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Windows
Analysis Report
ABA NEW ORDER No.2400228341.pdf.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
AsyncRAT
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Schedule system process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Double Extension File Execution
Yara detected AntiVM3
Yara detected AsyncRAT
Yara detected UAC Bypass using CMSTP
.NET source code contains very large array initializations
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
AI detected suspicious sample
Allocates memory in foreign processes
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent)
Drops PE files with benign system names
Initial sample is a PE file and has a suspicious name
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Machine Learning detection for sample
Sigma detected: Files With System Process Name In Unsuspected Locations
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation CLIP+ Launcher
Sigma detected: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher
Sigma detected: System File Execution Location Anomaly
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Writes to foreign memory regions
Yara detected Generic Downloader
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
One or more processes crash
PE file contains executable resources (Code or Archives)
PE file does not import any functions
Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Sigma detected: Conhost Spawned By Uncommon Parent Process
Sigma detected: Suspicious Schtasks From Env Var Folder
Sigma detected: Uncommon Svchost Parent Process
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- ABA NEW ORDER No.2400228341.pdf.exe (PID: 2624 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\ABA NEW ORDER No. 2400228341 .pdf.exe" MD5: D9D0BA1C1CC0DD9243F36FBA8B1147AD) - conhost.exe (PID: 3792 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - RegSvcs.exe (PID: 1632 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\reg svcs.exe" MD5: 9D352BC46709F0CB5EC974633A0C3C94) - CasPol.exe (PID: 5580 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Cas Pol.exe" MD5: 914F728C04D3EDDD5FBA59420E74E56B) - InstallUtil.exe (PID: 1776 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\ins tallutil.e xe" MD5: 5D4073B2EB6D217C19F2B22F21BF8D57) - cmd.exe (PID: 6768 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\System32 \cmd.exe" /c schtask s /create /f /sc onl ogon /rl h ighest /tn "svchost" /tr '"C:\ Users\user \AppData\L ocal\Temp\ svchost.ex e"' & exit MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 6848 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - schtasks.exe (PID: 2860 cmdline:
schtasks / create /f /sc onlogo n /rl high est /tn "s vchost" /t r '"C:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\Temp\svc host.exe"' MD5: 48C2FE20575769DE916F48EF0676A965) - cmd.exe (PID: 5624 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c ""C:\User s\user\App Data\Local \Temp\tmp8 9A5.tmp.ba t"" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 5364 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - timeout.exe (PID: 4852 cmdline:
timeout 3 MD5: 976566BEEFCCA4A159ECBDB2D4B1A3E3) - svchost.exe (PID: 3792 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\svchos t.exe" MD5: 5D4073B2EB6D217C19F2B22F21BF8D57) - conhost.exe (PID: 2656 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - InstallUtil.exe (PID: 3716 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\ins tallutil.e xe" MD5: 5D4073B2EB6D217C19F2B22F21BF8D57) - WerFault.exe (PID: 5592 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ WerFault.e xe -u -p 2 624 -s 104 8 MD5: FD27D9F6D02763BDE32511B5DF7FF7A0)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
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AsyncRAT | AsyncRAT is a Remote Access Tool (RAT) designed to remotely monitor and control other computers through a secure encrypted connection. It is an open source remote administration tool, however, it could also be used maliciously because it provides functionality such as keylogger, remote desktop control, and many other functions that may cause harm to the victims computer. In addition, AsyncRAT can be delivered via various methods such as spear-phishing, malvertising, exploit kit and other techniques. | No Attribution |
{"Server": "twart.myfirewall.org", "Port": "14143", "Version": "0.5.8", "MutexName": "FEjYSsXzhpZixwA", "Autorun": "true", "Group": "null"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
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JoeSecurity_AsyncRAT | Yara detected AsyncRAT | Joe Security | ||
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_ASEP_REG_Reverse | Detects file containing reversed ASEP Autorun registry keys | ditekSHen |
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JoeSecurity_AsyncRAT | Yara detected AsyncRAT | Joe Security | ||
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_ASEP_REG_Reverse | Detects file containing reversed ASEP Autorun registry keys | ditekSHen |
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MALWARE_Win_AsyncRAT | Detects AsyncRAT | ditekSHen |
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Click to see the 13 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_AsyncRAT | Yara detected AsyncRAT | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Asyncrat_11a11ba1 | unknown | unknown |
| |
INDICATOR_SUSPICIOUS_EXE_ASEP_REG_Reverse | Detects file containing reversed ASEP Autorun registry keys | ditekSHen |
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JoeSecurity_AsyncRAT | Yara detected AsyncRAT | Joe Security | ||
Windows_Trojan_Asyncrat_11a11ba1 | unknown | unknown |
| |
Click to see the 15 entries |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), @blu3_team (idea), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Sander Wiebing, Tim Shelton, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community: |
Source: | Author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community: |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Patrick Bareiss, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali: |
Source: | Author: Tim Rauch: |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Persistence and Installation Behavior |
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Source: | Author: Joe Security: |
⊘No Suricata rule has matched
Click to jump to signature section
Show All Signature Results
AV Detection |
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Source: | Malware Configuration Extractor: |
Source: | Virustotal: | Perma Link |
Source: | ReversingLabs: | |||
Source: | Virustotal: | Perma Link |
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Source: | Joe Sandbox ML: |
Exploits |
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Networking |
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System Summary |
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Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00007FF848F264B9 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00007FF848F1DB40 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00007FF848F26BA5 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00007FF848F143D0 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00007FF848F20D45 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00007FF848F1A810 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00007FF848F1A818 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00007FF848F1DFB1 | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00007FF848F225FA | |
Source: | Code function: | 0_2_00007FF849000001 | |
Source: | Code function: | 5_2_02F75B20 | |
Source: | Code function: | 5_2_02F74088 | |
Source: | Code function: | 5_2_02F74958 | |
Source: | Code function: | 5_2_02F73D40 |
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