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Windows
Analysis Report
file.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
Python Stealer, Amadey, Monster Stealer, RedLine, Stealc, Vidar
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Sigma detected: Capture Wi-Fi password
Yara detected Amadeys stealer DLL
Yara detected Monster Stealer
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected RedLine Stealer
Yara detected Stealc
Yara detected Vidar stealer
AI detected suspicious sample
Allocates memory in foreign processes
Binary is likely a compiled AutoIt script file
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Creates multiple autostart registry keys
Detected generic credential text file
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking locale)
Found many strings related to Crypto-Wallets (likely being stolen)
Gathers network related connection and port information
Hides threads from debuggers
High number of junk calls founds (likely related to sandbox DOS / API hammering)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Machine Learning detection for sample
Modifies the windows firewall
PE file contains section with special chars
Queries sensitive disk information (via WMI, Win32_DiskDrive, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive service information (via WMI, Win32_LogicalDisk, often done to detect sandboxes)
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Searches for specific processes (likely to inject)
Sigma detected: New RUN Key Pointing to Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Suspicious File Creation In Uncommon AppData Folder
Tries to detect process monitoring tools (Task Manager, Process Explorer etc.)
Tries to detect sandboxes / dynamic malware analysis system (registry check)
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (window names)
Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements
Tries to evade debugger and weak emulator (self modifying code)
Tries to harvest and steal Bitcoin Wallet information
Tries to harvest and steal WLAN passwords
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Crypto Currency Wallets
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Tries to steal communication platform credentials (via file / registry access)
Uses attrib.exe to hide files
Uses netsh to modify the Windows network and firewall settings
Writes to foreign memory regions
Yara detected Generic Python Stealer
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Checks for debuggers (devices)
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to create guard pages, often used to hinder reverse engineering and debugging
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates a window with clipboard capturing capabilities
Creates files inside the system directory
Creates job files (autostart)
Detected potential crypto function
Dropped file seen in connection with other malware
Drops PE files
Drops PE files to the application program directory (C:\ProgramData)
Enables debug privileges
Entry point lies outside standard sections
Extensive use of GetProcAddress (often used to hide API calls)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Installs a raw input device (often for capturing keystrokes)
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)
One or more processes crash
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
PE file overlay found
Queries information about the installed CPU (vendor, model number etc)
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Sigma detected: Console CodePage Lookup Via CHCP
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: PowerShell Get-Clipboard Cmdlet Via CLI
Sleep loop found (likely to delay execution)
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses Microsoft's Enhanced Cryptographic Provider
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Uses taskkill to terminate processes
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Yara detected Keylogger Generic
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- file.exe (PID: 6456 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\file.ex e" MD5: D0FCC1D2AD23B05B53EEFE1137594DDB) - cmd.exe (PID: 2616 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" /c start " " "C:\User s\user\App Data\Roami ngIDBGHDGH CG.exe" MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 2992 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - RoamingIDBGHDGHCG.exe (PID: 6768 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming IDBGHDGHCG .exe" MD5: DFA220EFB513FE8F746AB0B1CD410F08) - explorti.exe (PID: 1960 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\0d8f5e b8a7\explo rti.exe" MD5: DFA220EFB513FE8F746AB0B1CD410F08) - cmd.exe (PID: 5752 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\system32 \cmd.exe" /c start " " "C:\User s\userGCAF CAFHJJ.exe " MD5: D0FCE3AFA6AA1D58CE9FA336CC2B675B) - conhost.exe (PID: 5428 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - userGCAFCAFHJJ.exe (PID: 2676 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ userGCAFCA FHJJ.exe" MD5: AC2D65E997C85BE5D4D2807C12BAB4E8) - axplong.exe (PID: 7548 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\44111d bc49\axplo ng.exe" MD5: AC2D65E997C85BE5D4D2807C12BAB4E8) - WerFault.exe (PID: 7204 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ WerFault.e xe -u -p 6 456 -s 226 0 MD5: C31336C1EFC2CCB44B4326EA793040F2)
- explorti.exe (PID: 7212 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\0d8f5eb 8a7\explor ti.exe MD5: DFA220EFB513FE8F746AB0B1CD410F08)
- axplong.exe (PID: 7888 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\44111db c49\axplon g.exe MD5: AC2D65E997C85BE5D4D2807C12BAB4E8) - build.exe (PID: 3032 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\100000 1001\build .exe" MD5: C8CF26425A6CE325035E6DA8DFB16C4E) - stub.exe (PID: 1524 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\100000 1001\build .exe" MD5: 1CF17408048317FC82265ED6A1C7893D) - cmd.exe (PID: 6984 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "ver" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 6484 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cmd.exe (PID: 6516 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "wmic csp roduct get uuid" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 7452 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - WMIC.exe (PID: 6568 cmdline:
wmic cspro duct get u uid MD5: C37F2F4F4B3CD128BDABCAEB2266A785) - cmd.exe (PID: 1856 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "tasklist " MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 4304 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - tasklist.exe (PID: 6208 cmdline:
tasklist MD5: D0A49A170E13D7F6AEBBEFED9DF88AAA) - cmd.exe (PID: 6716 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "attrib + h +s "C:\U sers\user\ AppData\Lo cal\Monste rUpdateSer vice\Monst er.exe"" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 2616 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - attrib.exe (PID: 7672 cmdline:
attrib +h +s "C:\Use rs\user\Ap pData\Loca l\MonsterU pdateServi ce\Monster .exe" MD5: 5037D8E6670EF1D89FB6AD435F12A9FD) - cmd.exe (PID: 5024 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "mshta "j avascript: var sh=new ActiveXOb ject('WScr ipt.Shell' ); sh.Popu p('%error_ message%', 0, 'Syste m Error', 0+16);clos e()"" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 4164 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - cmd.exe (PID: 5028 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "taskkill /F /IM ch rome.exe" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 7700 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - taskkill.exe (PID: 7600 cmdline:
taskkill / F /IM chro me.exe MD5: A599D3B2FAFBDE4C1A6D7D0F839451C7) - cmd.exe (PID: 2892 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "tasklist /FO LIST" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 5452 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - tasklist.exe (PID: 5620 cmdline:
tasklist / FO LIST MD5: D0A49A170E13D7F6AEBBEFED9DF88AAA) - cmd.exe (PID: 6008 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "powershe ll.exe Get -Clipboard " MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 1016 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - powershell.exe (PID: 5584 cmdline:
powershell .exe Get-C lipboard MD5: 04029E121A0CFA5991749937DD22A1D9) - cmd.exe (PID: 6780 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "chcp" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 7356 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - chcp.com (PID: 5860 cmdline:
chcp MD5: 33395C4732A49065EA72590B14B64F32) - cmd.exe (PID: 7224 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "chcp" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 3856 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - chcp.com (PID: 4500 cmdline:
chcp MD5: 33395C4732A49065EA72590B14B64F32) - cmd.exe (PID: 7784 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "echo ### #System In fo#### & s ysteminfo & echo ### #System Ve rsion#### & ver & ec ho ####Hos t Name#### & hostnam e & echo # ###Environ ment Varia ble#### & set & echo ####Logic al Disk### # & wmic l ogicaldisk get capti on,descrip tion,provi dername & echo ####U ser Info## ## & net u ser & echo ####Onlin e User#### & query u ser & echo ####Local Group#### & net loc algroup & echo ####A dministrat ors Info## ## & net l ocalgroup administra tors & ech o ####Gues t User Inf o#### & ne t user gue st & echo ####Admini strator Us er Info### # & net us er adminis trator & e cho ####St artup Info #### & wmi c startup get captio n,command & echo ### #Tasklist# ### & task list /svc & echo ### #Ipconfig# ### & ipco nfig/all & echo #### Hosts#### & type C:\ WINDOWS\Sy stem32\dri vers\etc\h osts & ech o ####Rout e Table### # & route print & ec ho ####Arp Info#### & arp -a & echo #### Netstat### # & netsta t -ano & e cho ####Se rvice Info #### & sc query type = service state= all & echo ## ##Firewall info#### & netsh fir ewall show state & n etsh firew all show c onfig" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 5040 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - systeminfo.exe (PID: 7156 cmdline:
systeminfo MD5: EE309A9C61511E907D87B10EF226FDCD) - WmiPrvSE.exe (PID: 1852 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ wbem\wmipr vse.exe -s ecured -Em bedding MD5: 60FF40CFD7FB8FE41EE4FE9AE5FE1C51) - HOSTNAME.EXE (PID: 2172 cmdline:
hostname MD5: 33AFAA43B84BDEAB12E02F9DBD2B2EE0) - WMIC.exe (PID: 6628 cmdline:
wmic logic aldisk get caption,d escription ,providern ame MD5: C37F2F4F4B3CD128BDABCAEB2266A785) - cmd.exe (PID: 5664 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ cmd.exe /c "netsh wl an show pr ofiles" MD5: 8A2122E8162DBEF04694B9C3E0B6CDEE) - conhost.exe (PID: 5316 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - netsh.exe (PID: 1400 cmdline:
netsh wlan show prof iles MD5: 6F1E6DD688818BC3D1391D0CC7D597EB) - crypted.exe (PID: 3356 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\100000 2001\crypt ed.exe" MD5: 371D606AA2FCD2945D84A13E598DA55F) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 7304 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Reg Asm.exe" MD5: 0D5DF43AF2916F47D00C1573797C1A13) - 5447jsX.exe (PID: 5796 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\100000 3001\5447j sX.exe" MD5: 5DD9C1FFC4A95D8F1636CE53A5D99997) - conhost.exe (PID: 5228 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 7616 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Reg Asm.exe" MD5: 0D5DF43AF2916F47D00C1573797C1A13) - crypteda.exe (PID: 6824 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\100000 4001\crypt eda.exe" MD5: 04E90B2CF273EFB3F6895CFCEF1E59BA) - conhost.exe (PID: 6460 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- explorti.exe (PID: 7896 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\0d8f5eb 8a7\explor ti.exe MD5: DFA220EFB513FE8F746AB0B1CD410F08) - 97a671ae5d.exe (PID: 7188 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\100001 6001\97a67 1ae5d.exe" MD5: D0FCC1D2AD23B05B53EEFE1137594DDB) - WerFault.exe (PID: 7056 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ WerFault.e xe -u -p 7 188 -s 104 0 MD5: C31336C1EFC2CCB44B4326EA793040F2) - 342db65350.exe (PID: 5516 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\100001 7001\342db 65350.exe" MD5: D5F5B683A3CC5C05E5B2CD1204CA5517)
- 97a671ae5d.exe (PID: 7332 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\100001 6001\97a67 1ae5d.exe" MD5: D0FCC1D2AD23B05B53EEFE1137594DDB) - WerFault.exe (PID: 6324 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ WerFault.e xe -u -p 7 332 -s 132 0 MD5: C31336C1EFC2CCB44B4326EA793040F2)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Amadey | Amadey is a botnet that appeared around October 2018 and is being sold for about $500 on Russian-speaking hacking forums. It periodically sends information about the system and installed AV software to its C2 server and polls to receive orders from it. Its main functionality is that it can load other payloads (called "tasks") for all or specifically targeted computers compromised by the malware. | No Attribution |
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
RedLine Stealer | RedLine Stealer is a malware available on underground forums for sale apparently as a standalone ($100/$150 depending on the version) or also on a subscription basis ($100/month). This malware harvests information from browsers such as saved credentials, autocomplete data, and credit card information. A system inventory is also taken when running on a target machine, to include details such as the username, location data, hardware configuration, and information regarding installed security software. More recent versions of RedLine added the ability to steal cryptocurrency. FTP and IM clients are also apparently targeted by this family, and this malware has the ability to upload and download files, execute commands, and periodically send back information about the infected computer. | No Attribution |
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Stealc | Stealc is an information stealer advertised by its presumed developer Plymouth on Russian-speaking underground forums and sold as a Malware-as-a-Service since January 9, 2023. According to Plymouth's statement, stealc is a non-resident stealer with flexible data collection settings and its development is relied on other prominent stealers: Vidar, Raccoon, Mars and Redline.Stealc is written in C and uses WinAPI functions. It mainly targets date from web browsers, extensions and Desktop application of cryptocurrency wallets, and from other applications (messengers, email clients, etc.). The malware downloads 7 legitimate third-party DLLs to collect sensitive data from web browsers, including sqlite3.dll, nss3.dll, vcruntime140.dll, mozglue.dll, freebl3.dll, softokn3.dll and msvcp140.dll. It then exfiltrates the collected information file by file to its C2 server using HTTP POST requests. | No Attribution |
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Vidar | Vidar is a forked malware based on Arkei. It seems this stealer is one of the first that is grabbing information on 2FA Software and Tor Browser. | No Attribution |
{"C2 url": "http://85.28.47.70/744f169d372be841.php"}
{"C2 url": ["http://185.215.113.16/Jo89Ku7d/index.php"]}
{"C2 url": "20.52.165.210:39030", "Bot Id": "LiveTraffic", "Message": "error", "Authorization Header": "143feb5082f9936e624c1e27545e7d19"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_RedLine | Yara detected RedLine Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_RedLine | Yara detected RedLine Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_RedLine | Yara detected RedLine Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_RedLine | Yara detected RedLine Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_MonsterStealer | Yara detected Monster Stealer | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 3 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_CredentialStealer | Yara detected Credential Stealer | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 46 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_RedLine | Yara detected RedLine Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_RedLine | Yara detected RedLine Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_RedLine | Yara detected RedLine Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 6 entries |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Sander Wiebing: |
Source: | Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: _pete_0, TheDFIRReport: |
Source: | Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split): |
Source: | Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements): |
Source: | Author: frack113: |
Source: | Author: frack113, Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io': |