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Windows Analysis Report
jhi_service.exe

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	jhi_service.exe
Analysis ID:	1514209
MD5:	4708f291e40c2f7678e6367e97a04a58
SHA1:	1d5b92dec51330265912a15090442ce662b30fcd
SHA256:	811a5d5f28bed664d744d7a289aaefd965f4b90bb6d46f61eee8d6cadfd6e180
Infos:

Detection

Score:	21
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	40%

Signatures

Sigma detected: Suspicious New Service Creation

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

PE file contains sections with non-standard names

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

cmd.exe (PID: 6544 cmdline: cmd /c sc create EEPwq binpath= "C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe" >> C:\servicereg.log 2>&1 MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B)

conhost.exe (PID: 6568 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)

sc.exe (PID: 6708 cmdline: sc create EEPwq binpath= "C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe" MD5: D9D7684B8431A0D10D0E76FE9F5FFEC8)

cmd.exe (PID: 6944 cmdline: cmd /c sc start EEPwq >> C:\servicestart.log 2>&1 MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B)

conhost.exe (PID: 6976 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)

sc.exe (PID: 7056 cmdline: sc start EEPwq MD5: D9D7684B8431A0D10D0E76FE9F5FFEC8)

jhi_service.exe (PID: 7152 cmdline: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe MD5: 4708F291E40C2F7678E6367E97A04A58)

cleanup

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Sigma detected: Suspicious New Service Creation

Source: Process started

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): Data: Command: sc create EEPwq binpath= "C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe" , CommandLine: sc create EEPwq binpath= "C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe" , CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\sc.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\sc.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\sc.exe, ParentCommandLine: cmd /c sc create EEPwq binpath= "C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe" >> C:\servicereg.log 2>&1, ParentImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe, ParentProcessId: 6544, ParentProcessName: cmd.exe, ProcessCommandLine: sc create EEPwq binpath= "C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe" , ProcessId: 6708, ProcessName: sc.exe

Sigma detected: New Service Creation Using Sc.EXE

Source: Process started

Author: Timur Zinniatullin, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community: Data: Command: sc create EEPwq binpath= "C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe" , CommandLine: sc create EEPwq binpath= "C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe" , CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\sc.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\sc.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\sc.exe, ParentCommandLine: cmd /c sc create EEPwq binpath= "C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe" >> C:\servicereg.log 2>&1, ParentImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe, ParentProcessId: 6544, ParentProcessName: cmd.exe, ProcessCommandLine: sc create EEPwq binpath= "C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe" , ProcessId: 6708, ProcessName: sc.exe

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

Source: jhi_service.exe

Static PE information: certificate valid

Source: jhi_service.exe

Static PE information: HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, FORCE_INTEGRITY, NX_COMPAT, GUARD_CF, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source:	Binary string: D:\buildagent-cd_8811\workspace\11934\VisualStudio\bin\x64\Universal_Release\jhi_service.pdbm source: jhi_service.exe
Source:	Binary string: D:\buildagent-cd_8811\workspace\11934\VisualStudio\bin\x64\Universal_Release\jhi_service.pdb source: jhi_service.exe

Source: jhi_service.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://OCSP.intel.com/0
Source: jhi_service.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.comodoca.com/COMODORSACertificationAuthority.crl0q
Source: jhi_service.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.quovadisglobal.com/qvicag4.crl0
Source: jhi_service.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://crl.quovadisglobal.com/qvrca.crl0
Source: jhi_service.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.comodoca.com05
Source: jhi_service.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.quovadisglobal.com05
Source: jhi_service.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://ocsp.quovadisglobal.com07
Source: jhi_service.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://pki.intel.com/crl/IntelCA7B.crl0f
Source: jhi_service.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://pki.intel.com/crt/IntelCA7B.crt0
Source: jhi_service.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://trust.quovadisglobal.com/qvicag4.crt0O
Source: jhi_service.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://trust.quovadisglobal.com/qvrca.crt0
Source: jhi_service.exe	String found in binary or memory: http://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository0

Source: classification engine

Classification label: sus21.winEXE@9/2@0/0

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6568:120:WilError_03
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6976:120:WilError_03
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe	Mutant created: NULL

Source: jhi_service.exe

Static PE information: Section: .text IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\sc.exe

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: jhi_service.exe

String found in binary or memory: Install error: Couldn't set the service to delayed auto-start.

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe cmd /c sc create EEPwq binpath= "C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe" >> C:\servicereg.log 2>&1
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\sc.exe sc create EEPwq binpath= "C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe"
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe cmd /c sc start EEPwq >> C:\servicestart.log 2>&1
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\sc.exe sc start EEPwq
Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\sc.exe sc create EEPwq binpath= "C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe"	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\sc.exe sc start EEPwq	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe	Section loaded: apphelp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe	Section loaded: mswsock.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe	Section loaded: dnsapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe	Section loaded: iphlpapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe	Section loaded: rasadhlp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe	Section loaded: fwpuclnt.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe	Section loaded: kernel.appcore.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: jhi_service.exe

Static PE information: certificate valid

Source: jhi_service.exe

Static PE information: Image base 0x140000000 > 0x60000000

Source: jhi_service.exe	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT
Source: jhi_service.exe	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE
Source: jhi_service.exe	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC
Source: jhi_service.exe	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG
Source: jhi_service.exe	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG
Source: jhi_service.exe	Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT

Source: jhi_service.exe

Static PE information: HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, FORCE_INTEGRITY, NX_COMPAT, GUARD_CF, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE

Source: jhi_service.exe

Static PE information: data directory type: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG

Source:	Binary string: D:\buildagent-cd_8811\workspace\11934\VisualStudio\bin\x64\Universal_Release\jhi_service.pdbm source: jhi_service.exe
Source:	Binary string: D:\buildagent-cd_8811\workspace\11934\VisualStudio\bin\x64\Universal_Release\jhi_service.pdb source: jhi_service.exe

Source: jhi_service.exe	Static PE information: Data directory: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT is in: .rdata
Source: jhi_service.exe	Static PE information: Data directory: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE is in: .rsrc
Source: jhi_service.exe	Static PE information: Data directory: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC is in: .reloc
Source: jhi_service.exe	Static PE information: Data directory: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG is in: .rdata
Source: jhi_service.exe	Static PE information: Data directory: IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT is in: .rdata

Source: jhi_service.exe

Static PE information: section name: _RDATA

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\sc.exe sc create EEPwq binpath= "C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe"

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed
Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe	Last function: Thread delayed

Source: jhi_service.exe, 00000006.00000002.1697766688.000001FABA499000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp

Binary or memory string: Hyper-V RAW%SystemRoot%\system32\mswsock.dll

Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\sc.exe sc create EEPwq binpath= "C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe"			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\sc.exe sc start EEPwq			Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	2 Command and Scripting Interpreter	1 Windows Service	1 Windows Service	11 Process Injection	OS Credential Dumping	1 Security Software Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	1 Service Execution	1 DLL Side-Loading	11 Process Injection	1 DLL Side-Loading	LSASS Memory	1 System Information Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Junk Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	1 DLL Side-Loading	Obfuscated Files or Information	Security Account Manager	Query Registry	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Steganography	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
jhi_service.exe	0%	ReversingLabs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label
http://crl.quovadisglobal.com/qvicag4.crl0	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://trust.quovadisglobal.com/qvrca.crt0	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://pki.intel.com/crt/IntelCA7B.crt0	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://pki.intel.com/crl/IntelCA7B.crl0f	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository0	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://ocsp.quovadisglobal.com07	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://crl.quovadisglobal.com/qvrca.crl0	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://ocsp.quovadisglobal.com05	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://OCSP.intel.com/0	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe
http://trust.quovadisglobal.com/qvicag4.crt0O	0%	Avira URL Cloud	safe

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://ocsp.quovadisglobal.com05	jhi_service.exe	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://crl.quovadisglobal.com/qvrca.crl0	jhi_service.exe	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://trust.quovadisglobal.com/qvrca.crt0	jhi_service.exe	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://pki.intel.com/crt/IntelCA7B.crt0	jhi_service.exe	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://crl.quovadisglobal.com/qvicag4.crl0	jhi_service.exe	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://ocsp.quovadisglobal.com07	jhi_service.exe	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://www.quovadisglobal.com/repository0	jhi_service.exe	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://OCSP.intel.com/0	jhi_service.exe	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://pki.intel.com/crl/IntelCA7B.crl0f	jhi_service.exe	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown
http://trust.quovadisglobal.com/qvicag4.crt0O	jhi_service.exe	false	Avira URL Cloud: safe	unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

⊘No contacted IP infos

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1514209
Start date and time:	2024-09-20 00:06:50 +02:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 1m 44s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Run name:	Run as Windows Service
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	7
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	jhi_service.exe
Detection:	SUS
Classification:	sus21.winEXE@9/2@0/0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .exe Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated

Warnings

Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information
VT rate limit hit for: jhi_service.exe

Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	modified
Size (bytes):	28
Entropy (8bit):	3.678439190827718
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:4A4AnXjzSv:4HAnXjg
MD5:	A8F4D690C5BDE96AD275C7D4ABE0E3D3
SHA1:	7C62C96EFD2CA4F3C3EBF0B24C9B5B4C04A4570A
SHA-256:	596CCC911C1772735AAC6A6B756A76D3D55BCECD006B980CF147090B2243FA7B
SHA-512:	A875EBE3C5CDF222FF9D08576F4D996AF827A1C86B3E758CE23F6B33530D512A82CE8E39E519837512080C6212A0A19B3385809BE5F5001C4E488DD79550B852
Malicious:	true
Reputation:	moderate, very likely benign file
Preview:	[SC] CreateService SUCCESS..

C:\servicestart.log

Download File

Process:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	modified
Size (bytes):	421
Entropy (8bit):	3.501801842396102
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	6:lg3D/8FDgVKBRjGxVVLvH2s/u8qLLFmLaZnsHgm66//V+NmdXefq:lgAdgV0qVbH2suZLQqOVKmdXcq
MD5:	D79FA524150EF03E2968D0F6D740082C
SHA1:	082F6CDCFE4DA55C2D2EA9C995C7EFF0C4DB61F0
SHA-256:	F55A285B3662097AA32A88C257FD6DC33A8913159226B88B7AC82858FC68C9F7
SHA-512:	0809EE80F856BCD8CDE67A3FE8B3FD8870AD9E2F57E70F1E46FD98DF4DD463580E60565902D691F7E7491ABA00C8329AE6E0F06F5F18E617C40550A3ED777597
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	..SERVICE_NAME: EEPwq .. TYPE : 10 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS .. STATE : 2 START_PENDING .. (NOT_STOPPABLE, NOT_PAUSABLE, IGNORES_SHUTDOWN).. WIN32_EXIT_CODE : 0 (0x0).. SERVICE_EXIT_CODE : 0 (0x0).. CHECKPOINT : 0x0.. WAIT_HINT : 0x7d0.. PID : 7152.. FLAGS : ..

Static File Info

General

File type:	PE32+ executable (console) x86-64, for MS Windows
Entropy (8bit):	6.435377270234307
TrID:	Win64 Executable Console (202006/5) 92.65% Win64 Executable (generic) (12005/4) 5.51% Generic Win/DOS Executable (2004/3) 0.92% DOS Executable Generic (2002/1) 0.92% Autodesk FLIC Image File (extensions: flc, fli, cel) (7/3) 0.00%
File name:	jhi_service.exe
File size:	628'608 bytes
MD5:	4708f291e40c2f7678e6367e97a04a58
SHA1:	1d5b92dec51330265912a15090442ce662b30fcd
SHA256:	811a5d5f28bed664d744d7a289aaefd965f4b90bb6d46f61eee8d6cadfd6e180
SHA512:	278c22e0b52e802afa19cb8dc52900f72b66616ecc868386b91dd32952dd29b795a93626a9ce2c509ce32bc238a119e8c9d2e86a560d9ed9073ae87406ab892a
SSDEEP:	12288:lo/JNHBS76YiRGj69qj72WoGS9voWlNW3J1mOpD:lohBs76bRGj69y72WjS9voWlU3J1Vl
TLSH:	44D47C9AA3E840F9E077D13CC9975612F672784607608AEF13E0467A1F37AE15F3A721
File Content Preview:	MZ......................@...............................................!..L.!This program cannot be run in DOS mode....$........3...R...R...R...9...R...9...R...9...R...?...R...?...R...?...R...*z..R...R..tR..j?...R..j?...R..j?...R...R~..R..j?...R..Rich.R.

File Icon


Icon Hash:	90cececece8e8eb0

Static PE Info

General

Entrypoint:	0x140039620
Entrypoint Section:	.text
Digitally signed:	true
Imagebase:	0x140000000
Subsystem:	windows cui
Image File Characteristics:	EXECUTABLE_IMAGE, LARGE_ADDRESS_AWARE
DLL Characteristics:	HIGH_ENTROPY_VA, DYNAMIC_BASE, FORCE_INTEGRITY, NX_COMPAT, GUARD_CF, TERMINAL_SERVER_AWARE
Time Stamp:	0x60093A31 [Thu Jan 21 08:24:17 2021 UTC]
TLS Callbacks:
CLR (.Net) Version:
OS Version Major:	6
OS Version Minor:	0
File Version Major:	6
File Version Minor:	0
Subsystem Version Major:	6
Subsystem Version Minor:	0
Import Hash:	e633540196c51ee96c98a3f268b25cf0

Authenticode Signature

Signature Valid:	true
Signature Issuer:	CN=Intel External Issuing CA 7B, O=Intel Corporation, L=Santa Clara, S=CA, C=US
Signature Validation Error:	The operation completed successfully
Error Number:	0
Not Before, Not After	30/09/2020 02:57:03 17/06/2021 19:59:59
Subject Chain	CN=Intel(R) Embedded Subsystems and IP Blocks Group, O=Intel Corporation, L=Santa Clara, S=CA, C=US
Version:	3
Thumbprint MD5:	EFDD8C32A5CC970CD5CCDE6881F707E7
Thumbprint SHA-1:	ED89FB8699321131D508531E6489D164A21886EB
Thumbprint SHA-256:	4C6C0B896954FB85BC85B1C1370DD41E316C08A53D23FAC9EF2A50B707559175
Serial:	5600000C970A207F2C4F00043D000000000C97

Entrypoint Preview

Instruction
dec eax
sub esp, 28h
call 00007F5C307FAC2Ch
dec eax
add esp, 28h
jmp 00007F5C307FA53Fh
int3
int3
dec eax
mov eax, esp
dec esp
mov dword ptr [eax+20h], ecx
dec esp
mov dword ptr [eax+18h], eax
dec eax
mov dword ptr [eax+10h], edx
push ebx
push esi
push edi
inc ecx
push esi
dec eax
sub esp, 38h
dec ebp
mov esi, ecx
dec ecx
mov ebx, eax
dec eax
mov esi, edx
mov byte ptr [eax-38h], 00000000h
dec eax
mov edi, edx
dec ecx
imul edi, eax
dec eax
add edi, ecx
dec eax
mov dword ptr [eax+08h], edi
dec eax
mov eax, ebx
dec eax
dec ebx
dec eax
mov dword ptr [esp+70h], ebx
dec eax
test eax, eax
je 00007F5C307FA6EBh
dec eax
sub edi, esi
dec eax
mov dword ptr [esp+60h], edi
dec eax
mov ecx, edi
dec ecx
mov eax, esi
dec eax
mov edx, dword ptr [0002FF84h]
call edx
jmp 00007F5C307FA6A9h
mov byte ptr [esp+20h], 00000001h
dec eax
add esp, 38h
inc ecx
pop esi
pop edi
pop esi
pop ebx
ret
int3
dec eax
mov dword ptr [esp+10h], ebx
dec eax
mov dword ptr [esp+18h], esi
dec eax
mov dword ptr [esp+08h], ecx
push edi
inc ecx
push esi
inc ecx
push edi
dec eax
sub esp, 50h
dec ebp
mov esi, ecx
dec ecx
mov esi, eax
dec esp
mov edi, edx
dec eax
mov edi, ecx
xor ebx, ebx
dec eax
mov dword ptr [esp+38h], ebx
dec eax
cmp ebx, esi
je 00007F5C307FA6EBh
dec ecx
sub edi, edi
dec eax
mov dword ptr [esp+70h], edi
dec eax
mov ecx, edi
dec ecx
mov eax, esi
call dword ptr [0002FF2Ch]
dec eax
inc ebx

Rich Headers

Programming Language:

[IMP] VS2008 SP1 build 30729

Data Directories

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Is in Section
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT	0x8bf40	0x58	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT	0x8bf98	0xb4	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE	0x9b000	0x1048	.rsrc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXCEPTION	0x94000	0x51d8	.pdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY	0x95000	0x4780
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC	0x9d000	0xfc4	.reloc
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DEBUG	0x82560	0x70	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COPYRIGHT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_GLOBALPTR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_TLS	0x826d8	0x28	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_LOAD_CONFIG	0x825d0	0x108	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BOUND_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IAT	0x69000	0x608	.rdata
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_DELAY_IMPORT	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_COM_DESCRIPTOR	0x0	0x0
IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESERVED	0x0	0x0

Sections

Name	Virtual Address	Virtual Size	Raw Size	MD5	Xored PE	ZLIB Complexity	File Type	Entropy	Characteristics
.text	0x1000	0x673de	0x67400	60b29fff76cda035b43547292cc9de38	False	0.5073774213075061	data	6.443238840006497	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rdata	0x69000	0x2436a	0x24400	1c88cf120bd253da17788e7334605e89	False	0.41587419181034485	PGP symmetric key encrypted data - Plaintext or unencrypted data	5.395276545279143	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.data	0x8e000	0x5e8c	0x1e00	7c6bfd2ae83df3e6f10b1c402b34a600	False	0.14466145833333333	data	3.063107378868907	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE
.pdata	0x94000	0x51d8	0x5200	13396e91fefd4810ca5b433a62a5be9c	False	0.4787061737804878	data	5.774865478784579	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
_RDATA	0x9a000	0x94	0x200	e08ffc30530e38d31d6eb3de7d4adfee	False	0.208984375	data	1.4508727303968079	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.rsrc	0x9b000	0x1048	0x1200	f4072f2aa4125ebb473ae458e14b33ac	False	0.22721354166666666	data	3.4261012695210447	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ
.reloc	0x9d000	0xfc4	0x1000	b3801a6e198af157ff44701750ad7f31	False	0.405029296875	data	5.416433269359753	IMAGE_SCN_CNT_INITIALIZED_DATA, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE, IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

Resources

Name	RVA	Size	Type	Language	Country	ZLIB Complexity
RT_MESSAGETABLE	0x9b0f0	0xa30	data			0.16756134969325154
RT_VERSION	0x9bb20	0x3a8	data			0.4252136752136752
RT_MANIFEST	0x9bec8	0x17d	XML 1.0 document, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators	English	United States	0.5931758530183727

Imports

DLL	Import
KERNEL32.DLL	HeapReAlloc, SetStdHandle, SetEnvironmentVariableW, FreeEnvironmentStringsW, GetEnvironmentStringsW, GetOEMCP, GetACP, CreateThread, IsValidCodePage, ReadConsoleW, EnumSystemLocalesW, GetUserDefaultLCID, IsValidLocale, WriteConsoleW, CopyFileExW, SetFileAttributesW, ReadFile, WriteFile, DeviceIoControl, Sleep, GetConsoleMode, CreateEventW, FindNextFileW, lstrlenA, CreateFileA, GetMailslotInfo, CreateMailslotA, ResetEvent, GetConsoleOutputCP, OpenProcess, GetFileType, GetProcessTimes, GetExitCodeProcess, FindFirstFileW, LoadLibraryExW, FreeLibrary, GetModuleFileNameW, GetProcAddress, ExpandEnvironmentStringsW, FlushFileBuffers, VerifyVersionInfoW, VerSetConditionMask, GetLastError, CreateFileW, ReleaseMutex, CreateMutexW, CreateSemaphoreW, GetFileSizeEx, ReleaseSemaphore, CreateEventA, CloseHandle, SetEvent, GetCommandLineW, LocalFree, WaitForSingleObject, OpenEventA, lstrcmpiW, HeapSize, GetCommandLineA, GetStdHandle, GetModuleHandleExW, ExitProcess, RaiseException, RtlPcToFileHeader, RtlUnwindEx, GetCPInfo, GetStringTypeW, OutputDebugStringA, GetLocaleInfoW, LCMapStringW, CompareStringW, DecodePointer, RtlUnwind, EncodePointer, EnterCriticalSection, LeaveCriticalSection, InitializeCriticalSection, DeleteCriticalSection, CancelIo, HeapFree, TlsFree, TlsSetValue, HeapAlloc, GetOverlappedResult, GetProcessHeap, SignalObjectAndWait, CreateMutexA, InitializeCriticalSectionAndSpinCount, WaitForSingleObjectEx, GetModuleHandleW, RtlCaptureContext, RtlLookupFunctionEntry, RtlVirtualUnwind, UnhandledExceptionFilter, SetUnhandledExceptionFilter, GetCurrentProcess, TerminateProcess, IsProcessorFeaturePresent, IsDebuggerPresent, GetStartupInfoW, QueryPerformanceCounter, GetCurrentProcessId, GetCurrentThreadId, GetSystemTimeAsFileTime, InitializeSListHead, QueryPerformanceFrequency, FormatMessageW, WideCharToMultiByte, CreateDirectoryW, DeleteFileW, FindClose, FindFirstFileExW, GetFileAttributesExW, GetFileInformationByHandle, SetEndOfFile, SetFilePointerEx, SetLastError, MoveFileExW, MultiByteToWideChar, SwitchToThread, TlsAlloc, TlsGetValue
ADVAPI32.DLL	ReportEventW, SetSecurityDescriptorDacl, GetSecurityDescriptorDacl, CreateServiceW, CloseServiceHandle, OpenSCManagerW, BuildExplicitAccessWithNameW, AllocateAndInitializeSid, SetServiceStatus, ChangeServiceConfig2W, SetEntriesInAclW, DeleteService, SetServiceObjectSecurity, ControlService, FreeSid, StartServiceW, RegQueryValueExW, InitializeSecurityDescriptor, RegOpenKeyExW, RegSetValueExW, StartServiceCtrlDispatcherW, OpenServiceW, RegCloseKey, LookupAccountSidW, QueryServiceObjectSecurity, SetSecurityInfo, DeregisterEventSource, RegisterEventSourceW, RegisterServiceCtrlHandlerExW
WS2_32.dll	connect, WSAGetLastError, WSACleanup, accept, bind, closesocket, shutdown, listen, freeaddrinfo, getaddrinfo, WSAStartup, getsockname, send, socket, ntohs, recv
OLE32.DLL	CoUninitialize, CoInitializeEx, CoCreateInstance
SETUPAPI.DLL	CM_Get_Device_Interface_ListA, CM_Get_Device_Interface_ListW, CM_Get_Device_Interface_List_SizeW, CM_Get_Device_Interface_List_SizeA
RPCRT4.dll	UuidToStringA, UuidCreate, RpcStringFreeA
api-ms-win-devices-config-l1-1-1.dll	CM_Unregister_Notification, CM_Register_Notification
OLEAUT32.dll	SysAllocString, VariantClear, VariantInit, GetErrorInfo, SafeArrayGetUBound, SysFreeString

Exports

Name	Ordinal	Address
TEE_Transport_Create	1	0x14002a2d0

Possible Origin

Language of compilation system	Country where language is spoken	Map
English	United States

• cmd.exe
• conhost.exe
• sc.exe
• cmd.exe
• conhost.exe
• sc.exe
• jhi_service.exe

Click to jump to process

Memory Usage

• cmd.exe
• conhost.exe
• sc.exe
• cmd.exe
• conhost.exe
• sc.exe
• jhi_service.exe

Click to jump to process

High Level Behavior Distribution

• File
• Registry
• Network

Click to dive into process behavior distribution

Click to jump to process

Target ID:	0
Start time:	18:07:43
Start date:	19/09/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	cmd /c sc create EEPwq binpath= "C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe" >> C:\servicereg.log 2>&1
Imagebase:	0x240000
File size:	236'544 bytes
MD5 hash:	D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	1
Start time:	18:07:43
Start date:	19/09/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff7699e0000
File size:	862'208 bytes
MD5 hash:	0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	18:07:43
Start date:	19/09/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\sc.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	sc create EEPwq binpath= "C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe"
Imagebase:	0xfc0000
File size:	61'440 bytes
MD5 hash:	D9D7684B8431A0D10D0E76FE9F5FFEC8
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	moderate
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	3
Start time:	18:07:43
Start date:	19/09/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	cmd /c sc start EEPwq >> C:\servicestart.log 2>&1
Imagebase:	0x240000
File size:	236'544 bytes
MD5 hash:	D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	4
Start time:	18:07:43
Start date:	19/09/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff7699e0000
File size:	862'208 bytes
MD5 hash:	0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	5
Start time:	18:07:43
Start date:	19/09/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\sc.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	sc start EEPwq
Imagebase:	0xfc0000
File size:	61'440 bytes
MD5 hash:	D9D7684B8431A0D10D0E76FE9F5FFEC8
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	moderate
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	6
Start time:	18:07:43
Start date:	19/09/2024
Path:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Users\user\Desktop\jhi_service.exe
Imagebase:	0x7ff612eb0000
File size:	628'608 bytes
MD5 hash:	4708F291E40C2F7678E6367E97A04A58
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	low
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Description:	Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell .
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager ( `services.exe` ) is an interface to manage and manipulate services.The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as `sc.exe` and Net .
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Process: Process Creation, Service: Service Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.
Tactics:	Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Driver: Driver Load, File: File Metadata, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Modification, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report jhi_service.exe

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Compliance

Networking

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Boot Survival

Malware Analysis System Evasion

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\servicereg.log

C:\servicestart.log

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static PE Info

General

Authenticode Signature

Entrypoint Preview

Rich Headers

Data Directories

Sections

Resources

Imports

Exports

Possible Origin

Network Behavior

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

High Level Behavior Distribution

back

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: cmd.exePID: 6544, Parent PID: 772

General

File Activities

File Opened

Windows Analysis Report
jhi_service.exe