injection	1 Masquerading	OS Credential Dumping	1 System Time Discovery	Remote Services	1 Archive Collected Data	1 Encrypted Channel	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	LSASS Memory	3 Security Software Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Junk Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 Process Injection	Security Account Manager	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Steganography	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	1 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	NTDS	1 Process Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Network Information	Server	Cloud Accounts	Launchd	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	1 Obfuscated Files or Information	LSA Secrets	1 Application Window Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact
Domain Properties	Botnet	Replication Through Removable Media	Scheduled Task	RC Scripts	RC Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	Cached Domain Credentials	12 System Information Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Multiband Communication	Data Transfer Size Limits	Service Stop

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
SecurityHealthSystray.exe	47%	ReversingLabs	Win64.Spyware.Klogexe
SecurityHealthSystray.exe	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1311191

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1567841
Start date and time:	2024-12-03 22:39:06 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 5m 43s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	light
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	5
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	SecurityHealthSystray.exe
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal64.spyw.winEXE@1/1@0/0
EGA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100%
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .exe Override analysis time to 240s for sample files taking high CPU consumption

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, WMIADAP.exe, SIHClient.exe, conhost.exe
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): ocsp.digicert.com, slscr.update.microsoft.com, otelrules.azureedge.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, fe3cr.delivery.mp.microsoft.com
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
VT rate limit hit for: SecurityHealthSystray.exe

Process:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe
File Type:	Unicode text, UTF-16, little-endian text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	252
Entropy (8bit):	2.7608290872874175
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	6:QavElZi8rprS2a0a0a0a0a0a0a0a0a0a0a0a0a0a0a0a0a0n:QhlYeprkFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF0
MD5:	BDA43B8103F3E5C55A805BF8693E5336
SHA1:	B5D53A3EE77652921B440BF04C99408E348061CC
SHA-256:	A97028DBE4173F5736836DC9C6CC6235018093D4CDABE776F2EEBD955DDE4227
SHA-512:	0006087EF909C15C114553EE0242D2472E7DF13989814E65DD3C1F88D1D5569701182A897019A6424A3D603F643A96B74F8E7D4A9122F8A90C93AB9626EBFCDA
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	......-.-.-.-.-.-. .2.0.2.4./.1.2./.3. .:. .1.6./.3.9. .-.-.-.-.-.-.....[.R.M.+.].[.R.M.+.].[.R.M.+.].[.R.M.+.].[.R.M.+.].[.R.M.+.].[.R.M.+.].[.R.M.+.].[.R.M.+.].[.R.M.+.].[.R.M.+.].[.R.M.+.].[.R.M.+.].[.R.M.+.].[.R.M.+.].[.R.M.+.].[.R.M.+.].[.R.M.+.].

Static File Info

General

File type:	PE32+ executable (GUI) x86-64, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	4.059224918718081
TrID:	Win64 Executable GUI (202006/5) 92.65% Win64 Executable (generic) (12005/4) 5.51% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.92% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.92% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	SecurityHealthSystray.exe
File size:	264'192 bytes
MD5:	edd7bd6b0936af19c0858aaf2e12d543
SHA1:	2fd507b0eb1d124ba36f2897e9830be9926330c5
SHA256:	3af5c9759d95fd6091e665c03406f275fac26afe70db067a785cdc003389efbd
SHA512:	fae5b6da5767539509eecb8c65996bbe396f72f505b238ef2ea79ad2ce9b640a84bd09483728b0cbc4a6b0709bf6a0120ade83e542a516a7d9608bf5d08ca233
SSDEEP:	3072:74NmT9GpamcAShwlumlhA+QX24yAb0OOMSqPqBf:EgTj2lJlOBX2ZyV1
TLSH:	A5443A3B25C8F2BAD016963CC822BAF697796CE9CD24424FEE503E463D329F05D76611
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$..........S............^.`.....^.a.....^.b.............f.........\|.......f.......8.......c.....Rich............................PE..d..

File Icon


Icon Hash:	0fe88caecc6d2b8e

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x1400033b4
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x140000000
Subsystem:	windows gui
Image File Characteristics:	EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE
DLL Characteristics:	HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE
Time Stamp:	0x66ED69F5 [Fri Sep 20 12:26:29 2024 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	6
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	6
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	6
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	8f1164a9de43785702fb4f059bb0072e

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
dec eax
sub esp, 28h
call 00007F5FFD27419Ch
dec eax
add esp, 28h
jmp 00007F5FFD2717C7h
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
int3
nop word ptr [eax+eax+00000000h]
dec eax
cmp ecx, dword ptr [00014CF9h]
jne 00007F5FFD271963h
dec eax
rol ecx, 10h
test cx, FFFFh
jne 00007F5FFD271954h
rep ret
dec eax
ror ecx, 10h
jmp 00007F5FFD271C32h
int3
inc eax
push ebx
dec eax
sub esp, 20h
dec eax
mov ebx, ecx
mov byte ptr [ecx+18h], 00000000h
dec eax
test edx, edx
jne 00007F5FFD2719D8h
call 00007F5FFD2730AEh
dec eax
mov dword ptr [ebx+10h], eax
dec eax
mov edx, dword ptr [eax+000000C0h]
dec eax
mov dword ptr [ebx], edx
dec eax
mov ecx, dword ptr [eax+000000B8h]
dec eax
mov dword ptr [ebx+08h], ecx
dec eax
cmp edx, dword ptr [00015635h]
je 00007F5FFD271968h
mov eax, dword ptr [eax+000000C8h]
test dword ptr [00015793h], eax
jne 00007F5FFD27195Ah
call 00007F5FFD274B4Dh
dec eax
mov dword ptr [ebx], eax
dec eax
mov eax, dword ptr [00014E9Eh]
dec eax
cmp dword ptr [ebx+08h], eax
je 00007F5FFD27196Dh
dec eax
mov eax, dword ptr [ebx+10h]
mov ecx, dword ptr [eax+000000C8h]
test dword ptr [0001576Ch], ecx
jne 00007F5FFD27195Bh
call 00007F5FFD274F1Eh
dec eax
mov dword ptr [ebx+08h], eax

Rich Headers

Programming Language:

[RES] VS2012 build 50727
[LNK] VS2012 build 50727

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x17490	0x64	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x60000	0x15c20	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x5f000	0xd38	.pdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x76000	0x760	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x15fa0	0x70	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x10000	0x348	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	MD5	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0xe77f	0xe800	3d96659b004b303097d5a9f73467fe13	False	0.5720804148706896	data	6.371487214073958	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rdata	0x10000	0x7f80	0x8000	d04410aea3e151ad0e720e38abf3ce0d	False	0.357177734375	data	4.833710150136232	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x18000	0x46390	0x11c00	83d8b240398e0d88306a0b08a8993bab	False	0.02970950704225352	data	0.5080376891405495	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
.pdata	0x5f000	0xd38	0xe00	daee39f158a730dea5885a598a6680f8	False	0.46763392857142855	data	4.700701060805498	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x60000	0x15c20	0x15e00	a95ff6923e8f9741a0b33e86ea11cb71	False	0.09213169642857143	data	2.2190492766512606	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x76000	0x129a	0x1400	8d374c9c57dced6023d50d06161d1740	False	0.207421875	data	2.7477630625611127	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country	ZLIB Complexity
RT_ICON	0x604f0	0x468	Device independent bitmap graphic, 16 x 32 x 32, image size 1024	Korean	North Korea	0.23049645390070922
RT_ICON	0x604f0	0x468	Device independent bitmap graphic, 16 x 32 x 32, image size 1024	Korean	South Korea	0.23049645390070922
RT_ICON	0x60958	0x6b8	Device independent bitmap graphic, 20 x 40 x 32, image size 1600	Korean	North Korea	0.19476744186046513
RT_ICON	0x60958	0x6b8	Device independent bitmap graphic, 20 x 40 x 32, image size 1600	Korean	South Korea	0.19476744186046513
RT_ICON	0x61010	0x988	Device independent bitmap graphic, 24 x 48 x 32, image size 2304	Korean	North Korea	0.14672131147540984
RT_ICON	0x61010	0x988	Device independent bitmap graphic, 24 x 48 x 32, image size 2304	Korean	South Korea	0.14672131147540984
RT_ICON	0x61998	0x10a8	Device independent bitmap graphic, 32 x 64 x 32, image size 4096	Korean	North Korea	0.1198405253283302
RT_ICON	0x61998	0x10a8	Device independent bitmap graphic, 32 x 64 x 32, image size 4096	Korean	South Korea	0.1198405253283302
RT_ICON	0x62a40	0x1a68	Device independent bitmap graphic, 40 x 80 x 32, image size 6400	Korean	North Korea	0.09437869822485206
RT_ICON	0x62a40	0x1a68	Device independent bitmap graphic, 40 x 80 x 32, image size 6400	Korean	South Korea	0.09437869822485206
RT_ICON	0x644a8	0x25a8	Device independent bitmap graphic, 48 x 96 x 32, image size 9216	Korean	North Korea	0.08246887966804979
RT_ICON	0x644a8	0x25a8	Device independent bitmap graphic, 48 x 96 x 32, image size 9216	Korean	South Korea	0.08246887966804979
RT_ICON	0x66a50	0x4228	Device independent bitmap graphic, 64 x 128 x 32, image size 16384	Korean	North Korea	0.06170288143599433
RT_ICON	0x66a50	0x4228	Device independent bitmap graphic, 64 x 128 x 32, image size 16384	Korean	South Korea	0.06170288143599433
RT_ICON	0x6ace0	0x468	Device independent bitmap graphic, 16 x 32 x 32, image size 1024	Korean	North Korea	0.23049645390070922
RT_ICON	0x6ace0	0x468	Device independent bitmap graphic, 16 x 32 x 32, image size 1024	Korean	South Korea	0.23049645390070922
RT_ICON	0x6b148	0x6b8	Device independent bitmap graphic, 20 x 40 x 32, image size 1600	Korean	North Korea	0.19476744186046513
RT_ICON	0x6b148	0x6b8	Device independent bitmap graphic, 20 x 40 x 32, image size 1600	Korean	South Korea	0.19476744186046513
RT_ICON	0x6b800	0x988	Device independent bitmap graphic, 24 x 48 x 32, image size 2304	Korean	North Korea	0.14672131147540984
RT_ICON	0x6b800	0x988	Device independent bitmap graphic, 24 x 48 x 32, image size 2304	Korean	South Korea	0.14672131147540984
RT_ICON	0x6c188	0x10a8	Device independent bitmap graphic, 32 x 64 x 32, image size 4096	Korean	North Korea	0.1198405253283302
RT_ICON	0x6c188	0x10a8	Device independent bitmap graphic, 32 x 64 x 32, image size 4096	Korean	South Korea	0.1198405253283302
RT_ICON	0x6d230	0x1a68	Device independent bitmap graphic, 40 x 80 x 32, image size 6400	Korean	North Korea	0.09437869822485206
RT_ICON	0x6d230	0x1a68	Device independent bitmap graphic, 40 x 80 x 32, image size 6400	Korean	South Korea	0.09437869822485206
RT_ICON	0x6ec98	0x25a8	Device independent bitmap graphic, 48 x 96 x 32, image size 9216	Korean	North Korea	0.08246887966804979
RT_ICON	0x6ec98	0x25a8	Device independent bitmap graphic, 48 x 96 x 32, image size 9216	Korean	South Korea	0.08246887966804979
RT_ICON	0x71240	0x4228	Device independent bitmap graphic, 64 x 128 x 32, image size 16384	Korean	North Korea	0.06170288143599433
RT_ICON	0x71240	0x4228	Device independent bitmap graphic, 64 x 128 x 32, image size 16384	Korean	South Korea	0.06170288143599433
RT_MENU	0x754d0	0x4a	data	English	United States	0.8648648648648649
RT_DIALOG	0x75530	0x134	data	English	United States	0.5844155844155844
RT_STRING	0x75a60	0x3c	data	English	United States	0.6166666666666667
RT_ACCELERATOR	0x75520	0x10	data	English	United States	1.25
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x6ac78	0x68	data	Korean	North Korea	0.7596153846153846
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x6ac78	0x68	data	Korean	South Korea	0.7596153846153846
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x75468	0x68	data	Korean	North Korea	0.7884615384615384
RT_GROUP_ICON	0x75468	0x68	data	Korean	South Korea	0.7884615384615384
RT_VERSION	0x75668	0x3f4	data	English	United States	0.43873517786561267
RT_MANIFEST	0x75aa0	0x17d	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators	English	United States	0.5931758530183727

Imports

DLL	Import
KERNEL32.dll	ExitProcess, Sleep, GetProcAddress, LoadLibraryA, GetLastError, MultiByteToWideChar, EnterCriticalSection, LeaveCriticalSection, CloseHandle, GetFileSize, lstrlenA, GetTickCount, CreateFileA, SetFilePointer, WriteFile, GetLocalTime, lstrcpyA, GlobalLock, lstrcatA, DeleteFileA, InitializeCriticalSection, OpenEventW, DeleteCriticalSection, OutputDebugStringW, WideCharToMultiByte, CreateFileW, ReadFile, WriteConsoleW, SetStdHandle, HeapReAlloc, SetFilePointerEx, GetConsoleMode, GetConsoleCP, LCMapStringEx, GetStringTypeW, LoadLibraryW, LoadLibraryExW, HeapSize, RaiseException, RtlPcToFileHeader, GetCPInfo, GetOEMCP, GetACP, IsValidCodePage, RtlUnwindEx, GetCommandLineW, HeapFree, IsDebuggerPresent, IsProcessorFeaturePresent, EncodePointer, DecodePointer, HeapAlloc, GetSystemTimeAsFileTime, SetLastError, GetCurrentThreadId, GetModuleHandleExW, GetStdHandle, GetModuleFileNameW, GetProcessHeap, GetFileType, InitializeCriticalSectionAndSpinCount, InitOnceExecuteOnce, GetStartupInfoW, QueryPerformanceCounter, GetTickCount64, GetEnvironmentStringsW, FreeEnvironmentStringsW, RtlCaptureContext, RtlLookupFunctionEntry, RtlVirtualUnwind, UnhandledExceptionFilter, SetUnhandledExceptionFilter, FlsAlloc, FlsGetValue, FlsSetValue, FlsFree, GetCurrentProcess, TerminateProcess, GetModuleHandleW, FlushFileBuffers
USER32.dll	LoadIconW, GetWindowLongW, RegisterClassExW, GetWindowTextA, LoadCursorW, LoadStringW, EndDialog, PostQuitMessage, EndPaint, BeginPaint, DefWindowProcW, DestroyWindow, DialogBoxParamW
SHELL32.dll	SHGetSpecialFolderPathA
WININET.dll	InternetOpenW, InternetConnectW, HttpOpenRequestW, HttpSendRequestExW, InternetWriteFile, HttpEndRequestA, InternetCloseHandle

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
Korean	North Korea
Korean	South Korea
English	United States

Target ID:	0
Start time:	16:39:53
Start date:	03/12/2024
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Users\user\Desktop\SecurityHealthSystray.exe"
Imagebase:	0x7ff7237c0000
File size:	264'192 bytes
MD5 hash:	EDD7BD6B0936AF19C0858AAF2E12D543
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low
Has exited:	false

Description:	Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Image: Image Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata
Platforms:	Containers, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution, WMI: WMI Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report SecurityHealthSystray.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Memory Dumps

Unpacked PEs

Sigma Signatures

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

Key, Mouse, Clipboard, Microphone and Screen Capturing

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History\desktop.ini.bak

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Rich Headers

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Statistics

System Behavior

Analysis Process: SecurityHealthSystray.exePID: 6904, Parent PID: 2580

General

File Activities

File Created

File Written

Disassembly

Windows Analysis Report
SecurityHealthSystray.exe