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Windows Analysis Report
IcisR4FC8n.dll

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	IcisR4FC8n.dll renamed because original name is a hash value
Original sample name:	3b7da918dccee2561178e88aad4051d86a17336b.dll
Analysis ID:	1552285
MD5:	91d00706d68868cabd26759eeed32ae7
SHA1:	3b7da918dccee2561178e88aad4051d86a17336b
SHA256:	0250fcaf69b2460b4f6ff3b0f886a2e8f4d253d745a8520a9bbefc7502f46279
Tags:	dlluser-NDA0E
Infos:

Detection

Score:	64
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Machine Learning detection for sample

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

loaddll32.exe (PID: 7924 cmdline: loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\IcisR4FC8n.dll" MD5: 51E6071F9CBA48E79F10C84515AAE618)

conhost.exe (PID: 7932 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 7366FBEFE66BA0F1F5304F7D6FEF09FE)

cmd.exe (PID: 7988 cmdline: cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\IcisR4FC8n.dll",#1 MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B)

rundll32.exe (PID: 8012 cmdline: rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\IcisR4FC8n.dll",#1 MD5: 889B99C52A60DD49227C5E485A016679)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

⊘No configs have been found

Yara Signatures

⊘No yara matches

Sigma Signatures

⊘No Sigma rule has matched

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Source: IcisR4FC8n.dll

Avira: detected

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: IcisR4FC8n.dll

ReversingLabs: Detection: 26%

Machine Learning detection for sample

Source: IcisR4FC8n.dll

Joe Sandbox ML: detected

Source: IcisR4FC8n.dll

Static PE information: HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source:	Binary string: C:\Users\user\source\repos\NewClass\NewClass\bin\Debug\CryptoObfuscator_Output\NewClass.pdb source: IcisR4FC8n.dll
Source:	Binary string: C:\Users\user\source\repos\NewClass\NewClass\bin\Debug\CryptoObfuscator_Output\NewClass.pdbBSJB source: IcisR4FC8n.dll

Source: IcisR4FC8n.dll

Binary or memory string: OriginalFilenameNewClass.dll2 vs IcisR4FC8n.dll

Source: IcisR4FC8n.dll, -.cs

Cryptographic APIs: 'TransformFinalBlock', 'TransformBlock'

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal64.evad.winDLL@6/0@0/0

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:7932:120:WilError_03

Source: IcisR4FC8n.dll

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: IcisR4FC8n.dll

Static file information: TRID: Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) Net Framework (1011504/3) 50.14%

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\IcisR4FC8n.dll",#1

Source: IcisR4FC8n.dll

ReversingLabs: Detection: 26%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\IcisR4FC8n.dll"
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\IcisR4FC8n.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\IcisR4FC8n.dll",#1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\IcisR4FC8n.dll",#1	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\IcisR4FC8n.dll",#1	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Section loaded: apphelp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Section loaded: apphelp.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: IcisR4FC8n.dll

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR

Source: IcisR4FC8n.dll

Static PE information: HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source: IcisR4FC8n.dll

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG

Source:	Binary string: C:\Users\user\source\repos\NewClass\NewClass\bin\Debug\CryptoObfuscator_Output\NewClass.pdb source: IcisR4FC8n.dll
Source:	Binary string: C:\Users\user\source\repos\NewClass\NewClass\bin\Debug\CryptoObfuscator_Output\NewClass.pdbBSJB source: IcisR4FC8n.dll

Data Obfuscation

.NET source code contains potential unpacker

Source: IcisR4FC8n.dll, --.cs

.Net Code: _0011 System.Reflection.Assembly.Load(byte[])

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe

Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX

Jump to behavior

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Last function: Thread delayed

Source: C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 120000

Jump to behavior

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\IcisR4FC8n.dll",#1

Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	1 DLL Side-Loading	11 Process Injection	1 Rundll32	OS Credential Dumping	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Remote Services	1 Archive Collected Data	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	LSASS Memory	1 System Information Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Junk Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 Software Packing	Security Account Manager	Query Registry	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Steganography	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	11 Process Injection	NTDS	System Network Configuration Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Network Information	Server	Cloud Accounts	Launchd	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	1 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	LSA Secrets	Internet Connection Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact
Domain Properties	Botnet	Replication Through Removable Media	Scheduled Task	RC Scripts	RC Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	Cached Domain Credentials	Wi-Fi Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Multiband Communication	Data Transfer Size Limits	Service Stop

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
IcisR4FC8n.dll	26%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.CrypterX
IcisR4FC8n.dll	100%	Avira	HEUR/AGEN.1326624
IcisR4FC8n.dll	100%	Joe Sandbox ML

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
s-part-0017.t-0009.fb-t-msedge.net	13.107.253.45	true	false		high

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1552285
Start date and time:	2024-11-08 15:40:02 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 1m 53s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	5
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	IcisR4FC8n.dll renamed because original name is a hash value
Original Sample Name:	3b7da918dccee2561178e88aad4051d86a17336b.dll
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal64.evad.winDLL@6/0@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .dll Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): azurefd-t-fb-prod.trafficmanager.net, otelrules.azureedge.net, otelrules.afd.azureedge.net, azureedge-t-prod.trafficmanager.net
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
VT rate limit hit for: IcisR4FC8n.dll

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
09:40:55	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: loaddll32.exe modified

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
s-part-0017.t-0009.fb-t-msedge.net	https://thaykinhgiasoc.com/o/?c3Y9bzM2NV8xX25vbSZyYW5kPU9USlBZakE9JnVpZD1VU0VSMTcxMDIwMjRVMDAxMDE3NDA=N0123N	Get hash	malicious	HTMLPhisher, Mamba2FA	Browse	13.107.253.45
	file.exe	Get hash	malicious	LummaC, Stealc	Browse	13.107.253.45
	pzPO97QouM.exe	Get hash	malicious	ScreenConnect Tool	Browse	13.107.253.45
	Multi Graphics Inc CustomerVendor Form.pdf	Get hash	malicious	HTMLPhisher	Browse	13.107.253.45
	OaSEt8i2jE.exe	Get hash	malicious	Njrat	Browse	13.107.253.45
	https://eu.docworkspace.com/d/sIGWvrvOeAYXvpLkG	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	13.107.253.45
	PORgjGswYg.exe	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	13.107.253.45
	https://login-zendesk-account.servz.com.pk	Get hash	malicious	HTMLPhisher	Browse	13.107.253.45
	https://www.google.it/url?q=https://www.google.it/url?q=https://www.google.it/url?q=https://www.google.ro/url?q=https://digitalplatform-admin-p.azurewebsites.net/external-link/?targetURL=https://www.google.nl/url?q=ZFCKQSES42J831UCOWMB4MEAK36T3IE7YuQiApLjODz3yh4nNeW8uuQi&rct=XS5d7c8770636a4f3fd2ed2ec05584079425wDnNeW8yycT&sa=t&esrc=nNeW8F5d7c8770636a4f3fd2ed2ec05584079425A0xys8Em2FL&source=&cd=tS6T85d7c8770636a4f3fd2ed2ec05584079425Tiw9XH&cad=XpPkDfJX5d7c8770636a4f3fd2ed2ec05584079425VS0Y&ved=xjnktlqryYWwZIBRrgvK&uact=&url=amp%2Fbyda.ng%2Fcig.bin%2Fgoin%2F%23c2VjcmV0YXJpYXRAcGVvLm9uLmNh	Get hash	malicious	HTMLPhisher, Mamba2FA	Browse	13.107.253.45
	COw7owNqAr.exe	Get hash	malicious	FormBook	Browse	13.107.253.45

File type:	PE32 executable (DLL) (console) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	5.595341821043831
TrID:	Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) Net Framework (1011504/3) 50.14% Win32 Dynamic Link Library (generic) (1002004/3) 49.67% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.10% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.10% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	IcisR4FC8n.dll
File size:	20'480 bytes
MD5:	91d00706d68868cabd26759eeed32ae7
SHA1:	3b7da918dccee2561178e88aad4051d86a17336b
SHA256:	0250fcaf69b2460b4f6ff3b0f886a2e8f4d253d745a8520a9bbefc7502f46279
SHA512:	51da609073420a5bb89adba82b1c4f94e123113d4eb2462c979e44ede4fc099f7c6ef6933131de8dc4649fde47ddea9019cc8ad86c6b662b3772257fc99f823c
SSDEEP:	384:a71AAa51jr83QSJlAFJwQf4aXrwLH/0JvF7OoHuAsVAJbjwbbbbbbb8AjTIXfdwP:e1AnM3QSJafbOgImSt
TLSH:	5692E4CABFD5C864C4B89738A963025D17B0E50DBA03D75B58ECC23C1EC3B5A79D1A86
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$.......PE..L.....ld........... ..0..H...L.......f... ........@.. ....................................`................................

File Icon


Icon Hash:	7ae282899bbab082

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x40668a
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	false
Imagebase:	0x400000
Subsystem:	windows cui
Image File Characteristics:	EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED, LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED, LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE, DLL
DLL Characteristics:	HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, NX_COMPAT, NO_SEH, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE
Time Stamp:	0x646CF2CB [Tue May 23 17:07:23 2023 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	4
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	4
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	4
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	dae02f32a21e03ce65412f6e56942daa

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
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Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x6630	0x57	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0xa000	0x374	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x8000	0xc	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x3c30	0x1c	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x2000	0x8	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x2008	0x48	.text
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	MD5	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x2000	0x4690	0x4800	023aaaf02eaf69ea550cc2bbd6c11746	False	0.5250108506944444	DIY-Thermocam raw data (Lepton 2.x), scale -14847--15611, spot sensor temperature 0.000000, unit celsius, color scheme 0, minimum point enabled, maximum point enabled, calibration: offset -0.000000, slope 565132132352000.000000	5.864549116954133	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x8000	0xc	0x200	0fa96ac05cdf1133c8be0e59d2413371	False	0.044921875	data	0.08153941234324169	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0xa000	0x374	0x400	3e3dd889b9c2b6aa4cf2e67f7a1b9a25	False	0.36328125	data	2.7883056765139087	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country	ZLIB Complexity
RT_VERSION	0xa058	0x31c	data			0.4296482412060301

Imports

DLL	Import
mscoree.dll	_CorDllMain

Network Behavior

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Nov 8, 2024 15:40:52.297954082 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.3	0xd372	No error (0)	shed.dual-low.s-part-0017.t-0009.t-msedge.net	azurefd-t-fb-prod.trafficmanager.net		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)	false
Nov 8, 2024 15:40:52.297954082 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.3	0xd372	No error (0)	dual.s-part-0017.t-0009.fb-t-msedge.net	s-part-0017.t-0009.fb-t-msedge.net		CNAME (Canonical name)	IN (0x0001)	false
Nov 8, 2024 15:40:52.297954082 CET	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.3	0xd372	No error (0)	s-part-0017.t-0009.fb-t-msedge.net		13.107.253.45	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

Target ID:	0
Start time:	09:40:55
Start date:	08/11/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\loaddll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	loaddll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\IcisR4FC8n.dll"
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	126'464 bytes
MD5 hash:	51E6071F9CBA48E79F10C84515AAE618
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	1
Start time:	09:40:55
Start date:	08/11/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff720030000
File size:	873'472 bytes
MD5 hash:	7366FBEFE66BA0F1F5304F7D6FEF09FE
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	moderate
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	3
Start time:	09:40:55
Start date:	08/11/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	cmd.exe /C rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\IcisR4FC8n.dll",#1
Imagebase:	0xb80000
File size:	236'544 bytes
MD5 hash:	D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	4
Start time:	09:40:55
Start date:	08/11/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	rundll32.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\IcisR4FC8n.dll",#1
Imagebase:	0x4b0000
File size:	61'440 bytes
MD5 hash:	889B99C52A60DD49227C5E485A016679
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules ), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: `rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}` ).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

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Windows Analysis Report IcisR4FC8n.dll

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint Preview

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Network Behavior

DNS Answers

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: loaddll32.exePID: 7924, Parent PID: 640

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: conhost.exePID: 7932, Parent PID: 7924

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: cmd.exePID: 7988, Parent PID: 7924

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: rundll32.exePID: 8012, Parent PID: 7988

General

Chronological Activities

Windows Analysis Report
IcisR4FC8n.dll