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Windows Analysis Report
Bennetts.pdf

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	Bennetts.pdf
Analysis ID:	1560315
MD5:	3e54ef89de3eadb9ffaebe75d00dda83
SHA1:	e533107836a653f09dfefee1ec6e27e55f244ca3
SHA256:	96b0f06474395992825bf9fe65a726be79a580fbf524c1e2b6705030a5481130
Infos:

Detection

Score:	22
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	80%

Signatures

AI detected landing page (webpage, office document or email)

IP address seen in connection with other malware

Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)

Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)

Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)

Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

Acrobat.exe (PID: 7512 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Bennetts.pdf" MD5: 24EAD1C46A47022347DC0F05F6EFBB8C)

AcroCEF.exe (PID: 7768 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe" --backgroundcolor=16777215 MD5: 9B38E8E8B6DD9622D24B53E095C5D9BE)

AcroCEF.exe (PID: 7972 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe" --type=utility --utility-sub-type=network.mojom.NetworkService --lang=en-US --service-sandbox-type=none --log-severity=disable --user-agent-product="ReaderServices/23.6.20320 Chrome/105.0.0.0" --lang=en-US --log-file="C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\debug.log" --mojo-platform-channel-handle=2100 --field-trial-handle=1616,i,10632544991231734620,9954566153605342301,131072 --disable-features=BackForwardCache,CalculateNativeWinOcclusion,WinUseBrowserSpellChecker /prefetch:8 MD5: 9B38E8E8B6DD9622D24B53E095C5D9BE)

cleanup

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

Phishing

AI detected landing page (webpage, office document or email)

Source: PDF document

Joe Sandbox AI: PDF document contains QR code

Source: global traffic

DNS query: name: x1.i.lencr.org

Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443

Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.202.204.11:443 -> 192.168.2.9:49720
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.202.204.11:443 -> 192.168.2.9:49720
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.202.204.11:443 -> 192.168.2.9:49720
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.202.204.11:443 -> 192.168.2.9:49720
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.202.204.11:443 -> 192.168.2.9:49720
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.202.204.11:443 -> 192.168.2.9:49720
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.202.204.11:443 -> 192.168.2.9:49720
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.202.204.11:443 -> 192.168.2.9:49720
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.202.204.11:443 -> 192.168.2.9:49720
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.202.204.11:443 -> 192.168.2.9:49720
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.202.204.11:443 -> 192.168.2.9:49720
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.202.204.11:443 -> 192.168.2.9:49720
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.9:49720 -> 52.202.204.11:443
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 52.202.204.11:443 -> 192.168.2.9:49720

Source: Joe Sandbox View

IP Address: 52.202.204.11 52.202.204.11

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: GET /psdk/v2/content?surfaceId=ACROBAT_READER_MASTER_SURFACEID&surfaceId=DC_READER_LAUNCH_CARD&surfaceId=DC_Reader_RHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_RHP_Retention&surfaceId=Edit_InApp_Aug2020&surfaceId=DC_FirstMile_Right_Sec_Surface&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Upsell_Cards&surfaceId=DC_FirstMile_Home_View_Surface&surfaceId=DC_Reader_RHP_Intent_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Disc_LHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Edit_LHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Convert_LHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Sign_LHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_More_LHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Disc_LHP_Retention&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Home_LHP_Trial_Banner&adcProductLanguage=en-us&adcVersion=23.6.20320&adcProductType=SingleClientMini&adcOSType=WIN&adcCountryCode=US&adcXAPIClientID=api_reader_desktop_win_23.6.20320&encodingScheme=BASE_64 HTTP/1.1Host: p13n.adobe.ioConnection: keep-alivesec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="105"sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) ReaderServices/23.6.20320 Chrome/105.0.0.0 Safari/537.36Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01x-adobe-uuid: fdf9e666-cbf4-4e86-8c83-d46a601e2046x-adobe-uuid-type: visitorIdx-api-key: AdobeReader9sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"Origin: https://rna-resource.acrobat.comAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-siteSec-Fetch-Mode: corsSec-Fetch-Dest: emptyReferer: https://rna-resource.acrobat.com/Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br

Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.202.204.11
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.202.204.11
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.202.204.11
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.202.204.11
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.202.204.11
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.202.204.11
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.202.204.11
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.202.204.11
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.202.204.11
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.202.204.11
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.202.204.11
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 52.202.204.11
Source: unknown	UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1

Source: 77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F80085060.2.dr	String found in binary or memory: http://ctldl.windowsupdate.com/msdownload/update/v3/static/trustedr/en/authrootstl.cab
Source: 2D85F72862B55C4EADD9E66E06947F3D0.2.dr	String found in binary or memory: http://x1.i.lencr.org/
Source: ReaderMessages.1.dr	String found in binary or memory: https://www.adobe.co

Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 443 -> 49720
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49720 -> 443

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Bennetts.pdf"
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe	Process created: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe" --backgroundcolor=16777215
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process created: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe" --type=utility --utility-sub-type=network.mojom.NetworkService --lang=en-US --service-sandbox-type=none --log-severity=disable --user-agent-product="ReaderServices/23.6.20320 Chrome/105.0.0.0" --lang=en-US --log-file="C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\debug.log" --mojo-platform-channel-handle=2100 --field-trial-handle=1616,i,10632544991231734620,9954566153605342301,131072 --disable-features=BackForwardCache,CalculateNativeWinOcclusion,WinUseBrowserSpellChecker /prefetch:8
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe	Process created: unknown unknown	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe	Process created: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe" --backgroundcolor=16777215	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process created: unknown unknown	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process created: unknown unknown	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process created: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe" --type=utility --utility-sub-type=network.mojom.NetworkService --lang=en-US --service-sandbox-type=none --log-severity=disable --user-agent-product="ReaderServices/23.6.20320 Chrome/105.0.0.0" --lang=en-US --log-file="C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\debug.log" --mojo-platform-channel-handle=2100 --field-trial-handle=1616,i,10632544991231734620,9954566153605342301,131072 --disable-features=BackForwardCache,CalculateNativeWinOcclusion,WinUseBrowserSpellChecker /prefetch:8	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process created: unknown unknown	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process created: unknown unknown	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process created: unknown unknown	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process created: unknown unknown	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process created: unknown unknown	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process created: unknown unknown	Jump to behavior

Source: Bennetts.pdf	Initial sample: PDF keyword /JS count = 0
Source: Bennetts.pdf	Initial sample: PDF keyword /JavaScript count = 0
Source: A9du0ah5_1mxgwyi_5w0.tmp.1.dr	Initial sample: PDF keyword /JS count = 0
Source: A9du0ah5_1mxgwyi_5w0.tmp.1.dr	Initial sample: PDF keyword /JavaScript count = 0

Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	3 Exploitation for Client Execution	1 Browser Extensions	1 Process Injection	1 Masquerading	OS Credential Dumping	1 System Information Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	1 Encrypted Channel	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 Process Injection	LSASS Memory	Application Window Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	2 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	Obfuscated Files or Information	Security Account Manager	Query Registry	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	13 Application Layer Protocol	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	Binary Padding	NTDS	System Network Configuration Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	1 Ingress Tool Transfer	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
bg.microsoft.map.fastly.net	199.232.214.172	true	false		high
x1.i.lencr.org	unknown	unknown	false		high

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://x1.i.lencr.org/	2D85F72862B55C4EADD9E66E06947F3D0.2.dr	false		high
https://www.adobe.co	ReaderMessages.1.dr	false		high

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1560315
Start date and time:	2024-11-21 16:58:24 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 4m 14s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	defaultwindowspdfcookbook.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	16
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	Bennetts.pdf
Detection:	SUS
Classification:	sus22.winPDF@14/47@1/1
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .pdf Found PDF document Close Viewer

Input	Output
URL: PDF document Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "contains_trigger_text": true, "trigger_text": "Kindly scan the attached QR code for instant access to your document.", "prominent_button_name": "unknown", "text_input_field_labels": "unknown", "pdf_icon_visible": false, "has_visible_captcha": false, "has_urgent_text": true, "has_visible_qrcode": true }

URL: PDF document Model: Joe Sandbox AI	{ "brands": [ "Bmakwakwa" ] }
	{ "brands": [ "Bmakwakwa" ] }

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link
52.202.204.11	phish_alert_sp2_2.0.0.0-1.eml	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse
	X93fnhk2PX.lnk	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse
	KERR SURVEYING LLC EE RFI#1.pdf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse
	roquette October.pdf	Get hash	malicious	HTMLPhisher	Browse
	Heritage Commercial Flooring.pdf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse
	MSSHIFT Invoice 2.pdf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse
	http://arcor.cfd	Get hash	malicious	HTMLPhisher	Browse
	cleu.cmD	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse
	eEu5xPVQUo.exe	Get hash	malicious	Rhysida	Browse
	Tonincasa Updated Employee sheet .pdf	Get hash	malicious	HTMLPhisher	Browse

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
bg.microsoft.map.fastly.net	mORxR4LsiI.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	199.232.210.172
	Kellyb Timesheet Report.pdf	Get hash	malicious	HTMLPhisher	Browse	199.232.214.172
	estimate Cost.pdf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	199.232.214.172
	mLi58UzdI2.dll	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	199.232.210.172
	1.e.msi	Get hash	malicious	DanaBot	Browse	199.232.214.172
	F2.exe	Get hash	malicious	BlackMoon	Browse	199.232.214.172
	test2.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	199.232.210.172
	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	Credential Flusher	Browse	199.232.214.172
	ibk0BQaWAo.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	199.232.210.172
	ibk0BQaWAo.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	199.232.210.172

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
AMAZON-AESUS	Kellyb Timesheet Report.pdf	Get hash	malicious	HTMLPhisher	Browse	107.22.247.231
	estimate Cost.pdf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	34.193.227.236
	phish_alert_sp2_2.0.0.0.eml	Get hash	malicious	HTMLPhisher	Browse	3.219.205.87
	https://url.uk.m.mimecastprotect.com/s/1u4eCqxlyukZk7ltZfxHE-ELz?domain=andy-25.simvoly.com	Get hash	malicious	HTMLPhisher	Browse	52.2.101.114
	Encrypt DOC2024.11.20.1983928 shared with you!.msg	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	23.20.138.1
	https://docusign685420961463outlook99742742685.glitch.me/#cGFsdmEwMUBtc24uY29t	Get hash	malicious	HTMLPhisher	Browse	54.161.143.97
	x86.elf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	34.206.120.68
	https://3r9e6kkr.r.us-east-1.awstrack.me/L0/https:%2F%2Fwww.google.ca%2Furl%3Fq=30NUMBER%26rct=77772474802481024856%26sa=t%26url=amp%2Fs%2Festudioit.cl%2Fstarl%2F%2523Y2FybGEuYWxkZW1pcjFAbWxjaW5zdXJhbmNlLmNvbS5hdQ==/1/0100019346ba248e-096005ca-8ea9-493d-b2f5-e0c34fd69fc0-000000/JH6rhkavYmTGSs9Zspd-vAN7bi8=401	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	44.208.47.3
	original.eml	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	34.193.227.236
	Demande de proposition du Fondation qu#U00e9b#U00e9coise du cancer.pdf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	34.193.227.236

Process:	C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe
File Type:	ASCII text
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	290
Entropy (8bit):	5.226184797500668
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	6:HE74YJZ+q2PqLTwi2nKuAl9OmbnIFUt8YE74YJrTXZmw+YE74YJQnVkwOqLTwi2C:k0+Uv8wZHAahFUt8/0+rT/+/0+QV5TwM
MD5:	4D1E4484713CABA93205234DBED7344E
SHA1:	E3EF4ADC331FDCE8A0F68AB6EC58D190BB1B8164
SHA-256:	2BBA6989F6C5EF6A0575AC910B0205B6F188E6C2910D47B20AEA7A7E5DBDF3F7
SHA-512:	D1A9595ECBAD592CC61EE13B4ECAE739EE5F39BB3F3E8374928EE06F8F8337353BB596C639BD0C3F318070EB3B14B82D2445DDD1B6A8D2CC6F131BAAEEB1DFEB
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	2024/11/21-10:59:28.706 1f08 Reusing MANIFEST C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache/MANIFEST-000001.2024/11/21-10:59:28.708 1f08 Recovering log #3.2024/11/21-10:59:28.709 1f08 Reusing old log C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache/000003.log .

File type:	PDF document, version 1.4, 0 pages
Entropy (8bit):	7.822196132109965
TrID:	Adobe Portable Document Format (5005/1) 100.00%
File name:	Bennetts.pdf
File size:	38'884 bytes
MD5:	3e54ef89de3eadb9ffaebe75d00dda83
SHA1:	e533107836a653f09dfefee1ec6e27e55f244ca3
SHA256:	96b0f06474395992825bf9fe65a726be79a580fbf524c1e2b6705030a5481130
SHA512:	4920ea4aa41a664779fd3e2fb5a2c17a01cdd90f2bce68c00132f64086ca507feaa2e5c50dfcaa7edcbd03ec21dcef01c77a0fb1ac04b2eab329937e7a7b49eb
SSDEEP:	768:N6lWgg7+40HEDRjENP6CvXRhIWW81R2uy/m:NQU+mRa/vXRhIWVRWm
TLSH:	1803BFB1A4884C5DE1D3DB11A632B6DC842E724383CA64D27073CF17FA498E86F6579B
File Content Preview:	%PDF-1.4.1 0 obj.<<./Title (..)./Creator (...w.k.h.t.m.l.t.o.p.d.f. .0...1.2...6)./Producer (...Q.t. .4...8...7)./CreationDate (D:20241118034636-08'00').>>.endobj.3 0 obj.<<./Type /ExtGState./SA true./SM 0.02./ca 1.0./CA 1.0./AIS false./SMask /None>>.endo

General
Header:	%PDF-1.4
Total Entropy:	7.822196
Total Bytes:	38884
Stream Entropy:	7.946968
Stream Bytes:	33082
Entropy outside Streams:	5.163928
Bytes outside Streams:	5802
Number of EOF found:	1
Bytes after EOF:

Name	Count
obj	43
endobj	43
stream	10
endstream	10
xref	1
trailer	1
startxref	1
/Page	2
/Encrypt	0
/ObjStm	0
/URI	0
/JS	0
/JavaScript	0
/AA	0
/OpenAction	0
/AcroForm	0
/JBIG2Decode	0
/RichMedia	0
/Launch	0
/EmbeddedFile	0

ID	DHASH	MD5
6	33e09c8ec3859b60	45d4e7964e4778bca8f594ad48d956a9
9	f0c082b69c8ac0f0	678e7b3340bb67e9b4e5fe54c2828f82
11	f0cc92b69d8ad4f0	f2e1fcab607450430ee312f9affcad0e
13	9ecfa54949499bbb	fcc4808cbbfd12840b8a95e2d8d1d31f

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:38.373694897 CET	49720	443	192.168.2.9	52.202.204.11
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:38.373733044 CET	443	49720	52.202.204.11	192.168.2.9
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:38.373811007 CET	49720	443	192.168.2.9	52.202.204.11
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:38.374042034 CET	49720	443	192.168.2.9	52.202.204.11
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:38.374058008 CET	443	49720	52.202.204.11	192.168.2.9
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:39.908885002 CET	443	49720	52.202.204.11	192.168.2.9
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:39.909244061 CET	49720	443	192.168.2.9	52.202.204.11
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:39.909276009 CET	443	49720	52.202.204.11	192.168.2.9
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:39.910322905 CET	443	49720	52.202.204.11	192.168.2.9
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:39.910398960 CET	49720	443	192.168.2.9	52.202.204.11
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:39.910410881 CET	443	49720	52.202.204.11	192.168.2.9
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:39.910502911 CET	49720	443	192.168.2.9	52.202.204.11
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:39.910859108 CET	49720	443	192.168.2.9	52.202.204.11
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:39.910923004 CET	443	49720	52.202.204.11	192.168.2.9
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:39.911077976 CET	49720	443	192.168.2.9	52.202.204.11
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:39.911093950 CET	443	49720	52.202.204.11	192.168.2.9
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:39.958441973 CET	49720	443	192.168.2.9	52.202.204.11
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:40.458314896 CET	443	49720	52.202.204.11	192.168.2.9
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:40.458360910 CET	443	49720	52.202.204.11	192.168.2.9
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:40.458441019 CET	49720	443	192.168.2.9	52.202.204.11
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:40.458472967 CET	443	49720	52.202.204.11	192.168.2.9
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:40.458506107 CET	443	49720	52.202.204.11	192.168.2.9
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:40.458571911 CET	49720	443	192.168.2.9	52.202.204.11
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:40.494615078 CET	49720	443	192.168.2.9	52.202.204.11
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:40.494635105 CET	443	49720	52.202.204.11	192.168.2.9

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:39.050570965 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.9	0x27d2	No error (0)	x1.i.lencr.org	crl.root-x1.letsencrypt.org.edgekey.net		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)	false
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:40.880137920 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.9	0xb594	No error (0)	bg.microsoft.map.fastly.net		199.232.214.172	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:40.880137920 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.9	0xb594	No error (0)	bg.microsoft.map.fastly.net		199.232.210.172	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:54.447101116 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.9	0x87bc	No error (0)	bg.microsoft.map.fastly.net		199.232.210.172	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Nov 21, 2024 16:59:54.447101116 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.9	0x87bc	No error (0)	bg.microsoft.map.fastly.net		199.232.214.172	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

Timestamp	Bytes transferred	Direction	Data
2024-11-21 15:59:39 UTC	1473	OUT	GET /psdk/v2/content?surfaceId=ACROBAT_READER_MASTER_SURFACEID&surfaceId=DC_READER_LAUNCH_CARD&surfaceId=DC_Reader_RHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_RHP_Retention&surfaceId=Edit_InApp_Aug2020&surfaceId=DC_FirstMile_Right_Sec_Surface&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Upsell_Cards&surfaceId=DC_FirstMile_Home_View_Surface&surfaceId=DC_Reader_RHP_Intent_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Disc_LHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Edit_LHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Convert_LHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Sign_LHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_More_LHP_Banner&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Disc_LHP_Retention&surfaceId=DC_Reader_Home_LHP_Trial_Banner&adcProductLanguage=en-us&adcVersion=23.6.20320&adcProductType=SingleClientMini&adcOSType=WIN&adcCountryCode=US&adcXAPIClientID=api_reader_desktop_win_23.6.20320&encodingScheme=BASE_64 HTTP/1.1 Host: p13n.adobe.io Connection: keep-alive sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="105" sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) ReaderServices/23.6.20320 Chrome/105.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Accept: application/json, text/javascript, /; q=0.01 x-adobe-uuid: fdf9e666-cbf4-4e86-8c83-d46a601e2046 x-adobe-uuid-type: visitorId x-api-key: AdobeReader9 sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows" Origin: https://rna-resource.acrobat.com Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9 Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty Referer: https://rna-resource.acrobat.com/ Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
2024-11-21 15:59:40 UTC	608	IN	HTTP/1.1 200 Server: openresty Date: Thu, 21 Nov 2024 15:59:40 GMT Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8 Content-Length: 5227 Connection: close x-request-id: mJKdOgI0oSdyfMRyTwq6O6pVFbDSYKE5 vary: accept-encoding Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, OPTIONS Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Authorization,Content-Type,X-Api-Key,cache-control,User-Agent,If-None-Match,x-adobe-uuid,x-adobe-uuid-type, X-Request-Id Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true Access-Control-Expose-Headers: x-request-id Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=15552000; includeSubDomains
2024-11-21 15:59:40 UTC	5227	IN	Data Raw: 7b 22 73 75 72 66 61 63 65 73 22 3a 7b 22 44 43 5f 52 65 61 64 65 72 5f 48 6f 6d 65 5f 4c 48 50 5f 54 72 69 61 6c 5f 42 61 6e 6e 65 72 22 3a 7b 22 63 6f 6e 74 61 69 6e 65 72 73 22 3a 5b 7b 22 63 6f 6e 74 61 69 6e 65 72 49 64 22 3a 31 2c 22 63 6f 6e 74 61 69 6e 65 72 4c 61 62 65 6c 22 3a 22 4a 53 4f 4e 20 66 6f 72 20 44 43 5f 52 65 61 64 65 72 5f 48 6f 6d 65 5f 4c 48 50 5f 54 72 69 61 6c 5f 42 61 6e 6e 65 72 22 2c 22 64 61 74 61 54 79 70 65 22 3a 22 61 70 70 6c 69 63 61 74 69 6f 6e 2f 6a 73 6f 6e 22 2c 22 64 61 74 61 22 3a 22 65 79 4a 6a 64 47 45 69 4f 6e 73 69 64 47 56 34 64 43 49 36 49 6c 52 79 65 53 42 42 59 33 4a 76 59 6d 46 30 49 46 42 79 62 79 4a 39 4c 43 4a 31 61 53 49 36 65 79 4a 30 61 58 52 73 5a 56 39 7a 64 48 6c 73 61 57 35 6e 49 6a 70 37 49 6d Data Ascii: {"surfaces":{"DC_Reader_Home_LHP_Trial_Banner":{"containers":[{"containerId":1,"containerLabel":"JSON for DC_Reader_Home_LHP_Trial_Banner","dataType":"application/json","data":"eyJjdGEiOnsidGV4dCI6IlRyeSBBY3JvYmF0IFBybyJ9LCJ1aSI6eyJ0aXRsZV9zdHlsaW5nIjp7Im

Target ID:	1
Start time:	10:59:26
Start date:	21/11/2024
Path:	C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\Bennetts.pdf"
Imagebase:	0x7ff6153b0000
File size:	5'641'176 bytes
MD5 hash:	24EAD1C46A47022347DC0F05F6EFBB8C
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Target ID:	2
Start time:	10:59:28
Start date:	21/11/2024
Path:	C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat DC\Acrobat\acrocef_1\AcroCEF.exe" --backgroundcolor=16777215
Imagebase:	0x7ff61f300000
File size:	3'581'912 bytes
MD5 hash:	9B38E8E8B6DD9622D24B53E095C5D9BE
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report Bennetts.pdf

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Phishing

Software Vulnerabilities

Networking

System Summary

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

LLM Input / Output

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\LOG

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\LOG.old (copy)

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\Local Storage\leveldb\LOG

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\Local Storage\leveldb\LOG.old (copy)

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\Network\76983ad9-5c05-4440-8674-4ec78c06c037.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\Network\Network Persistent State (copy)

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\Network\Network Persistent State~RF6725c3.TMP (copy)

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\Network\c26d1c51-d4ae-45e6-9b6d-22bf0096e039.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\Session Storage\000003.log

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\Session Storage\LOG

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\AcroCef\DC\Acrobat\Cache\Session Storage\LOG.old (copy)

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\ConnectorIcons\icon-241121155933Z-214.bmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\ReaderMessages

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\ReaderMessages-journal

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\2D85F72862B55C4EADD9E66E06947F3D

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\2D85F72862B55C4EADD9E66E06947F3D

C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\SOPHIA\Acrobat\Files\ACROBAT_READER_MASTER_SURFACEID

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\SOPHIA\Acrobat\Files\DC_FirstMile_Home_View_Surface

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\SOPHIA\Acrobat\Files\DC_FirstMile_Right_Sec_Surface

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\SOPHIA\Acrobat\Files\DC_READER_LAUNCH_CARD

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\SOPHIA\Acrobat\Files\DC_Reader_Convert_LHP_Banner

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\SOPHIA\Acrobat\Files\DC_Reader_Disc_LHP_Banner

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\SOPHIA\Acrobat\Files\DC_Reader_Disc_LHP_Retention

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\SOPHIA\Acrobat\Files\DC_Reader_Edit_LHP_Banner

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\SOPHIA\Acrobat\Files\DC_Reader_Home_LHP_Trial_Banner

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\SOPHIA\Acrobat\Files\DC_Reader_More_LHP_Banner

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\SOPHIA\Acrobat\Files\DC_Reader_RHP_Banner

Windows Analysis Report
Bennetts.pdf

Description:	Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Application Log: Application Log Content, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store and generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access.
Tactics:	Persistence
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Process: Process Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Image: Image Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata
Platforms:	Containers, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp . Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer ).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre