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Windows Analysis Report
mydoc.zip

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	mydoc.zip
Analysis ID:	1544432
MD5:	91cdc0b030d0fed60dde68b0b8a826c2
SHA1:	a461780985b8c53f1969e2964cc587c941d5f4a6
SHA256:	1146651d66ab9255aa2a92f78292c3622fba2b9d054a5f748470365fb3dc5645
Infos:

Detection

Score:	2
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	60%

Signatures

Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)

Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Classification

Process Tree

System is w7x64

unarchiver.exe (PID: 3336 cmdline: "C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\mydoc.zip" MD5: 16FF3CC6CC330A08EED70CBC1D35F5D2)

7za.exe (PID: 3384 cmdline: "C:\Windows\System32\7za.exe" x -pinfected -y -o"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\pk3m1tos.mei" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\mydoc.zip" MD5: 77E556CDFDC5C592F5C46DB4127C6F4C)

cleanup

Malware Configuration

⊘No configs have been found

Yara Signatures

⊘No yara matches

Sigma Signatures

Sigma detected: Office Macro File Creation

Source: File created

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\7za.exe, ProcessId: 3384, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\pk3m1tos.mei\mydoc.docm

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

There are no malicious signatures, click here to show all signatures.

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86_microsoft.vc80.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_8.0.50727.4940_none_d08cc06a442b34fc\MSVCR80.dll

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Memory allocated: 770B0000 page execute and read and write			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\7za.exe	Memory allocated: 770B0000 page execute and read and write			Jump to behavior

Source: classification engine

Classification label: clean2.winZIP@3/1@0/0

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe

Mutant created: NULL

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\unarchiver.log

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe "C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\mydoc.zip"
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\7za.exe "C:\Windows\System32\7za.exe" x -pinfected -y -o"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\pk3m1tos.mei" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\mydoc.zip"
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\7za.exe "C:\Windows\System32\7za.exe" x -pinfected -y -o"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\pk3m1tos.mei" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\mydoc.zip"	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Section loaded: wow64win.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Section loaded: wow64cpu.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\7za.exe	Section loaded: wow64win.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\7za.exe	Section loaded: wow64cpu.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\x86_microsoft.vc80.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_8.0.50727.4940_none_d08cc06a442b34fc\MSVCR80.dll

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Memory allocated: 4A0000 memory reserve \| memory write watch	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Memory allocated: 24B0000 memory reserve \| memory write watch	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Memory allocated: 8A0000 memory commit \| memory reserve \| memory write watch	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 485			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 9487			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe TID: 3420	Thread sleep count: 485 > 30	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe TID: 3420	Thread sleep time: -242500s >= -30000s	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe TID: 3420	Thread sleep count: 9487 > 30	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe TID: 3420	Thread sleep time: -4743500s >= -30000s	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe

Memory allocated: page read and write | page guard

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\7za.exe "C:\Windows\System32\7za.exe" x -pinfected -y -o"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\pk3m1tos.mei" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\mydoc.zip"

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	1 DLL Side-Loading	11 Process Injection	2 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	OS Credential Dumping	2 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Disable or Modify Tools	LSASS Memory	1 Application Window Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Junk Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	11 Process Injection	Security Account Manager	2 System Information Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Steganography	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	1 DLL Side-Loading	NTDS	System Network Configuration Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Screenshots

Thumbnails

This section contains all screenshots as thumbnails, including those not shown in the slideshow.

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

⊘No Antivirus matches

Dropped Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Unpacked PE Files

⊘No Antivirus matches

Domains

⊘No Antivirus matches

URLs

⊘No Antivirus matches

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

⊘No contacted domains info

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1544432
Start date and time:	2024-10-29 12:30:19 +01:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 5m 43s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 7 x64 SP1 with Office 2010 SP1 (IE 11, FF52, Chrome 57, Adobe Reader DC 15, Flash 25.0.0.127, Java 8 Update 121, .NET 4.6.2)
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	5
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	mydoc.zip
Detection:	CLEAN
Classification:	clean2.winZIP@3/1@0/0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .zip Override analysis time to 240000 for current running targets taking high CPU consumption

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, conhost.exe
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
VT rate limit hit for: mydoc.zip

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
07:31:08	API Interceptor	1x Sleep call for process: 7za.exe modified
07:31:41	API Interceptor	5883948x Sleep call for process: unarchiver.exe modified

Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	3273
Entropy (8bit):	5.025435735072816
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	48:RiNE3dEdGb8dG8dGpmdGoqdG8dGpMNdGbSdGNNdGcNdGRdG8dG8dGmxdG8dG/dGy:q1R9pN
MD5:	3F8C51D8BA4522FB9425633F7EC44D3A
SHA1:	FF43667B44D916884C6DA1A27985DBF6A1F98B26
SHA-256:	B5F2AADB09DF5C4239D71660D72319CB7D1AA9427ECF0E175F5CFC7F055D8FE6
SHA-512:	E27BC427768CBB6F22CE6D449E902A8A34338A0EACFF482B14C74DFE18915B189A1033B05ECAC79436C49A0BE2B0A14FFEA71932E1A494A27DBEEE7907649F91
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	10/29/2024 7:31 AM: Unpack: C:\Users\user\Desktop\mydoc.zip..10/29/2024 7:31 AM: Tmp dir: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\pk3m1tos.mei..10/29/2024 7:31 AM: Received from standard error: ERROR: Wrong password : mydoc.docm..10/29/2024 7:31 AM: Received from standard out: 7-Zip 18.05 (x86) : Copyright (c) 1999-2018 Igor Pavlov : 2018-04-30..10/29/2024 7:31 AM: Received from standard out: ..10/29/2024 7:31 AM: Received from standard out: Scanning the drive for archives:..10/29/2024 7:31 AM: Received from standard out: 1 file, 22091 bytes (22 KiB)..10/29/2024 7:31 AM: Received from standard out: ..10/29/2024 7:31 AM: Received from standard out: Extracting archive: C:\Users\user\Desktop\mydoc.zip..10/29/2024 7:31 AM: Received from standard out: --..10/29/2024 7:31 AM: Received from standard out: Path = C:\Users\user\Desktop\mydoc.zip..10/29/2024 7:31 AM: Received from standard out: Type = zip..10/29/2024 7:31 AM: Received from standard out: Physical Size = 22091..10/29/2024 7:31 AM: Rec

Static File Info

General

File type:	Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compression method=deflate
Entropy (8bit):	7.991440102594048
TrID:	ZIP compressed archive (8000/1) 100.00%
File name:	mydoc.zip
File size:	22'091 bytes
MD5:	91cdc0b030d0fed60dde68b0b8a826c2
SHA1:	a461780985b8c53f1969e2964cc587c941d5f4a6
SHA256:	1146651d66ab9255aa2a92f78292c3622fba2b9d054a5f748470365fb3dc5645
SHA512:	8535d305e0e3118b0e312374657cf5fbf3db5953dbc14f5dc00d4a7a29c4e6d482876dae5d6a21b084a67479e26a547d4ef74affa2b7daee7e299de7dc639432
SSDEEP:	384:mEpqvUmQueD3LSUPJ4m+K/xROQ4xIh9T4wuMYxo/C7SMzqpMwPLp1NMg1D/jeSlg:nKUqkSUh4ux9iIzuMYxo5MzyMwPLp3Mx
TLSH:	60A2E1B296B59E3742B215E15B416A16B5F40671B488202F7E5CF44EBE8F1D1F03C97C
File Content Preview:	PK...........R.B...U..za......mydoc.docm...%..S.8...dU....b~r[..c..gx.7).._.....48.i3.....h..........yG=...V...........].^.....?P..I..S........."5...H(sCN."..&k.kA...B.....:..h>..d.....&.................K.......G....d2.H`.\......&........wq&..,YN.*b..W...

File Icon


Icon Hash:	20e2a3f4c6a9a280

Target ID:	0
Start time:	07:31:08
Start date:	29/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\unarchiver.exe" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\mydoc.zip"
Imagebase:	0x10a0000
File size:	12'800 bytes
MD5 hash:	16FF3CC6CC330A08EED70CBC1D35F5D2
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	false

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	07:31:08
Start date:	29/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\7za.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Windows\System32\7za.exe" x -pinfected -y -o"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\pk3m1tos.mei" "C:\Users\user\Desktop\mydoc.zip"
Imagebase:	0x2c0000
File size:	289'792 bytes
MD5 hash:	77E556CDFDC5C592F5C46DB4127C6F4C
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

⊘No disassembly

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. Adversaries may also disable updates to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools on victim systems.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Driver: Driver Load, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Sensor Health: Host Status, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
Platforms:	Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used.For example, information about application windows could be used identify potential data to collect as well as identifying security tooling ( Security Software Discovery ) to evade.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report mydoc.zip

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Compliance

System Summary

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Anti Debugging

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\unarchiver.log

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Network Behavior

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

back

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: unarchiver.exePID: 3336, Parent PID: 1244

General

Chronological Activities

Analysis Process: 7za.exePID: 3384, Parent PID: 3336

General

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

Windows Analysis Report
mydoc.zip