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Windows
Analysis Report
SecuriteInfo.com.Program.RemoteAdminNET.1.22990.5900.msi
Overview
General Information
Detection
AteraAgent
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Yara detected AteraAgent
AI detected suspicious sample
Changes security center settings (notifications, updates, antivirus, firewall)
Creates files in the system32 config directory
Installs Task Scheduler Managed Wrapper
Queries sensitive disk information (via WMI, Win32_DiskDrive, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive service information (via WMI, WIN32_SERVICE, often done to detect sandboxes)
Queries sensitive service information (via WMI, Win32_LogicalDisk, often done to detect sandboxes)
Queries sensitive sound device information (via WMI, Win32_SoundDevice, often done to detect virtual machines)
Query firmware table information (likely to detect VMs)
Reads the Security eventlog
Reads the System eventlog
Sample is not signed and drops a device driver
Very long command line found
Writes many files with high entropy
Yara detected Generic Downloader
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Adds / modifies Windows certificates
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Checks for available system drives (often done to infect USB drives)
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (OutputDebugString,GetLastError)
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates COM task schedule object (often to register a task for autostart)
Creates a DirectInput object (often for capturing keystrokes)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a start menu entry (Start Menu\Programs\Startup)
Creates driver files
Creates files inside the system directory
Creates or modifies windows services
Deletes files inside the Windows folder
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the windows directory (C:\Windows)
Drops files with a non-matching file extension (content does not match file extension)
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Is looking for software installed on the system
Launches processes in debugging mode, may be used to hinder debugging
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)
PE file contains more sections than normal
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
PE file does not import any functions
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the product ID of Windows
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: Remote Thread Creation By Uncommon Source Image
Sigma detected: Startup Folder File Write
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Stores files to the Windows start menu directory
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Classification
- System is w10x64
- svchost.exe (PID: 7316 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k Unist ackSvcGrou p MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
- msiexec.exe (PID: 7420 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \msiexec.e xe" /i "C: \Users\use r\Desktop\ SecuriteIn fo.com.Pro gram.Remot eAdminNET. 1.22990.59 00.msi" MD5: E5DA170027542E25EDE42FC54C929077)
- msiexec.exe (PID: 7508 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ msiexec.ex e /V MD5: E5DA170027542E25EDE42FC54C929077) - msiexec.exe (PID: 7696 cmdline:
C:\Windows \syswow64\ MsiExec.ex e -Embeddi ng 88B9AFD 431CCCBC2C 183FA86EEA F26D8 MD5: 9D09DC1EDA745A5F87553048E57620CF) - AteraAgent.exe (PID: 7924 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\ATERA Networks\A teraAgent\ AteraAgent .exe" /i / Integrator Login="gea roid@pcsal es.ie" /Co mpanyId="" /Integrat orLoginUI= "" /Compan yIdUI="" MD5: 28D920237F64F246331725C1B2A29D1B) - msiexec.exe (PID: 5352 cmdline:
C:\Windows \syswow64\ MsiExec.ex e -Embeddi ng B00A7C3 6C28E72411 76BB9CC8D9 8E5DB E Gl obal\MSI00 00 MD5: 9D09DC1EDA745A5F87553048E57620CF) - AnyDesk-f45e5af2_msi.exe (PID: 5048 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\AnyDes k-f45e5af2 _msi\AnyDe sk-f45e5af 2_msi.exe" --control MD5: 93B4FC0135DEBA59A7D1A59468FE2794)
- Sgrmuserer.exe (PID: 7556 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ Sgrmuserer .exe MD5: 3BA1A18A0DC30A0545E7765CB97D8E63)
- svchost.exe (PID: 7660 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k Local SystemNetw orkRestric ted -p -s StorSvc MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
- svchost.exe (PID: 7772 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k wsapp x -p -s Cl ipSVC MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
- svchost.exe (PID: 7804 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k Local ServiceNet workRestri cted -p -s wscsvc MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
- AteraAgent.exe (PID: 8036 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\ATERA Networks\A teraAgent\ AteraAgent .exe" MD5: 28D920237F64F246331725C1B2A29D1B) - sc.exe (PID: 8148 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \sc.exe" f ailure Ate raAgent re set= 600 a ctions= re start/2500 0 MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 8156 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - AgentPackageAgentInformation.exe (PID: 6608 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\ATERA Networks\A teraAgent\ Packages\A gentPackag eAgentInfo rmation\Ag entPackage AgentInfor mation.exe " 328987ae -dff2-409c -a138-b16d 9739728b " 7f4bc6c6-5 9a6-4bc9-8 598-c31d71 8ec694" ag ent-api.at era.com/Pr oduction 4 43 or8ixLi 90Mf "mini malIdentif ication" MD5: ACCE8B17DE63299AA4D5CB7D709BEEDC) - conhost.exe (PID: 5352 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - AgentPackageAgentInformation.exe (PID: 7276 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\ATERA Networks\A teraAgent\ Packages\A gentPackag eAgentInfo rmation\Ag entPackage AgentInfor mation.exe " 328987ae -dff2-409c -a138-b16d 9739728b " 4d4475cf-d e40-427c-8 4dc-885cd4 d49f26" ag ent-api.at era.com/Pr oduction 4 43 or8ixLi 90Mf "iden tified" MD5: ACCE8B17DE63299AA4D5CB7D709BEEDC) - conhost.exe (PID: 1244 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - AgentPackageAgentInformation.exe (PID: 8128 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\ATERA Networks\A teraAgent\ Packages\A gentPackag eAgentInfo rmation\Ag entPackage AgentInfor mation.exe " 328987ae -dff2-409c -a138-b16d 9739728b " 286bd9d8-3 53a-4b8d-9 785-82c152 8904e7" ag ent-api.at era.com/Pr oduction 4 43 or8ixLi 90Mf "gene ralinfo fr omGui" MD5: ACCE8B17DE63299AA4D5CB7D709BEEDC) - conhost.exe (PID: 7456 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cmd.exe (PID: 7032 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \cmd.exe" /c cscript "C:\Progr am Files ( x86)\Micro soft Offic e\Office16 \ospp.vbs" /dstatus MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 5488 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cscript.exe (PID: 2348 cmdline:
cscript "C :\Program Files (x86 )\Microsof t Office\O ffice16\os pp.vbs" /d status MD5: 24590BF74BBBBFD7D7AC070F4E3C44FD) - AgentPackageADRemote.exe (PID: 2832 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\ATERA Networks\A teraAgent\ Packages\A gentPackag eADRemote\ AgentPacka geADRemote .exe" 3289 87ae-dff2- 409c-a138- b16d973972 8b "1770ba 0d-887c-48 bc-9dfe-81 a93d31467b " agent-ap i.atera.co m/Producti on 443 or8 ixLi90Mf " eyJBZENvbW 1hbmRUeXBl IjozLCJJbn N0YWxsYXRp b25GaWxlVX JsIjoiaHR0 cHM6Ly9wYW NrYWdlc3N0 b3JlLmJsb2 IuY29yZS53 aW5kb3dzLm 5ldC9pbnN0 YWxsZXJzL0 FueURlc2sv QWdlbnRfQW 55RGVza19D dXN0b21fQ2 xpZW50Lm1z aSJ9" MD5: 3180C705182447F4BCC7CE8E2820B25D) - conhost.exe (PID: 1556 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - msiexec.exe (PID: 3852 cmdline:
"msiexec.e xe" /i "C: \Windows\T EMP\AnyDes k-CM.msi" /qn MD5: E5DA170027542E25EDE42FC54C929077) - AgentPackageMonitoring.exe (PID: 2800 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\ATERA Networks\A teraAgent\ Packages\A gentPackag eMonitorin g\AgentPac kageMonito ring.exe" 328987ae-d ff2-409c-a 138-b16d97 39728b "8f 1aa051-8e5 0-4815-abc 3-1c654528 9f2a" agen t-api.ater a.com/Prod uction 443 or8ixLi90 Mf "syncpr ofile" MD5: B50005A1A62AFA85240D1F65165856EB) - conhost.exe (PID: 2896 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- AteraAgent.exe (PID: 7268 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\ATERA Networks\A teraAgent\ AteraAgent .exe" MD5: 28D920237F64F246331725C1B2A29D1B) - sc.exe (PID: 8028 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \sc.exe" f ailure Ate raAgent re set= 600 a ctions= re start/2500 0 MD5: 3FB5CF71F7E7EB49790CB0E663434D80) - conhost.exe (PID: 8048 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - AgentPackageAgentInformation.exe (PID: 1132 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\ATERA Networks\A teraAgent\ Packages\A gentPackag eAgentInfo rmation\Ag entPackage AgentInfor mation.exe " 328987ae -dff2-409c -a138-b16d 9739728b " d1d3f044-b 3ad-4477-a 71b-e7adea 6af624" ag ent-api.at era.com/Pr oduction 4 43 or8ixLi 90Mf "gene ralinfo" MD5: ACCE8B17DE63299AA4D5CB7D709BEEDC) - conhost.exe (PID: 6560 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cmd.exe (PID: 5936 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \cmd.exe" /c cscript "C:\Progr am Files ( x86)\Micro soft Offic e\Office16 \ospp.vbs" /dstatus MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 6568 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cscript.exe (PID: 1128 cmdline:
cscript "C :\Program Files (x86 )\Microsof t Office\O ffice16\os pp.vbs" /d status MD5: 24590BF74BBBBFD7D7AC070F4E3C44FD) - AgentPackageSTRemote.exe (PID: 6872 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\ATERA Networks\A teraAgent\ Packages\A gentPackag eSTRemote\ AgentPacka geSTRemote .exe" 3289 87ae-dff2- 409c-a138- b16d973972 8b "56e781 24-ff9e-4e 29-ad5e-02 09b83f61c7 " agent-ap i.atera.co m/Producti on 443 or8 ixLi90Mf " downloadif needed" MD5: 00A4D22D776D110ADCC63F0C567131C6) - conhost.exe (PID: 3600 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - AgentPackageUpgradeAgent.exe (PID: 7120 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\ATERA Networks\A teraAgent\ Packages\A gentPackag eUpgradeAg ent\AgentP ackageUpgr adeAgent.e xe" 328987 ae-dff2-40 9c-a138-b1 6d9739728b "7cc0114f -d163-4617 -a905-9a32 9cdf5945" agent-api. atera.com/ Production 443 or8ix Li90Mf "ch eckforupda tes" MD5: 6095B43FA565DA44E7A818CFB4BACBA2) - conhost.exe (PID: 5516 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - AgentPackageInternalPoller.exe (PID: 4236 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\ATERA Networks\A teraAgent\ Packages\A gentPackag eInternalP oller\Agen tPackageIn ternalPoll er.exe" 32 8987ae-dff 2-409c-a13 8-b16d9739 728b "1971 04ea-9832- 45bd-9a2f- 8c3a397475 67" agent- api.atera. com/Produc tion 443 o r8ixLi90Mf "pollAll" MD5: 01807774F043028EC29982A62FA75941) - conhost.exe (PID: 7264 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - AgentPackageSystemTools.exe (PID: 560 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\ATERA Networks\A teraAgent\ Packages\A gentPackag eSystemToo ls\AgentPa ckageSyste mTools.exe " 328987ae -dff2-409c -a138-b16d 9739728b " 28e860a2-2 85e-4a91-9 ed0-d26147 90e752" ag ent-api.at era.com/Pr oduction 4 43 or8ixLi 90Mf "prob e" MD5: 26E9CCE4BD85A1FCACBF03A8C3F3DDCA) - conhost.exe (PID: 412 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - AgentPackageRuntimeInstaller.exe (PID: 3324 cmdline:
"C:\Progra m Files (x 86)\ATERA Networks\A teraAgent\ Packages\A gentPackag eRuntimeIn staller\Ag entPackage RuntimeIns taller.exe " 328987ae -dff2-409c -a138-b16d 9739728b " e4786dfd-8 714-4cf5-9 610-b4bc75 778433" ag ent-api.at era.com/Pr oduction 4 43 or8ixLi 90Mf "eyJD b21tYW5kTm FtZSI6Imlu c3RhbGxkb3 RuZXQiLCJE b3ROZXRWZX JzaW9uIjoi Ni4wLjMyIi wiTWFjQVJN RG93bmxvYW RVcmwiOiJo dHRwczovL2 Rvd25sb2Fk LnZpc3VhbH N0dWRpby5t aWNyb3NvZn QuY29tL2Rv d25sb2FkL3 ByLzNiMTFi ZDM4LTU4Zm QtNDc4My05 ZDdmLWUxOG UwNDA5ZmU2 YS9hM2RmNG M3ZWJmZjhm YzJjNjdkN2 M5ZjU1MThm YjdmZC9kb3 RuZXQtcnVu dGltZS02Lj AuMzItb3N4 LWFybTY0Ln BrZyIsIk1h Y1g2NERvd2 5sb2FkVXJs IjoiaHR0cH M6Ly9kb3du bG9hZC52aX N1YWxzdHVk aW8ubWljcm 9zb2Z0LmNv bS9kb3dubG 9hZC9wci9h YTBiMWY3MS 04ZGZjLTRi MWItOTUyNS 0yMjQ5Y2Q0 N2NkN2QvZW RkNDJjM2Yy YmYxMTEwNj czNTVhZTFk NDU5OGZhNT EvZG90bmV0 LXJ1bnRpbW UtNi4wLjMy LW9zeC14Nj QucGtnIiwi V2luQVJNRG 93bmxvYWRV cmwiOiJodH RwczovL2Rv d25sb2FkLn Zpc3VhbHN0 dWRpby5taW Nyb3NvZnQu Y29tL2Rvd2 5sb2FkL3By L2I2ZGIyMj YxLTQyODgt NDc0Zi04Nz YyLTRlZTA2 YmNiMTIyNy 9lOGIxNDU4 ZWE5ZjgyYj kwZTYzYmU4 ZmU4YjlmMj c3NS9kb3Ru ZXQtcnVudG ltZS02LjAu MzItd2luLW FybTY0LmV4 ZSIsIldpbl g2NERvd25s b2FkVXJsIj oiaHR0cHM6 Ly9kb3dubG 9hZC52aXN1 YWxzdHVkaW 8ubWljcm9z b2Z0LmNvbS 9kb3dubG9h ZC9wci80NT E1YWFhYS1j N2Q1LTQwYm YtYjdmZC1m NDc2ZDZlYT NiMWEvYzU0 NWVhOTJkYm Q1Mzc3NTNh ZWZiOTM3ND c4ZmQ1MzIv ZG90bmV0LX J1bnRpbWUt Ni4wLjMyLX dpbi14NjQu ZXhlIiwiV2 luWDg2RG93 bmxvYWRVcm wiOiJodHRw czovL2Rvd2 5sb2FkLnZp c3VhbHN0dW Rpby5taWNy b3NvZnQuY2 9tL2Rvd25s b2FkL3ByLz Q4ZWRkZTFl LTFlOGYtNG RiNi1iNGRj LWM4ODI1NT ZkZGE0Yi8w ODRhZjllNT Q2ODZmNzBh OGRhZWNlYT JkMmZiZTJj Yi9kb3RuZX QtcnVudGlt ZS02LjAuMz Itd2luLXg4 Ni5leGUiLC JNYWNBUk1D aGVja3N1bS I6ImszRlZu UDdFQ25zUW dITm92ZTBv ZmFVNXgzVF VHVDZkOFk3 TmFwbTZPZW puNXBpVXNo Zlcwczc1Qk JhVUR6T3hr NmxXL01BOF JnM2pqTVFI ai9Eb3lRPT 0iLCJNYWNY NjRDaGVja3 N1bSI6IjZ2 bUxDeVFPSn BrUkFtSDMx UnRYZE9tSn FuQkZEXHUw MDJCZ1VGeW xzN3hjSldv WmZcdTAwMk Juc25WWWtR c2JIYWV0TX VUcm8xaWRM cDhSVnl6Rj E4NmFLQUNo SkZnUT09Ii wiV2luQVJN Q2hlY2tzdW 0iOiJ3eG02 bWxhZkdzWX pPTmh4WVBL SW85a3RBVk N0WC94MGVu a0s0RjAwUH JQMm9FSTI3 aXFPNTh2ak FEOHpITUMw enRYNnBBWW ZNb0hEMXoy czYzcm5SQT 09IiwiV2lu WDY0Q2hlY2 tzdW0iOiI1 Ry9MOVhSM2 J0R0ZrcGFo aHpTdkVDcV NIb3J1d0Fh ZTZVdkk4az FNYWFvb3Ni RmR5Nk4xU3 NHdFB2NEpu SUs4UmxPVU tUSHU2NFZM THRCb1RWTH FoUT09Iiwi V2luWDg2Q2 hlY2tzdW0i OiJTZU51SV x1MDAyQkhM aTM0L0JQL1 ZKcHFqb2Fa eVZDY1ZLVn NhQUdtalc5 dWJyeUFrZ3 pkZ2wwS2xj NENuT2ljZ0 1Mb2R4dVNV cU9SeVRJbU dZWmVGSzlM bW1RPT0iLC JXb3Jrc3Bh Y2VJZCI6Im JmMGNlNDlk LTc3Y2YtND cyMS1iZjcw LTU3Njg2Mz gzYzlhYiIs IkxvZ05hbW UiOiJEb3RO ZXRSdW50aW 1lSW5zdGFs bGF0aW9uUm Vwb3J0Iiwi U2hhcmVkS2 V5IjoialVJ Uy9UOUNSVk RlS3hZZzRV cjNhQ2hoV1 F1Y1k3UFZ2