Edit tour

Windows Analysis Report
IOA.bat

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	IOA.bat
Analysis ID:	1512994
MD5:	04ceefdab7aaca32fbb352ae88c3a89a
SHA1:	098d423f086301e4f1a2465b804b9193affd9f70
SHA256:	c59fbfc3d93e62c1a5e30f3c26fa6be9e99ea4273f6af31bdacd1332425d7777
Infos:

Detection

Score:	22
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	80%

Signatures

Obfuscated command line found

Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)

Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)

Sigma detected: Potential Dosfuscation Activity

Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)

Classification

Process Tree

System is w10x64

cmd.exe (PID: 6756 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\user\Desktop\IOA.bat" " MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)

conhost.exe (PID: 6812 cmdline: C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)

cmd.exe (PID: 5460 cmdline: "cmd /c echo @echo off>temp.cmd&& echo set KEY_NAME=\"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DataTransfer\\DataManagementGateway\\ConfigurationManager\">>temp.cmd&& echo FOR /F ^\"usebackq tokens=1,2,*\" ^A IN (`REG QUERY ^ /v DiacmdPath 2^^^>nul ^^^| find ^\"DiacmdPath\"`) DO ( set diacmdfile=^C )>>temp.cmd&& echo call :print ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo set destDir=^\\Microsoft\\Data Transfer\\DataManagementGateway\\UserConfiguration\\>>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diawp.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diahost.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo goto :eof>>temp.cmd&& echo :print>>temp.cmd&& echo set folder=^>>temp.cmd&& echo EXIT /B ^0>>temp.cmd&& temp.cmd && del temp.cmd", MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE)

cleanup

Sigma Signatures

Sigma detected: Potential Dosfuscation Activity

Source: Process started

Author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): Data: Command: "cmd /c echo @echo off>temp.cmd&& echo set KEY_NAME=\"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DataTransfer\\DataManagementGateway\\ConfigurationManager\">>temp.cmd&& echo FOR /F ^\"usebackq tokens=1,2,*\" ^A IN (`REG QUERY ^ /v DiacmdPath 2^^^>nul ^^^| find ^\"DiacmdPath\"`) DO ( set diacmdfile=^C )>>temp.cmd&& echo call :print ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo set destDir=^\\Microsoft\\Data Transfer\\DataManagementGateway\\UserConfiguration\\>>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diawp.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diahost.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo goto :eof>>temp.cmd&& echo :print>>temp.cmd&& echo set folder=^>>temp.cmd&& echo EXIT /B ^0>>temp.cmd&& temp.cmd && del temp.cmd",, CommandLine: "cmd /c echo @echo off>temp.cmd&& echo set KEY_NAME=\"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DataTransfer\\DataManagementGateway\\ConfigurationManager\">>temp.cmd&& echo FOR /F ^\"usebackq tokens=1,2,*\" ^A IN (`REG QUERY ^ /v DiacmdPath 2^^^>nul ^^^| find ^\"DiacmdPath\"`) DO ( set diacmdfile=^C )>>temp.cmd&& echo call :print ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo set destDir=^\\Microsoft\\Data Transfer\\DataManagementGateway\\UserConfiguration\\>>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diawp.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diahost.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo goto :eof>>temp.cmd&& echo :print>>temp.cmd&& echo set folder=^>>temp.cmd&& echo EXIT /B ^0>>temp.cmd&& temp.cmd && del temp.cmd",, CommandLine|base64offset|contains: , Image: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, NewProcessName: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, OriginalFileName: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\user\Desktop\IOA.bat" ", ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe, ParentProcessId: 6756, ParentProcessName: cmd.exe, ProcessCommandLine: "cmd /c echo @echo off>temp.cmd&& echo set KEY_NAME=\"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DataTransfer\\DataManagementGateway\\ConfigurationManager\">>temp.cmd&& echo FOR /F ^\"usebackq tokens=1,2,*\" ^A IN (`REG QUERY ^ /v DiacmdPath 2^^^>nul ^^^| find ^\"DiacmdPath\"`) DO ( set diacmdfile=^C )>>temp.cmd&& echo call :print ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo set destDir=^\\Microsoft\\Data Transfer\\DataManagementGateway\\UserConfiguration\\>>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diawp.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diahost.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo goto :eof>>temp.cmd&& echo :print>>temp.cmd&& echo set folder=^>>temp.cmd&& echo EXIT /B ^0>>temp.cmd&& temp.cmd && del temp.cmd",, ProcessId: 5460, ProcessName: cmd.exe

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

• System Summary
• Data Obfuscation
• Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection
• Malware Analysis System Evasion
• HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

Source: classification engine

Classification label: sus22.winBAT@4/1@0/0

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Mutant created: \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\SM0:6812:120:WilError_03

Source: unknown

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\user\Desktop\IOA.bat" "

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\user\Desktop\IOA.bat" "
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "cmd /c echo @echo off>temp.cmd&& echo set KEY_NAME=\"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DataTransfer\\DataManagementGateway\\ConfigurationManager\">>temp.cmd&& echo FOR /F ^\"usebackq tokens=1,2,*\" ^A IN (`REG QUERY ^ /v DiacmdPath 2^^^>nul ^^^\| find ^\"DiacmdPath\"`) DO ( set diacmdfile=^C )>>temp.cmd&& echo call :print ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo set destDir=^\\Microsoft\\Data Transfer\\DataManagementGateway\\UserConfiguration\\>>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diawp.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diahost.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo goto :eof>>temp.cmd&& echo :print>>temp.cmd&& echo set folder=^>>temp.cmd&& echo EXIT /B ^0>>temp.cmd&& temp.cmd && del temp.cmd",
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "cmd /c echo @echo off>temp.cmd&& echo set KEY_NAME=\"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DataTransfer\\DataManagementGateway\\ConfigurationManager\">>temp.cmd&& echo FOR /F ^\"usebackq tokens=1,2,*\" ^A IN (`REG QUERY ^ /v DiacmdPath 2^^^>nul ^^^\| find ^\"DiacmdPath\"`) DO ( set diacmdfile=^C )>>temp.cmd&& echo call :print ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo set destDir=^\\Microsoft\\Data Transfer\\DataManagementGateway\\UserConfiguration\\>>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diawp.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diahost.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo goto :eof>>temp.cmd&& echo :print>>temp.cmd&& echo set folder=^>>temp.cmd&& echo EXIT /B ^0>>temp.cmd&& temp.cmd && del temp.cmd",	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Section loaded: cmdext.dll			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Section loaded: cmdext.dll			Jump to behavior

Data Obfuscation

Obfuscated command line found

Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "cmd /c echo @echo off>temp.cmd&& echo set KEY_NAME=\"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DataTransfer\\DataManagementGateway\\ConfigurationManager\">>temp.cmd&& echo FOR /F ^\"usebackq tokens=1,2,*\" ^A IN (`REG QUERY ^ /v DiacmdPath 2^^^>nul ^^^\| find ^\"DiacmdPath\"`) DO ( set diacmdfile=^C )>>temp.cmd&& echo call :print ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo set destDir=^\\Microsoft\\Data Transfer\\DataManagementGateway\\UserConfiguration\\>>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diawp.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diahost.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo goto :eof>>temp.cmd&& echo :print>>temp.cmd&& echo set folder=^>>temp.cmd&& echo EXIT /B ^0>>temp.cmd&& temp.cmd && del temp.cmd",
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "cmd /c echo @echo off>temp.cmd&& echo set KEY_NAME=\"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DataTransfer\\DataManagementGateway\\ConfigurationManager\">>temp.cmd&& echo FOR /F ^\"usebackq tokens=1,2,*\" ^A IN (`REG QUERY ^ /v DiacmdPath 2^^^>nul ^^^\| find ^\"DiacmdPath\"`) DO ( set diacmdfile=^C )>>temp.cmd&& echo call :print ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo set destDir=^\\Microsoft\\Data Transfer\\DataManagementGateway\\UserConfiguration\\>>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diawp.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diahost.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo goto :eof>>temp.cmd&& echo :print>>temp.cmd&& echo set folder=^>>temp.cmd&& echo EXIT /B ^0>>temp.cmd&& temp.cmd && del temp.cmd",
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "cmd /c echo @echo off>temp.cmd&& echo set KEY_NAME=\"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DataTransfer\\DataManagementGateway\\ConfigurationManager\">>temp.cmd&& echo FOR /F ^\"usebackq tokens=1,2,*\" ^A IN (`REG QUERY ^ /v DiacmdPath 2^^^>nul ^^^\| find ^\"DiacmdPath\"`) DO ( set diacmdfile=^C )>>temp.cmd&& echo call :print ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo set destDir=^\\Microsoft\\Data Transfer\\DataManagementGateway\\UserConfiguration\\>>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diawp.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diahost.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo goto :eof>>temp.cmd&& echo :print>>temp.cmd&& echo set folder=^>>temp.cmd&& echo EXIT /B ^0>>temp.cmd&& temp.cmd && del temp.cmd",	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "cmd /c echo @echo off>temp.cmd&& echo set KEY_NAME=\"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DataTransfer\\DataManagementGateway\\ConfigurationManager\">>temp.cmd&& echo FOR /F ^\"usebackq tokens=1,2,*\" ^A IN (`REG QUERY ^ /v DiacmdPath 2^^^>nul ^^^\| find ^\"DiacmdPath\"`) DO ( set diacmdfile=^C )>>temp.cmd&& echo call :print ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo set destDir=^\\Microsoft\\Data Transfer\\DataManagementGateway\\UserConfiguration\\>>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diawp.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diahost.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo goto :eof>>temp.cmd&& echo :print>>temp.cmd&& echo set folder=^>>temp.cmd&& echo EXIT /B ^0>>temp.cmd&& temp.cmd && del temp.cmd",	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe

Last function: Thread delayed

Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe

Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "cmd /c echo @echo off>temp.cmd&& echo set KEY_NAME=\"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DataTransfer\\DataManagementGateway\\ConfigurationManager\">>temp.cmd&& echo FOR /F ^\"usebackq tokens=1,2,*\" ^A IN (`REG QUERY ^ /v DiacmdPath 2^^^>nul ^^^| find ^\"DiacmdPath\"`) DO ( set diacmdfile=^C )>>temp.cmd&& echo call :print ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo set destDir=^\\Microsoft\\Data Transfer\\DataManagementGateway\\UserConfiguration\\>>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diawp.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diahost.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo goto :eof>>temp.cmd&& echo :print>>temp.cmd&& echo set folder=^>>temp.cmd&& echo EXIT /B ^0>>temp.cmd&& temp.cmd && del temp.cmd",

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "cmd /c echo @echo off>temp.cmd&& echo set key_name=\"hklm\\software\\microsoft\\datatransfer\\datamanagementgateway\\configurationmanager\">>temp.cmd&& echo for /f ^\"usebackq tokens=1,2,*\" ^a in (`reg query ^ /v diacmdpath 2^^^>nul ^^^\| find ^\"diacmdpath\"`) do ( set diacmdfile=^c )>>temp.cmd&& echo call :print ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo set destdir=^\\microsoft\\data transfer\\datamanagementgateway\\userconfiguration\\>>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diawp.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diahost.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo goto :eof>>temp.cmd&& echo :print>>temp.cmd&& echo set folder=^>>temp.cmd&& echo exit /b ^0>>temp.cmd&& temp.cmd && del temp.cmd",
Source: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	Process created: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe "cmd /c echo @echo off>temp.cmd&& echo set key_name=\"hklm\\software\\microsoft\\datatransfer\\datamanagementgateway\\configurationmanager\">>temp.cmd&& echo for /f ^\"usebackq tokens=1,2,*\" ^a in (`reg query ^ /v diacmdpath 2^^^>nul ^^^\| find ^\"diacmdpath\"`) do ( set diacmdfile=^c )>>temp.cmd&& echo call :print ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo set destdir=^\\microsoft\\data transfer\\datamanagementgateway\\userconfiguration\\>>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diawp.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diahost.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo goto :eof>>temp.cmd&& echo :print>>temp.cmd&& echo set folder=^>>temp.cmd&& echo exit /b ^0>>temp.cmd&& temp.cmd && del temp.cmd",			Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	1 Scripting	Valid Accounts	11 Command and Scripting Interpreter	1 Scripting	11 Process Injection	11 Process Injection	OS Credential Dumping	System Service Discovery	Remote Services	Data from Local System	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	LSASS Memory	Application Window Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Junk Data	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 DLL Side-Loading	Security Account Manager	Query Registry	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	Steganography	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Joe Sandbox version:	41.0.0 Charoite
Analysis ID:	1512994
Start date and time:	2024-09-18 09:45:36 +02:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 1m 36s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	default.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 10 x64 22H2 with Office Professional Plus 2019, Chrome 117, Firefox 118, Adobe Reader DC 23, Java 8 Update 381, 7zip 23.01
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	3
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	IOA.bat
Detection:	SUS
Classification:	sus22.winBAT@4/1@0/0
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Successful, ratio: 100% Number of executed functions: 0 Number of non-executed functions: 0
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .bat Stop behavior analysis, all processes terminated

Warnings

Not all processes where analyzed, report is missing behavior information

Process:	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
File Type:	ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	25
Entropy (8bit):	4.213660689688185
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:fbYbRQ8an:fbIPa
MD5:	3B0125EEE0300F303EEEED5AB6800F99
SHA1:	280F852C4C4DAC0A3A94DA2BB381BA6F60C27408
SHA-256:	1C166CE7C90DED7C94A666E9EDB6FE98D6B30816EDDE583CF38B7DAACF723086
SHA-512:	3966ECE716742A5CC36CBD9FC6FA1EBBFB9DA7F9BA7DB5033101EAFA929036366AFF39A7A5B1765B2FA4106DA0EF479D3BA698C0557D93449FC4D49BF93E24BB
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	set folder=>..EXIT /B 0..

Static File Info

General

File type:	ASCII text, with very long lines (772), with no line terminators
Entropy (8bit):	5.207505160698119
TrID:
File name:	IOA.bat
File size:	772 bytes
MD5:	04ceefdab7aaca32fbb352ae88c3a89a
SHA1:	098d423f086301e4f1a2465b804b9193affd9f70
SHA256:	c59fbfc3d93e62c1a5e30f3c26fa6be9e99ea4273f6af31bdacd1332425d7777
SHA512:	9a193b8f88a04c6117d03376c3d477d8c76aac90739a88d8577fe2344e9d0d797576c2b34e91a6be0435798dbff50893f66aa2aab474502e94f6b0032a5033c6
SSDEEP:	24:d+HsLQh1PIMum8IKw6Q+HNhiVWXej9ez4nHkdaDt:UHsM/Pzz+HNYVWXm9i4HcU
TLSH:	1801C402283C6E4638CA297BFF502508F319BDCF08C4AD475CA62035A8524D912EC6F6
File Content Preview:	"cmd /c echo @echo off>temp.cmd&& echo set KEY_NAME=\"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DataTransfer\\DataManagementGateway\\ConfigurationManager\">>temp.cmd&& echo FOR /F ^\"usebackq tokens=1,2,*^\" ^%^%A IN (`REG QUERY ^%KEY_NAME^% /v DiacmdPath 2^^^>nul ^^^\|

File Icon


Icon Hash:	9686878b929a9886

• cmd.exe
• conhost.exe
• cmd.exe

Click to jump to process

Memory Usage

• cmd.exe
• conhost.exe
• cmd.exe

Click to jump to process

Click to jump to process

Target ID:	0
Start time:	03:46:25
Start date:	18/09/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\user\Desktop\IOA.bat" "
Imagebase:	0x7ff6e27a0000
File size:	289'792 bytes
MD5 hash:	8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	1
Start time:	03:46:26
Start date:	18/09/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV1
Imagebase:	0x7ff7699e0000
File size:	862'208 bytes
MD5 hash:	0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	03:46:26
Start date:	18/09/2024
Path:	C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"cmd /c echo @echo off>temp.cmd&& echo set KEY_NAME=\"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DataTransfer\\DataManagementGateway\\ConfigurationManager\">>temp.cmd&& echo FOR /F ^\"usebackq tokens=1,2,*\" ^A IN (`REG QUERY ^ /v DiacmdPath 2^^^>nul ^^^\| find ^\"DiacmdPath\"`) DO ( set diacmdfile=^C )>>temp.cmd&& echo call :print ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo set destDir=^\\Microsoft\\Data Transfer\\DataManagementGateway\\UserConfiguration\\>>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diawp.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo move ^\"diahost.exe.config\" ^\"^\">>temp.cmd&& echo goto :eof>>temp.cmd&& echo :print>>temp.cmd&& echo set folder=^>>temp.cmd&& echo EXIT /B ^0>>temp.cmd&& temp.cmd && del temp.cmd",
Imagebase:	0x7ff6e27a0000
File size:	289'792 bytes
MD5 hash:	8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Description:	This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Execution
Data Sources:
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell .
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Office 365, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

Loading Joe Sandbox Report ...

Warning!

Windows Analysis Report IOA.bat

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Sigma Signatures

System Summary

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

HIPS / PFW / Operating System Protection Evasion

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

World Map of Contacted IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\Desktop\temp.cmd

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Network Behavior

Statistics

CPU Usage

Memory Usage

Behavior

System Behavior

Analysis Process: cmd.exePID: 6756, Parent PID: 2580

General

File Activities

File Opened

File Created

File Read

File Attributes Queried

Other File Operations

Volume Information Queried

Section Activities

Sections loaded by Windows

Registry Activities

Key Monitored

Mutex Activities

Mutex Created

Process Activities

Process Created

Process Queried

Process Information Set

Process Terminated

Thread Activities

Windows Analysis Report
IOA.bat