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Windows Analysis Report
RasTls.dll

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	RasTls.dll
Analysis ID:	1561846
MD5:	f1c9f093d5479560e83a0759201210b7
SHA1:	9553567e231a172c69f0ef8800a927193b9cbd49
SHA256:	1906e7d5a745a364c91f5e230e16e1566721ace1183a57e8d25ff437664c7d02
Infos:

Detection

Score:	88
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

AI detected suspicious sample

Machine Learning detection for sample

Overwrites code with unconditional jumps - possibly settings hooks in foreign process

PE file contains section with special chars

Switches to a custom stack to bypass stack traces

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Entry point lies outside standard sections

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

PE file contains sections with non-standard names

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Uses 32bit PE files

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

loaddll32.exe (PID: 6668 cmdline: loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll" MD5: 51E6071F9CBA48E79F10C84515AAE618)

conhost.exe (PID: 6616 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)

cmd.exe (PID: 5856 cmdline: cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll",#1 MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B)

rundll32.exe (PID: 1368 cmdline: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll",#1 MD5: 889B99C52A60DD49227C5E485A016679)

rundll32.exe (PID: 736 cmdline: rundll32.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll,GetOfficeDatatal MD5: 889B99C52A60DD49227C5E485A016679)

rundll32.exe (PID: 2416 cmdline: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll",GetOfficeDatatal MD5: 889B99C52A60DD49227C5E485A016679)

cleanup

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Source: RasTls.dll

Avira: detected

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: RasTls.dll

ReversingLabs: Detection: 68%

AI detected suspicious sample

Source: Submited Sample

Integrated Neural Analysis Model: Matched 100.0% probability

Machine Learning detection for sample

Source: RasTls.dll

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: RasTls.dll

Static PE information: EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE, DLL

Source: RasTls.dll

Static PE information: DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Networking

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe

Network Connect: 65.20.90.139 443

Jump to behavior

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: CP-ASDE CP-ASDE

Source: unknown

UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1

Source: global traffic

DNS traffic detected: DNS query: swiftandfast.net

Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49942
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49731 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49741
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49740
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49741 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49836 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49932 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49828 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49933 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49942 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49739
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49836
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49933
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49932
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49732
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49731
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49830
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49732 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49730
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49730 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49740 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49830 -> 443
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49828
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49739 -> 443

System Summary

PE file contains section with special chars

Source: RasTls.dll

Static PE information: section name: .X:T

Source: RasTls.dll

Static PE information: EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE, DLL

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal88.evad.winDLL@10/0@1/1

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6616:120:WilError_03

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll,GetOfficeDatatal

Source: RasTls.dll

ReversingLabs: Detection: 68%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll"
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll,GetOfficeDatatal
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll",GetOfficeDatatal
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll",#1	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll,GetOfficeDatatal	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll",GetOfficeDatatal	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll",#1	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Section loaded: apphelp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Section loaded: netapi32.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Section loaded: iphlpapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Section loaded: samcli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Section loaded: netutils.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Section loaded: windows.storage.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Section loaded: wldp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Section loaded: msasn1.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Section loaded: apphelp.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: RasTls.dll

Static file information: File size 6302208 > 1048576

Source: RasTls.dll

Static PE information: Raw size of .WFm is bigger than: 0x100000 < 0x601800

Source: RasTls.dll

Static PE information: DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT

Source: initial sample

Static PE information: section where entry point is pointing to: .WFm

Source: RasTls.dll	Static PE information: section name: .X:T
Source: RasTls.dll	Static PE information: section name: .BXf
Source: RasTls.dll	Static PE information: section name: .WFm

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Overwrites code with unconditional jumps - possibly settings hooks in foreign process

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Memory written: PID: 6668 base: B60005 value: E9 8B 2F 3A 76	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Memory written: PID: 6668 base: 76F02F90 value: E9 7A D0 C5 89	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	Memory written: PID: 736 base: 2940005 value: E9 8B 2F 5C 74	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	Memory written: PID: 736 base: 76F02F90 value: E9 7A D0 A3 8B	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	Memory written: PID: 1368 base: 33A0005 value: E9 8B 2F B6 73	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	Memory written: PID: 1368 base: 76F02F90 value: E9 7A D0 49 8C	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	Memory written: PID: 2416 base: 3110005 value: E9 8B 2F DF 73	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	Memory written: PID: 2416 base: 76F02F90 value: E9 7A D0 20 8C	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Switches to a custom stack to bypass stack traces

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	API/Special instruction interceptor: Address: 6C8B454B
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	API/Special instruction interceptor: Address: 6C8B5B49
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	API/Special instruction interceptor: Address: 6C77132F
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	API/Special instruction interceptor: Address: 6C703714

Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 6C5D745C second address: 6C5D7467 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 pop esi 0x00000003 movsx dx, bh 0x00000007 mov bp, 091Bh 0x0000000b rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 6C5D745C second address: 6C5D7467 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 pop esi 0x00000003 movsx dx, bh 0x00000007 mov bp, 091Bh 0x0000000b rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 6C615B71 second address: 6C615B75 instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 pop ebx 0x00000003 cdq 0x00000004 rdtsc
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	RDTSC instruction interceptor: First address: 6C6A9216 second address: 6C6A921A instructions: 0x00000000 rdtsc 0x00000002 pop ebx 0x00000003 cdq 0x00000004 rdtsc

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe TID: 4180	Thread sleep count: 170 > 30	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe TID: 4180	Thread sleep time: -170000s >= -30000s	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe TID: 6096	Thread sleep count: 170 > 30	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe TID: 6096	Thread sleep time: -170000s >= -30000s	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe TID: 2828	Thread sleep count: 167 > 30	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe TID: 2828	Thread sleep time: -167000s >= -30000s	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	Last function: Thread delayed

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 120000

Jump to behavior

Source: rundll32.exe, 00000003.00000002.3555760931.000000000297A000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, rundll32.exe, 00000004.00000002.3555728306.000000000346A000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, rundll32.exe, 00000005.00000002.3555760361.000000000315A000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW%SystemRoot%\system32\mswsock.dll

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Jump to behavior

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe

Network Connect: 65.20.90.139 443

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll",#1

Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	1 DLL Side-Loading	111 Process Injection	1 Rundll32	1 Credential API Hooking	21 Security Software Discovery	Remote Services	1 Credential API Hooking	2 Encrypted Channel	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	11 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	LSASS Memory	1 Process Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	1 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	111 Process Injection	Security Account Manager	11 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	2 Application Layer Protocol	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	1 DLL Side-Loading	NTDS	21 System Information Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
RasTls.dll	68%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Backdoor.Healquick
RasTls.dll	100%	Avira	TR/Redcap.mvaff
RasTls.dll	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
swiftandfast.net	65.20.90.139	true	true		unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public IPs

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
65.20.90.139	swiftandfast.net	United States		199592	CP-ASDE	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1561846
Start date and time:	2024-11-24 13:36:16 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 5m 6s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Run name:	Run with higher sleep bypass
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	10
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	RasTls.dll
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal88.evad.winDLL@10/0@1/1
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .dll Sleeps bigger than 100000000ms are automatically reduced to 1000ms Sleep loops longer than 100000000ms are bypassed. Single calls with delay of 100000000ms and higher are ignored

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, WMIADAP.exe, SIHClient.exe, conhost.exe
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): ocsp.digicert.com, slscr.update.microsoft.com, otelrules.azureedge.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, fe3cr.delivery.mp.microsoft.com
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
VT rate limit hit for: RasTls.dll

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
CP-ASDE	RFQ.scr.exe	Get hash	malicious	Discord Token Stealer	Browse	65.21.66.211
	hiss.arm7.elf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	65.20.118.153
	Payload 94.75 (2).225.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	65.21.172.133
	Payload 94.75.225.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	65.21.98.72
	0438.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	65.21.245.7
	0438.pdf.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	65.21.245.7
	J4zGPhVRV3.exe	Get hash	malicious	RMSRemoteAdmin	Browse	65.21.245.7
	J4zGPhVRV3.exe	Get hash	malicious	RMSRemoteAdmin	Browse	65.21.245.7
	FPPhfkcDCh.exe	Get hash	malicious	Remcos	Browse	65.21.245.7

File type:	PE32 executable (DLL) (console) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	7.965303809439106
TrID:	Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (1002004/3) 99.60% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.20% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.20% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	RasTls.dll
File size:	6'302'208 bytes
MD5:	f1c9f093d5479560e83a0759201210b7
SHA1:	9553567e231a172c69f0ef8800a927193b9cbd49
SHA256:	1906e7d5a745a364c91f5e230e16e1566721ace1183a57e8d25ff437664c7d02
SHA512:	be63e2da1a550053d599e4369fe2e4a96bfed5bf0dc52bd4cba2a6ab0f8995c9953d4b703547e3bed45ce640c0eee4ebe3aef15849f126fff39b1f0178951201
SSDEEP:	196608:5y0OghWwkjhzqi5DOjUl2DGzNZZkuBm1W8xQVW:5JFEDj9qiloUl7Ux1W
TLSH:	E3562363216A0006E5F9883DC61F7D9831F742769B43E87CB1B6ADD52B269B1F203B53
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L.....Ob...........!................0.=..............................................:`...@.............................N..

File Icon


Icon Hash:	7ae282899bbab082

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x103dc030
Entrypoint Section:	.WFm
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x10000000
Subsystem:	windows cui
Image File Characteristics:	EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, 32BIT_MACHINE, DLL
DLL Characteristics:	DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT
Time Stamp:	0x624FFDD6 [Fri Apr 8 09:18:14 2022 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	5
OS Version Minor:	1
File Version Major:	5
File Version Minor:	1
Subsystem Version Major:	5
Subsystem Version Minor:	1
Import Hash:	1a39c9a6ecf0ca64fc5770962bbdc4e5

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
push BFD4F858h
call 00007F8A00B455FCh
dec edx
not edx
jmp 00007F8A00BE90E9h
mov eax, dword ptr [ebp+00h]
sub cx, 5642h
shrd cx, dx, 00000081h
mov cx, word ptr [ebp+04h]
lea ebp, dword ptr [ebp+00000006h]
jmp 00007F8A00B815E3h
bt ecx, esi
mov ecx, dword ptr [ebp+00h]
jmp 00007F8A00D391E5h
add edi, eax
jmp 00007F8A00BA710Dh
jne 00007F8A00B92BCEh
mov eax, dword ptr [ebp+00h]
jmp 00007F8A00B06AB0h
add esi, 00000004h
test di, ax
xor ecx, ebx
jmp 00007F8A00B3436Dh
mov eax, dword ptr [esi]
mov edx, esi
bt edx, 1Ah
btc edx, 14h
mov edx, dword ptr [eax]
cmc
cmp sp, 55CAh
mov dword ptr [esi], edx
btc dx, di
add edx, edx
test ebp, 4118545Dh
mov edx, dword ptr [ebp+00h]
test cl, dh
jmp 00007F8A00BECD4Eh
inc ecx
not ecx
xor ebx, ecx
jmp 00007F8A00B60936h

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x9216d0	0x4e	.WFm
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x5c5ac4	0x118	.WFm
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x96a000	0x1b2	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x969000	0x5fc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x968670	0x40	.WFm
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x366000	0x90	.BXf
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	MD5	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x1a59b	0x0	d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e	False	0	empty	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rdata	0x1c000	0x462e	0x0	d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e	False	0	empty	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x21000	0xa900	0x0	d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e	False	0	empty	0.0	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
.X:T	0x2c000	0x339eac	0x0	d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.BXf	0x366000	0x5b0	0x600	7ef56d7580a2e67cae4f7f89e6eafb55	False	0.07877604166666667	data	0.5089280985485166	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
.WFm	0x367000	0x601800	0x601800	61ee4f262fb1277e667af5bfdf9afdab	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x969000	0x5fc	0x600	28b0624b163f2fd9b5e789a185b2c2db	False	0.52734375	data	4.347436157519483	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x96a000	0x1b2	0x200	6a1cfcb854d8d3c8d4a13f0819166e2e	False	0.470703125	data	4.47450519324645	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country	ZLIB Complexity
RT_MANIFEST	0x96a058	0x15a	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators	English	United States	0.5491329479768786

Imports

DLL	Import
KERNEL32.dll	GetVersionExW
USER32.dll	wsprintfA
ADVAPI32.dll	CredEnumerateA
SHELL32.dll	ShellExecuteW
WS2_32.dll	WSAIoctl
SHLWAPI.dll	PathGetArgsW
NETAPI32.dll	NetUserGetInfo
IPHLPAPI.DLL	GetAdaptersInfo
CRYPT32.dll	CryptUnprotectData
OLEAUT32.dll	GetErrorInfo
KERNEL32.dll	GetSystemTimeAsFileTime
USER32.dll	CharUpperBuffW
KERNEL32.dll	LocalAlloc, LocalFree, GetModuleFileNameW, GetProcessAffinityMask, SetProcessAffinityMask, SetThreadAffinityMask, Sleep, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, GetModuleHandleA, GetProcAddress

Exports

Name	Ordinal	Address
GetOfficeDatatal	1	0x100098d0

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:12.508543968 CET	49730	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:12.508558035 CET	49731	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:12.508575916 CET	443	49730	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:12.508654118 CET	49730	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:12.508656979 CET	443	49731	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:12.508712053 CET	49730	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:12.508717060 CET	443	49730	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:12.508730888 CET	49731	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:12.508800030 CET	49731	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:12.508819103 CET	443	49731	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:15.656908989 CET	49732	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:15.656975985 CET	443	49732	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:15.657051086 CET	49732	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:15.657095909 CET	49732	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:15.657104015 CET	443	49732	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:56.659132004 CET	443	49730	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:56.659212112 CET	49730	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:56.659288883 CET	49730	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:56.659305096 CET	443	49730	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:56.750670910 CET	443	49731	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:56.750802040 CET	49731	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:56.750924110 CET	49731	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:56.750946999 CET	443	49731	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:59.667820930 CET	49739	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:59.667879105 CET	443	49739	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:59.667973995 CET	49739	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:59.668024063 CET	49739	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:59.668031931 CET	443	49739	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:59.741568089 CET	443	49732	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:59.741672039 CET	49732	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:59.741758108 CET	49732	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:59.741796017 CET	443	49732	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:59.761442900 CET	49740	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:59.761486053 CET	443	49740	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:59.761567116 CET	49740	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:59.761615038 CET	49740	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:59.761622906 CET	443	49740	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:02.746087074 CET	49741	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:02.746192932 CET	443	49741	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:02.746413946 CET	49741	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:02.746490955 CET	49741	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:02.746510029 CET	443	49741	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:43.845158100 CET	443	49739	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:43.845355034 CET	49739	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:43.845355034 CET	49739	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:43.892118931 CET	443	49740	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:43.892313957 CET	49740	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:43.892433882 CET	49740	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:43.892443895 CET	443	49740	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:44.151957989 CET	49739	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:44.151983023 CET	443	49739	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:46.855658054 CET	49828	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:46.855686903 CET	443	49828	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:46.855761051 CET	49828	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:46.855844975 CET	49828	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:46.855853081 CET	443	49828	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:46.902158976 CET	49830	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:46.902174950 CET	443	49830	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:46.902379990 CET	49830	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:46.902461052 CET	49830	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:46.902468920 CET	443	49830	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:46.927247047 CET	443	49741	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:46.927400112 CET	49741	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:46.927519083 CET	49741	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:46.927541018 CET	443	49741	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:49.933461905 CET	49836	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:49.933516026 CET	443	49836	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:49.933707952 CET	49836	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:49.933800936 CET	49836	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:38:49.933809996 CET	443	49836	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:30.977833986 CET	443	49828	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:30.977966070 CET	49828	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:30.978156090 CET	49828	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:30.978169918 CET	443	49828	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:31.111716986 CET	443	49830	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:31.111788034 CET	49830	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:31.111844063 CET	49830	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:31.111852884 CET	443	49830	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:33.980344057 CET	49932	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:33.980379105 CET	443	49932	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:33.980463982 CET	49932	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:33.980592012 CET	49932	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:33.980600119 CET	443	49932	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:34.096189022 CET	443	49836	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:34.096278906 CET	49836	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:34.096343040 CET	49836	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:34.096379995 CET	443	49836	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:34.120963097 CET	49933	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:34.120997906 CET	443	49933	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:34.121076107 CET	49933	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:34.121157885 CET	49933	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:34.121165991 CET	443	49933	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:37.105736017 CET	49942	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:37.105787039 CET	443	49942	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:37.105866909 CET	49942	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:37.105936050 CET	49942	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:39:37.105945110 CET	443	49942	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:40:18.097523928 CET	443	49932	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:40:18.097615957 CET	49932	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139
Nov 24, 2024 13:40:18.488009930 CET	443	49933	65.20.90.139	192.168.2.4
Nov 24, 2024 13:40:18.488070965 CET	49933	443	192.168.2.4	65.20.90.139

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:12.252051115 CET	60433	53	192.168.2.4	1.1.1.1
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:12.500844002 CET	53	60433	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.4

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:12.252051115 CET	192.168.2.4	1.1.1.1	0xa9bc	Standard query (0)	swiftandfast.net	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Nov 24, 2024 13:37:12.500844002 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.4	0xa9bc	No error (0)	swiftandfast.net		65.20.90.139	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

Target ID:	0
Start time:	07:37:09
Start date:	24/11/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll"
Imagebase:	0xe80000
File size:	126'464 bytes
MD5 hash:	51E6071F9CBA48E79F10C84515AAE618
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	1
Start time:	07:37:09
Start date:	24/11/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff7699e0000
File size:	862'208 bytes
MD5 hash:	0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	false

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	07:37:10
Start date:	24/11/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll",#1
Imagebase:	0x240000
File size:	236'544 bytes
MD5 hash:	D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	false

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	3
Start time:	07:37:10
Start date:	24/11/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	rundll32.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll,GetOfficeDatatal
Imagebase:	0x5a0000
File size:	61'440 bytes
MD5 hash:	889B99C52A60DD49227C5E485A016679
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	false

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	4
Start time:	07:37:10
Start date:	24/11/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll",#1
Imagebase:	0x5a0000
File size:	61'440 bytes
MD5 hash:	889B99C52A60DD49227C5E485A016679
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	false

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	5
Start time:	07:37:13
Start date:	24/11/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\RasTls.dll",GetOfficeDatatal
Imagebase:	0x5a0000
File size:	61'440 bytes
MD5 hash:	889B99C52A60DD49227C5E485A016679
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	false

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules ), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: `rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}` ).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.Unlike Keylogging , this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:
Tactics:	Collection, Credential Access
Data Sources:	Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Metadata
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report RasTls.dll

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

Networking

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Exports

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

back

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: loaddll32.exePID: 6668, Parent PID: 2580

General

Chronological Activities

Windows Analysis Report
RasTls.dll