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Windows
Analysis Report
LisectAVT_2403002B_38.exe
Overview
General Information
Detection
Sality
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Yara detected Sality
AI detected suspicious sample
Allocates memory in foreign processes
Changes security center settings (notifications, updates, antivirus, firewall)
Contains functionality to inject threads in other processes
Deletes keys which are related to windows safe boot (disables safe mode boot)
Disable Task Manager(disabletaskmgr)
Disables UAC (registry)
Disables the Windows registry editor (regedit)
Disables the Windows task manager (taskmgr)
Disables the windows firewall (over ALG)
Disables user account control notifications
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking mutex)
Found stalling execution ending in API Sleep call
Machine Learning detection for sample
May modify the system service descriptor table (often done to hook functions)
Modifies the windows firewall
PE file has a writeable .text section
Uses netsh to modify the Windows network and firewall settings
Writes to foreign memory regions
Connects to several IPs in different countries
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to communicate with device drivers
Contains functionality to delete services
Contains functionality to dynamically determine API calls
Contains functionality to open a port and listen for incoming connection (possibly a backdoor)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read device registry values (via SetupAPI)
Contains functionality to shutdown / reboot the system
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Drops PE files
Enables debug privileges
Found dropped PE file which has not been started or loaded
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after checking a module file name)
Found evasive API chain checking for process token information
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
JA3 SSL client fingerprint seen in connection with other malware
May infect USB drives
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Queries device information via Setup API
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sample file is different than original file name gathered from version info
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Classification
- System is w10x64
- LisectAVT_2403002B_38.exe (PID: 7092 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\LisectA VT_2403002 B_38.exe" MD5: DCD409FA904F30AB580781337FB866B7) - netsh.exe (PID: 3184 cmdline:
netsh fire wall set o pmode disa ble MD5: 4E89A1A088BE715D6C946E55AB07C7DF) - conhost.exe (PID: 6052 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - fontdrvhost.exe (PID: 776 cmdline:
"fontdrvho st.exe" MD5: BBCB897697B3442657C7D6E3EDDBD25F) - fontdrvhost.exe (PID: 784 cmdline:
"fontdrvho st.exe" MD5: BBCB897697B3442657C7D6E3EDDBD25F) - dwm.exe (PID: 984 cmdline:
"dwm.exe" MD5: 5C27608411832C5B39BA04E33D53536C)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Sality | F-Secure states that the Sality virus family has been circulating in the wild as early as 2003. Over the years, the malware has been developed and improved with the addition of new features, such as rootkit or backdoor functionality, and so on, keeping it an active and relevant threat despite the relative age of the malware.Modern Sality variants also have the ability to communicate over a peer-to-peer (P2P) network, allowing an attacker to control a botnet of Sality-infected machines. The combined resources of the Sality botnet may also be used by its controller(s) to perform other malicious actions, such as attacking routers.InfectionSality viruses typically infect executable files on local, shared and removable drives. In earlier variants, the Sality virus simply added its own malicious code to the end of the infected (or host) file, a technique known as prepending. The viral code that Sality inserts is polymorphic, a form of complex code that is intended to make analysis more difficult.Earlier Sality variants were regarded as technically sophisticated in that they use an Entry Point Obscuration (EPO) technique to hide their presence on the system. This technique means that the virus inserts a command somewhere in the middle of an infected file's code, so that when the system is reading the file to execute it and comes to the command, it forces the system to 'jump' to the malware's code and execute that instead. This technique was used to make discovery and disinfection of the malicious code harder.PayloadOnce installed on the computer system, Sality viruses usually also execute a malicious payload. The specific actions performed depend on the specific variant in question, but generally Sality viruses will attempt to terminate processes, particularly those related to security programs. The virus may also attempt to open connections to remote sites, download and run additional malicious files, and steal data from the infected machine. |
⊘No configs have been found
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
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JoeSecurity_Sality | Yara detected Sality | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Sality | Yara detected Sality | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Sality | Yara detected Sality | Joe Security |
System Summary |
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Source: | Author: frack113: |
⊘No Snort rule has matched
Timestamp: | 2024-07-25T13:45:08.202500+0200 |
SID: | 2018340 |
Source Port: | 49710 |
Destination Port: | 80 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | Malware Command and Control Activity Detected |
Timestamp: | 2024-07-25T13:45:06.951501+0200 |
SID: | 2018340 |
Source Port: | 49709 |
Destination Port: | 80 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | Malware Command and Control Activity Detected |
Timestamp: | 2024-07-25T13:45:22.156809+0200 |
SID: | 2022930 |
Source Port: | 443 |
Destination Port: | 49715 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 2024-07-25T13:46:00.464743+0200 |
SID: | 2022930 |
Source Port: | 443 |
Destination Port: | 49722 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Click to jump to signature section
Show All Signature Results
AV Detection |
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