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Windows
Analysis Report
mlk3kK6uLZ.exe
Overview
General Information
Sample name: | mlk3kK6uLZ.exerenamed because original name is a hash value |
Original sample name: | b85fa0d79d936b8b006c535d006c7f29.exe |
Analysis ID: | 1472622 |
MD5: | b85fa0d79d936b8b006c535d006c7f29 |
SHA1: | 210085d4f3cf1cf08c34baa5bfba0b0fc5a6c639 |
SHA256: | 170004b7b6bab6c3c860a6402f9d3d8988e4f3de7682e28738c3c27ac33b0e1c |
Tags: | 32exetrojan |
Infos: | |
Detection
Amadey, Mars Stealer, PureLog Stealer, Quasar, RedLine, Stealc, Vidar
Score: | 100 |
Range: | 0 - 100 |
Whitelisted: | false |
Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for dropped file
Detected unpacking (changes PE section rights)
Detected unpacking (overwrites its own PE header)
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL
Multi AV Scanner detection for dropped file
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: Schedule system process
Snort IDS alert for network traffic
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
Yara detected Amadey
Yara detected Amadeys stealer DLL
Yara detected Mars stealer
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
Yara detected PureLog Stealer
Yara detected Quasar RAT
Yara detected RedLine Stealer
Yara detected Stealc
Yara detected Vidar stealer
Yara detected zgRAT
.NET source code contains method to dynamically call methods (often used by packers)
.NET source code contains very large array initializations
AI detected suspicious sample
Allocates memory in foreign processes
C2 URLs / IPs found in malware configuration
Connects to many ports of the same IP (likely port scanning)
Contains functionality to inject code into remote processes
Creates an undocumented autostart registry key
Creates multiple autostart registry keys
Found many strings related to Crypto-Wallets (likely being stolen)
Hides that the sample has been downloaded from the Internet (zone.identifier)
Hides threads from debuggers
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Installs a global keyboard hook
Installs new ROOT certificates
Machine Learning detection for dropped file
Machine Learning detection for sample
PE file contains section with special chars
Queries sensitive disk information (via WMI, Win32_DiskDrive, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Reads the System eventlog
Sample uses string decryption to hide its real strings
Sigma detected: Files With System Process Name In Unsuspected Locations
Sigma detected: New RUN Key Pointing to Suspicious Folder
Sigma detected: Potentially Suspicious Malware Callback Communication
Sigma detected: System File Execution Location Anomaly
Tries to detect process monitoring tools (Task Manager, Process Explorer etc.)
Tries to detect sandboxes / dynamic malware analysis system (registry check)
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (window names)
Tries to detect virtualization through RDTSC time measurements
Tries to evade debugger and weak emulator (self modifying code)
Tries to harvest and steal Bitcoin Wallet information
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to harvest and steal ftp login credentials
Tries to steal Crypto Currency Wallets
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Uses known network protocols on non-standard ports
Uses schtasks.exe or at.exe to add and modify task schedules
Writes to foreign memory regions
Yara detected Generic Downloader
AV process strings found (often used to terminate AV products)
Abnormal high CPU Usage
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Binary contains a suspicious time stamp
Checks for debuggers (devices)
Checks if Antivirus/Antispyware/Firewall program is installed (via WMI)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Connects to several IPs in different countries
Contains capabilities to detect virtual machines
Contains functionality for execution timing, often used to detect debuggers
Contains functionality to call native functions
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (IsDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to query CPU information (cpuid)
Contains functionality to query locales information (e.g. system language)
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains functionality which may be used to detect a debugger (GetProcessHeap)
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Creates files inside the system directory
Creates job files (autostart)
Detected TCP or UDP traffic on non-standard ports
Detected potential crypto function
Downloads executable code via HTTP
Drops PE files
Drops certificate files (DER)
Enables debug privileges
Enables security privileges
Entry point lies outside standard sections
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
Found inlined nop instructions (likely shell or obfuscated code)
Found large amount of non-executed APIs
Found potential string decryption / allocating functions
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Installs a raw input device (often for capturing keystrokes)
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Monitors certain registry keys / values for changes (often done to protect autostart functionality)
One or more processes crash
PE file contains an invalid checksum
PE file contains sections with non-standard names
Queries disk information (often used to detect virtual machines)
Queries information about the installed CPU (vendor, model number etc)
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the installation date of Windows
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sample execution stops while process was sleeping (likely an evasion)
Sigma detected: Communication To Uncommon Destination Ports
Sigma detected: CurrentVersion Autorun Keys Modification
Sigma detected: Suspicious Add Scheduled Task Parent
Sigma detected: Suspicious Schtasks From Env Var Folder
Sigma detected: Uncommon Svchost Parent Process
Uses 32bit PE files
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w10x64
- mlk3kK6uLZ.exe (PID: 4436 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\Deskt op\mlk3kK6 uLZ.exe" MD5: B85FA0D79D936B8B006C535D006C7F29) - axplong.exe (PID: 760 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\825462 4243\axplo ng.exe" MD5: B85FA0D79D936B8B006C535D006C7F29)
- axplong.exe (PID: 6360 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\8254624 243\axplon g.exe MD5: B85FA0D79D936B8B006C535D006C7F29) - leg222.exe (PID: 6472 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\100016 0001\leg22 2.exe" MD5: 5486FD5B8200F34B23F23A21F8912ADE) - RegAsm.exe (PID: 6768 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Reg Asm.exe" MD5: 0D5DF43AF2916F47D00C1573797C1A13) - Z73fDV6g4L.exe (PID: 6220 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \Z73fDV6g4 L.exe" MD5: 1B75671FB234AE1FB72406A317FA752A) - conhost.exe (PID: 4952 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - VP2pdCInvS.exe (PID: 4512 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \VP2pdCInv S.exe" MD5: 15A7CAE61788E4718D3C33ABB7BE6436) - WerFault.exe (PID: 4456 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ WerFault.e xe -u -p 6 472 -s 284 MD5: C31336C1EFC2CCB44B4326EA793040F2) - hello.exe (PID: 7396 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\100020 2001\hello .exe" MD5: 2EB71684C81D24144953FE0F6F5B392C) - conhost.exe (PID: 7404 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - aspnet_regiis.exe (PID: 7464 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\asp net_regiis .exe" MD5: 5D1D74198D75640E889F0A577BBF31FC) - build16666.exe (PID: 7516 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\100021 0001\build 16666.exe" MD5: 4640FAEAFA95CE219C649E9F5CBFFD75) - Freshbuild.exe (PID: 7612 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\100022 6001\Fresh build.exe" MD5: 07101CAC5B9477BA636CD8CA7B9932CB) - Hkbsse.exe (PID: 7684 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\b66a8a e076\Hkbss e.exe" MD5: 07101CAC5B9477BA636CD8CA7B9932CB) - newstart.exe (PID: 2672 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\100024 0001\newst art.exe" MD5: A20FC3377C07AA683A47397F9F5FF355) - see.exe (PID: 1868 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\100024 1001\see.e xe" MD5: CD65AA14F5B3B1C266D82BA09B42FF86) - ZharkBOT.exe (PID: 6308 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\100024 3001\Zhark BOT.exe" MD5: CD2DD54E31B33E1FEDECED94367CD942) - schtasks.exe (PID: 7224 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ schtasks.e xe /Create /SC MINUT E /MO 1 /T N espartu. exe /TR "C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\Tem p\11000000 0011111\es partu.exe" /F MD5: 48C2FE20575769DE916F48EF0676A965) - conhost.exe (PID: 3364 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - espartu.exe (PID: 3724 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\110000 000011111\ espartu.ex e" MD5: CD2DD54E31B33E1FEDECED94367CD942)
- svchost.exe (PID: 6524 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k WerSv cGroup MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A) - WerFault.exe (PID: 5900 cmdline:
C:\Windows \SysWOW64\ WerFault.e xe -pss -s 472 -p 64 72 -ip 647 2 MD5: C31336C1EFC2CCB44B4326EA793040F2)
- svchost.exe (PID: 2300 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s B ITS MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
- svchost.exe (PID: 4332 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ svchost.ex e -k netsv cs -p -s w lidsvc MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
- svchost.exe (PID: 6120 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ svchost.ex e -k Local Service -p -s Licens eManager MD5: B7F884C1B74A263F746EE12A5F7C9F6A)
- Hkbsse.exe (PID: 8112 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\b66a8ae 076\Hkbsse .exe MD5: 07101CAC5B9477BA636CD8CA7B9932CB)
- Hkbsse.exe (PID: 2448 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\b66a8ae 076\Hkbsse .exe MD5: 07101CAC5B9477BA636CD8CA7B9932CB)
- espartu.exe (PID: 3992 cmdline:
C:\Users\u ser\AppDat a\Local\Te mp\1100000 00011111\e spartu.exe MD5: CD2DD54E31B33E1FEDECED94367CD942)
- espartu.exe (PID: 5512 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\110000 000011111\ espartu.ex e" MD5: CD2DD54E31B33E1FEDECED94367CD942) - schtasks.exe (PID: 2516 cmdline:
C:\Windows \System32\ schtasks.e xe /Create /SC MINUT E /MO 1 /T N espartu. exe /TR "C :\Users\us er\AppData \Local\Tem p\11000000 0011111\es partu.exe" /F MD5: 48C2FE20575769DE916F48EF0676A965) - conhost.exe (PID: 5044 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - RegSvcs.exe (PID: 4592 cmdline:
"C:\Window s\Microsof t.NET\Fram ework\v4.0 .30319\Reg Svcs.exe" MD5: 9D352BC46709F0CB5EC974633A0C3C94) - FRaqbC8wSA1XvpFVjCRGryWt.exe (PID: 2020 cmdline:
"C:\Progra mData\FRaq bC8wSA1Xvp FVjCRGryWt .exe" MD5: E634EE541D4D4911DABDDAC835517559) - schtasks.exe (PID: 2700 cmdline:
"schtasks" /create / SC MINUTE /MO 1 /TN "svchost" /tr "C:\Pr ogramData\ FRaqbC8wSA 1XvpFVjCRG ryWt.exe" /rl HIGHES T /f MD5: 48C2FE20575769DE916F48EF0676A965) - conhost.exe (PID: 3092 cmdline:
C:\Windows \system32\ conhost.ex e 0xffffff ff -ForceV 1 MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D) - svchost.exe (PID: 1772 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Roaming \Microsoft Windows\s vchost.exe " MD5: E634EE541D4D4911DABDDAC835517559) - schtasks.exe (PID: 7332 cmdline:
MD5: 48C2FE20575769DE916F48EF0676A965) - conhost.exe (PID: 3876 cmdline:
MD5: 0D698AF330FD17BEE3BF90011D49251D)
- espartu.exe (PID: 2704 cmdline:
"C:\Users\ user\AppDa ta\Local\T emp\110000 000011111\ espartu.ex e" MD5: CD2DD54E31B33E1FEDECED94367CD942)
- cleanup
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Amadey | Amadey is a botnet that appeared around October 2018 and is being sold for about $500 on Russian-speaking hacking forums. It periodically sends information about the system and installed AV software to its C2 server and polls to receive orders from it. Its main functionality is that it can load other payloads (called "tasks") for all or specifically targeted computers compromised by the malware. | No Attribution |
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Quasar RAT, QuasarRAT | Quasar RAT is a malware family written in .NET which is used by a variety of attackers. The malware is fully functional and open source, and is often packed to make analysis of the source more difficult. |
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
RedLine Stealer | RedLine Stealer is a malware available on underground forums for sale apparently as standalone ($100/$150 depending on the version) or also on a subscription basis ($100/month). This malware harvests information from browsers such as saved credentials, autocomplete data, and credit card information. A system inventory is also taken when running on a target machine, to include details such as the username, location data, hardware configuration, and information regarding installed security software. More recent versions of RedLine added the ability to steal cryptocurrency. FTP and IM clients are also apparently targeted by this family, and this malware has the ability to upload and download files, execute commands, and periodically send back information about the infected computer. | No Attribution |
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Stealc | Stealc is an information stealer advertised by its presumed developer Plymouth on Russian-speaking underground forums and sold as a Malware-as-a-Service since January 9, 2023. According to Plymouth's statement, stealc is a non-resident stealer with flexible data collection settings and its development is relied on other prominent stealers: Vidar, Raccoon, Mars and Redline.Stealc is written in C and uses WinAPI functions. It mainly targets date from web browsers, extensions and Desktop application of cryptocurrency wallets, and from other applications (messengers, email clients, etc.). The malware downloads 7 legitimate third-party DLLs to collect sensitive data from web browsers, including sqlite3.dll, nss3.dll, vcruntime140.dll, mozglue.dll, freebl3.dll, softokn3.dll and msvcp140.dll. It then exfiltrates the collected information file by file to its C2 server using HTTP POST requests. | No Attribution |
Name | Description | Attribution | Blogpost URLs | Link |
---|---|---|---|---|
Vidar | Vidar is a forked malware based on Arkei. It seems this stealer is one of the first that is grabbing information on 2FA Software and Tor Browser. | No Attribution |
{"C2 url": "http://85.28.47.70/570d5d5e8678366c.php"}
{"C2 url": "http://85.28.47.70/570d5d5e8678366c.php"}
{"Version": "1.4.0", "Host:Port": "45.66.231.158:45764;", "SubDirectory": "Microsoft Windows", "InstallName": "svchost.exe", "MutexName": "80038a66-0dbb-4135-8eb1-4ce5a34ce41b", "StartupKey": "svchost", "Tag": "Proxy", "LogDirectoryName": "svchostetw", "ServerSignature": "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", "ServerCertificate": "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"}
{"C2 url": "185.172.128.116/Mb3GvQs8/index.php", "Version": "4.30"}
{"C2 url": ["185.172.128.33:8970"], "Bot Id": "@LOGSCLOUDYT_BOT", "Authorization Header": "3b888690d495b9792a58ef1c36d35d19"}
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_RedLine_1 | Yara detected RedLine Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_RedLine | Yara detected RedLine Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Stealc_1 | Yara detected Stealc | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_zgRAT_1 | Yara detected zgRAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PureLogStealer | Yara detected PureLog Stealer | Joe Security | ||
MALWARE_Win_zgRAT | Detects zgRAT | ditekSHen |
| |
JoeSecurity_RedLine | Yara detected RedLine Stealer | Joe Security |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_RedLine | Yara detected RedLine Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_RedLine | Yara detected RedLine Stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_Amadey_2 | Yara detected Amadey\'s stealer DLL | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PureLogStealer | Yara detected PureLog Stealer | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 45 entries |
Source | Rule | Description | Author | Strings |
---|---|---|---|---|
JoeSecurity_zgRAT_1 | Yara detected zgRAT | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_PureLogStealer | Yara detected PureLog Stealer | Joe Security | ||
MALWARE_Win_zgRAT | Detects zgRAT | ditekSHen |
| |
JoeSecurity_Vidar_1 | Yara detected Vidar stealer | Joe Security | ||
JoeSecurity_MarsStealer | Yara detected Mars stealer | Joe Security | ||
Click to see the 44 entries |
System Summary |
---|
Source: | Author: Sander Wiebing, Tim Shelton, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Sander Wiebing: |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Patrick Bareiss, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali: |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems): |
Source: | Author: vburov: |
Persistence and Installation Behavior |
---|
Source: | Author: Joe Security: |
Timestamp: | 07/13/24-07:07:04.553234 |
SID: | 2051828 |
Source Port: | 80 |
Destination Port: | 58981 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 07/13/24-07:07:00.456748 |
SID: | 2044623 |
Source Port: | 58978 |
Destination Port: | 80 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 07/13/24-07:06:08.592536 |
SID: | 2043234 |
Source Port: | 8970 |
Destination Port: | 49710 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 07/13/24-07:06:32.660417 |
SID: | 2044623 |
Source Port: | 58973 |
Destination Port: | 80 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 07/13/24-07:07:04.736461 |
SID: | 2051831 |
Source Port: | 80 |
Destination Port: | 58981 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 07/13/24-07:07:03.747294 |
SID: | 2044243 |
Source Port: | 58981 |
Destination Port: | 80 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 07/13/24-07:07:03.629036 |
SID: | 2044696 |
Source Port: | 58980 |
Destination Port: | 80 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 07/13/24-07:07:07.333581 |
SID: | 2044696 |
Source Port: | 58983 |
Destination Port: | 80 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 07/13/24-07:06:19.054947 |
SID: | 2043231 |
Source Port: | 49710 |
Destination Port: | 8970 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 07/13/24-07:06:13.939319 |
SID: | 2046056 |
Source Port: | 8970 |
Destination Port: | 49710 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 07/13/24-07:06:08.398513 |
SID: | 2046045 |
Source Port: | 49710 |
Destination Port: | 8970 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 07/13/24-07:07:04.374384 |
SID: | 2044244 |
Source Port: | 58981 |
Destination Port: | 80 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 07/13/24-07:07:04.555587 |
SID: | 2044246 |
Source Port: | 58981 |
Destination Port: | 80 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 07/13/24-07:06:01.501384 |
SID: | 2856147 |
Source Port: | 49704 |
Destination Port: | 80 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 07/13/24-07:06:02.494732 |
SID: | 2856122 |
Source Port: | 80 |
Destination Port: | 49704 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
Timestamp: | 07/13/24-07:06:04.782188 |
SID: | 2044696 |
Source Port: | 49705 |
Destination Port: | 80 |
Protocol: | TCP |
Classtype: | A Network Trojan was detected |
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AV Detection |
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Source: | Avira: |
Source: | Avira: | ||
Source: | Avira: |
Source: | Malware Configuration Extractor: | ||
Source: | Malware Configuration Extractor: | ||
Source: | Malware Configuration Extractor: | ||
Source: | Malware Configuration Extractor: | ||
Source: | Malware Configuration Extractor: |