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Windows Analysis Report
PRODUCT OVERVIEW.doc

Overview

General Information

Sample name:	PRODUCT OVERVIEW.doc
Analysis ID:	1508635
MD5:	65363c1147fb7a4c3e42de314a5b002e
SHA1:	66455f01c498579a48529bcc709387b033d4113c
SHA256:	d534ed1c1ca02484710138b6a1517db17c76e799041ba0e908cde3abb93d80bb
Infos:

Detection

Score:	92
Range:	0 - 100
Whitelisted:	false
Confidence:	100%

Signatures

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet

Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)

Office equation editor establishes network connection

Sigma detected: Equation Editor Network Connection

Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)

Detected potential crypto function

Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware

May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis

Office Equation Editor has been started

Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)

Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)

Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)

Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication

Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)

Yara signature match

Classification

Process Tree

System is w7x64

WINWORD.EXE (PID: 3536 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE" /Automation -Embedding MD5: 9EE74859D22DAE61F1750B3A1BACB6F5)

EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 3620 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8)

EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 3840 cmdline: "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8)

cleanup

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Source	Rule	Description	Author	Strings
PRODUCT OVERVIEW.doc	INDICATOR_RTF_MalVer_Objects	Detects RTF documents with non-standard version and embeding one of the object mostly observed in exploit documents.	ditekSHen	0x20d9:$obj1: \objhtml 0x20fd:$obj2: \objdata 0x2115:$obj3: \objupdate

Sigma Signatures

Exploits

Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet

Source: Network Connection

Author: Joe Security: Data: DestinationIp: 141.98.10.11, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 80, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 3620, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 192.168.2.22, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 49163

System Summary

Sigma detected: Equation Editor Network Connection

Source: Network Connection

Author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems): Data: DestinationIp: 192.168.2.22, DestinationIsIpv6: false, DestinationPort: 49163, EventID: 3, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, Initiated: true, ProcessId: 3620, Protocol: tcp, SourceIp: 141.98.10.11, SourceIsIpv6: false, SourcePort: 80

Sigma detected: Modification of IE Registry Settings

Source: Registry Key set

Author: frack113: Data: Details: 46 00 00 00 2A 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 C0 A8 02 16 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 , EventID: 13, EventType: SetValue, Image: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE, ProcessId: 3620, TargetObject: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections\SavedLegacySettings

Sigma detected: Office Macro File Creation

Source: File created

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): Data: EventID: 11, Image: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE, ProcessId: 3536, TargetFilename: C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\~$Normal.dotm

Suricata Signatures

⊘No Suricata rule has matched

Joe Sandbox Signatures

Click to jump to signature section

Show All Signature Results

AV Detection

Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample

Source: PRODUCT OVERVIEW.doc

Avira: detected

Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL

Source: tip.swpushroller.eu	Virustotal: Detection: 14%	Perma Link
Source: http://tip.swpushroller.eu/dovfd/Yherfwjd.jsj	Virustotal: Detection: 14%	Perma Link
Source: http://tip.swpushroller.eu/dovfd/Yherfwjd.js	Virustotal: Detection: 14%	Perma Link

Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file

Source: PRODUCT OVERVIEW.doc	ReversingLabs: Detection: 56%
Source: PRODUCT OVERVIEW.doc	Virustotal: Detection: 60%			Perma Link

Exploits

Office equation editor establishes network connection

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Network connect: IP: 141.98.10.11 Port: 80

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft.vc90.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_9.0.30729.4940_none_08e4299fa83d7e3c\MSVCR90.dll

Jump to behavior

Software Vulnerabilities

Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Source: global traffic

DNS query: name: tip.swpushroller.eu

Source: global traffic

TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49163 -> 141.98.10.11:80

Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49163 -> 141.98.10.11:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 141.98.10.11:80 -> 192.168.2.22:49163
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49163 -> 141.98.10.11:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49163 -> 141.98.10.11:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 141.98.10.11:80 -> 192.168.2.22:49163
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 141.98.10.11:80 -> 192.168.2.22:49163
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49163 -> 141.98.10.11:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 192.168.2.22:49163 -> 141.98.10.11:80
Source: global traffic	TCP traffic: 141.98.10.11:80 -> 192.168.2.22:49163

Source: Joe Sandbox View

ASN Name: HOSTBALTICLT HOSTBALTICLT

Source: global traffic

HTTP traffic detected: GET /dovfd/Yherfwjd.js HTTP/1.1Accept: */*Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateUser-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)Host: tip.swpushroller.euConnection: Keep-Alive

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{A1605534-7DEB-40CA-8353-3AAD76C36219}.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: global traffic

DNS traffic detected: DNS query: tip.swpushroller.eu

Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.395356284.000000000053F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://tip.swpushroller.eu/dovfd/Yherfwjd.js
Source: EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.395356284.000000000053F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	String found in binary or memory: http://tip.swpushroller.eu/dovfd/Yherfwjd.jsj

System Summary

Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)

Source: PRODUCT OVERVIEW.doc, type: SAMPLE

Matched rule: Detects RTF documents with non-standard version and embeding one of the object mostly observed in exploit documents. Author: ditekSHen

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Memory allocated: 770B0000 page execute and read and write			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Memory allocated: 770B0000 page execute and read and write			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00544566	2_2_00544566
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00544698	2_2_00544698
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0054418C	2_2_0054418C

Source: PRODUCT OVERVIEW.doc, type: SAMPLE

Matched rule: INDICATOR_RTF_MalVer_Objects author = ditekSHen, description = Detects RTF documents with non-standard version and embeding one of the object mostly observed in exploit documents.

Source: classification engine

Classification label: mal92.expl.winDOC@3/8@1/1

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$ODUCT OVERVIEW.doc

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File created: C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\CVR7148.tmp

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File read: C:\Users\desktop.ini

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Safer\CodeIdentifiers

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	File read: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts			Jump to behavior

Source: PRODUCT OVERVIEW.doc	ReversingLabs: Detection: 56%
Source: PRODUCT OVERVIEW.doc	Virustotal: Detection: 60%

Source: unknown	Process created: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE" /Automation -Embedding
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process created: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wow64win.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wow64cpu.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: msi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: rpcrtremote.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dwmapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: version.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: secur32.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: winhttp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: webio.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: iphlpapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: winnsi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dnsapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: nlaapi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc6.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dhcpcsvc.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: rasadhlp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: propsys.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: ntmarta.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wow64win.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: wow64cpu.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: msi.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: cryptsp.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: rpcrtremote.dll	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Section loaded: dwmapi.dll	Jump to behavior

Source: PRODUCT OVERVIEW.LNK.0.dr

LNK file: ..\..\..\..\..\Desktop\PRODUCT OVERVIEW.doc

Source: Window Recorder

Window detected: More than 3 window changes detected

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

Key opened: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\14.0\Word\Resiliency\StartupItems

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE

File opened: C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft.vc90.crt_1fc8b3b9a1e18e3b_9.0.30729.4940_none_08e4299fa83d7e3c\MSVCR90.dll

Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0053F750 push edi; iretd	2_2_0053F751
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00557D52 push esi; ret	2_2_00557D53
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00548F59 push eax; retf	2_2_00548F61
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0055607E push esi; ret	2_2_0055607F
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_0053F813 pushad ; ret	2_2_0053F814
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00551000 push eax; retn 0054h	2_2_00551001
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_005582DE push edi; ret	2_2_005582DF
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00557EC4 push esi; ret	2_2_00557EC7
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00557ECC push esi; ret	2_2_00557ECF
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_005401F4 push eax; retf	2_2_005401F5
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00549EE1 push esi; iretd	2_2_00549EE2
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_00556086 push esi; ret	2_2_00556087
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_005580A2 push esi; ret	2_2_005580A3
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE	Code function: 2_2_005580AA push esi; ret	2_2_005580AB

Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOALIGNMENTFAULTEXCEPT \| NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOALIGNMENTFAULTEXCEPT \| NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE	Process information set: NOALIGNMENTFAULTEXCEPT \| NOOPENFILEERRORBOX	Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE TID: 3640	Thread sleep time: -120000s >= -30000s			Jump to behavior
Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE TID: 3860	Thread sleep time: -120000s >= -30000s			Jump to behavior

Source: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Key value queried: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid

Jump to behavior

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Reconnaissance	Resource Development	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Gather Victim Identity Information	Acquire Infrastructure	Valid Accounts	23 Exploitation for Client Execution	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Process Injection	1 Masquerading	OS Credential Dumping	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Remote Services	1 Archive Collected Data	1 Encrypted Channel	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Abuse Accessibility Features
Credentials	Domains	Default Accounts	Scheduled Task/Job	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	1 DLL Side-Loading	1 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	LSASS Memory	1 Remote System Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data from Removable Media	2 Ingress Tool Transfer	Exfiltration Over Bluetooth	Network Denial of Service
Email Addresses	DNS Server	Domain Accounts	At	Logon Script (Windows)	Logon Script (Windows)	1 Process Injection	Security Account Manager	1 File and Directory Discovery	SMB/Windows Admin Shares	Data from Network Shared Drive	2 Non-Application Layer Protocol	Automated Exfiltration	Data Encrypted for Impact
Employee Names	Virtual Private Server	Local Accounts	Cron	Login Hook	Login Hook	1 Obfuscated Files or Information	NTDS	3 System Information Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Input Capture	12 Application Layer Protocol	Traffic Duplication	Data Destruction
Gather Victim Network Information	Server	Cloud Accounts	Launchd	Network Logon Script	Network Logon Script	1 DLL Side-Loading	LSA Secrets	Internet Connection Discovery	SSH	Keylogging	Fallback Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Data Encrypted for Impact

Behavior Graph

Hide Legend

Legend:

Process
Signature
Created File
DNS/IP Info
Is Dropped
Is Windows Process
Number of created Registry Values
Number of created Files
Visual Basic
Delphi
Java
.Net C# or VB.NET
C, C++ or other language
Is malicious
Internet

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
PRODUCT OVERVIEW.doc	57%	ReversingLabs	Document-RTF.Exploit.CVE-2017-11882
PRODUCT OVERVIEW.doc	60%	Virustotal		Browse
PRODUCT OVERVIEW.doc	100%	Avira	TR/AVI.Obfuscated.lqzgf

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
tip.swpushroller.eu	15%	Virustotal		Browse

URLs

Source	Detection	Scanner	Label	Link
http://tip.swpushroller.eu/dovfd/Yherfwjd.jsj	15%	Virustotal		Browse
http://tip.swpushroller.eu/dovfd/Yherfwjd.js	15%	Virustotal		Browse

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Name	IP	Active	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
tip.swpushroller.eu	141.98.10.11	true	true	15%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown

Contacted URLs

Name	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://tip.swpushroller.eu/dovfd/Yherfwjd.js	true	15%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown

URLs from Memory and Binaries

Name	Source	Malicious	Antivirus Detection	Reputation
http://tip.swpushroller.eu/dovfd/Yherfwjd.jsj	EQNEDT32.EXE, 00000002.00000002.395356284.000000000053F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp	true	15%, Virustotal, Browse	unknown

World Map of Contacted IPs

No. of IPs < 25%
25% < No. of IPs < 50%
50% < No. of IPs < 75%
75% < No. of IPs

Public IPs

IP	Domain	Country	Flag	ASN	ASN Name	Malicious
141.98.10.11	tip.swpushroller.eu	Lithuania		209605	HOSTBALTICLT	true

General Information

Joe Sandbox version:	40.0.0 Tourmaline
Analysis ID:	1508635
Start date and time:	2024-09-10 14:36:10 +02:00
Joe Sandbox product:	CloudBasic
Overall analysis duration:	0h 4m 21s
Hypervisor based Inspection enabled:	false
Report type:	full
Cookbook file name:	defaultwindowsofficecookbook.jbs
Analysis system description:	Windows 7 x64 SP1 with Office 2010 SP1 (IE 11, FF52, Chrome 57, Adobe Reader DC 15, Flash 25.0.0.127, Java 8 Update 121, .NET 4.6.2)
Number of analysed new started processes analysed:	9
Number of new started drivers analysed:	0
Number of existing processes analysed:	0
Number of existing drivers analysed:	0
Number of injected processes analysed:	0
Technologies:	HCA enabled EGA enabled AMSI enabled
Analysis Mode:	default
Analysis stop reason:	Timeout
Sample name:	PRODUCT OVERVIEW.doc
Detection:	MAL
Classification:	mal92.expl.winDOC@3/8@1/1
EGA Information:	Failed
HCA Information:	Failed
Cookbook Comments:	Found application associated with file extension: .doc Found Word or Excel or PowerPoint or XPS Viewer Attach to Office via COM Active ActiveX Object Scroll down Close Viewer

Warnings

Exclude process from analysis (whitelisted): dllhost.exe, WerFault.exe, WMIADAP.exe, svchost.exe
Report size getting too big, too many NtOpenKeyEx calls found.
Report size getting too big, too many NtQueryValueKey calls found.

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Time	Type	Description
08:36:58	API Interceptor	498x Sleep call for process: EQNEDT32.EXE modified

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
141.98.10.11	17213054441f2891f24374c97759e4ac14183d6cfaeabe4240dc8794e61fa899b9e40b62fb429.dat-decoded.exe	Get hash	malicious	Remcos	Browse

Domains

⊘No context

ASNs

Match	Associated Sample Name / URL	SHA 256	Detection	Threat Name	Link	Context
HOSTBALTICLT	tppc.elf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	141.98.10.95
	sarm6.elf	Get hash	malicious	Mirai	Browse	141.98.10.95
	TRIAL IMG_00O0125RDER.exe	Get hash	malicious	FormBook, GuLoader	Browse	141.98.10.120
	1316wjL1Ep.elf	Get hash	malicious	Unknown	Browse	141.98.10.95
	17213054441f2891f24374c97759e4ac14183d6cfaeabe4240dc8794e61fa899b9e40b62fb429.dat-decoded.exe	Get hash	malicious	Remcos	Browse	141.98.10.11
	Demand G2-2024.xlsx	Get hash	malicious	FormBook	Browse	141.98.10.47
	171232524570452cfc1123de8b7cabf91834cbebe0e4fd1dae96e0b4418fab427bf67de7f5439.dat-decoded.exe	Get hash	malicious	RisePro Stealer	Browse	141.98.10.48
	1712325246bbbf6f1de2af242e599680d3f96095835a7a7584ff1f1f967e4c2d3f319cbbe6606.dat-decoded.exe	Get hash	malicious	PrivateLoader, RisePro Stealer	Browse	141.98.10.48
	171232524570452cfc1123de8b7cabf91834cbebe0e4fd1dae96e0b4418fab427bf67de7f5439.dat-decoded.exe	Get hash	malicious	RisePro Stealer	Browse	141.98.10.48
	17123252454cee8f5bbeea28bef775c962baa7b486704978d6564a4b4c25e4f526d316c953208.dat-decoded.exe	Get hash	malicious	PrivateLoader, RisePro Stealer	Browse	141.98.10.48

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRF{83FEED26-4D35-4A4A-A776-314B61CBE485}.tmp

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	16384
Entropy (8bit):	0.0
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3::
MD5:	CE338FE6899778AACFC28414F2D9498B
SHA1:	897256B6709E1A4DA9DABA92B6BDE39CCFCCD8C1
SHA-256:	4FE7B59AF6DE3B665B67788CC2F99892AB827EFAE3A467342B3BB4E3BC8E5BFE
SHA-512:	6EB7F16CF7AFCABE9BDEA88BDAB0469A7937EB715ADA9DFD8F428D9D38D86133945F5F2F2688DDD96062223A39B5D47F07AFC3C48D9DB1D5EE3F41C8D274DCCF
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{A1605534-7DEB-40CA-8353-3AAD76C36219}.tmp

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1024
Entropy (8bit):	0.05390218305374581
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:ol3lYdn:4Wn
MD5:	5D4D94EE7E06BBB0AF9584119797B23A
SHA1:	DBB111419C704F116EFA8E72471DD83E86E49677
SHA-256:	4826C0D860AF884D3343CA6460B0006A7A2CE7DBCCC4D743208585D997CC5FD1
SHA-512:	95F83AE84CAFCCED5EAF504546725C34D5F9710E5CA2D11761486970F2FBECCB25F9CF50BBFC272BD75E1A66A18B7783F09E1C1454AFDA519624BC2BB2F28BA4
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{BC04DEE3-CAB5-4532-8936-5008E24452D9}.tmp

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1536
Entropy (8bit):	1.3554734412254816
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:Iiiiiiiiiif3l/Hlnl/bl//l/bllBl/PvvvvvvvvvvFl/l/lAqsalHl3lldHzlb6:IiiiiiiiiifdLloZQc8++lsJe1Mz0U
MD5:	C74F59794FDC1CF5B9433B0FD360683E
SHA1:	2B74E741C7B9B425A0180B5A94906B03F5AC77E3
SHA-256:	A57F6461B04DEC9340A5E7527F33B76CC5E659D1D3062718811E574FC7DE3449
SHA-512:	2B6E08E5D46FA6595D34657B3EFE637A5D03A3C50104F1FC0B59514146BB8447DB43BECD54E2DED92EA780AA6F8A124691F62A6A573CE58A19E9DFE29D8ABE89
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	..(...(...(...(...(...(...(...(...(...(...(...A.l.b.u.s...A........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................."...&...*.......:...>...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{D5F10659-0D02-40BC-B312-200A727365E9}.tmp

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	133306
Entropy (8bit):	3.8425100328102264
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3072:uBPqBUXa5Q1mAa5Q1mAa5Q1gzbYcos+3/+J/OZ0p:u5qBca5ma5ma5xbYRPo
MD5:	742EA03F33075BA6895531405DDA0C0F
SHA1:	D62D689D7D6F9BFF39D5659D2F04209D40773A32
SHA-256:	03342BE4FA28C0AD59CEA56A87D7BA41E2CB68C543B87A80F87CD4B6CB1354A5
SHA-512:	B203B7E6E57167271F146C8E9F464DD164F28426A499DBC109AEBB38FFF13ED2BC778FA8CAE53F7728CD639453C978E5472FEA00199AAEF12443C7BEA35A692D
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	4.8.5.2.9.2.2.7.6.!.9.,.~.8.>.?.?.0.@...1.$.;.+.9.%.?.?./.2...>.].!.-.%.3.;.2.\|....?.#.).)._.'.2.7.4.:.%./.8.<._.,.~.?.;.?.?.!.\|.=.0.[.;.?...?.+.`.=...:.8.;._.&...2.%.&.%.+.0.4.&.?.?.:.:.=.-.?.'.^.....%.8.~.4.'.?.[.#.?.&./...'.'....~.1...\|.9.?.?.-.<.....7.^.-..?..._.&......1.4...;.).8.7...1.4.>.!.,.@.!.`.^...9.:.#...`.:.`.;.].4._.8.2.^.3.'.<.3.0.).5.@..:.9.!.'..[.?.=.,.-..\|.?.;.:.0.5.1.?.?.^.@.).8.7.=.&.).).!.?.2..?.=.?.=.%.5.@.?.5.,..1.[.9.^.;.@.:.\|.=.$.<.\|.$.?.[.%.(...#.>.,.>.?._.>.8.$.;...0.?.+.:.4.+._.?.'.!.1.^.<._.9.'.].'.1...?.'.4.3.+.$.`.5...9.].?.?._.,.?.).%.?...%.$.%...8.7.-.?.7...9.!.0...1.,..).3.?.>.1.4.=.?.@.\|...1.%.%.6.$.:.-.0...`.?.).5.0...6.?.9...).?._.<.].8.5.[...1.<.9.]._.:.%.`.?.?.4...-.&.?.2.`.=.~.:...7.<.%.?.?.,.?...0./.^.[.%.7./.?.+.?.3.^.+.<.\|.?.@.[.=.=.^.?._.:..../.?.3./.8.8.7.:.9.?.1.3.2.?..].+...6.9.!.&.3.(.'.4.%.<./.+.~.2.?.-.~.<.%.[.`.(.?.6.\|.3.@...1.9.'.%.%..._.+.%.^.$.$.^...).?.5...;.'.).?.@./._.4.7.,.<.?.4.2.~.>.$.<.`.?.-.;.?.5.#.(.?.%.../.(.

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\PRODUCT OVERVIEW.LNK

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	MS Windows shortcut, Item id list present, Points to a file or directory, Has Relative path, Archive, ctime=Fri Aug 11 15:42:05 2023, mtime=Fri Aug 11 15:42:05 2023, atime=Tue Sep 10 11:36:57 2024, length=152751, window=hide
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	1044
Entropy (8bit):	4.548595949126755
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	12:81+AhgXg/XAlCPCHaXIBEYB/BGFX+WkoZccsOTlaOicvbEIVaEDtZ3YilMMEpxRi:819/XTYiYbkeoZcdte0EDv3qo457u
MD5:	F62C453AECF08377E0827E7D6F5F11F9
SHA1:	C16B0520413874D56828AF4F0AA5EB75F43D08F1
SHA-256:	2163F4A515B476B056A8A53BE56B72F0B006CFD66B8637746919B7517068647E
SHA-512:	41785645B6B15E8F839A567F7F556370E8DF20AB36CFDEF79BF064C025BAA8E83331610E10DD318FA0F96057EFC450F410D25B3FC664B4B9EF13517BCB51D16A
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	L..................F.... ...7.K.r...7.K.r....O..~....T...........................P.O. .:i.....+00.../C:\...................t.1.....QK.X..Users.`.......:..QK.X...................6.....U.s.e.r.s...@.s.h.e.l.l.3.2...d.l.l.,.-.2.1.8.1.3.....L.1.....Y.d..user.8......QK.XY.d...&=....U...............A.l.b.u.s.....z.1......WE...Desktop.d......QK.X.WE...._=..............:.....D.e.s.k.t.o.p...@.s.h.e.l.l.3.2...d.l.l.,.-.2.1.7.6.9.....r.2..T..Y.d .PRODUC~1.DOC..V.......WC..WC.*.........................P.R.O.D.U.C.T. .O.V.E.R.V.I.E.W...d.o.c.......~...............-...8...[............?J......C:\Users\..#...................\\571345\Users.user\Desktop\PRODUCT OVERVIEW.doc.+.....\.....\.....\.....\.....\.D.e.s.k.t.o.p.\.P.R.O.D.U.C.T. .O.V.E.R.V.I.E.W...d.o.c.........:..,.LB.)...Ag...............1SPS.XF.L8C....&.m.m............-...S.-.1.-.5.-.2.1.-.9.6.6.7.7.1.3.1.5.-.3.0.1.9.4.0.5.6.3.7.-.3.6.7.3.3.6.4.7.7.-.1.0.0.6.............`.......X.......571345..........D_....3N...W...9..W.e8..

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\index.dat

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	Generic INItialization configuration [folders]
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	66
Entropy (8bit):	4.771666846631183
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:M1921AQlm4FqV1AQlv:MjOS
MD5:	3DCCA147DE5026500DCFE818C57EDF17
SHA1:	1EE15D91FA992B3B2CC76B055605F5C2AD94DFEC
SHA-256:	D24FBD6D83DD99A0CACCE5FA7BE972690608655E3031ADFD2BC2C100951B80F7
SHA-512:	1D51E6B42974A90C445AAC7419FBBDAA0787EDCE1DE30F5A9BA41EBC4488918F1ADCDF3B1BDEF1EB3518188B4A7C39F57B9DB972D0DCCF6C9A445FC7EB99F579
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	low
Preview:	[doc]..PRODUCT OVERVIEW.LNK=0..[folders]..PRODUCT OVERVIEW.LNK=0..

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\~$Normal.dotm

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	162
Entropy (8bit):	2.4797606462020307
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:vrJlaCkWtVyHlqlzl0pbklMWjV4lc+/dllln:vdsCkWtWYlz21kF2JV/l
MD5:	2CF7D3B8DED3F1D5CE1AC92F3E51D4ED
SHA1:	95E13378EA9CACA068B2687F01E9EF13F56627C2
SHA-256:	60DF94CDE4FD9B4A73BB13775079D75CE954B75DED5A2878277FA64AD767CAB1
SHA-512:	2D5797FBBE44766D93A5DE3D92911358C70D8BE60D5DF542ECEDB77D1195DC1EEF85E4CA1445595BE81550335A20AB3F11B512385FE20F75B1E269D6AB048E0A
Malicious:	false
Reputation:	high, very likely benign file
Preview:	.user..................................................A.l.b.u.s.............p........1...............2..............@3...............3......z.......p4......x...

C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$ODUCT OVERVIEW.doc

Download File

Process:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
File Type:	data
Category:	dropped
Size (bytes):	162
Entropy (8bit):	2.4797606462020307
Encrypted:	false
SSDEEP:	3:vrJlaCkWtVyHlqlzl0pbklMWjV4lc+/dllln:vdsCkWtWYlz21kF2JV/l
MD5:	2CF7D3B8DED3F1D5CE1AC92F3E51D4ED
SHA1:	95E13378EA9CACA068B2687F01E9EF13F56627C2
SHA-256:	60DF94CDE4FD9B4A73BB13775079D75CE954B75DED5A2878277FA64AD767CAB1
SHA-512:	2D5797FBBE44766D93A5DE3D92911358C70D8BE60D5DF542ECEDB77D1195DC1EEF85E4CA1445595BE81550335A20AB3F11B512385FE20F75B1E269D6AB048E0A
Malicious:	false
Preview:	.user..................................................A.l.b.u.s.............p........1...............2..............@3...............3......z.......p4......x...

Static File Info

General

File type:	Rich Text Format data, version 1
Entropy (8bit):	4.6608191655333915
TrID:	Rich Text Format (5005/1) 55.56% Rich Text Format (4004/1) 44.44%
File name:	PRODUCT OVERVIEW.doc
File size:	152'751 bytes
MD5:	65363c1147fb7a4c3e42de314a5b002e
SHA1:	66455f01c498579a48529bcc709387b033d4113c
SHA256:	d534ed1c1ca02484710138b6a1517db17c76e799041ba0e908cde3abb93d80bb
SHA512:	fdca66c58dc22c186c8752634203a8e5234891e4f895893c538eb0856b8b94fb0573ba3582bc8278154495467490a6c2172c7c9f4489ec7dd5e4e095343b9bb3
SSDEEP:	1536:sEneABaLFcF2iEABaLFcF2iXA6u8AaPGosM9ezY08gsOTaCi9qYj2pAgb:seRoAFczYGaCgqY4Agb
TLSH:	94E3F2ACD38B54A58F49A7B3531B4E8916BD323EF74614B8304CA77437EAE7885094BC
File Content Preview:	{\rtf1..{\\qSlLGtYt2YniItkDsB5ncfiz2h4q1MVZ092QI4IrYoivkLxrAeg3jiR9cquO48MNSGIodVUlVz60oDCdJoS1zY3sigvi4KDRLKwHyG0s2dLk9VOpSBpS3DSSUlVZezy4otOcwLmVLGrvPGRhmIB9ajaB6b3lV7WW1T1cDmiuYQ3KGWEZQhxtF7JKhiz5}..{\1485292276!9,~8>??0@.1$;+9%??/2.>]!-%3;2\|.?#))_'2

File Icon


Icon Hash:	2764a3aaaeb7bdbf

Static RTF Info

Objects

Id	Start	Format ID	Format	Classname	Datasize	Filename	Sourcepath	Temppath	Exploit
0	00002107h								no

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Sep 10, 2024 14:37:01.619410038 CEST	49163	80	192.168.2.22	141.98.10.11
Sep 10, 2024 14:37:01.624524117 CEST	80	49163	141.98.10.11	192.168.2.22
Sep 10, 2024 14:37:01.624627113 CEST	49163	80	192.168.2.22	141.98.10.11
Sep 10, 2024 14:37:01.625617981 CEST	49163	80	192.168.2.22	141.98.10.11
Sep 10, 2024 14:37:01.630634069 CEST	80	49163	141.98.10.11	192.168.2.22
Sep 10, 2024 14:37:23.014017105 CEST	80	49163	141.98.10.11	192.168.2.22
Sep 10, 2024 14:37:23.014127016 CEST	49163	80	192.168.2.22	141.98.10.11
Sep 10, 2024 14:37:23.014234066 CEST	49163	80	192.168.2.22	141.98.10.11
Sep 10, 2024 14:37:23.023755074 CEST	80	49163	141.98.10.11	192.168.2.22

UDP Packets

Timestamp	Source Port	Dest Port	Source IP	Dest IP
Sep 10, 2024 14:37:01.537622929 CEST	54562	53	192.168.2.22	8.8.8.8
Sep 10, 2024 14:37:01.594079018 CEST	53	54562	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.22

DNS Queries

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	OP Code	Name	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Sep 10, 2024 14:37:01.537622929 CEST	192.168.2.22	8.8.8.8	0x9c38	Standard query (0)	tip.swpushroller.eu	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

DNS Answers

Timestamp	Source IP	Dest IP	Trans ID	Reply Code	Name	CName	Address	Type	Class	DNS over HTTPS
Sep 10, 2024 14:37:01.594079018 CEST	8.8.8.8	192.168.2.22	0x9c38	No error (0)	tip.swpushroller.eu		141.98.10.11	A (IP address)	IN (0x0001)	false

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

tip.swpushroller.eu

HTTP Packets

Session ID	Source IP	Source Port	Destination IP	Destination Port	PID	Process
0	192.168.2.22	49163	141.98.10.11	80	3620	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE

Timestamp	Bytes transferred	Direction	Data
Sep 10, 2024 14:37:01.625617981 CEST	323	OUT	GET /dovfd/Yherfwjd.js HTTP/1.1 Accept: / Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E) Host: tip.swpushroller.eu Connection: Keep-Alive

Target ID:	0
Start time:	08:36:57
Start date:	10/09/2024
Path:	C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	false
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE" /Automation -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x13ffd0000
File size:	1'423'704 bytes
MD5 hash:	9EE74859D22DAE61F1750B3A1BACB6F5
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	false

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	2
Start time:	08:36:58
Start date:	10/09/2024
Path:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	543'304 bytes
MD5 hash:	A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	true

Show Windows behavior

Target ID:	5
Start time:	08:37:39
Start date:	10/09/2024
Path:	C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE
Wow64 process (32bit):	true
Commandline:	"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\EQUATION\EQNEDT32.EXE" -Embedding
Imagebase:	0x400000
File size:	543'304 bytes
MD5 hash:	A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8
Has elevated privileges:	true
Has administrator privileges:	true
Programmed in:	C, C++ or other language
Reputation:	high
Has exited:	false

Show Windows behavior

Function 00544566 Relevance: .6, Instructions: 573COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000002.00000002.395356284.000000000053F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 0053F000, based on PE: false

Similarity

API ID:
String ID:
API String ID:
Opcode ID: 60a6d82d6c333f7ad21900efc5f4fd48a4ad3104a245f1eae1cdc4e01795a507
Instruction ID: 7c4fccb7facbab4cf35617daef89612a2954cd89d6b8ef73a9184f211c8bf6b3
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 60a6d82d6c333f7ad21900efc5f4fd48a4ad3104a245f1eae1cdc4e01795a507
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: C8E1982105E7C05FD7638B344CAAA927F74AE23104B4E85DBD8C58F5E3E249494ACBB7

Function 0054418C Relevance: .5, Instructions: 459COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000002.00000002.395356284.000000000053F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 0053F000, based on PE: false

Similarity

API ID:
String ID:
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Opcode ID: b56f99f96d3c4198bbff1d239ed71dc484eb784cc85854d75e827970ae8c2b48
Instruction ID: 2678956729e6cf7a5a1b7e1285c4639e1de080526c2b764099edd3718d1fd17f
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: b56f99f96d3c4198bbff1d239ed71dc484eb784cc85854d75e827970ae8c2b48
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 91B19B2145E7C09FD7538B344CAA9927F74AE2350474E82DBD4C1CF5A7E219490AC7B7

Function 00544698 Relevance: .4, Instructions: 433COMMON

Download Yara Rule

Memory Dump Source

Source File: 00000002.00000002.395356284.000000000053F000.00000004.00000020.00020000.00000000.sdmp, Offset: 0053F000, based on PE: false

Similarity

API ID:
String ID:
API String ID:
Opcode ID: 5eb6e6a5f51dedf2905f2fa0c7d6821e05247c30752834526f586575b13084b8
Instruction ID: 730ace4c914582b15711e883934080ff35150dc9b12c9caebb53a47eaab1e619
Opcode Fuzzy Hash: 5eb6e6a5f51dedf2905f2fa0c7d6821e05247c30752834526f586575b13084b8
Instruction Fuzzy Hash: 96B1982105F7C05FD3638B345CAAA923F74AE63204B4E85DBD4C58F1A3E249495ACBB7

Description:	Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Tactics:	Execution
Data Sources:	Application Log: Application Log Content, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking , side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Data Sources:	File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Metadata, Process: Process Modification
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Image: Image Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Metadata, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Metadata
Platforms:	Containers, Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion, Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Tactics:	Defense Evasion
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution, WMI: WMI Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping or `net view` using Net .
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Tactics:	Discovery
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Platforms:	IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Tactics:	Collection
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp . Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer ).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive.Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Description:	Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Tactics:	Command and Control
Data Sources:	Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Platforms:	Linux, macOS, Windows
Url:	Open detailed description by Mitre

Behavior Section

Behavior Chronological

Disassembly

Uncategorized

Graph

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Windows Analysis Report PRODUCT OVERVIEW.doc

Overview

General Information

Detection

Signatures

Classification

Process Tree

Malware Configuration

Yara Signatures

Initial Sample

Sigma Signatures

Exploits

System Summary

Suricata Signatures

Joe Sandbox Signatures

AV Detection

Exploits

Compliance

Software Vulnerabilities

Networking

System Summary

Data Obfuscation

Hooking and other Techniques for Hiding and Protection

Malware Analysis System Evasion

Language, Device and Operating System Detection

Mitre Att&ck Matrix

Behavior Graph

Screenshots

Thumbnails

Antivirus, Machine Learning and Genetic Malware Detection

Initial Sample

Dropped Files

Unpacked PE Files

Domains

URLs

Domains and IPs

Contacted Domains

Contacted URLs

URLs from Memory and Binaries

World Map of Contacted IPs

Public IPs

General Information

Warnings

Simulations

Behavior and APIs

Joe Sandbox View / Context

IPs

Domains

ASNs

JA3 Fingerprints

Dropped Files

Created / dropped Files

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRF{83FEED26-4D35-4A4A-A776-314B61CBE485}.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{A1605534-7DEB-40CA-8353-3AAD76C36219}.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{BC04DEE3-CAB5-4532-8936-5008E24452D9}.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{D5F10659-0D02-40BC-B312-200A727365E9}.tmp

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\PRODUCT OVERVIEW.LNK

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\index.dat

C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\~$Normal.dotm

C:\Users\user\Desktop\~$ODUCT OVERVIEW.doc

Static File Info

General

File Icon

Static RTF Info

Objects

Network Behavior

Network Port Distribution

TCP Packets

UDP Packets

DNS Queries

DNS Answers

HTTP Request Dependency Graph

HTTP Packets

Windows Analysis Report
PRODUCT OVERVIEW.doc