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Windows Analysis Report
download.js

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	download.js
Analysis ID:	1559080
MD5:	9357b0c94d4cbc79742037437f91bcc3
SHA1:	2dea51b874477fa5e1b2dca1c3a9f0e63b0980d2
SHA256:	1d4d2387cc84d022c01913e5b8c89592114b0235259a8830a6b4f2ecac1dac4d
Tags:	jsKongTukeuser-monitorsg
Infos:

Detection

Score:	21
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	80%

Signatures

Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper

Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)

Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)

Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

wscript.exe (PID: 7308 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\download.js" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80)

cleanup

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper

Source: Process started

Author: Margaritis Dimitrios (idea), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community: Data: Command: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\download.js", CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\download.js", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentCommandLine: , ParentImage: , ParentProcessId: 4056, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\download.js", ProcessId: 7308, ProcessName: wscript.exe

Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Source: Process started

Author: Michael Haag: Data: Command: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\download.js", CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\download.js", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentCommandLine: , ParentImage: , ParentProcessId: 4056, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\download.js", ProcessId: 7308, ProcessName: wscript.exe

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

Source: unknown

UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1

Source: global traffic

DNS traffic detected: DNS query: time.windows.com

Source: download.js

Initial sample: Strings found which are bigger than 50

Source: classification engine

Classification label: sus21.winJS@1/0@1/0

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: uxtheme.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: sxs.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: jscript.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: iertutil.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: amsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: userenv.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: profapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wldp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: msasn1.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: rsaenh.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: cryptbase.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: msisip.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wshext.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: scrobj.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: textshaping.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: textinputframework.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: coreuicomponents.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: coremessaging.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: ntmarta.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wintypes.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wintypes.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wintypes.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{f414c260-6ac0-11cf-b6d1-00aa00bbbb58}\InprocServer32

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Window found: window name: WSH-Timer

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	2 Scripting	Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	2 Scripting	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 DLL Side-Loading	OS Credential Dumping	2 System Information Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	1 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	1 DLL Side-Loading	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 Obfuscated Files or Information	LSASS Memory	Application Window Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	1 Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
download.js	5%	ReversingLabs

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Reputation
bg.microsoft.map.fastly.net	199.232.210.172	true	false	high
s-part-0017.t-0009.t-msedge.net	13.107.246.45	true	false	high
time.windows.com	unknown	unknown	false	high

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1559080
Start date and time:	2024-11-20 06:58:14 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 2m 16s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	3
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	download.js
Detection:	SUS
Classification:	sus21.winJS@1/0@1/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .js Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe, SIHClient.exe
Excluded IPs from analysis (whitelisted): 20.101.57.9, 20.12.23.50
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): otelrules.azureedge.net, slscr.update.microsoft.com, ctldl.windowsupdate.com.delivery.microsoft.com, twc.trafficmanager.net, otelrules.afd.azureedge.net, sls.update.microsoft.com, azureedge-t-prod.trafficmanager.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, wu-b-net.trafficmanager.net, glb.sls.prod.dcat.dsp.trafficmanager.net

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
s-part-0017.t-0009.t-msedge.net	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	LummaC	Browse	13.107.246.45
	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	LummaC, Amadey, Credential Flusher, Cryptbot, LummaC Stealer, Stealc, Vidar	Browse	13.107.246.45
	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	LummaC	Browse	13.107.246.45
	https://www.google.co.ao/url?Obdy=ObM8wNGVUva21gnTm3qS&cgsr=7knoOQwChvIkzgfn0TSm&sa=t&wofc=nQYL5DF797O1da77PTBQ&url=amp%2Fprimer-distrito-amvt.org%2F.r%2FiO8EME-SUREDANNaW50ZXJtb2RhbC5qYXhAc2VhYm9hcmRtYXJpbmUuY29t	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	13.107.246.45
	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	LummaC, Amadey, Credential Flusher, Cryptbot, LummaC Stealer, Stealc	Browse	13.107.246.45
	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	LummaC	Browse	13.107.246.45
	https://estudioit.cl/starl/#ZGVicmEuY2FydGVyQGNhc2EuZ292LmF1	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	13.107.246.45
	http://www.dvdcollections.co.uk/search/redirect.php?deeplink=https://lp-engenharia.com/zerooo/?email=mwright@burbankca.gov	Get hash	malicious	HTMLPhisher	Browse	13.107.246.45
	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	LummaC	Browse	13.107.246.45
	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	LummaC, Amadey, Credential Flusher, Cryptbot, LummaC Stealer, Stealc	Browse	13.107.246.45
bg.microsoft.map.fastly.net	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	Credential Flusher	Browse	199.232.214.172
	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	199.232.210.172
	Benefit Enrollment -wZ5nusm.pdf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	199.232.214.172
	6GvQSVIEIu.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	199.232.210.172
	Benefit Enrollment -eGz8VNb.pdf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	199.232.214.172
	217469812STM.pdf	Get hash	malicious	ScreenConnect Tool, Phisher	Browse	199.232.210.172
	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	Remcos	Browse	199.232.214.172
	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	Credential Flusher	Browse	199.232.210.172
	beacon_x64.exe	Get hash	malicious	CobaltStrike	Browse	199.232.210.172
	DellTpm1.2_Fw5.81.2.1_V3_64.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	199.232.214.172

File type:	ASCII text, with very long lines (12351), with CRLF line terminators
Entropy (8bit):	6.050021771009888
TrID:
File name:	download.js
File size:	21'059 bytes
MD5:	9357b0c94d4cbc79742037437f91bcc3
SHA1:	2dea51b874477fa5e1b2dca1c3a9f0e63b0980d2
SHA256:	1d4d2387cc84d022c01913e5b8c89592114b0235259a8830a6b4f2ecac1dac4d
SHA512:	b9929209a4fa61db03c0541833d0bf374a7c8b3b41d29ed2a99e16e12e629a5cf1a4485c39034776b636c3de79e223a244660d828de025e5f5f157f81562b1bf
SSDEEP:	384:8f+ziLEnu1IG9SKPOf2x5P7Q93OyUjJPkCLfgNTWQh:85IGeOx5PcuJ7U5h
TLSH:	B0928D83B789F4F942DD956E9E53780C76252C3FC18A9DC4F6E2EA8373816401F84E86
File Content Preview:	$frwmhd=$executioncontext;$retionoredatisonreaterarinatrees = ([cHAr[]]@((-4108+4161),(-2458+2510),(158175/2775),(10292-(13498-3256)),(565152/(9022+(6106490/(55888651/(19648-(2018+7837)))))),(9958-9904),(6467-6411),(-5483+(25945530/4685)),(385440/(611+639

File Icon


Icon Hash:	68d69b8bb6aa9a86

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Nov 20, 2024 06:59:19.353250980 CET	61686	53	192.168.2.7	1.1.1.1

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Nov 20, 2024 06:59:19.353250980 CET	192.168.2.7	1.1.1.1	0x82c8	Standard query (0)	time.windows.com	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Nov 20, 2024 06:59:19.360542059 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.7	0x82c8	No error (0)	time.windows.com	twc.trafficmanager.net		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)	false
Nov 20, 2024 06:59:21.234457016 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.7	0xbdf4	No error (0)	shed.dual-low.s-part-0017.t-0009.t-msedge.net	s-part-0017.t-0009.t-msedge.net		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)	false
Nov 20, 2024 06:59:21.234457016 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.7	0xbdf4	No error (0)	s-part-0017.t-0009.t-msedge.net		13.107.246.45	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Nov 20, 2024 06:59:41.560693026 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.7	0x68cf	No error (0)	bg.microsoft.map.fastly.net		199.232.210.172	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false
Nov 20, 2024 06:59:41.560693026 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.7	0x68cf	No error (0)	bg.microsoft.map.fastly.net		199.232.214.172	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

Target ID:	0
Start time:	00:59:23
Start date:	20/11/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\download.js"
Imagebase:	0x7ff762270000
File size:	170'496 bytes
MD5 hash:	A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Execution
Data Sources:
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution, WMI: WMI Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Windows Analysis Report download.js

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Networking

System Summary

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

back

System Behavior

Analysis Process: wscript.exePID: 7308, Parent PID: 4056

General

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

Windows Analysis Report
download.js