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Windows
Analysis Report
80c619d931fa4e5c89fe87aac0b6b143.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
XWorm
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected AntiVM3
Yara detected XWorm
.NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
.NET source code contains very large strings
AI detected suspicious sample
Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender
Allocates memory in foreign processes
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Check if machine is in data center or colocation facility
Connects to many ports of the same IP (likely port scanning)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent)
Drops PE files to the user root directory
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Machine Learning detection for sample
Protects its processes via BreakOnTermination flag
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Writes to foreign memory regions
Yara detected Generic Downloader
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Abnormal high CPU Usage
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a start menu entry (Start Menu\Programs\Startup)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the user directory
Enables debug privileges
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May check the online IP address of the machine
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Powershell Defender Exclusion
Sigma detected: Startup Folder File Write
Stores files to the Windows start menu directory
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- 80c619d931fa4e5c89fe87aac0b6b143.exe (PID: 6780 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\80c619d 931fa4e5c8 9fe87aac0b 6b143.exe" MD5: 5957AB676B59DA646EA6C4D1B18F4381) - RegSvcs.exe (PID: 4956 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\reg svcs.exe" MD5: 9D352BC46709F0CB5EC974633A0C3C94) - powershell.exe (PID: 6668 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Execution Policy Byp ass Add-Mp Preference -Exclusio nPath 'C:\ Windows\Mi crosoft.NE T\Framewor k\v4.0.303 19\regsvcs .exe' MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 4028 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 5036 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Execution Policy Byp ass Add-Mp Preference -Exclusio nProcess ' regsvcs.ex e' MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 6984 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 2164 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Execution Policy Byp ass Add-Mp Preference -Exclusio nPath 'C:\ Users\user \XClient.e xe' MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 5612 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 5776 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Execution Policy Byp ass Add-Mp Preference -Exclusio nProcess ' XClient.ex e' MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 5896 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - schtasks.exe (PID: 4140 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \schtasks. exe" /crea te /f /RL HIGHEST /s c minute / mo 1 /tn " XClient" / tr "C:\Use rs\user\XC lient.exe" MD5: 48C2FE20575769DE916F48EF0676A965) - conhost.exe (PID: 3396 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- XClient.exe (PID: 5608 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\XClien t.exe MD5: 9D352BC46709F0CB5EC974633A0C3C94) - conhost.exe (PID: 6524 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- XClient.exe (PID: 5544 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\XClie nt.exe" MD5: 9D352BC46709F0CB5EC974633A0C3C94) - conhost.exe (PID: 5488 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- XClient.exe (PID: 6424 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\XClie nt.exe" MD5: 9D352BC46709F0CB5EC974633A0C3C94) - conhost.exe (PID: 6148 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- XClient.exe (PID: 1576 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\XClien t.exe MD5: 9D352BC46709F0CB5EC974633A0C3C94) - conhost.exe (PID: 5896 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- XClient.exe (PID: 6160 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\XClien t.exe MD5: 9D352BC46709F0CB5EC974633A0C3C94) - conhost.exe (PID: 984 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- XClient.exe (PID: 5912 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\XClien t.exe MD5: 9D352BC46709F0CB5EC974633A0C3C94) - conhost.exe (PID: 3772 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- XClient.exe (PID: 5532 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\XClien t.exe MD5: 9D352BC46709F0CB5EC974633A0C3C94) - conhost.exe (PID: 5144 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
XWorm | Malware with wide range of capabilities ranging from RAT to ransomware. | No Attribution |
{"C2 url": ["case-shield.gl.at.ply.gg"], "Port": "26501", "Aes key": "<123456789>", "SPL": "<Xwormmm>", "Install file": "USB.exe", "Version": "XWorm V5.6"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_XWorm | Yara detected XWorm | Joe Security | ||
MALWARE_Win_AsyncRAT | Detects AsyncRAT | ditekSHen |
| |
JoeSecurity_XWorm | Yara detected XWorm | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_XWorm | Yara detected XWorm | Joe Security | ||
MALWARE_Win_AsyncRAT | Detects AsyncRAT | ditekSHen |
| |
Click to see the 10 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_XWorm | Yara detected XWorm | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_GenericDownloader_1 | Yara detected Generic Downloader | Joe Security | ||
MALWARE_Win_AsyncRAT | Detects AsyncRAT | ditekSHen |
| |
JoeSecurity_XWorm | Yara detected XWorm | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_GenericDownloader_1 | Yara detected Generic Downloader | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 13 entries |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: frack113: |
Source: | Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research): |
Source: | Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements): |
Timestamp | SID | Severity | Classtype | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2024-09-09T17:32:00.021865+0200 | 2853193 | 1 | Malware Command and Control Activity Detected | 192.168.2.5 | 49725 | 147.185.221.17 | 26501 | TCP |
Click to jump to signature section
Show All Signature Results
AV Detection |
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Source: | Malware Configuration Extractor: |
Source: | ReversingLabs: |
Source: | Integrated Neural Analysis Model: |
Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: |
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Compliance |
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Source: | Unpacked PE file: |
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Networking |
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Source: | Suricata IDS: | ||
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Source: | URLs: |
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Source: | UDP traffic detected without corresponding DNS query: | ||
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Source: | String found in binary or memory: | ||
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Operating System Destruction |
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Source: | Process information set: | Jump to behavior |
System Summary |
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Source: | Matched rule: | ||
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Source: | Long String: | ||
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Source: | Process Stats: |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_04C18A48 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_04C18A60 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_04C18A18 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_04C18A24 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_04C18A30 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_04C1B898 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_04C1B9C8 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_04C1B1D0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_04C18A54 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_04C1B270 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_04C1B338 |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_004FD874 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_004FD9B0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00E36A20 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00E36A11 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_04C17F30 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_04C17A28 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_04C19B58 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_04C17F20 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_04C191D1 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_04C19B48 | |
Source: | Code function: | 1_2_029AE390 | |
Source: | Code function: | 1_2_029A96C8 | |
Source: | Code function: | 1_2_029A46F8 | |
Source: | Code function: | 1_2_029AD5C8 | |
Source: | Code function: | 1_2_029A1950 | |
Source: | Code function: | 1_2_029A4E5A | |
Source: | Code function: | 1_2_029A8DF8 | |
Source: | Code function: | 1_2_029A8AB0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 1_2_029AFAF8 | |
Source: | Code function: | 1_2_06270085 | |
Source: | Code function: | 3_2_00D0B490 | |
Source: | Code function: | 3_2_00D0B470 | |
Source: | Code function: | 6_2_04B4B4A0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 6_2_04B4B490 | |
Source: | Code function: | 10_2_04A6B490 | |
Source: | Code function: | 10_2_04A6B470 | |
Source: | Code function: | 10_2_08AD3AA0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 19_2_01390BC0 |
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